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EDITOR'S NOTE
It is with great pleasure that I present to you the second issue of Volume
18 of the Water Law Review; a perfect capstone to a highly successful and
exciting year for the journal. This issue follows close on the heels of the
Water Lalw RevieWs eighth annual Symposium, which shined a spotlight oil
retiring Colorado Supreme Court Justice Gregory, J. Hobbs, Jr., to thank him
for his contributions to Colorado law, as well as to this journal, since he took
the bench in 1996. I would like to personally recognize and thank Emily
Dowd, this year's Symposium Editor, for her tireless commitment to the
event. Through her leadership, the Symposium was able not only to play its
usual role as a valuable forum for the discussion of legal principles and the
future of water management and law in Colorado, but also to entertain the
over 120 attendees and to serve as a fitting and deserved celebration of Justice
Hobbs and his unique impact on Colorado law.
As part of that celebration, the Water Law Review was also pleased to
publish a special poetry issue collecting all of the poetry Justice Hobbs has
published with our journal over the years as a token of our appreciation and
indebtedness to his unwavering support for our mission: to provide a unique,
high-quality forum for sharing ideas, information, and legal and policy analyses
concerning water law and its attendant issues.
Like that special issue, this spring issue also serves, for at least three
reasons, as a fitting dedication to Justice Hobbs and his contributions to the
Water Law Review. First, I would direct your attention to the leading article
by Troy Eid, entitled, Coloiados Gregoryj Hobbs,Jr.:At the Headwters of
Justice. Eid's piece accompanied his remarks at this year's Symposium and is
a perfect summation of some of Justice Hobbs's most notable
accomplishments, both legal and non-legal. Second, in his ninth update to
Colorado Water Law: An HistoricalOverview, first published in 1997, Justice
Hobbs himself provides handy excerpts firom recent Colorado Supreme Court
opinions touching on water law, a tradition that enriches the Water Iaw
Review and provides its readers with a valuable round-up of the important
issues facing water rights holders and the courts today.
Finally, I am pleased to present three excellent feature articles that assess
the prior appropriation doctrine and suggest improvements and adaptations to
preserve its future vitality; in doing so, each article thereby also engages in the
discussion our mission and Justice Hobbs's academic enthusiasm seek to
facilitate.
First, Lawrence MacDonnell
presents Prior Appropriation: a
Reassessment, a truly comprehensive look at the prior appropriation doctrine
that looks at the doctrine's historical development throughout the West and
examines its future in light of numerous present-day concerns, including
climate change, population growth, and environmental protection.
By
meticulously delving into prior appropriation's roots, MacDonnell paints a full
picture of the current state of the doctrine, and from this context offers a
number of thoughtful adaptations and changes that, he argues, states should
consider adopting.
Next is Conditional Water Rights and the Problem of Speculazion, by

Focusing on Colorado, Pettis examines the judicial and
Aaron Pettis.
legislative development of the antispeculatlion doctrine alind argues that recent
cases may pennit some ianount of speculation in conditional water rights, or at
least findings of diligence that prolong development for economic reasons in a
way that creates undue uncertainty lor junior appropriators. Pettis accordingly
advocates for tweaks to the statutory framework for conditional water rights,
particularly a statutory expiration date that could balance the need to protect
long-term development of water rights with the goal of creating additional
certainty for current junior users.
Finally, in Whv Prior Approprwtion Needs lquiy, Duane Rudolph
discusses the role of equitable remedies in Western water law and illustrates
their importance to water rights systems and the appropriators they govern.
Using an illustrative, case-study analysis, Rudolph details some of the
foundational water law cases in Colorado, New Mexico, and California to
show how indispensible equity aid conscience are to water law. Rudolph then
examines recent cases in each state to demonstrate equity's endurance ald to
advocate for its continued prominence in prior approl)riaton.
In addition, and as always, we hope that you will find our student writing
useful in covering the recent cases, literature, and developments in water law
around the country. Of particular note is a collection of student notes
prepared in collaboration with the Stamford Environmental LawJourmd that
examine die public trust doctrine and its starkly different prominence in
Colorado-where it has not taken hold and the law has adapted in its absencemid California-where the doctrine is alive and well and poses [fascinating
questions in itsapplication to groundwater in light of Environmental Liw
Foundation . State Water Resources Control Board and the Sustainable
Groundwater Management Act.
Considering the excellent scholarship in the pages that follow, as well as
die resounding success of our eighth annual Symposium, I cannot help but be
optimistic and excited for the Water Law lciqefes nineteenth year. Excited,
in no small part, because of the interest, contributions, and support of all of
our readers and Fiiends like you. Thank you again for engaging with the
Water Law Review and supporting our mission through your subscription.
We hope that our work continues to serve a valuable role in the practice of
water law and in the water community generally for years to come.

Wjllian Da r's Wert
Editor-in-Chief
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COLORADO'S GREGORYJ. HOBBS, JR.:
AT THE HEADWATERS OF JUSTICE
BY TROY EID *
Had Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr. never ascended to the Colorado Supreme
Court, it might have been necessary to invent him. Water is that important to
Colorado. So are leaders who can be counted on in challenging times.
Even before his appointment as a Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court
in 1996, Greg Hobbs's name had become synonymous with expertise in water
law. Few judges, state or federal, can claim to have altered the political
landscape of*an entire state. Greg possibly can. In 2009, a popular six-tern
fornner Member of the US Congress from Colorado's Western Slope, Scott
Mcnnis, was campaigning in the Republican primary election for Governor.
Mcnnis had seemingly locked up the GOP nomination until charges arose
that he had allegedly plagiarized a water law article Greg had written and
published twenty years earlier. Mchnnis lost the primary to a virtually
unknown GOP candidate, Dan Maes, who in turn fell in the general election
to the Mayor of Denver, John Hickenlooper. Justice Hobbs carefully avoided
making any public statements on the controversy. Yet his public persona as
the virtual embodiment of water law in Colorado cast a long shadow over the
race.
Born in 1944, Greg Hobbs was by all indications a star student who never
took himself too seriously. He grew up in an Air Force family that moved
frequently, perhaps fueling an outsized enthusiasm for travel and adventure
that remains a Hobbs hallmark. IfJustice Hobbs looks and acts like an Eagle
Scout, it's because he earned that rank in the Boy Scouts in 1959. He
received a B.A. in history at the University of Notre Dame and joined the
Peace Corps in Colombia shortly thereafter. Later, in 1971, Justice Hobbs
graduated from the University of California at Berkeley with a law degree. The
future Justice Hobbs then clerked for Judge Williai E. Doyle of the US
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, moving to Denver permanently in
*

Principal Shareholder and Co-Chair, Aicricui Indian Law Practice Group, Greenberg

Traurig, LLP, Denver, Colorado, and Adjunct Prolessor of Law, University of Denver Stirm
College of Ltw. A forlner United States Attorney for the District of Colorado, Mr. Eid served
as Chainmnm of thc Indian Law and Order Commission, the national advisorv board to the
President and Congress on Native American and Alaska N'afivc criminal justice and public
safety issues, from 2011 to 2014. He is a member of the Navajo Nation Bar Association and
recipient of its Member of the Year Award. A.B. Stanford University, .. D. The University of

Chicago Law School, Law Clerk to Judge Edith H. Jones, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.
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1973.
Greg's remarkable legal career prior to joining the Colorado Supreme
Court combined public service-including tours of duty with the US
Environmental Protection Agency and the Colorado Attorney General's
Office-with successful private law firm practice. Greg has also devoted
countless hours teaching and helping students, including serving as an Adjunct
Professor at the University of Denver.
NAVAJO TEACHERS SOVEREIGNTY WORKSHOP

Most recently, justice Hobbs partnered with the University of Northern
Colorado and the Navajo Nation to develop a unique training program. for
public high school teachers who live and work on the Navajo Indian
Reservation, an area that extends into Arizona, New Mexico and Utah and is
the size of West Virginia.' This was the Navajo Teachers Sovereignty
Workshop, the brainchild of UNC History Professor Michael Welsh, a
longtime friend and collaborator of Greg's who secured a $2 million grant for
this five-year project. The workshop's goal was to strengthen high school
course curriculum about Native American tribal sovereignty, the bedrock
principle that federally-recognized Indian tribal governments retain their
inherent powers of self-governance, or as the U.S. Supreme Court memorably
described it, the authority pre-dating the United States Constitution of tribes
"to make their own laws and be ruled by them."'
Greg recruited a number of us to provide in-service training when the
Navajo teachers' delegation visited Colorado. We also identified and
generated potential high school course materials about tribal self-governance
and self-determination. Other workshop faculty included the late David
Getches, Dean of the University of Colorado School of Law, and Janelle
Doughty, a citizen of the Southern Ute Indian Tribe and distinguished alumna
of the University of Denver's Graduate School of Social Work who currently
serves as her tribe's Executive Officer. One of the Navajo Nation-run
institutions participating in the workshop was the Leupp School, a former
boarding school of the US Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian
Affairs mad a pro bono client of mine. These teachers from the remote village
of Leupp, Arizona, serve many students who must travel one hundred miles
or more each way just to attend class. Not one of the dozen teachers from the
Leupp School who participated in the workshop had ever attended an inservice training outside of Arizona-that is, until Justice Hobbs joined forces
with Mike Welsh and his colleagues at UNC.
The Navajo Teachers Sovereignty Workshop introduced teachers from
Leupp and other Reservation communities to top state, federal and tribal
officials to explore where each sovereign's powers begin and end, and how
these three forms of governments-all recognized by the Constitution-can
work more effectively together. Greg also traveled to the Navajo Reservation
mad the Grand Canyon, where the teachers recorded some of their oral
1. GREGORY J. HOBBS, JR., LIVING THE FOUR CORINERS 15-17, 39-65 (2010).

2. Willius v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959).
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histories lor future generations of students. A Leupp School teacher sumnmed
it up for me this way: "Best in-service training I ever had."
GE1rING TO KNOW GREG

Colorado's go-to expert on water law and
.Justice Hobbs's public image iLs
policy was already well-established when we met in 1999. Governor Bill
Owens had assumed oilice in January of that year; I was appointed the
Governor's Chief Legal Counsel, responsible among other things lor judicial
appointments and matters concerning the Colorado State Judiciary.
My first encounter with Justice Hobbs wits indirect and memorable. A
copy of I've Seen the Mountains Falling, a digest of Greg's poems, arrived at
our ollices in die State Capitol building, autographed and addressed to
Governor Owens. Fittingly enough, the book was published by the Philmont
Staff Association. Greg had served as a Ranger at Philmont, the national
Scout ranch near Cimarron, New Mexico, for seven summers. Philmont is so
much a part of Greg's life that he even met his magnificent future wife,
Barbara "Bobbie" Hay, at Philmont in 1966. Energetic back then as always,
Greg somehow made time to write a backcountry hiking guide to die
Philmont wilderness in his time working there.
Ironically, I've Seen the Mountains Falling initially arrived in my oilice in
a plastic bag carried gingerly by a uniformed member of the Colorado State
Patrol's Executive Security Unit. One of my responsibilities for Governor
Owens was to work with the Patrol to evaluate potential threats against the
Governor's safety.
"Check out the title of this book and be sure to read the note inside," the
State Trooper urged.
I leafed through the paperback. A personal inscription on the fide page
was addressed to the Governor: "May the sound of mountain waters and the
vista of the plains always call you. Greg Hobbs."
"We think it might be some kind of threat," the Trooper explained. "Any
idea who this 'Greg Hobbs' is?"
I assured him that the Justice was Friendly and that his intentions were
peacefl, regardless of mountains falling on Governor Owens or anyone else.
In fairness to the Trooper, not many judges write poetry books. In this
and many other ways, Greg would break the mold and become a respected
public citizen. He is perhaps best known for his vigorous participation in
seemingly every public forum large and small having to do with the
development of water law in die Rocky Mountain West. This, too, is only
fitting given that Greg's life coincides with evolving attitudes toward water
resources in Colorado and the Four Corners Region iehas come to know
and love so well.
WATER LAW PERSONIED
Not long after Greg was born, die US Departnent of the Interior in 1946
3. GREGORY.J. HOBBSJR., I'VE SEEN THE MOUNTAINS FALLING: POEMS OF
COLORADO, PHILMONT, SOtFIlHWEST (1995).
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published what would become known among water lawyers as "The Blue
Book," the Department's massive development plan for damming and
diverting virtually the entire flow of the Colorado River Basin. Reflecting the
sentiments of the era, this landmark federal report-weighing more than four
pounds mid bearing a bright blue cover-was subtitled, "A Natural Menace
Becomes a Natural Resource."
The Blue Book proposed 143 separate water projects to dam and divert
the Colorado River mid its tributaries from the Rockies to the Gulf of
California. Even back then, Interior's wish list exceeded the Colorado River's
entire annual flow by twenty-five percent. Yet that did not discourage federal
dreaners. "Tomorrow," the Blue Book's authors predicted, "the Colorado
River will be utilized to the very last drop."' In the next two decades, the
Department's Bureau of Reclamation would "make the Colorado the first
major river in the world to come under almost total human control," in author
Kevin Fedarko's appropriate phrase, by building nineteen large dams and
reservoirs on which more than thirty million people would eventually come to
depend.5
Given Greg's love of the law and the outdoors, it is no surprise that the
liuture Justice immersed himself in the development and stewardship of
Colorado's water resources. By the time Greg began practicing law, however,
the federal government's camnpaign to tame the Colorado River and other
western waterways-transforming them into the equivalent of a vast municipal
waterworks system, with little or no regard for the affected ecosystems or
traditional Native American ways of life-was giving way to a more nuanced
environmental ethic. The legal career of this former Philmont Scout would
chart a trail between responsible natural resource development, on the one
hand, and longer-term ecological protection and sustainability on the other.
Balancing between these often conflicting priorities is no mean feat,
particularly in the arid West. Yet as with so many other challenges, Greg
threw his fill energy into the task.
Colorado water law is unique not only because so many rivers have their
headwaters here, but because of what lawyers call the 80 Percent Problem:
about eighty percent of Colorado's water is located west of the Continental
Divide, yet more than eighty-five percent of the state's population lives and
works in cities and suburbs along the Front Range. Because so many
Coloradans reside far away from the sources of water on which they depend, a
distinctive set of laws regarding water use and land ownership emerged
beginning in the 1860s that is collectively known today as the Colorado
Doctrine.
As a contributor to the Citizen's Guide to Colorado Water Law, a handy
reference published and periodically updated by the Colorado Foundation for
Water Education-of which Greg was a founding member-Justice Hobbs has
broken down the Colorado Doctrine into its four components:

4. Sec KEVIN FEDARKO, THIE EMFRALD MILE 67 (2013).

5. Id.
6. CoLo. FOUND. FOR VATER EDUC., CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO COLoRAI)O WATER LAW,
at app. 2.1 (2d ed. March 11, 2013) thereinafter CITIZEN'S GUIDEI.
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1. All surface and groundwater in Colorado is a public resource lor
beneficial use by public agencies arid private persons;
2.

A water right is a right to use a portion of the public's water
resources;

3.

Water rights owners may build facilities on the lands of others to
divert, extract, or move water from a stream or aquil'er to its place
of use; and

4.

Water rights owners may use streams and aquilers for the
transportation and storage of water.

Justice Hobbs describes it as "a doctrine of scarcity, not plenty."
Among
other things, the Colorado )octrine, by enabling water rights' holders to cross
others' lands in order to use and store water, made possible the infrastructureintensive water diversions that created and sustain the 80 Percent Problem.
With more than 177,000 separate adjudicated water rights in Colorado,
along with various legal obligations to nineteen downstreamn states that depend
on Colorado's annual snowmelt, there is probably no more exciting state in
which to practice water law. Greg figured that out as a young attorney and has
since inspired many others to become better stewards of our precious water
resources. "Water is a limited resource, vital to Colorado," he writes in the
Citizen's Guide. "The Colorado census of 1861 reported slightly over 26,000
persons. By 2003, the state's population had grown to some 4.4 million. Still,
natural limitations on the state's water resources have not changed."'
AJUDGE WHo 'TELLS THE TRUTH'
Besides authoring decisions as a Colorado Supreme Court Justice, Greg
has written and published extensively throughout an impressive career-so
much so that the archival guide to his official papers, maintained by Colorado
State University and including historical maps, books, poetry, and other
diverse materials, spans fifty-four pages. It would be exceedingly difficult, and
unfair to the breadth and energy of Justice Hobbs's work, to attempt to
summarize or even categorize his myriad contributions to the life of the law in
Colorado. Yet one recent endeavor has special poignancy: The Justice's
passionate advocacy on behalf of the descendants of the survivors of the Sand
Creek Massacre on the 150th anniversary of that tragedy. Those descendants
include citizens of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe in Montana, the Northern
Arapaho Tribe of the Wind River Indian Reservation in Wyoming, and the
Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes of Oklahroma.

7. Samantha Wright, It,All Comes Down to Water: justice Hobbs Meanders Through
Water Law, THE WATCH, Sept. 25, 2014, available at http://www.thewatch media.con/it-allconses-down-to-water-chief-justice-hohhs-mendcrs-hrough-water-law/ (last visited Apr. 2,
2015).

8. CrrlZEN's GuIDE, supffi note vi.
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There are several published accounts of the Sand Creek Massacre.!
According to an executive order by Governor Hickenlooper creating the Sand
Creek Massacre Commemoration Commission,
On November 29, 1864, approximately 675 United States soldiers killed
more than 200 Cheyenne and Arapaho villagers who were living peacefully
near Fort Lyon, Colorado, a place where American negotiators had assured
they would be safe. Cheyenne Chief Black Kettle's village had raised a U.S.
flag and a white flag as symbols of peace, but Colonel John Chivington
ignored the banners and ordered his troops to take no prisoners. Ambushed
and outnumbered, the Cheyenne and Arapaho villagers fled on foot to the
bottom of the dry stream bed. After eight hours, the shooting finally stopped
and the village was pillaged and set ablaze. Most of the dead were women,
children, and elderly men. The few survivors sought safety in neighboring
camps, but the descendants' lives were forever changed. The Sand Creek
Massacre deeply impicts the sovereign Tribal nations whose ancestors were
massacred that tragic day, and preventing atrocities such as this in the future is
imperative."
As the State of Colorado began planning for the 150th commemoration,
Justice Hobbs took it upon himself to get involved and speak out. Writing in
The Denver Post, and presenting at the official commemoration event on the
west steps of the Colorado State Capitol Building, he decried the "horrendous
wrong" of the Sand Creek Massacre.
Citing to foundational Indian law cases of the US Supreme Court, federal
statutes, and other legal materials, Justice Hobbs' speech carefully traced the
origins of the Sand Creek Massacre and put it into its larger historical context
as an integral part of "the coerced cession of Arapaho and Cheyenne
homelands" to enable non-Indian settlement." Seated behind Greg was
Governor Hickenlooper, who had just delivered the State's first public
apology for the Sand Creek Massacre. Also gathered next to the Governor
and on the Capitol steps were the elected leaders of the Northern Cheyenne,
Northern Arapaho, and Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma, along
with Greg's fellow Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court.
Standing in the crowd that frigid November morning were hundreds of
onlookers, including several of us who had joined tribal youth in running the
last leg of the annual Sand Creek Massacre Spiritual Healing Run, a relay that
goes all the way from the Sand Creek Massacre National Historic Site to the
State Capitol. Justice Hobbs's searing public indictment of injustice left many
listeners in tears. An elderly tribal leader standing nearby said it all. Wiping
his eyes, the elder looked up at podium as Justice Hobbs was finishing his
remarks and put his hand on my shoulder. "That judge sure told the truth,"
he said.
9. A compelling account of the Sand Creek Massacre anid its aftermath can be found in
DAVID FRID'IjOF HALAAS AND ANDREW E. MASICH, HAIFBREED: THE REMARKABLE TRUE
STORY OF GEORGE BENT" 113-154 (2004).
10. GOvERNOR JOHN V. HICKENLOOPER, EXEC. ORDER No. B 2014-003, CREAxrING THE
SAND CREEK MASSACRE COMMEMORATION COMMISSION (Mar. 14, 2014).
11. Justice GregoryJ. Hobbs, Jr., Address at the Sand Creek Massacre Commemoration

(Dec. 3, 2014); Gregory Hobbs, Sand Creek Massacre: Colorado's Land Grab foin Aative
7ibes, DENv. Pos', Nov. 22, 2014
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Public attitudes toward natural resource development and stewardship,
and the civil rights of Native Americans and many other people who call
Colorado home, have changed dramatically since Colorado's early days.
Perhaps even greater changes lie ahead. Yet no matter when and how future
historians write the story of Colorado and the people who built and nurtured
it, Gregoryj. Hobbs, Jr. will stand limly at the headwaters.
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INTRODUCTION

Thoughtful observers have declared the law of prior appropriation obsolete,' no longer relevant, or even dead.' On the other hand, others have declared it the best-suited law yet devised to govern human uses of water, especially in water-limited places.' Many writers have criticized at least some
aspects of the law of prior appropriation.3 As further explored below, the criticisms take many forms. Far less has been written about the virtues of prior
appropriation despite the tact that principles originated in the mining districts
of nineteenth-century California ended up being adopted by seventeen western states.'
Under the prior appropriation system, millions of individual water "rights"
have been established that govern human uses of both surface and underground water. Based on these rights, individuals and organizations have built
the facilities necessary to divert/withdraw enormous quantities of water from
streams and aquifers all around the West. Particularly irrigated agriculture,
but also cities, industries, and even whitewater kayak courses, have used this
water. Economies have developed, in important part enabled by these water
uses, and the American West has transforned from a largely unsettled landscape to the home of approximately a third of the people living in the United
States and the fastest growing region in the nation.' That the basic legal system

has "worked" seems evident.
Prior appropriation proponents often point to its invitation, offered to one
and all, to find some use for water, in return for which the law grants to, and
protects in, the user a perpetual right.! Especially under the original system of
self-initiation, prior appropriation is a doctrine that promotes and encourages
human efforts to put water to some economically beneficial use; this includes
making the sometimes substantial investment of time and money necessary for
this purpose." The priority rule enables senior water right holders to count on
1. Alex C. Sienkiewicz, Note, Instream Values Find Harborin Bean Like III, )rown in
PiiorAppropnation,25 PUB3. LAND & RESOURCi.S L. Rrv. 131, 146 (2004).
2. Reed D. Benson, Alive but Inelevant: 7he PriorAppropriation Docrine in 7bdav's
lestern WaterLaw, 83 U. COLO.L. REV. 675, 678 (2012).
3. Charles F. Wilkinson, In Meinoriam:Prior Appropriaion 1848-1991, 21 ENV-FI.. L. v,
v (1991).
4. See Frank J. Trelease, Policies br Walter Law: PropertvRights, Economic Forces,and
Public Regulation, 5 NAT. RISOURCESJ. 1, 48 (1965) Ihereinafter Trelease, Policies Ibr Water
Law]; Frank J.Trelease, 7he Model Water Code, the Wie Adimistratorand the Goddaai
Burcauciat, 14 NAr. RESOURCESJ. 207, 228 (1974) [hereinafter Trelease, Model Water Codd;
see also ROBERT G.DUNBAR, FORGING NEw RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERs 209-10 (1983).
5. DUNBAR, supra note 4, at 209, 215-16; see infra text accompanying notes 45-84.
6. See infra Part I.C; see zZo GETcHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 7-8 (4th ed. 2009).
7. For a discussion of recreation water rights, see Glenn E. Porzak etal., Recreation Water RighL5: "7he Inside Sto,y" 10 U. I)ENV. WATEIR L. REV.209, 210 (2007).
8. A now somewhat dated but useful discussion of population growth in the western states
is provided in WESTERN WATER POLiCY REViEW ADVISORY COMM'N, WATER IN THE WEST:

CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY, at 2-14 to 2-18 (1998).
9. See, e.g., Trelease, Policiesfor Water Law, supia note 4, at 7-8.
10. This focus on protecting the time and effort invested by those appropriating water was
much on the mind of judges first considering the new doctrine of appropriation. See, e.g., Ir-
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getting most or all of the water they originally appropriated, even when flows
decline. Seniority, and the assurances it provides, encourages long-term investment in the facilities needed to enable water use. Those more junior water right holders are on notice that, when flows decline, they may have to curtail uses; thus they are likely to invest and operate accordingly. The ability to
make changes in the use of a water right allows appropriators to adjust uses as
opportunities change, thus enabling water rights to continue to supply changing needs and circumstances. Owners of water rights can readily transfer them
to others who are interested in making the changes necessary to allow for new
uses. Public supervision of water uses under a well-defined system of priority
rights helps to sort out disputes and ensure full use of available water. Limited
administrative authority protects private uses and serves as a check on possible
arbitrary or unreasonable requirements that would impair private uses."
Perhaps the most active proponent of prior appropriation has been Dean
Frank Trelease, who wrote in a period in which some scholars were promoting reforms of the riparian doctrine that embraced an administrativelysupervised permit system.'" Trelease applied an analysis strongly influenced
by economics. Defining the goal of water law as producing the maximum
benefits for society from the use of water, Trelease concluded that property
rights are necessary for that end, and that prior appropriation, as a user-based
system, is preferable to administrative allocation.'3 He argued that perpetual
rights, such as those provided under prior appropriation, are superior to termlimited rights proposed by riparian law reformers because of the certainty they
provide. 4 He favored well-defined rights that included a priority rule, as under prior appropriation, for sorting out conflicts:15
In the West this is usually done by describing the water rights in terms of
priorty, quantity of diversion, and time of diversion. When senior approp)nators had taken all of the dependable flow of the western streams, further
(levelopment was inaugurated by junior appropriators who stored spring

win v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 146 (1855) (discussing "the rights of those who, by prior appropriation, have taken the waters fIom their natural beds, and by costly artificial works have conducted them for miles over mountains and ravines, to supply the necessities of gold diggers"); Coffin
v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882) ("IViast expenditures of time and money have
been made in reclaiming and fertilizing by irrigation portions of our unproductive territory.
Houses have been built, and perlnanent improvements made; the soil has been cultivated, and
thousands of acres have been rendered immensely valuable, with die understanding that appropriations of water would be protected.").
11. See Frank J. Trelease, New Water Lcgislation:Drafting for Development, Efficient Allocabon and Environmentai Protection, 12 L2aN,,D & WATER L. REv. 385, 410-11 (1977).
12. See Trelease, Model Waeier Code, supa note 4, at 207; FRANK E. MALONEY r AL., A

78-79 (1972).
13. See Trelease, Model Water Code, supia note 4, at 211-12.
14. Trelease, Policies for IVater Lau- supra note 4, at 25 ("One advantage of secure water
rights over short tenn or cancelable rights is that the forner will aid in the attaininent of the major goal of maximumn benelits by encouraging investment."). Trelease also argued that "[ilf
%vater rights are given attributes of property, the people owning these property rights %ill tend to
lnake tie best decisions for themselves as to their proper use, and these decisions %vill on the
whole add up to the best development fron the state's standpoint." Id. at 9-10.
MODEL. WATER COlE: TEXT AND COMMENTARY

15. Id. at 26 ("If a water right is to serve its owner and the public efficiently as a right of
property, it is essential that the right be sufficiently definite to identify the property and differentiate it from the property of others.").
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floods, built larger dams that stored the supply of good years against future
droughts, or brought water from long distances across or tl-ough mountain
ranges from other basins where the supply exceeded tie demanld.'6

The maximization principle, according to Trelease, also requires a means
of allowing water uses to adjust as changes occur, a process Trelease believed
is best accomplished through a market system that also depends on clear,
transferable properly rights, as with prior appropriation." In Trelease's view,
private uses of water that produce benelits meet the public interest standard."
However, Trelease acknowledged that a market system does not protect all
values, thus requiring some fbn of public supervision.'"
Professor David Schorr argues that the development of prior appropriation represented "contemporary radical, agrarian ideals of broadly distributed
property and antinionopolism."
Under this analysis, prior appropriation
sought not to promote wealth maximization through creation of well-defined
transferable rights, but to promote fairness and equity by enabling the widest
possible use of water resources.' His evidence for this view is the inclusion in
prior appropriation of such "inefficient" elements as declaring water to be
property of the state, beneficial use, anod fbrfeitlre " Schorr's analysis seems
primarily a reaction to modern-day property rights advocates who emnbrace
prior appropriation as an important example of the law recognizing the creation of private property rights to the use of a commons. '

16.
17.

Jd. at 28.
See id. at 29-34.
18. IM. at 37 ("Hence watcr uses that contribute to such incrcascs in individual, local and
national wealth are prima tacie in the public intcest.").
19. Md. at 38-42.
20. David B. Schon, Appropriation as Agiwianimn: Dila-ibutivc.Jsticeji the Creation of
Propetiy lilhts, 32 EcotLocY L.Q. 3, 3 (2005) Ihereinafter Schorr, Appropr
5eion.5cc
also
DAVID B. SCHORR, THE CO.ORADO DOC'RINE: WATER RIGHTS, CORPORATIONS, AND
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 26 (2012) Ihereinldter SCHORR,
COLORADO].
21. See Schorr, ApproprFitio, sup-a note 20, at 7.
22. Id. at 10 ("However, this consensus view, which stresses the wealth-maximizing locus of
prior appropriation, seems unlikely, as it fails to explain-other than as forcign ilplants in the
purc capture doetnine-tic many aspects of the law generally agreed to be incfficient, such as the
beneficial use requirement and lbrfciture for non-use. It also falls short in accounting 1or such
features of western law as the constitutional or statutory declarations of public or state ownership of waters found in all appropriation states.").
23. WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURcE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1983) lhereinaftcr WATER RIGHTS, was described by
a reviewer as "a hymn of praise to the doctrine of prior apl)ropriation and to the ideal of water
rights as exclusively private property." Paul Herrington, Book Note, 94 ECON. J. 1013, 1043
(1984). Schorr, Appropia-mon, supa note 20, at 8-9 slates:
To some, the rule of pior appr'opliation represents the possibility and promise of etficiency in natural resources law, with the extension of this model to other resources
devouily wished. On this view, the certainty and transferabiliy associated with the
creation of private-property rights in a resource benefit society by enhancing efficiency, paticularly in comparison 'ith the coinnmon-properly-like riparian rights docti-ine.

He adds that:
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A leading defender of prior appropriation, Gregory Hobbs, now a Justice
on the Colorado Supreme Court, focused primarily on the intrusions of federal law that, in his view, confounded state intentions respecting uses of water."
In his critique of a document addressed to the new Clinton administration and
produced in 1992 by a group of academics and representatives of non-profits,
Hobbs provided this statement of western water law:
Because of scarcity, need, and many competing demands, water in the West
is allocated, administered, and surrounded by legal rights, remedies, and restuictions in order to provide stability, security, and flexibility in use of this
critical resource. Beneficial use without waste is the operative principle of
prior appropriation, a doctrine of sustainability which evolved friom local custom. A water right cannot be obtained except in the amount reasonably nec-

essary for beneficial use through a reasonably efficient meals of capture,
possession, and control. Speculative claims are prohibited. Water rights can
be bought, sold, and changed to other uses, so long as injury is not caused to
other water rights.2
In his view, western water law has been "remarkably adaptable in recognizing new uses while protecting existing uses.""
Nornan Johnson and Charles Du Mars offered this assessment of prior
appropriation:
The doctrine of prior appropriation has evolved to meet changing needs as
the West has matured and diversified. Changes have occuiTed with different

emphasis and at different rates from state to state. More modifications will
undoubtedly be made. The flexibility of the appropriation doctrine has been
proven one of its most important characteristics. It evolved as a method for
adapting to change in mining and27 imigation practices, and it will flourish if
that adaptation process continues.
Why, then, so many critics? What is prompting so many, including the
present writer, to argue for changes? What are the major motivations? One
might start by saying the system is, to some degree, a victim of its own success.
The ability to establish legally protected rights to divert and use water facilitated a level of development that started to produce its own problems and to
generate a backlash. Prior appropriation, with its priority system, inevitably
encourages early initiation of appropriations-sonietimes well in advance of

Criticisms of the western law from this quarter tend to locus on certain efficiencyimpairing aspects of the law, depicting such elements of western water law as public
ownership of waters, the rcquirecment of beneficial use and the rles of forfeiture and
abandonment as foreign impurities that have seeped into dihlaw.
Id.at 9.
24. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., lPioril:"77iw Most Misunderstood Stick in the Bundle, 32
ENvri. L. 37, 48-49 (2002) Ihereinafter Hobbs, JrioniI.
25. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Ecological Integrity New Western Myth: A Crinque of the
Long's Peak Repot, 24 EN'TrL. L. 157, 164-65 (1994) (internal footnotes onitted).
26. Id at 165.
27. Norman K. Johnson & Charles T.DuMars, A Survey of the Evohition of Western Water Law in Response to Changing Economic and Public Interest l)enands, 29 NAT.
REsoURCFSJ. 347, 387 (1989).
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actual need for tie water.28 It encourages appropriators to seek control of the
largest feasible quantity of water under (his early appropiiation, an incentive
only partially mitigated by having public officials review the basis and need for
this quantity.29 Its requirement that the manner of water use only meet local
customs works against other incentives to become more efficient, a problem
exacerbated by the fact that appropriators fear they will simply lose the right to
any undiverted water saved through efficiency.'
Return flows resulting from
sometimes excessive irrigation practices soon becamne built into the water system upon which downstreamn appropriators relied, potentially constraining
those whose more efficient uses night increase consumption and reduce these
return llows.' By highlighting the property rights aspects of water rights, judges promoted the view that there could be no impingement of any sort, that a
water right ensured the pernanent right to continue to divert and use a fixed
amount of water that could include every drop of water in the source, and that
new users wanting to take water from any particular source had to take what
3
remained without any obligations or limitations on existing appropriators. 1
For exanple, as cities in many western states gained population, especially IbIlowing World War II, they found that others had already fully appropriated
local sources of water, at least during the irrigation season.' They also discovered that most irrigators were not interested in selling their water rights since
28. Stephen F. Williams, The Requirement olBenelicvd Use as a Cause of l'asC i 1 a-.
tir Resource JDevelopment, 23 NAT. RE oURCE S.j. 7, 8-10 (1983).
29. The duty of water itself bases water requirenents on an amount considered necessary to
produce the nixLinauul anount of a given crop on an acre of land-a presumed perfect amount
of water. See, e.g., Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629,
634 (19.54) ("that measure of water, which, by careful management and use, without wastage, is
reasonably required to be applied to any given tract of land for such period of time is nay be
adequate to produce therefrom a maximum anlount of such crops as ordinarily are grown
thereon."). The focus today is shifting to deticit irrigation, defined as
lAin optimization strategy in which irrigation is applied during drought-sensitive
growth stages of a crop. Outside these periods, irrigation is limnited or even unnecessary if rainfall provides a minimuni supply of water. Water restriction is limited to
drought-tolerant phenological stages, ofien the vegetative stages and the late ripening
period. Total irrigation application is therefore not proportional to irrigation requirements throughout the crop cycle. While this inevitably results in plant drought
stress and consequently in production loss, DI maximizes irrigation water p)roductivity, which is tie main limifing fictor. In other words, DI aims at stabilizing yields and
at obtaining maximum crop water productivity rather than maximum yields.
Deficit Jrr 4taon, IN-r't. COMM'N ON IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE (ICID), http://www.icid.org/
ies irri-deficit.html (last visited Mau. 14, 2015).
30. Diversion or withdrawal rights can be reduced through partial al)andonment or forfeiture actions. See, e.g., V. Lane Jacobson, Snake River Basin Adjudication Issue 10: Prtial Fork.itre fbi- Non-use of a Water Jight in Idaho, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 179, 198-99 (1998).
31. Stephen F. Williams, Opthizing l ,ter Use: 7he Retumn Fow Issue, 44 U. COI.O. L.
REv. 301, 302 (1972-1973).
32. See, e.g., Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530, 532 (1883) (upholding right to divert all de
water in Trout Creek); Arnstrong v. Larunie Cnty. Ditch Co., 27 P. 235, 237-38 (Colo. App.
1891) (no sharing of water under prior appropriation); CLESSON S. KINNEY, A TREA-rISE ON
THE LAW OF IRRIGATIION AND WATER RIGHTS AND THE ARID REGION DOCTRINE OF
APPROPRIATION OF WATERS § 781, at 1357 n.2, 1358 (2d ed. 1912) (citing cases).
33. See John E. Thorson et al., Diviling Western Wateis: A Century ofAltidicahtg Rivers nd Streanms, llut II, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. RIv. 299, 317-20 (2006) [hereinafter Thorson

Ill.

WA TEX LA I4 REVIE W

VoIl11ne 18

they would no longer be able to farm without those rights." Consequently, cities sometimes turned to distant sources of water not yet heavily used, provoking resistance from those living in the so-called area of origin who feared that
the loss of this water diminished their future development opportunities.P Inhabitants of places with unappropriated water still available discovered, however, that prior appropriation placed no limits on transbasin water transfers
and, in fact, created some incentives to use transbasin water.' Finally, individuals whose uses or interests in water were not protected as appropriations or
under the prior appropriation system simply had no standing. Traditional
prior appropriation had simply not acknowledged such interests.
It is at least arguable that the excesses of federal reclamation policy indirectly led to the wave of criticism of the prior appropriation system during the
past forty years. Marc Reisner chronicled the politics that produced water
projects constructed by the Bureau of Reclamnation, which were made possible
by subsidies largely supported by hydroelectric power revenues.' Our extraordinary effectiveness at controlling and using water, even when some of
those uses made little economic sense, produced widespread physical and environinental change in western rivers-change on a scale Ear exceeding that accomplished by the many thousands of appropriators who could only take the
water they could alford to divert and use. Coinciding with a period of rapidly
growing environmental awareness and a growing interest in outdoor recreation, these changes helped to galvanize the work of people like David Brower,
who successfully led the light against dans in Dinosaur National Monument
and Grand Canyon National Park." While such efforts produced important
new legislation from Congress, including the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act,"
states did little or nothing to incorporate these considerations into their water
laws."
People began asking why states authorize and protect water rights without
taking into consideration the effects of the associated water development and
use on the recreational and environmental values of the source of water."
They discovered that state law does not account for these values when water
34.

SeCe e.g., LAWRENCEJ. MACDONNELL, FROM RECLAMATION TO SUSTAINABlrY 72-

74(1999).
35. For a discussion of area of origin issues, see Lawrence J.MacDonnell & Charles W.
Howe,Area-ot-Otigin Protectionin Transbasin 14 7ter Diversions:An Evaluation ofAlernaLive
Approaches, 57 U. COLO. L. Rlv. 527, 527-29 (1986).

36. The law authorizes an im)orter of water from another basin to make full use of that
water without limitation. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-82-106(1) (2014).
37. "The reclaniation marriage Iwith state water rightsl was so successful that it provokedbecause of river over-regdation-the paradigm shift Wilkinson and Blumnm heralded as ending
Prior's era in the early 1990s." Hobbs, Piioriky supra note 24, at 40.
38. MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING
WATER 139-41 (1986); see also RICHARD W. WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER:
SUBSIDIES, PROPERTiy RIGHTS, ANI) THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 34-36 (1989).
39. See PHILLIP L. FRADKIN, A RIVER No MORE: THE COLORADO RtvER AND THE WEST

192-95 (1984).
40. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (2012).
41. See, e.g., David H. Getches, 71e Metamorphosis of IVestern Water Policy: Have Federai La-s and Local Decisions Eclipsed the States' Role, 20 STAN. ENVYL. LJ. 3, 24-25
(2001) 1hereinafter Getches, Metamioiphosil.
42. Id.at 19.
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rights are approved, adninistered, and used. They becane aware of the dramatic changes to riverine function mid health associated with the construction
and operation of dams.'
People learned that prior appropriators not only used dans to store water
but also used diversion damns to divert water out of streams, thereby altering
stream conditions. They also learned that prior appropriators, a relatively
small group, effectively controlled the rivers, managed their flows, diverted
much or even all of their water, used most of that water to grow often lowvalue crops in desert and seni-desert conditions, and had 'no responsibility
whatsoever for the effects of these actions on fisheries or other riverdependent species, on recreational uses of rivers, or on water quality."
Here prior appropriation probably needs to accept some of the blame.
Despite tie warnings 'of George Perkins Marsh and the efforts of people like
Elwood Mead to insert public considerations into the decision process,'5 states
focused on encouraging development and use of their waters in support of
economic growth and resisted consideration of other values until well into the
twentieth century. By that time, most rivers had been fully appropriated, and
the appropriation of aquifers was not far behind. The law had established private rights to the use of pttblic waters, mad those rights now controlled the uses
of rivers and aquifers. Seemingly, these rights precluded regulation intended
to mitigate their harmful effects, or at least state leaders (and water rights attorneys) claimed so. As we will see, courts have applied only federal laws to
require modification of some water uses-usually under vehement opposition
from the states."
Still others have pointed to disadvantaged communities such as American
Indian tribes that have not received sufficient access to water under state prior
appropriation systelms. ' 7 Relatedly, these critics noted that state law did not
always enable federal land management agencies to manage the waters within
these lands in ways consistent with federal objectives." States, concerned with
protecting users holding established prior alppropriation water rights, have resisted efforts under the reserved rights doctrine to redress the situation."
43. See, e.g., WORI.D COMM'N ON DAMs, DAMS ANI) DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK
FOR DECISION-MAKING 74-84 (2000); MICHAEL COILI.IIR ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVY,
DAMS AND RIVERS: PRIMER ON THE DOWNsTREAM EFFECTI'S OF I)AMS 3, 7 (1996); SANDRA
PosTEI,& BRIAN RICHTER, RIVERS FOR LIFE: MANAGING WATER FOR PEOPLE AND NATURE 2-

3, 20-21 (2003).
For a discussion of how state water law pays little attention to water quality, see DAVID
GETCHF.S ET Al.., CONTROLLING WATER USE: THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WATER
QUALITY PROTECTION 89-92 (1991).
45. ELVWOOD MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS: A DiscUSSION OF THE ECONOMIC AND
THE GROWTH OF IRRIGATED AGRICUIEURF, IN 'HE WEST
LEGAL QUESTIONS CRErED mSV
347-48 (1903); WIIIAM D. ROWLEY, REcL.AMATION: MANAGING WATE.'R IN THE Wr.S'r, THE
BUREAU OF REcLAMATION: ORIGINS AND GROWTH TO 1945, at 60 (2006).
44.

H.

46.

See Getchcs, Mcarnoiphosl, supr note 41, at 24.

47. See DAVID M.

GILLIIAN & THOMAS
SEEKING A BALANCE IN WESTERN WATER USE

C. BROWN, INSTREAM FLO\v PROTECION:
193 (1997); Sally K. Fairl'ax & A. Dan Tarlock,

No W ter For 7he W4oods: A Ctkied Analvsis ofUnited States v. New Mexico, 15 IDAHO L.

R.V. 509, 517, 528-29 (1979).
48. GII.LIiAN & BRO\VN, suipranote 47, at 204-05.
49. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Reversing the Winters Docti.)e-ilrilgReserved Ivter Rights for Idaho Wilderncss andits Implications,73 U. CoLo. L. REV. 173, 174-76 (2002);
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While not expressly a problem with prior appropriation law, these examples
illustrate interests not accommodated under most existing state laws.
Still another important source of pressure on the traditional water law system emerged from the need to meet continuing new demands for water in a
world in which water resources had been almost fully claimed by existing users, and in which there were increasingly few opportunities for additional water development."' With no new large federal water projects forthcoming and
with groundwater aquifers beginning to show signs of overuse, those with new
water needs started to look at existing uses. The first thing that becanle evident was the extent to which the West's water resources had been committed
to irrigated agriculture-ninety percent of all diversions were lor irrigation and
eighty percent of all water consumption resulted from such use.' This was, of
course, exactly what the early proponents of prior appropriation wanted: a
stable system of water uses benefiting as much land and as many farms and
ranches as possible, protected by their priorities to the continued use of the
"duty of water" needed to successfully grow crops. The system worked. Irrigators controlled the use of the water in virtually every stream and river in the
West with nearby irrigable land.
Given the often-marginal nature of irrigated agriculture in many parts of
the West, irrigators used water as easily and cheaply as they could." They
flooded pasture lands to grow grasses; they diverted water from the streams
using brush dams, gravel mounded up into temporary berms using bulldozers,
piles of rocks, or old car bodies; they ran water from the strean to the field
through ditches dug out of the earth with plows, scrapers, and shovels; and
they turned the water onto the fields at upper elevations, counting on gravity to
spread the water over the land. Sometimes they dug furrows to help move the
water past the roots of the crops. They worried mostly about getting plenty of
water to their fields, not really knowing how much their crops required but assuming that more was better than less. They didn't care much what happened
to tie water once it left their property. No law required them to return unconsumed water to the stream.
Yet, the West was changing, and an increasing number of its people wanted the region's water resources to be used differently-at least to some degree.
It seemed the doctrine of prior appropriation and its progeny, water rights,
stood in the way of any change. The critics set to work highlighting the beleaguered condition of western rivers and aquifers, the values and interests that
were not represented adequately (in their view) under the traditional prior appropriation system, focusing on the enormous quantities of water committed
to irrigation using practices that, on average, only consumed half of the water

Lois G. Wittc, Still
No Watcr [or the Woods, ALI-ABA Federal Lands Law Conference, Salt
Lake City, Utah 9-14 (Oct. 19, 2001), hlp://wwv.stream.1s.fed.us/publicafions/PDFs/Sfill_
no water for the woods.pdf.
50. A good overview is provided in NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE
WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE ENvIRONMENT (1992).
51. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A NEW ERA FOR IRRIGATION 52-56 (1996).
52. A summary of the economic value of crops grown using inigation in tie western states
is provided in MARC REISNER & SARAH BATES, OVERTAPPED OASIS: REFORM OR REVOLUTION
FOR WESTERN WATER 32-34 (1990).
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diverted from streams and aquifers. 3 While the states have made modest
changes in their water laws, most notably in incorporating mechanisms to enable protection of instreaxn flows, the basic system remains substantially intact.'
Elwood Mead was an early critic of the self-initiation form of prior appropriationi5 In his 1903 classic, hiJgali'onInstitutions, he stated:
The whole principle is wrong. It is wrong in principle as well as faulty in procelure.
It LSSUIeICs that tie establishmelnt of titles to the snows on the mountains and tie rains
fatling on the public lamd and the water collected in fie lakes and rivers, ol die Use of
which the development of the state in a great measure depends, is a private matter. It
ignores public interests in a resource upon which the enduring prosperity of the
community must rest. It is like A suing B1 for control of properly which belongs to C.
Many able attorneys hold that these decreed rights %%ill in time be held invalid because when they were established the public, the real owner of the property, did not
have its day in coUirt.'

Colorado attorney Moses Lasky pointed to the strong bias against adninistrative decision making in the United States during the era in which prior
appropriation developed, the preference (and even necessity) for individual
assertion of rights under frontier conditions,'" and the strong preference
amnong common-law trained lawyers for determination of legal rights by courts
in the context of a specific dispute."' Because of the widespread adoption of
permitting systems by 1928, Lasky concluded that "Itloday prior-appropriation
is the law nowhere in the West."
The critic who pronounced prior appropriation dead, Professor Charles
Wilkinson, earlier identified four major problems with the law: economic failings, failure to respect 0interests of other governments, excluded policy objectives, ad bad science.
In addition to federal reclamation subsidies and the
benefits available through special water districts (neither specifically matters of
prior appropriation law), Wilkinson pointed to the absence of consideration
of the externalities of water development and use and, most importantly, the
Fact that appropriators take water without payment to the public. Other governments excluded under prior appropriation, he noted, are tribes and Mexico." Foremost among excluded policy objectives, in his view, is water conser-

53. The present author was atp)a'ricialut in this process, ollering his own prescriptions for
changes, most comprehensively in FROM RECLAMATION TO SUSTt1NABILITY, supra notc 34, at
39-42, 45, 47, 49-51. He presented Isis suggestions under four broad headings: reducing the
gap between diversions and consumltion; allowing rivers to finction like rivers; chariging uses
to meet new demands; and place-based collaboration. Id.

54. See in/ iaPart I.
55. Mead believed strongly tiat states should control uses of water, as a common aid essentia resource, on behalf ofltheir citizens. See MFAn, suptia note 45, at 207.

56. Id.
57. See inh- Part I.A-B (discussion of dlevelopment of prior appropriation in mining
camps of California).
58. Moses Lasky, from PriorApproprition to Economitc i1tribution of Water bv the

State- via Im'gationAdrmintration, I ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 161, 168 (1928-1929).
59. I. at 170.
60. Charles F. Wilkinson, Akdo Lcopo ldand 1'Vestcm I'oter Lae 7hiinkbig lcipenclicidar
to tie Pior Appropriato)n Doctrine,24 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 12-19 (1989).

61.
62.

Id.atl12-14.
Ild. at 14-15.
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vation.' Also historically excluded was protection of instreamn flows.' He also
points to the absence of planning under prior appropriation.' Under science,
he points to the lack of integration of uses of surface water and groundwater,
failure to account for water needs of wildlife, and the absence of any consideration of water quality eflects of water use.' In an earlier article, Wilkinson locused on the changing values and interests of westerners, which he found differed from those that dominated at the time the prior appropriation doctrine
emerged and became institutionalized.
Wilkinson's colleague, David Getches, tended to focus his critiques more
broadly on water policy than just prior appropriation, but he found a number
of deficiencies in the basic appropriation doctrine as well. 8 To promote
greater water use efficiency, Getches proposed changing the law to enable an
appropriator who conserves water to retain the right to its use.' He called for
more active application of the beneficial use principle to impose restrictions
on diversions of water in excess of amounts required for actual use.7 Getches
also highlighted the limited consideration given under prior appropriation to
public values and suggested the need to incorporate these values into water
planning.'

63. Id. at 16 (refcening in particular to the substanfial anounts of water diverted compared
to tie anounts actually consumed by crops in inigation).

64. Id.
65.
66.
67.
317-21

Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 17-18.
Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Tansi&zin, ,56 U. CoinO. L. REV. 317,
(1985).

The field lof western water lawl has been dominated by die themes of appropriation
under state law; stable priority for historic uses; concern for private rights over public
rights; preference for consunipive, usually commercial, uses; and die provision of
subsidized water for irrigators. It goes virtually without saying that this range of nineteenth and early twentieth century priorities is not as broad as the spectrum of considerations that iiust be accommodated in current water policy.
d. at 321.
68. These two scholars, joined by Sarah Bates and Lawrence MacDonnell, produced
SARAH BATis EL AL., SEARCHING OUT THE HEADwATERS: CHANGE AN) REDISCOVERY IN
WESTrRN WATER PotIcY (1993). This book outlines the tour principles they believed should
guide the development of western water policy: die principle of conservation; die principle of
equity; the principle of ecology; and a water ethic. -d at 178-98.
69. David H. Gctches, Water Use Efficiency: The Vdue of Water in the West, 8 PUB.
LAN) L. REV. 1, 15 (1987) ("California made a major improvement in its law in 1983 by allowing the salvager to sell and reuse salvaged water. The law recognizes conservation as a heneficial
use and declares that rights to conserved water are not abandoned when they are trnused."
(footnote omitted)) [hereinafter Getches, Water Use Efticiencj].

70. Seeid.at26-29.
71. See id. at 29 ("The hmost
effective way to reflect public values in water decisions may be
to integrate them into ie considerations that are made during a comprehensive water planning
process."). Getches also suggested articulation of standards to guide public interest review. See
David H. Getches, Changing the River's ('ourse: Western Water Policy Refom, 26 ENqt. L.
157, 168-69 (1996); see adso Davis H. Getches, Water Wrongs: Why Can't We Get It Right
the First 7hne, 34 ENVTL. L. 1, 13, 15 (2004); David H. Getches, Water Planing: Untapped
Opportunityfor the Vestem States, 9 J. ENERGY L. & Pot'Y 1, 18, 33 (1988-1989); David H.
Getches, From Askhabad, to Wellton-Mohawk, to Los Angeles: The Drought in Wyater Policy,
64 U. CoLo. L. REv. 523, 546 (1993) ("We follow the consequences of a commitment of water
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In a process Getches helped initiate while he was Director of the Colorado Department of Natural Resources under Governor Richard LuTm, the
Western Governors' Association established a "water efficiency working
group" in 1986." A report by scholau-in-residence Bruce Driver emphasized
the importance of water transfers, water salvage and conservation, and conjunctive use for improving efficiency of water uses." Driver's report embraced
water marketing, including f'rom federal Bureau of Reclamation lacilities, supported state laws encouraging conservation while noting the challenges associated with not reducing historic return flows, and suggested additional steps to
protect instream flows.71
Prolessor John Leshy has called For the development of a progressive national water policy that would entail a number of improvements in existing systerns of state water m-anagement:''
A. States should have better information and more capacity to manage and
regulate water use within their borders;
1B.
States should have effective, comprehensive programs to )rovide enough
water flows in their streams to ensure a meaningful level of ecological health;
C. States should have eflective groundwater regulation programs to sustin
gqoundwater-dependent communities over the long term and to protect asso-

ciated surl~tce waters;
D.States should make stronger eflorts to link regulation of land use and water use;
E. States should vigorously prom1ote measures to conserve and make more

only so far as the next water user."). Getches recognizes that "governments still have not confronted the root cause of water problems: the absence of a comprehensive water policy," and
proposes tools such as new institutions, formulation of long-range goals, and thorough analysis
of alternatives and consequences. Id. at 549-52; see gcneralv Gctches, Meitanophosis,supia1
note 41 (noting that only limited changes in state
laws related to conservation and efficiency,
groundwater, instream flow, public interest, planning, and transfers and marketing, have occuIn-ed).
72. WFSTERN GOVERNORS' Ass'N, WATER EFICIENCY: OPPORTUNrTES FOiR AcION, A
REPORT TO THE WESTERN GOVERNORS FROM THE WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION
WATER EFFICIENCY WORKINt; GROUP, at ii (1987) Ihereinafter WATER EFF1CIENCI.
73. BRUCE DRIVER, WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASS'N, WESTERN WATER: TUNING THE
SYSTEM, at v (1986). The report's first finding was that
Transfers of water, salvage, and conservation of water, conjunctive
supplies of water and provision of alternative supplies of water for
changes and other measures can help meet western water needs
add new wealth to the regon. Western states should redouble
courage implementaion of these meuls.

use of substitutable
seniors through excost-cffectively and
their efforts to en-

Id.
74. I.at v-ix.
75. John Lcshv, Notes on a Progressive National Water Policy, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV.
133, 134, 144-45 (2009). Leshy' notes that "States have not always been very vigorous about asserting regulator' control and oversight over water management matters." Id. at 145. Moreover, Leshy observes that "water policy is stubbortly resistant to sweeping change." Id. at 144.
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efficient use of water;
F. States should have clear policies and processes for addressing transfers of
water rights, particularly for agricultural to municipal, industrial, and ecological uses; and
G. States should more vigorously monitor and, where necessary, regulate the
activities of special government districts to serve state policy objectives.
Water law scholar Dan Tarlock has suggested that the role of prior appropriation is increasingly of secondary importance in a changing West." According to Tarlock,
The principal criticisms are that perpetual "use it or lose it rights" lock too
much water into marginal agriculture and generally encourage ineflicient offstream consumptive uses to the detriment of aquatic ecosystem values and
the needs of growing urban areas. Critics have either pronounced the doctrine dysfunctional or dead or argued that it should be replaced by nonperpetual permit systems that better value consumptive and instream uses.'8
Tarlock argues prior appropriation will continue to forni the basic structure of western water law, but the importance of that structure will diminish."
Thus, he predicts:
In the future, prior appropriation will function primarily as (1) a default rule
to resolve small-scale conflicts, (2) a worst case enforcement scenano in
complex allocation negotiations to encourage parties to find creative ways to
avoid its actual application through cooperative management regimes and
other sharing arrangements that accommodate a wide range of competing
demands, and (3) a rule of compensation when water is voluntarily transf'erred or to inform the constitutional analysis when water is involuntarily reallocated. "
In his view, the best evidence for the reduced importance of classical prior
appropriation is what he sees as the diminished importance of the priority
rule.8
Tarlock is clearly right. The prior appropriation doctrine is essentially an
allocative mechanism. Its concern is with the fornation of use rights. That
job is essentially complete. Very little water in the western states remains unallocated for direct human uses. We are in a world of managing our sources of
water to meet as many of those allocated uses as we reasonably can. Moreo-

76. Id.at146-51.
77. A. Dan Tarlock, The ulivucof 1r0" Appropriation in the Nell, Vest, 41 NAT.
RESOURCES J.769, 773-75 (2001) [hereinafter Talock, Jilim-c] (noting that "ltlhe new West
%illinevitablv produce changes in prior appropriation, but the changes %illbe miore subtle because they will be nore ones of practice than of fonn" and that, "the doctrine's importance as a
water allocation driver has decreased in the past decades.").
78. Id. at 772 (fbotnote omitted).
79. See id.at 775, 786.
80. Id.at 775.
81. Id.at780-85.
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ver, we are simultaneously attempting to find water in this fully allocated systen for the ecological and recreational benefits attendant to it and for the unmet needs on Indian reservations, as well as to enable some existing uses of
water to shift to meet new direct human demands. Some important modtiIicalions to existing prior appropriation law are needed, but so too are new approaches that move well beyond this regime."2
Perhaps the most visible critic of our mYisuses of water in recent years has
been Professor Robert Glennon.8
In the concluding chapter of Unquenchable, he provides the following list of proposed "reforms":
- encouraging creative conservation
- using price signals
- creating market incentives
- reexamining how we dispose of human waste
- requiring developers to pay their own way
- reconsidering the location of wastewater plants
- separating storm water from sewer water
- creating infrastructure with dual pipes to supply potable and reclaimed water
-

abandoning business as usual (more darns, diversions, and wells)

-

recognizing the link between water and energy

-

appreciating the critical role played by water in the economy

removing barriers to water transfers while providing for government oversight of them

-

- creating incentives for homeowners ad others to harvest water
- stimulating alternative waste disposal technologies
- metering water use
- securing water for the enVironment."

These reconnendations serve perhaps more as a statement of goals than
as prescriptions for reform-but they capture some of the most common re-

frains: the need for more efficient use of water and for improved environmental protection.
In Part I, this Article looks at prior appropriation's fornative period; examrines the process of its early development in California, Nevada, and Colorado; considers its transition into state statutory law; examines its relornation

82. Id. at 785-86 (suggesting these additions are likely to locus on ways to accomplish contemporary intercstslthat extend well beyond the adlocation hnction of pior appropnation).
83. See gcnci-affi ROBERT GI.ENNON, WATER FoHI-s: GROUNDVATER PUMPING AND
THE FATE OF AMERICA'S FRESH WATER (2002) Ihercinafter GiENNON, WATER FOLIES];
RoBERTr GLENNON, UNQUENCHABIE: AMERICA'S WATER CRISIS AND WHAT TO DO ABouT rr
(2009) [hereinafter GLINNON, UNQUENCHABiLE].
84. GLENNON, UNQtJENCHANBLE, supi-a note 83, at 317.
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into a publicly-managed system; and assesses its evolution to the present. The
Article's principal purpose is to examine the state of prior appropriation today, to consider whether its principles and practices are developing and evolving consistent with the needs and interests it is intended to support. Part II
discusses ten fundamental features of prior appropriation that require modifi-cation to keep pace with a West that is currently concerned not with matters
of allocation of water use rights, but with management of rivers and aquifers to
support a wide array of needs and interests.'
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION LAW AND
ADMINISTRATION
A. INTRODUCTION
Use of water played an important role in the settlement of the American
West. The rules governing human uses of water emerged during the course
of this settlement and reflected many influences, including the customs of
Spain and Mexico; the common law riparian doctrine of the eastern United
States; the community principles brought by the Mormons to irrigation in
what became Utah; and the practices of gold miners on public lands in California, Nevada, and Colorado." Out of this rich stew emerged the doctrine of
prior appropriation, ultimately adopted, at least in part, as the law in at least
seventeen western states."
The basic principles of prior appropriation are well known. In its original
form, taking possession of (diverting or withdrawing) some portion of water-a
rule of capture-initiated the water right, so long as the possession was accompanied by intent to make some productive use of the water." As refined, the
use itself becamne necessary to vest the right; the use had to be "beneficial." A
still further refinenent limited the quantity of water taken from the source to
the amount necessary for the beneficial use, not just the quantity of water
physically possessed. " Unlike under the common law riparian doctrine, there
were no restrictions on the place of use.' In times of shortage, earlier appropriators (seniors) held the better right.' Failure to continue to exercise the
right, however, potentially resulted in its loss through abandonnent. "
As Donald Pisani has noted, there was nothing inevitable about the adoption of prior appropriation." Early court decisions justified this approach,

85. These ten elements are: priority, public ownership, beneficial use, conditional rights,

abandonment, forfeiture, changes of use, groundwater use, instream flow, and adjudication.
86. See Lasky, supta note 58, at 166; see also GCetches, Watcr Use Efficiency, supra note

69, at 4; Wilkinson, supra note 67, at 317-19; John E. Thiorson ct al., D)ividing Wcsicm Watcrs: A Centimy ofAcljudicatingRivers alwdStreams, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. RExV. 355, 389-408
(2005) [hereinafter Thorson II.
87. Sec GE-rCHES, supra note 6, at 7-8.
88. See in/ia notes 236-42 and accompanying text.

89. See Archuleta v. Gomez, 200 P.3d 333, 343 (Colo. 2009).
90. See id. at 340.
91. Id. at 341; see also COLO. CONST. art. 16, § 6.
92. Archuleta, 200 P.3d at 344.
93. DONADIJ. PISANI, To RECIAIM A DIVIDED WESI': WATER, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY
1848-1902, at31 (Ray A. Billington et al. cds., 1992).
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while simultaneously disregarding the common law of riparianism, on the
physical conditions and circumstances of settlement mad development in the
West-its general aridity, the limited sources of water supply, the unusually
large demands for use of water to enablermining and irrigation and, of course,
the actions of the users themselves that sometimes rellected a very different
view of the role of water and the manner of its use than prevailed under die
riparian doctrine.' Less often stated but obviously important was the uncertainty in the law that should apply, For although the United States owned virtually all the lands in its western territories through purchase and treaty and presumably "owned" the associated water, Congress had not expressed its intent
The new State of California was
respecting uses of water on federal lands
anxious to encourage mining on federal lands within its territory but was Lincertain about its legal authority on those lands.' Some territorial legislatures
eventually began to enact laws respecting uses of water within their boundaries,
but the effect of those laws on appropriations made on federal public lands
within the state was uncertain.97
B. ORIGINS OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION

The story is now a faniliar one in water law: how prospector-trespassers "
on newly acquired federal lands in the even more recently established State of
Cailornia developed their own rules to govern both the search for gold and
the use of water." The principles of prior appropriation as we know them today did not spawn hilly formed from this process. To the contrary, it was a
gradual process of development with many different ideas competing lor acceptance. The colnmon law existing in the eastern states known as the doctrine of riparianism substantially influenced the process.'" There was the possibility that state or territorial legislatures would make legislative grants to
individuals or corporations to use water. Congress itself might have decided
to establish its own rules respecting uses of water on public lands. Instead, die
original rules were largely those developed by the users themselves, its interpreted and applied by the courts.
First and foremost, it was the actions of prospectors needing water for
mining operations in the remote, unsettled mountains of California that
shaped the original rules. Despite the penchant for academics to inpose
ideological or philosophical labels on the ideas underlying the prospectors'
actions, it is perhaps more useful to simply acknowledge the particular nature

94.

See, e.g., Collin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Col. 443, 446, 448 (1882).

95. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Stone, 7 Cal. 46, 48 (1857) ("The lormer decisions of this Court,
in cases involving tie right of parties to appropriate waters for mining and other purposes, have
been based upon de wants of tei conmmnity and the peculiar condition oftdings in this Stale,

(tor which there is no precedent,) rather than may absolute rule of law governing such cases.").
96. Hicks v. Bell, 3 Cal. 219, 223, 226-27 (1853).
97. S5eWillev v. Decker, 73 P. 210, 214-15 (Wyo. 1903).
98. See United States v. Gear, 44 U.S. 120, 120 (1845); see also SAMIUEI. C. WIEI., 1
WATER RicirTs INTHE WESTERN UNITED STATES 86-87 (3d. ed. 1911) Ihereinafter WIEt,
WATER RIGHTSj.
99. See, e.g., PISANI, supa note 93, at 11-14.
100. See id. al 31; Frank J. Trelease, Coordinationof Ripaian and Approprtiaive Rights to

the ULe of Waiei; 33 TIx. L. REV. 24, 31-35 (1954).
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of the needs for water that motivated their actions and the circumstances in
which they operated. Mining for gold, as it existed during the early years in
California, required the use of large quantifies of water.'"' Streams were relatively numerous but generally small, with wide variability in annual flows
common to snownelt systems. In some cases, the miners were interested in
the gravels in and along the streams; in others, they needed large volumes of
water under high pressure to blast rock off hillsides.' 2 Early on, it became
common for companies that were able to make the investnent in building the
diversion and conveyance systems needed for supply to provide water to miners.

103

Until 1866 the miners and water users operated on federal lands without
permission from Congress; °' their legal status was therefore unclear. California courts addressed conflicts between competing users and recognized their
possessory rights, at least as based on customs applicable in their mining district, while acknowledging their lack of ownership or express right to use the
land and water."' In a world where possession established claim of right,
many miners believed, and the courts eventually agreed, that priority should
serve to resolve conflicts between competing claimants-both for land and for
water.'°
But water is different than land. It doesn't stay put. One cannot place
stakes around water to mark out the area or amount claimed. Possession required physical control-diversion of water from a stream into a ditch. The act
of diversion manifested an assertion of claim to the amount of water diverted.
The miners needed large volumes to move the gravels and to separate the
gold, but the use was largely nonconsumptive. Nevertheless, miners often
permanently removed water from its original source and carried it to other locations of need. The consequences of mining included an enormous disruption in the landscape and a widespread rearrangement of the hydrology, according to the constantly changing areas of development and needs of the
miners. °7
It was under these conditions that the courts of California sought to define
legal principles that would help facilitate mining activities while also managing
the conflicts that required judicial resolution. Several decisions noted the
unique challenges presented by these new and substantial uses of water, especially due to the lack of legislation or even relevant precedent to apply.' 8 In
101.

See Titcomb v. Kirk, 51 Cal. 289, 289, 292 (1876), for an early California decision

providing historical background. See also WIEL, WATER RIGHTS, sup-t note 98, at 74.
102. ROBERT L. KELLEY, GOLD vs. GRAIN: CALIFORNIA's HYDRAULIC MINING
CONTROVERSY, A CHAPrER IN THE DECLINE OF THE CONCEPr OF LAIsSEZ FAIRE 21-56
(1959); RODMAN W. PAUL, CALIFORNIA GOLD 147-49, 152-53 (Harvard Univ. Press 1947).

103. PISANI, supra note 93, at 16-19.
104. See Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, §§ 1, 9, 14 Stat. 251 (repealed by Federal Lands Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2744, 2793) Ihereinaftcr Mining Act of 18661; Basey v.Gallagher, 87 U.S. 670, 678 (1874).
105. .See inhfra cases cited in notes 110-58.
106.

See PISANI, supra note 93, at 20-31.

107. Seeid.atl5-16, 18-19.
108. Thus, in Hoffinman v Stone, 7 Cal. 46, 48 (1857), the court stated: "The absence of legislation on this subject, has devolved on the Courts the necessity of fining rules for the proection of this great interest, and in determining these questions, we have conformed, as nearly as
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the words of a treatise writer on the new laws of mining and water in California: "There being no legislation to interpret, tie Courts have laid down ie
rules upon principles deemed proper at the time, and these have gr'adually
become incorporated into the jurispndence of the State, until they are as
as the principles of law regulating any other species of
firmly ''established
rights. °"
The first water law case to r-each the California Supreme Court, Eddv v.
Simpson,"0 aptly illustrates the new issues the courts laced involving uses of
water. In Eddy, both parties had initially diverted water from different sources

to use for mining. Some of the water originally diverted by the defendants
flowed into the source diverted by plaintiffs after defendants used it on their
land."' DefendanLs then constructed a diversion above plaintiffs' source and
clalimed the right to withdraw the water deposited in plaintiffs' source ats a result of these efforts." The trial court found for the defendants on the theory
that, but for the effort of the defendants, the diverted water would not otherwise have ended up in the plaintiffs' source."' The California Supreme Court

possible, to the analogies of the common law." Then, in 3ear River and Auburn Vater and
ew York Mining Co., 8 Cd. 327, 332 (1857), the court addcd:
MinhgCGo. .
It may be said, with truth, that tie judiciary of this State has had thrown upon it responsibilities not incurred by the Courts of any other State in the Union. In addition
to those perplexing cases that must arise, in the nature of things, and especially in putting into practical operation, a new constitution and a new code of statutes, we have
had a large class of cases unknown in the jurisprudence of our sister States. The mining interest of the State has grown up under the force of new and extraordinary circumstances, and in the absence of any specific and certain legislation to guide us.
Left without any direct precedent, as well as without specific legislation, we have been
compelled to apply to this anomalous state of things the aidogies of the common
law, and the more expanded principles of equitable justice. There being no known
system existing at the beginning, parties were left without any certain guide, and for
that reason, have placed themselves in such conflicting positions that it is impossible
to render any' decision that will not produce great injury, not only to the parties inmediately connected with the suit, but to large bodies of men, who, though no formal
parties to the record, must be deeply affected by the decision. No class of cases can
arise more difficult of a just solution, or more (istressing in practical result. And the
6f that most perplexing class of cases.
present is one of the most difficult
109. GREGORY YALE, LEGAL. TrriES TO MINING CIAIMS AND WATER RIGHTS IN
CALIFORNIA UNDER THE MINING LAW OF CONGRESS, Or.u.v, 1866, at 138 (1867).
110. 3 Cal. 249 (1853). Earlier that year the court considered a case involving water, Iain.sct
v. Chxidlcr, 3 Cal. 90 (1853), involving damage to a mining claim caused by overflow of water
friom a ditch. It was an action in nuisance and did not involve principles of water law. Ic.at 90.
111. Eddy, 3 Cal. at 251-52.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 250. The instruction to the jury made by the district court, though not accepted
in this opinion, provides a clear statement of what became the principles adopted by the Callfornia Supreme Court:
As a general principle, the party who first uses the water of a stream, is by virtue of
priority of occupation entitled to hold die smie. If a company or association of miners construct a ditch, to convey water from a finning stiean for mining or other purposes, and they are the first to use the water, locate and construct the ditch, they are
legally entitled to the same as their property, to the extent of the capacity of the ditch
to hold and convey water. For, if it appears that there is more water running iii the
streamn than the ditch of the first party can hold and convey, then any other party may
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reversed, holding that defendants had lost their rights to the water when they
lost their original possession.' 4 The court believed it was applying "known
principles and well-settled law""' in reaching this conclusion, but it was the law
of a world in which people did not divert water and move it to places outside
the watershed. The court recognized the matter involved a "novel question
growing out of the peculiar enterprises in which many of the people of this
State are embarked,""' 6 but it wanted to apply what it believed was well settled
law. The court noted that the legal right to water under traditional common
law is in its use, not its ownership."' It accepted that both parties claimed their
right based on their possession of water in accordance with the custom that

had developed in the mining districts on federal land. "'
Two years later, in the landmark case I-in v. Philh'ps, the court considered a dispute between one party claiming a right based on the new custom of
"prior occupation" and another party asserting rights under the common law
riparian doctrine as the miner of a claim riparian to the stream.' 9 Noting,
however, that the claimant was not the owner of the land, the court deterinined that riparian principles did not apply.'" It went further, however, in affinning its recognition of the local customs that governed rights to hold both
land and water on the public domain and stated that "Courts are bound to
take notice of the political and social condition of the country, which they judicially ntle."'' This included the legitimacy of occupying federal lands for
mineral development and "the rights of those who, by prior appropriation,
have taken the waters from their natural beds, and by costly artificial works
have conducted them for miles over mountains and ravines, to supply the necessities of gold diggers, and without which the most important interests of the
mineral region would remain without development.'.. Ultimately the court
rightfully take and use the surplus, and it does not matter whether the excess of water
be taken from a point above or below the dam of the lirst party.

Id. (citation omitted).
114. ld.at252-53.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. h. at 252. Contrastingly, Yale believed the actual custom of appropriation in California
regarded diverted water as property, giving its appropriator full rights to (1o whatever he wished
with the water. Thus, he says in commenting on the Eldy decision: "we trace the law of approl),ialion as the rule of right in determining the ownership to water as a commodity." YALE, supra note 109, at 157(emphasis in original).
118. Eddy, 3 Cal. at 249-50, 252; seC WIEL, WATR RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 80-81 (discussing recognition of possessory rights developed by miners on federal land).
119. 5 Cal. 140, 145-47 (1855).
120. Id. For a very helpful discussion of the continuing legal uncertainties both concerning
the status of the common law and the question of legal rights on federal lands faced by both
miners and water providers until Congress enacted the 1866 Act, see WIL, NVATER RIGHTS,
supra note 98, at 80-103.

121.

lIin, 5 Cal. at 146.

122. Id. As to this, Yale finds what he believes is the true policy of tie new principlesencouragement of mining and reward for one's labors:
That this policy may be stated with sufficient deliniteness to be the right of individual
appropriation, subject to such rules and limitations as may be necessary to give effect
to tie two leading principles: First, the most productive working of the mines. See-

Issue 2

eRIOR APIPROPRIA 7ION A REASSESSMENT

decided the case based onl priority, giving the better right to the senior upstream water supplier.'
The numerous cases that followed during the remainder of the decade
presented a variety of different conflicts between water users and added some
further detail to the basic principles in contention. For examjple, the following
year, in Conger v. Weaver; the court detennined that the right of appropriation vested from tie first steps taken to .its diligent accomplishment, not from
the time of completion of the facilities or the time of actual use:
Illn the case of constructing canals, under the license from the State, the survey of the ground, planting stakes along the line, and actually commencing
and (iligendy pursuing the work, is as much possession as the nature of the
subject will admit, and forms a series of acts of ownership which must be
conclusive of the right.'
In that same year, the court explained that "[plossession, or actual appropriation, must be the test of priority in all claims to the use of water, whenever
such claims are not dependent upon the ownership of the land through which
the water llows.""
In 1857, the Court offered this explanation of the law:
ond, the interests, convenience, and profit of the greatest number. But these last
principles are subservient to another principle, which is necessary to ive effect to
these primary principles, and this principle is protection to labor and encouragement
of it, which can only be given by allowing to mining claims and appopiations a right
of )rop)erty, with its incidents.
YALE,suplu note 109, at 158-59 (emphasis in original).
123. ILrin, 5 Cal. at 146-47. Yale provides this statement of the holding:
The broad doctrine was then announced for the first time in any system of jurisprudene, that tie right to the unlimited use of water in a running stream vested in the
first appropriator, whether a riparim owner or not, with the correlative right to divert
it to any extent, for sale or other use; and that subsequent locators, even for mining
purposes, upon the banks of the sane stream, as riparian owners, could only acquire
an interest in the water for any purpose subordinate to the right of the first appropriator, provided any water was left.
YALE,supwa note 109, at 137.

124.

Conger v. Weaver, 6 Cal. 548, 558 (1856). The Court stated:

But, from the nature of these works, it is evident that it requires time to complete
them, antd from their extent, in some instances, it would require much time; and the
question now arises, at what point of time does the right commence, so as to protect
the undertaker from the subsequent settlements or enterprises of other persons. If it
does not commence until the canal is completed, then the license is valueless, for alter nearly the whole work has been done, any one, actuated by malice or self interest,
may prevent its accoml)lishment; any small squatter settlement might eflkctually destroy it.

Id.
125. Kelly v. Natoma Water Co., 6 Cal. 105, 108 (1856). The issue concerned whether defendant's appropriation was senior because of evidence of some intent to divert water prior to
the construction of plaintiff's diversion. The court stated that "Isluch appropriation cannot be
constructive, because there would be no rule to limit or control it, resting, as it must, only in
intention." Id.
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The fact early manifested itself, that the mines could not be successfully
worked without a proprietorship in waters, and it was recognized and maintained. To protect those who, by their energy, industry, and capital, had
constructed canals, and races, carrying water for miles into parts of the country which must have otherwise remained unliuitful and undeveloped, it was
held that the first appropriator acquired a special property in the waters thus
appropriated, and as a necessary consequence of such property, might invoke all legal. remedies for its enjoyment or defense. A party appropriating
water, has the sole and exclusive right to use the sane for the purposes for
which it was appropriated, and so long as he is not obstructed in the use
thereof, he has no ground of action.'

Here the court upheld the ability of an appropniator to recapture and use
water it transported to another watershed, considering the bed of the intermittent stream in the watershed comparable to a ditch."'
In Maeis v. Bickuell,' the California court considered whether a diversion made to shift water out of the channel so that the gravels in the bed could
be worked constituted an appropriation of water.a It concluded that a valid
appropriation "must be for some useful purpose" and that diverting water to
drain ihe channel (lid not constitute such a purpose. '

126. Hoffman v. Stone, 7 Cal. 46, 49 (1857); see also Butte Canal & Ditch Co. v. Vaughn, 11
Cal. 143 (1858).
127. 1d. Thus, tie court altered its previous position in Eddy ,: S11pson. A case decided
that same year, Bear River andAuunb
Water andMinifg Co. v. New York Mbhang Co., raised
the question of the quality of water to which an appropriator was entitled. 8 Cal. 327, 333
(1857). The BearRiver court noted the common law principle that a riparian is entitled to enjoy the flow undiminished in both quantity and quality, but found these requirements unsuited
to conditions in the mining region of California. Id. It pointed out that water is commonly diverted not only out of the stream but often out of the watershed, clearly diminishing or even
eliminating the natural flow and that:
Itlhe water is taken to a locality where it is used; and after being so used, it finds its

way to other mining localifics, where it is again used. The effect of the diversion is
not to diminish the number of times the water may be used. In the majority of cases,
it is used as often, and upon the whole, as profitably, as if it had never been diverted,
but had continued to flow down its natural channels. Tlhie general usefulness of the
element is not impaired by the diversion. It may be very safely assumed, that as much
good, if not more, is accomplished by the diversion, as could have been attained, had
such diversion never occurred. In fact, we must, in reason, presume that the water is
taken to richer mining localities, where it is more needed, and, therefore, the diversion of the stream promotes this leading interest of the State.

Id. at 334. Similarly, the court pointed out that upstreanl mining uses necessarily introduce sedimnent into streams, thereby diminishing the quality of the water. To require that water quality
not be impaired would be to deny the ability to mine. Id. at 335-36. It thus concluded that
such impainnent constituted injury without compensable damage. Id. at. 336.
128. 7 Cal. 261 (1857).
129. Id. at 262.
130. Id. at 262-63. Crandal v. Woods, another 1857 decision, also deternined the nile of
priority applied not only to claims of water for mining but for other purposes as well. 8 Cal.
136 (1857). In that case, the parties claiming public land for agriculture resisted appropriation
of water originating from springs on the fanned land on the basis that their possession of the
land included the right to the use of appurtenant water. Id. at 140-41. The court rejected this
assertion of ripamian rights, stating:
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In 1859, Oimim v. Dixon'3. raised the question of whether a senior appropriation of water to power a mill could be moved upstream, apparently for
different uses, to a ditch above that of the objecting plaintiff. The court reasoned that because the defendCt's mill did not require use of all of the flows
all of the time, the plaintiff, an upstrearm junior appropriator, had established
rights to the water he had diverted that could not be infi-inged by the proposed
change of use."2 In the court's own words, "Itihe measure of the right, as to
extent, follows the nature of the appropriation, or the uses for which it is taken.

In McDonal v. Bear River & Auhumin H'"iler & M'ining Co., ' a case involving a dispute between an upstrean diverter for mining and a downstreamn
mill operator, the court made this statement of law:
The ownership of water, as a substantive mad valuable property, distinct,
sometimes, From the land through which it flows, has been recognized by our
Courts; and this ownership, of course, drawvs to it all the legal remedies for its
invasion. The right accrues from appropriation; this appropriation is the intent to take, accompanied by some open, physical demonstration of the intent, and for some valuable use. We have held that there is no (ifference in
respect to this use, or rather purpose, to which the water is to be applied; at
least, that an appropriation for the uses of a mill stands on the same footing
as an appropriation or the use of the mines. Each of these purposes, indeed,
may be equally useful, or even necessary to the miners themselves. But the
nature of the use may be important, as denoting the extent of the water appropriated. Water taken for a mill is not taken as an uticle of merchandise,
to be sold in the market; it is merely used as a motive power, and after it
passes the mill and subserves its purposes, may be used as an aid to the
working of the mines. But this last use must not be inconsistent with the prias his necessary use is concerned.
or right acquired by the mill owner, so fra"
This right of water may be transferred like other property."
In Kicd v. Lab-cl,' the trial court had instructed the jury that an appropriator could divert the till extent of its appropriation at any point on the stream
3
so long as it caused no hann to other appropriators. ' The plaintiff objected,

If he admits, however, that he is not the owner of tie soil, and that die tact is established that lie acquired his rights subsequent to those of others, then, as both rest
alike for their foundation utpon appropriation, the subsequent locator must take subject to the rights of the former, and the rile, qui priorestin temporc, poiJer est injurc, must apply.

d. at 143.
131. 13 Cal. 33, 36 (1859).
132. d. at 39-40.
133. M.at 38.
134. 13 Cal. 220 (1859).
135. Id.at 232-33.
136. 15 Cal. 161 (1860).
evidence was to show that the defendants were entitled to
137. Id.at 179 ("The Object of this
a certain quantity of water for their Gold Flat ditch, and that they diverted this quantity through
their new ditch instead of the other, which it was claimed they had the legal right to do. The
evidence having been admitted, the Court instructcd the juiy in effect, that a person entitled to
divert a given quantity of the water of a strearn, may take the same at any point on tie stream,
and may change the point of diversion at pileasure, if the rights of others are not injuriously al-
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arguing that the effect was to give appropriators ownership of a certain amount
of water.'" The court stated that "jai right may be acquired to its use, which
will be regarded and protected as property; but it has been distinctly declared
in several cases that this right carries with it no specific property in the water
itself,' '3 but it upheld the trial court's instruction, stating:
[tihese authorities show conclusively, that in all cases the effect of the change
upon the rights of others is the controlling consideration, and that in the absence of injurious consequences to others, any change which the party
chooses to make is legal and 0proper. It follows that in this case the law was
conectly given by the Court.
Water litigation reaching the California Supreme Court slowed in the
1860s. The 1863 decision in McKL'nney v. Snmilh involved the claim by parties that had originally diverted water to clear the channel for placer mining so
that they could subsequently use this aimount for additional purposes in different locations. ' The court determined the original "appropriation" was for
limited purposes that did not include these additional uses. "' That sarne year,
4
the court considered a complaint by a
in Phoenix Water Co. v. Flecher,1
prior appropriator that a subsequent upstream darn and lumber mill was interfering with his use (for mining) because of alteration of flows and deterioration
in water quality. Using the language of the riparian common law, the court
stated that the rule of law was well established that "the owner of hydraulic
works on the stream above, has no right to detain the water unreasonably" and
must build and use the water in a manner that persons downstream can "parFurthermore, acticipate in its use and enjoyment without interruption."
cording to the court, "Itihe prior appropriator is clearly entitled to protection
against acts which materially diminish the quantity of water to which he is entitled, or deteriorate its quality, for the uses to which he wishes to apply it.""..
In Wxon v. Bear River & Auburn Water & Mining Co.," 7 the court rejected an argument based on
the theory that, in the mineral districts of ICalifornial, the rights of miners
and persons owning ditches constructed fbr mining purposes are paramount
to all other rights and interests of a different character, regardless of the time
fcctcd by the change.").
138. Id.at 180.
139. Id.
140. Id.at 181.
141. 21 Cal. 374 (1863).
142. Id.
143. Id.at 382-83.
144. 23 Cal. 481 (1863).
145. Id.at 486.
146. Id.at 487. The decision references Hill v:King, 8 Cal. 336 (1857), and Ber River&
Auburn Water & Mining Co. i' New York Mining Co., 8 Cal. 327 (1857), for the proposition
that, "the prior appropriator below was entitled to the water so as to fill his ditch as it existed at
the time of subsequent locations above; and that such subsequent locators bad no right to so
use the water as to diminish the quantity to which the prior appropriator %as entitled." Phoenix
Vater Co., 23 Cal. at 487.
147. 24 Cal. 367 (1864).
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or mode of their acquisition; thus annihilating the doctrine of priority in all
cases where the contest is between a miner or ditch owner and one who
of any other kind of right or the ownership of any other
claims the exercise
8
kind of interest.1

The court further stated that "Itlo such a doctrine we are unable to SuLbscribe, nor do we think it clothed with a plausibility sufficient to justiF, us in
combating it."''
Hill v. Smithi' involved the question of liability for the harmfl effects of
mining on an existing water supplier. The Court stated
That the defendant's work caused luge quantities of rubbish and sediment to
be deposited in plaintiffs reservoir and ditches, thereby lessening their capacity and entailing upon her additional expense in cleaning then out and
maintaining their original capacity, hardly admits of debate. And it is very
clear from the evidence that the value of the water for mining purposes, by
reason of the mud and sediment mixed with it by the defendant's mining operations, was diminished by from one-fourth to one-halft'

The court rejected the defendait's argument that he had conducted the
mining activities with ordinairy care and that plaintifl's harln was the conse-

quence of an unavoidable effect of mining. It reasoned that it was immaterial
how carefully the defendant had worked, because if his work in fact injured
plaintiff he was nonetheless liable.' 5' The court considered but rejected the
notion that conditions in the mining districts required changes in the common
law that might justify the injury here:
[Tlhe entire charge impliedly if not expressly proceeds upon and sanctions
the idea that as between ditch-owners and miners using the water of a stream
in the mineral regions of the State for mining tpurposes, the law tolerates and

winks at some uncertain and indeterminate amount of injury by the one to
the prior rights of the other. This is due in a great measure doubtless to the
notion, which has become quite prevalent, that the rules of the common law
touching water rights have been materially modified in this State upon the
theory that they were inapplicable to the conditions found to exist here, and

touchtherefore inadequate to a just and ftir determination of controversies
:
1 1
ing such rights. This notion is without any substantial foundation.

The HIlldecision prompted a sharp rebuke from mining lawyer and treatise writer Gregory Yale, who complained dat it "confoundledl" the principles
of appropriation and the common law riparian doctrine.' ' In his view, "Itihe
Yale further noted that,
two principles are the opposite of each other."'

148. Id.at 373.
149. Id.
150. 27 Cal. 476 (1865).
151. Id at 480-81.
152. Id. at 481.
153. Id.at 481-82.
154. YALE, Splr)1a note 109, at 194.
155. Id. at 194-95.
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"One admits of equality ... while the other is based on the priority of time." 6
Since, in his view, the conditions that waranted equality of right did not exist
on the public mineral lands of California, its principles no longer applied. 7
The continuing influence of the conmon law on the thinking of the court became evident later that year when the court applied riparian principles to resolve a dispute between two agricultural users on public lands.' "
The ability to make a change of use of an existing appropriation without
loss of priority arose again in Davis v. Gale.9 The Court concluded that
Appropriation, use and nonuse are the tests of his right; and place of use and
character of use are not. When he has made his appropriation lie becomes
entitled to the use of the quantity which lie has appropriated at any place
where he may choose to convey it, mid
for any useful and beneficial purpose
60
to which he may choose to apply it.

The principles that emerged from these cases were later summaiized as follows:
The waters of these streams on the public lands of the United States were all

subject to appropriation at any time by any person who proposed to devote
the water so taken to a beneficial use. The making of a diversion with such
intent and for such purpose would vest in the diverter, at once, the right to
use the water. No length of time of such use was essential to the acquisition
of the right. The water was treated as property having no owner. The rights
of the United States as riparian owner of the abutting lands were completely
ignored. With respect to contending appropriators of water from the sane
stream, he who was first in time was considered superior in right. Such right
vested by relation as of the time when the appropriator began the actual work
of constructing his diversion works and ditch for that purpose, provided the
work was done in such a manner as to be visible and to manifest to others his
intent and purpose to prosecute the work to completion, and provided further, that he did so and actually took and used the water. The right so obtained was a right to only so much of the water as was beneficially used. The
owner of such right was entitled at any time to change the place of diversion

156. Id.at 195.
157. Yale explained:

One admits of equality only, without regai-d to time, as between all the owners on the
stream, above and below, and between whom the maxim of the proper use of the water applies; while the other is based upon the priority of time, admitting an appropriation of the water for all time to come, of a quantity unlimited only by the use for
which it is taken, and this use is unrestricted, and may extend to tie diversion of the
whole streamn to distait points, leaving the natural chamel below entirely barren of
water, mid utterly destroying all riparian rights upon the streamn below, and qualifying
those above.
Id.
158. Ferrea v. Knipe, 28 Cal. 340, 344-45 (1865). Ultimately, the California Supreme Court
decided riparian principles should apply for uses on private lands. Lux v. Hagan, 10 P. 674,
782-83 (1886).
159. 32 Cal. 26 (1867).
160. Id. at 34.
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or the place of use, if the rights of others were not impaired thereby.'
In 1866 Congress finally ratified the actions of the miners on public
lands.' ' Section 9 of the Mining Act of 1866 provided that:
IWIhenever, by priority of possession, ights to the use of water for mining,
argicultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and accrued, and
the same are recognized and acknowledged lby the local customs, laws, and
the decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall
he maintained and protected in the same.""
The effect was to ratily existing water uses and to recognize the principle
of "priority by possession." Justice Field, who had served on the California
Supreme Court during the development of prior appropriation, atthored two
opinions in 1874 explaining ils meaning. In Atchison v. Peteson,'6 ' he declared:
By the custom which has obtained anong miners in the Pacific States and
Territories, where mining for the precious metals is had on the public lands
of the United States, the first appropriator of mines, whether in placers,
veins, or lodes, or of waters in the streams on such lands for mining purposes, is held to have a better right ihan others to work the mines or use the waters. The first appropriator who subjects the property to use, or takes de
necessary steps for that purpose, is regarded, except as against the government, as the source of title in all controversies relating to the property. As
respects the use of water for mining )ulrposes, the doctrines of the common
law declaratory of the rights of riparian owners were, at an early day, al'ter the
discovery of gold, found to be iiiapplicable or applicable only in a very limited extent to the necessities of miners, and inadequate to their protection. '6

161. Lucien Shaw, 77'e Development o/ the Law oflIttes in the West, 10 CAL. L REv.
443, 451 (1922) (footnote omitted). It is worth noting that this summary omits dhe water quality
protections generally found by the California Suprcme Court.
162. See Mining Act of 1866, supira note 104. In 1870, Congress expressly declared tat
patents were subject to rights established by pior appropriation. Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, §
17, 16 Stat. 218. In 1877 Congress declared all "surplus" water on the public lands to be available for appropriation. Act of Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (codified as aniended at 43
U.S.C. §§ 321-339 (2012)).
163. Mining Act of 1866, supra note 104, § 9.
164. 87 U.S. 507 (1874).
165. Id. at 510-11. He explained the rationale:
This equality of right anong all die proprietors on the same stream would have been
incompatible with any extended diversion of the water by one proprietor, and its conveyance for mining purposes to points from which it could not be restored to the
strean. But the government being the sole proprietor of all the pub)lic lands, whelther
bordering on streams or otherwise, there was no occasion for the application of the
common-law doctrine of riparian )roprietorshi) with respect to the waters of those
streanis. The government, by its silent acquiescence, asscnted to the general occupation of the public lands for mining, muid, to encourage their free and unlimited use for
that purpose, reserved such lands as were mineral irom sale and the acquisition of titie by settlement. And lie who first connects his own labor with property thus situated
and open to general exploration, does, in natural justice, acquire a better right to its
use and enjoyment thaii others who have not given such labor.
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Referring to California cases, Justice Field described the law of prior appropriation in the following terms:
The right to water by prior appropriation, thus recognized and established as
the law of miners on the mineral lands of the public domain, is limited in
every case, in quantity and quality, by the uses for which the appropriation is
made. A different use of the water subsequendy does not affect the right;
that is subject to the same limitations, whatever the use. The appropriation
does not confer such an absolute right to the body of the water diverted that
the owner can allow it, after its diversion, to run to waste and prevent others
friom using it for mining or other legitimate purposes; nor does it confer such
a right that he can ihsist upon the flow of the water without deterioration in
quality, where such deterioration does not deleat nor impair the uses to
which the water is applied."'
Then, in Basey v. Gallaghe;'7 Justice Field concluded that prior appropriation also applied to deterinine rights between two irrigation uses operating
on the public lands.' " Referring to Atchison v. Peterson, he stated: "[elver
since that decision it has been held generally throughout the Pacific States and
Territories that the right to water by prior appropriation for any beneficial
purpose is entitled to protection.' 69
In its 1872 Civil Code, California spelled out its law of prior appropriafion:
Section 1410. The right to the use of running water flowing in a river or
stream or down a cafion or ravine may be acquired by appropriation.
Section 1411. The appropriation must be for some useful or beneficial purpose, mad when the appropriator or his successor in interest ceases to use it
for stch a purpose, the right ceases.
Section 1412. The person entitled to the use may change the place of diversion, if others are not injured by such change, and may extend the ditch,
flume, pipe,
or aqueduct by which the diversion is made to places beyond that where the
first use was made.

Section 1413. The water appropriated may be turned into the channel of
another stream and mingled with its water, and then reclaimed; but in reclaiming it the water already appropriated by another must not be diminished.

Section 1414. As between appropriators, the first in time is first in right.
Section 1415. A person desiring to appropriate water must post a notice, in

Id.at 512.
166. Id. at 514.
167. 87 U.S. 670 (1874).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 683.
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writing, in a conspicuous place at the point of intended diversion, stating
there in:
1. That he claims the water there flowing to the extent of (giving the
number) inches, measured under a four-inch pressure;
2. The purposes [or which he claims it, and the place of intended use;
3. The means by which he intends to divert it, and the size of the flume,
ditch, pipe, or aqueduct in which he intends to divert it;
A copy of the notice must, within ten days after it is posted, be recorded
in the office of the Recorder of the county in which it is posted.
Section 1416. Within sixty (lays after the notice is posted, the claimant must
commence the excavation or construction of the works in which he intends
to divert the water, and must prosecute the work diligently and uninterruptedly to completion, unless temlporarily interrupted by snow or rain.
Section 1417. By "completion" is meant conducting the waters to the place
of intended use.
Section 1418. By a compliance with the above rules the claimant's right to
tie use of the water relates back to the time the notice was posted.
Section 1419. A failure to comply with such rules deprives the claimants of
the right to the use of the water as against a subsequent claimant who complies therewith."'
The law of prior appropriation developed in California as a means of
providing basic rules governing the possession of mining claims and water for
mining uses on federal lands. By granting a superior right to an unowned
thing on the first possessor, it sought to remedy the absence of authorization
by federal law. It adopted the principle of priority as a simple and f tir means
to sort out conflicts between two competing claimants when there was not
enough water for both sides. Further, it required that the appropriation be for
a useful or beneficial purpose to obtain the protection of law. It also reqtuired
diligence in its development and use to maintain the valuable priority right. It
allowed the point of diversion and place of use to change without loss of priority so long ats the diverter did not injure others thereby. Additionadly, the new
system included a posting system to provide notice to others and, as codified,
required users to record these notices with the county clerk. Finally, the new
system abolished the right upon the termination of its use.

C. THE SPREAD OF PRIOR APPIROPRIATION
Prior appropriation, especially after its recognition by Congress in 1866,
seemed to apply to uses of water on the federal public lands. In 1866, the
170.

1 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1410-19 (enacted 1872) (Creed Haynond &John C. Burch eds.,

1st ed. 1874), available at http://books.google.cons/books?id-loQOAQAAMAAJ&printsec

frontcover#v=oncpagc&q&f=falsc.

=
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Nevada Supreme Court applied appropriation principles to address a dispute
between two competing users of water from the sane source for irrigation on
public lands."' Three years later, the same court addressed the issue of who
held prior rights between two competing users of water on public lands; after
applying the requirement for diligence in completion of facilities, it decided
that defendant's claim was junior to plaintiffs claim.' 72
Then, in 1872, the Nevada Supreme Court decided that a party obtaining
a patent of federal lands with an appurtenant strean enjoyed riparian rights,
even as against a party previously appropriating the water of the stream. 7 In
addition, the Colorado Territorial Legislature enacted a statute in the late
1860s providing that
All persons who claim, own or hold a possessory right or title to any land or
parcel of land within the boundary of Colorado territory, as defined in the
organic act of said territory, when those claims are on the bank, margin or
neighborhood of any stream of water, creek or river, shall be entitled to the
use of the water of said stream, creek or river, for the purposes of irrigation,
mad makin, said claims available to the full extent of the soil, for agricultural
purposes.
In the event of insufficient water the law further established a mechanism
to "apportion, in a just and equitable proportion, a certain amount of said water upon certain or alternate weekly days to different localities, as they may in
their judgment think best for the interest of all parties concerned."''
Other
western territories and states, including Montana, also adopted these provisons. In 1872 the Montana Supreme Court considered what law to apply to
a dispute respecting use of a strean between two property owners, both riparian users.' While the two justices who wrote opinions both affirmed the district court decision, they expressed sharply contrasting views respecting the law
governing uses of water in Montana. Justice Knowles asserted that the common law had been displaced by the actions of settlers in the Territory, such as
the plaintiff claiming rights to use water on the basis of appropriation, and that
Congress in 1866 had recognized this custom as the basis of establishing rights
to water on public lands. '" Moreover, he interpreted the provision Montana

171. Lobdell v. Simpson, 2 Ncv. 274, 277-79 (1866) (acknowledging the development of
this law in California cases).
172. Ophir Silver Mining Co. v. Carpenter, 4 Nev. 534, 546-48 (1869); see also Proctor v.
Jennings, 6 Nev. 83 (1870).
173. Van Sickle v. Haines, 7 Nev. 249, 289 (1872). The court stated: "He became the owner of the soil, and as incident thereto had the right to the benelit to be derived from the flow of
the water therethrough; and no one could lawfully divert it against his consent." Id. at 256. The
appropriator used the water on non-iparian lands.
174. The Revised Statutes of Colorado: As Passed at the Seventh Session of the Legislative
Assembly, ch. xlv, § I (David. C. Collier ed., 1868).
175. Id. § 4. Apportionment was to be made by three commissioners appointed by the county probate judge. Id.
176. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 144 n.28.
177. Thorp v. Freed, I Mont. 651 (1872).
178. Id. at 655-56; see also id.at 660 ("The right to appropriate water for the purposes of
irrigation having, in our opinion, been acknowledged and recognized by the customs, laws and
decisions of die courts of this Territory, the law of congress comes in and says that whenever, by
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had adopted from Colorado as recognizing appropriation for irTigaion and
rejecting the common law.'78 Chief justice Wade, in contrast, believed that
prior appropriation was ill suited to the circumstances in Montana ivolving
patented land used for agriculture:
And because this princil)le of "prior in time, prior in right" became thus established in California, as applied to mineral lands of the public domain, an
elfort has been made in this Teritory to apply the same doctrine to agricultural or farming lands, hut the principle has never been acquiesced in by the
people, and is now in litigation all over the Territory. And it seems to me
perfectly clear that the reason for the doctrine as applied to trespassers upon
when applied to actual purchasers from the
the public domain, utterly fails
government of agricultural lands.'8
Chief justice Wade pointed to the provisions of the Montana statute for
shauing of water and concluded its intention was a rejection of prior appropriation."' He added:
So, then, we say that water for irrigation in this coUntry as naturally belongs to
the lknds through which the stream passes, in certain proportions as in other
countries it belongs to the land to supply the necessities of life. Irrigation in
this country is what rain is to other countries, and a monopoly of one would
be equally as appropriate as that of the other, and equally sustained by any
principle of justice and equity. As in other countries, the rains come to the
prior and to the subsequent locators of lands upon a stream in equal proportions, so in this arid country should the waters of my given stream be divided
18
equdly among the fIariners for the pl)uposes of irrigation.

In his view, the bestowal of absolute property rights in the flow of a stremn
to the first appropriator gave that appropriator extraordinary control of a limited water supply, potentially akin to a monopoly."' He concluded:
If this decision necessitates the adoption of the common law respecting running water, and the manner in which the same may be used and the rights incident thereto, we cap see no objection to it on that account. It may operate

priority of possession, te right to tie use of water for this purpose 'have vested and accrued,'

'the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and protected in the
salnc."').

179..Se icL at 657.
180. Id. at 667 (Wade, CJ., concurring).
181. Id. at 668 ("WIe say most unhesitatingly, that the whole purpose of the statute was to
utterly abolish and annihilate the doctrine of prior appropriation, and to establish an equal distribution of the waters of any given streamn in the agricultural districts of de Ten-itory.").
182. I. at 676.
183. Id. He added:
The doctrine of prior appropriation goes to the extent of (eclaring that he who first
appropriates the waters of a stream upon the government lands thereby acquires an
absolute pro)erty therein, as against all the world, which property is capable of being
bought and sold, mortgaged, devised, inherited and transmitted, from generation to
generation, like other property.
Id. at 678.
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unjustly in certain peculiar cases, but as a general rule it will secure justice
and equity. Whenever any old and long established rule or principle of law
is to be modilied or changed, it should be done with the greatest care and
prudence, for such rule or principle generally speaks the wisdom of long experience, much thought and much learning, and should not be inconsiderately trifled with. We believe our Territory should not form an exception to
the just operation of the rules and principles that govern and control the
rights and remedies incident to running water. We have arrived at this conclusion after much thought and study, having in view solely the interests of
our. people and tie prosperity of the Teritory. '
In language that presaged the message of John Wesley Powell, Chief Justice Wade concluded:
It is well known to any individual who has resided in this Territory for one
season, that there is not sufficient available water in the Territory for the
purposes of irrigation, and if the doctrine of prior appropriation, as contended for by appellants, is to prevail, long before one-tenth pail of the tillable
land in the Territory is subjected to cultivation the entire available water of
the country will have been monopolized and owned by a few individuals,
thereby defeating any advance in the agricultural prosperity of the country,
and thereby directly repelling immigration thither.
Powell's survey of the arid regions of the American West persuaded him
that access to water was the limiting factor in the region's development." His
major recommendation was to survey lands in a manner that would provide
such access. He did not object to prior appropriation, noting that western development depended on separating water from its natural channel.' 7 But he
feared that if water rights were transferable they would end up being concentrated in a few hands and suggested two limitations: that the "user right"
should attach to the land where used, not the individual or company; and that
the right should depend on the diligent development of the facilities necessary
to use the water.' " In effect, he was proposing a hybrid system in which the
user could take water from the stream as necessary to make the land productive, but the right stayed permanently with the land.
In its constitution drafted in 1876 in preparation for statehood, Colorado
broke new ground by declaring that "[tihe water of every natural stremn, not
heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be
the property of the public, and the sate is dedicated to the use of the people
of' the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided.'..
Colorado
added that "[piriority of appropriation shall give the better right" mad stated
that "Itihe tight to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to
184.
185.

Id. at 682-83.
Id. at 686.

186. Sce genemllyJ. W. PO\vEII. REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE ARID REGION OF THE
UNIrEI) STATES, vrrn A MORE DETAILEI) AccouNTr OF THE LANDS OF UTAH (2d ed. 1879).

187. Id. at 42 ("All of the waters of all of the arid lands will eventually be taken from their
natural channels, and they can be utilized only to the extent to which they are thus removed,
and water rights must of necessity be severed from the natural channels.").
188. Id. at 43. In his draft bills, Powell proposed that if the individual acquiring fide to land
(lid not begin irrigating his land within five years, ie right would lapse. Id. at 32.
189. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
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beneficial uses shall never be denied."'" The constitution's declaration that all
water was the "property of the public" was an indirect way of saying that it was
not the property of riparian landowners-an intention made explicit by the following provision, which rendered unappropriated water available for appropriation.'"' In this way, Colorado expressly adopted prior appropriation as the
sole means of establishing a private right to use water.
The Colorado Constitution's declaration that the waters within the state
were the property of the public also served to deny any federal claim of title to
those waters on public lands within the state. The California prior appropriation cases assumed the United States was the owner of the land and water and
that, either because of early Congressional inaction or because the 1866 Act
served as a grant of the right to use waters to those who had established rights
through possession and use, ultimate tide to all water on federal lands rested
with the United States. The Nevada Vu Sickle'2 case rested on that premise.
Additionally, in Thoip v. FReecl,' Justice Knowles based his legal conclusions
on federal ownership of water. However, in Colorado's constitution the state
was rejecting any notions of federal ownership of water and asserting instead
the authority of the state to establish rules governing rights to use all waters located within the state.' 4 The water belonged to the people of Colorado, the
constitution asserted, not the United States.
Not long thereafter, a dispute arose between landowners/irrigators situated
along St. Vrain Creek and others who diverted from the south fork of the St.
Vrain out of the watershed and into Left Hand Creek to irrigate lands they
owned.") The downstream riparian users, who had taken up irrigation after
the Left Hand users, discovered the existence of the diversion darn during a
period of drought and tore it out. ' The Left Hand users sued for damnages,
asserting their superior rights as prior appropriators."'. The downstream users
asserted their riparian righLs by pointing to the territorial statutes enacted in
the 1860s, and by arguing that prior appropriation was not tie law of Colorado until the 1876 Constitution and that they had patented their lands and used
water before then.'
The Colorado Supreme Court responded that prior appropriation had
190. Id.§ 6.
191. The common law had always (lenied the possibility of "ownership" ol"running" water
(water flowing in a stream), ard made clear the nature of the legal right enjoved by a ripalrial
A. DAN
landowner was usufructuau-that is, a right of enjoyment without owncrship.
TARLOCK, IAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURC1S, § 3.10, at 3-12 to -14 (2010) lhereinafter
TARLOCK, lAW OF WATER RIGHTSI. This physical property of water-that it does not stand still
in nature, that everyone in the state enjoys it, that it exists ats a product of natural processes, that
it is essential for all life, and that therefore tie court must consider water ats available for all to
use and enjoy-Roman law had identlied. THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN tit. 1,pts. 1-6, 65
(J.A.C. Thomas trans., North-Holland Pub. Co. 1975) (c. 553 CE).
192. 7 Nev. 249 (1872).
193. 1 Mont. 651 (1872).
194. See SCHORR, COLORADO, SuplYltnote 20, at 42-43 (stating that the Colorado Constitution prohibited the denid of the right to appropriate its order to prevent the legislature from
making exclusive grants to individuals or companies).
195. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 444 (1882).
196. Il.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 448-49.
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always been the law in Colorado.'" It declared that "imperative necessity" had
made it so:
The climate is diy, and the soil, when moistened only by the usual rainfall, is
arid and unproductive; except in a few favored sections, artificial irrigation
for agriculture is an absolute necessity. Water in the various streams thus
acquires a value unknown in moister climates. Instead of being a mere incident to the soil, it rises, when apprgriated, to the dignity of a distinct usufructuary estate, or right of property.
Economic considerations also demanded recognition of this law:
It has always been the policy of the national, as well as the territorial and state
governments, to encourage the diversion and use of water in this countiy for
agriculture; and vast expenditures of time and money have been made in reclaiming and fertilizing by irrigation portions of our unproductive territoly.
Houses have been built, and permanent improvements made; the soil has
been cultivated, and thousands of acres have been rendered immensely valuable, with the understanding that appropriations of water would be protected.
Deny the doctrine of priority or superiority of right by priority of appropiation, and a great part of the value of all this property is at once destroyed.
The Court found support in the language of a US Supreme Court decision,
Broder v. Natoina Water & Miing Co.,' in which the US Supreme Court
stated that congressional action in 1866 was a "voluntary recognition of a preexistIng right of possession, constituting a valid claim to its continued use, Irather than the establishment of a new one. " °" The Colorado Supreme Court
interpreted the territorial statutes as an expression of appropriation principles,
rather than riparian law."° To the argument that users should not be allowed
to use water outside of the original watershed, the Court responded: "the right
to water acquired by priority of appropriation thereof is not in any way dependent upon the locus of its application to the beneficial use designed."'
In 1885, the Nevada Supreme Court determined that local customs
should govern rights to use water on lands within the state.' The court found
support in the actions of Congress, and overruled Van Sickle." The court,
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 446.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 447; Broder v. Natoma Water & Mining Co., 101 U.S. 274 (1879).
Brode,; 101 U.S. at 276 (emphasis in original).
Collin, 6 Colo. at 447-48.
Id. at 449. The court added:

The doctrine of priority of right by priority of appropriation for agriculture is
evoked ... by the imperative necessity for artificial irrigation of the soil. And it would
be an ungenerous and inequitable rule that would deprive one of its benefit simply
because he has, by large expenditure of time amd money, carried the water from one
stream over an intervening watershed mid cultivated land in the valley of another.
Id.
206. Jones v. Adams, 6 P. 442, 447 (Nev. 1885).
207. Id. at 445, 447.
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speaking through Chief'Justice Hawley, stated:
ITihe ninth section of the act of congress conlirnd to the omners of waterrights ol the public lands of the United States the same rights which they
held under the local customs, laws, and decisions of the courts prior to its
enactment; that the act of congress (lid not introduce, and was not intended
to introduce, any new system, or to evince any new or (illerent policy upon
the paut of the general government; that it recognized, sanctioned, protected,
and conhirmed the system already established by the customs, laws, and decisions of corts, and provided for its continuance.In 1889, die Nevada Supreme Court followed Collin by determining that
the common law could not apply in Nevada because of the different physical
conditions in that state:
Its inal)lacability to the Pacific states, as shown in Atchison v. Peterson ...
applies forcibly to the state of Nevada. Here the soil is arid, and unlit for
cultivation Unless irrigated by the waters of running streams. The general
surface of the state is table land, traversed by parallel mountain ranges. The
great plalns of the state aliord natural advantages for conducting water, and
lands otherwise waste and valueless become productive by artificial irrigation.
The condition of the country, and tie necessities of the situation, impelled
settlers upon the public lands to resort to the diversion and use of waters.
This fact of itself is a striking illustration, and conclusive evidence of the inapplicability of the common-law rule.'
Wyoming also moved allirmatively to establish prior appropriation as the
rule governing uses of all water in the state. Wyoming's Constitution, adopted
at statehood in 1890,20 expressly adopted prior appropriation: "Priority of appropriation for beneficial uses shall give the better right.""' The constitution
also asserted state control of water: "The water of all natural streams, springs,
lakes or other collections of still water, within the boundaries of the state, are
hereby declared to be the property of the state."' In Moyer v Preston, the
Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that riparim principles never applied in
Wyoming."' The court, citing to Collin, noted that tie arid conditions prevailing in the state required the diversion of water for irrigation use and that there
was a much greater area of irrigable land not riparian to streams.' In a subsequent case involving a dispute between water users in Montana and Wyoming,

208.

kI.at 446.

209. Reno Smelting, Milling & Reduction Works v. Stevenson, 21 P. 317, 321 (Ncv. 1889).
210. WYO. CONsT. Ratification.
211. Id.art. VIII,§ 3.
212. Id.art. VIII, § 1; sce;so 18A6 Wyo. Srss. LAws 294, 299 ("Thc water of every natural
stream not heretofore appropriated %ithin
this Tcnitory, is hereby declared to be de properly
of the public, and ti stone is dedicated to tie usc of the people, subjcct to appropriation as
herein provided.").
213. 44 P. 845, 847 (Wyo. 1896) ("The common-law doctrinc rclating to de rights of a riiainU proprietor in de water of a natural stream, and the use thereof, is unsuited to our requircinents and necessities, and never obtained in Wyoming.").
214. Id. ("A dilierent principle, better adapted to the material conditions of this region, has
been recognized. Thai principle, briefly stated, is that the light to the use of water for beneficial
purposes depends upon a prior appropriation.").
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Willey v. Decker; Justice Potter of the Wyoming Supreme Court provided an
2
extensive discussion of the adoption of prior appropriation in western states. 1
He stated that-along with Colorado and Wyoming-Arizona, Nevada, and
Utah had fully embraced prior appropriation. 6 Montana, he noted, had followed California in only recognizing prior appropriation when practiced of).
public lands within tie state."' Nebraska had decided to allow both appropriation and riparian principles to co-exist in that state."'
In the landmark case of Lux v. Haggin, the California Supreme Court upheld the superiority of common law riparian rights over prior appropriation
on private lands in the state." ' The court examined the presumed policy reasons favoring adoption of prior appropriation and asked "whether the recognition of a doctrine of appropriation... would secure the greatest good to the
2
greatest number."1
The court noted that the appropriator "by his appropriation makes the running water his own, subject only to the trust that he shall
employ it for some useful purpose.22 ' It added:
lIlt does not require a prophetic vision to anticipate that the adoption of the
rule, so-called, of "appropriation," would result, in time, in a monopoly of all
the waters of the state by comparatively few individuals, or combinations of
individuals, controlling aggregated capital, who could either apply the water
to purposes useful to themselves, or sell it to those from whom they had taken it away as well as to others. 2
California still recognizes riparian rights to use water for private lands located on watercourses. 2 Those states that initially established a so-called hybrid system authorizing uses of water either on the basis of appropriation or
riparian principles now have shifted to prior appropriation only. 24 Yet, as we
shall see, the influence of some riparian principles such as reasonable use continues to shape the development of prior appropriation today.2
D. THE EVOLUTION OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION

While uses of water, for mining in the mountains of California drove the
early development of prior appropriation, uses of water for irrigated agriculture in the arid and seni-arid regions of the West motivated the evolution of
prior appropriation-especially concerning needs for public administration of
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

73 P. 210, 213-23 (Wyo. 1903).
Id. at 215-16 (citing cases friom Arizona, Nevada, and Utah).
Id.at 214.
IM.at 217 (citing Crawford Cnty. v. Hathaway, 93 N.W. 781 (Neb. 1903)).
10 P. 674 (Cal. 1886).
Ic.at 702.
Id.at 703.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Other western states where riparian rights may still exist arc Nebraska and Oklahoma.

TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS, supra note 191, §§ 5.11, 5.13, at 5-19 to -21.

224. In general, these states authorized tie transfonnation of riparian rights that people had
placed into actual use into prior appropriation rights. Id. § 5.11; see adso Frank J. Trelease,
Coordinationof Riparian and Approplivae Rihts to the Use of Water; 33 TE.x L. REV. 24,
40-41 (1954).
225. See infra note 401 and accompanying text.
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uses. In many respects, the. basic principles of prior appropriation have
changed very little from those established in the 1850s and 1860s. Perhaps
the most important fundanental development occurred early as irrigation uses
took center stage and water uses became more tied to particular lands. Unlike
the fast moving world of gold mining where water uses (generally made possible by companies established specifically as water suppliers) moved from location to location as needs arose, irrigated agriculture required the long-tenn
supply of water to particular lands. Irrigators, as landowners either individually or collectively, took charge of supplying their own water. While some private, lor-prolit companies entered into the water supply business for irrigation,
they were almost entirely unsuccessful. " ' Accordingly, the law shifted from
favoring the interests of water suppliers under which it gave them almost total
control of the water they diverted ad delivered to favoring the interests of the
users of the water-the irn'igators.
Samuel Wiel has characterized this shift as moving from an assumption of
rights based on possession of water to rights based on water's use."' The real
value of the water right was to enable the permanent settlement of lands based
on irrigated agriculture. Just as it had been important in Calilornia to protect
the investment of the water companies in facilities necessary to provide water
for mining, now it was important for the settler/landowner to control the water
right to protect his efforts to inprove the land. States extended prior appropriation to emphasize the importance of use.' While early prior appropriation recognized the requirement of use, the doctrine evolved to make use
(more accurately, beneficial use) its central eleinent." Simultaneously, the
courts began to emphasize the legal rights of the user, even in situations in
which a separate entity that had constructed the diversion and primary delivery facilities provided water."
The emergence of use as the central feature of prior appropriation also
brought attention to the nature and extent of the right. A use-based right restored the usufructuary status understood to be the nature of the right under
the riparian doctrine."' It erased any notions that might have arisen in the California gold fields that the appropriator was in fact the owner of the water it-

226. See PISANI, Supita note 93, at 85-98. Opposition to for-proiti water supply companies
was intense in Colorado in the 1880s. See DUNBAR, supra note 4, at 209-10; see also David B.

Schorr,

he Thxt ,Vater-lrivatilationDebate: Golorado Water Corpoi-atons in the Gilded

Age, 33 EcOLOGY L.Q. 313, 322-28 (2006). Most of these vcnturcs Iailed as a matter of economics. Irrigators simply could not alcord to pay the full costs of the water and opposed tie
idea of a company making a profit from delivery of water.
227. See WIE, \VATER RIGHTS, supra note 98, § 139, at 214-15. States also adopted possession as the basis of the right on the public domain because only the United States owned
land. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
228. Confusion continued, however, as mnmay assumed their right resulted from the "appropriation" of water-that is, its diversion and possession-aid regarded their possession as establishing ownership of the amount of water possessed and giving them he right to (1o whatever
they ished with the water. See infiv notes 270-71 and accompanying text.
229. .CWIIe .WAI'ER RIGHTS. supinoite 98, at 214-15.
230. See, e.g., Wheeler v. N. Colo. Inigating Co., 17 P. 487 (Colo. 1888) (discussing the status of a company supplying water).
231. See WiEi., WATER RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 216-17; see also Saunuel C. Wiel, Run-

jnig Wale,; 22 HARV. L.Rrv. 190, 199-202 (1909).
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Combined with state declarations of ownership of water, adherence to

the usufructuary concept underlined the responsibility of the user to make
careful use of the resource. Moreover, adherence to the usufructuary concept
highlighted the essential shared nature of water uses-that the commitment of
water to any given use may limit or preclude other valuable uses. As we shall

see, people like Elwood Mead picked up this concept and applied it as a basis
for extending public supervision over all human uses of water. 3
Basey v. Gallagher contains an important early statement reflecfing this
emerging awareness, in which Justice Field stated:
[Tihe right to water by pnior appropriation for any beneficial purpose is entitled to protection. Water is diverted to propel machinery in flour-mills and
saw-nills, and to irrigate land for cultivation, as well as to enable miners to
work their mining claims; and in all such cases the right of the first appropriator, exercised within reasonable lifits, is respected and enforced. We say
within reasonable limits, for this right to water, like the right by prior occupancy to mining ground or agricultural land, is not unrestricted. It must be
exercised with reference to the general condition of the country mad the necessities of the people, and not so as to deprive a whole neighborhood or
community of its use and vest an absolute monopoly in a single individual."
Similarly, Chief Justice Hawley (then of the Nevada Supreme Court) noted:
In a diy mad arid country like Nevada, where the rains are insufficient to
moisten the earth, and irrigation becomes necessaiy for the successful raising
of crops, the rights of prior appropriators must be confined to a reasonable
mad necessary use. The agricultural resources of the State cannot be developed and our valley-lands cannot be cultivated without the use of water from
the streamns, to cause the earth to bring forth its precious fruits. No person
can by virtue of a prior appropriation claim or hold any more water than is
necessary for the purpose of the appropriation. Reason is the life of the law,
mad it would be unreasonable mad unjust for any person to appropriate all
the waters of a creek when it was not necessary to use the same for the purposes of his appropriation. The law which recognizes the vested rights of
prior
appropriators has always confined such rights within reasonable limits. 2s
i s 235

Correspondingly, courts moved away from holding that the amnount of water appropriated equaled the capacity of the ditch in favor of a rule that the
quantity of water appropriated could be no more than the amount reasonably
necessary to accomplish the purpose of the appropriation.2
They began us232. See sup,a note 117 and accompanying text (appropriation provided ownership of diverted water).
233. See infra Part I.E.

234. Baseyv. Gallagher, 87 U.S. 670, 683 (1874).
235. Barnes v. Sabron, 10 Ne'. 217, 243-44 (1875).
236. See, e.g., id.at 244 ("If the capacity of his ditches is greater than is necessary to inigate
his farming land, he must be restricted to the quantity needed for the purposes of inigation,for
watering his stock and for domestic purposes."); Hough v. Porter, 98 P. 1083, 1102-03 (Or.

1909) (citations omitted) ("The result is that tie law has become well settled that beneficial use

and needs of the appropriator, and not the capacity of the ditches or quantity first applied, is the
measure and limit of the right of such appropriators.").
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ing the term "beneficial use" to refer to the anoufit of water that users may
appropriate (not as a type of use) and to make clear that diversion in excess of
this amnount constituted waste to which no legal right pertained. " Thus, in
Union Mill & Mining Co. v. Ferji7, the United States District Court for the
District of Nevada remanded the case back to a master to make findings:
[Wihether the defendant has adopted the mode which causes least waste in
taking the water l'rom the river, and if not, what mode consistent with the fair
and beneficial use of the water by him can be adopted; what means are employed to return the water to its natural channel, and are they the means best
calculated to prevent waste, if not or if none have been emlployed, what
method will best effect that object; what amount of water per acre is needed

during the irrigating season to irrigate defendant's land; some standard of
melasurement of the water, and the quantity ineasured by such standard,
flowing in the river and in defendant's ditch at the time mentioned in the

bill.m
As already mentioned, Chief judge Hawley recognized that the limited supply
of water available in most parts of the West meant users had to restrict their
diversions to their reasonable needs.") In Comhs v. Agriculturid )ich Co.,
the Colorado Supreme Court stated: "An excessive diversion of water cannot
be regarded as a diversion to beneficial use, within the meaning of the constituttion. Water, in this country, is too scarce, and consequently too precious, to
admit of waste."'. In Power v. Switze,; the Montana Supreme Court noted:
"The intention of the claimant is therefore a most important factor in determining the validity of an appropriation of water. When that is ascertained,
linitations as to the quantity of water necessary to effectuate his intent can be
applied according to the acts, diligence, and needs of the appropriator. ' .. In
the 1902 Reclamation Act, Congress declared, "benelicial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right."'
While the courts continued to use language emphasizing the importance
of economical use of water, there also emerged the view that it was better to
237. See KINNEY, supra note 32, § 911, at 1612-13 (footnotes omitted) ("But as an appropriator acquires no tite to the corpiis, or very body of water, and only acquires a right to the use
of such quantity of water within the extent of his appropriation as he can use economically and
without waste, he cannot lawfully acquire a right to am excessive amount of water foi the purpose for which he appropriates it, nor can he acquire a right to use the water in a wasteful manner andotherehy deprive others from its use.").
238. Union Mill & Mining Co. v. Ferris, 24 F. Cas. 594, 603 (D. Nev. 1872) (No. 14371).
239. Barnes, 10 Nev. at 233 (citations omitted) ("It logically follows from the legal principles
we have announced that the plaintil, as the first appropriator of the waters of Currant Creek,
has the right to insist that the water flowing therein shall, during the irrigatilg season, he subject
to his reasonahle use and enjoyment to the full extent of his original appropriation and beneficial use. To this extent his rights go, hut no further; for in subordination to such lights the defendrnts, in tie order and to the extent of their original appropriation and use, had the unquestionable right to appropriate the remainder of the water running in said stremn.").
240. Comhs v. Agric. Ditch Co., 28 P. 966, 968 (Colo. 1892).
241. Power v. Switzer, 55 P. 32, 35 (Mont. 1898).
242. Reclunation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, § 8, 32 Stat. 390 (now codified at 43 U.S.C. § 372
(2012)); see also N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 3; 48 NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.035 (2014); N.D.
CFNT. CODE § 61-04-01.2 (2013); OKtA. STAT. tit. 82, § 105.10 (2014); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 540.610(1) (2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-3 (West 2014); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-101
(2014).
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have the full amnount of water needed to produce the maximum amount of
crops thani to have a larger number of farms but all with inadequate water
supplies." This view emphasized the importance of priority in ensuring the'
senior user obtained tie full amount of his appropriation. Thus, Kinney -argued:
[Ojwing to the great scarcity of water in this part of the count-y, compared
with the amount which might be used if every one got what he wanted, or
needed, the rule of priority of right is the only one which could have been
adopted, and at the same time have the water do the greatest good to the
greatest number. In a strictly agricultural country, it is better that one man
who was first in appropriating the water of a certain stream should have a
well inigated farm from which he can ralise plentiful crops than that a hun-

dred families who have settled near the stream have barely enough water for
domestic purposes."'
In contrast, at about that same time Wiel suggested the idea of "reasonable priority," under which "the exclusiveness of a prior right should be recognized only to a certain degree, and that priorities should not be enforced when
to do so would be 'unreasonable' to water users upon the same stream,
though subsequent in tine of use."" He explained:
To-day the lands have been far more fully settled, the water users on many
streams are beginning to crowd each other, and the "exclusiveness" rule of
priority comes more and more in conflict with the community idea. Justice
is coming more and more to demand an equitable co-relation of the users
for the common good, and these changed conditions have caused here and
there revivals of the idea that the priority must be reasonable, all things and
evidence being considered, or it will not be fhlly enforced.'
Despite Wiel's forecast that the concept of reasonable priority would be a
"growing doctrine," the rule of absolute priority largely triumphed in the twentieth century.2 '

Consider this classic 1897 summary of the principles of prior appropriation by then US District CourtJudge Hawley:
Under the principles of prior appropriation, the law is well settled that the
right to water flowing in the public streams may be acquired by an actual appropriation of the water for a beneficial use; that, if it is used for inigation,
the appropriator is only entitled to the amount of water that is necessary to
irrigate his land, by making a reasonable use of the water; that the object had
in view at the time of the appropriation and diversion of the water is to be
considered in connection with the extent and right of appropriation; that, if
the capacity of the flume, ditch, canal, or other aqueduct, by means of which
243. See, c.g., Frank J. Trelease, Ia-w, W-ater and People: 7he Role of Water ILaw inConsernhg and Developing NaturalResources fi d West, 18 WYO. LJ. 3, 9-10 (1963-1964).
244. KINNEY, supra note 32, § 780, at 1355.
245. Samuel C. Wiel, 7"in'ory'in Western Water Law, 18 YA, LJ. 189, 190 (1909).
246. Id.at 194; see also WIFL, WATER RIGHTS, supra note 98, §§ 310-14, at 329-39.
247. See A. Dan Tarlock, Prior ApproplTation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L.
RE,. 881 (2000) [hereinafter Tarlock, PriorAppropriationl, for a more contemporary critique
of die priority rule.
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the water is conducted, is of greater capacity than is necessary to irrigate the
lands of the appro)riator, he %1II1
be restricted to the quantity of water needed fbr the purposes of irrigation, for watering his stock, and for domestic use;
that the same rule applies to an appropriation made for any other beneficial
use or purpose; that no person cal, by virtue ofl his appropriation, acquire a
right to any more water than is necessary tor the purpose of his appropriation."
He defines beneficial use in terms of the amount of water necessary for
the use and makes clear the size of the ditch does not determine the anount
of water legally appropriated."
judge Hawley continued:
Tihe intention of the appropriator, his object and purpose in making the
appropriation, his acts and conduct in regard thereto, the quantity and character of land owned by him, his necessities, ability, and surroundings, must
be considered by the courts, in connection with the extent of his actual appropriation and use, in determining and defining his lights."0
The considerations here identified suggest an active role for the reviewer of a
proposed
appropriation in what states and courts came to call the "duty of water. "
Judge Hawley's opinion went on:
TlIhe mere act of commencing the construction of a ditch with the avowed
intention of appropriating a given quantity of water from a stream gives no
right to the water unless this 1purpose and intention are carried out by the
reasonable, diligent, and effectual prosecution of the work to the linal completion of the ditch, and diversion of the water to some beneficial use. ,

Here he is restating the principle of relation back with the added requirement
that not only must the water user complete the ditch diligently, but also the user must in fact divert the water through the ditch lor a beneficial use.
judge Hawley then states:
ITIhe rights acquired by the appropiator must he exercised with reference
to the general condition of the country and the necessities of the conmmity,
and measured in its extent by the actual needs of the particular purpose for
which the appropriation is made, and not for the purpose of ohtaining a mo-

248. Union Mill & Mining Co. v. Dangberg, 81 F. 73, 94 (C.C.1). Ncv. 1897).
249. Id. ("llf the water is used for thc purpose of irrigating lands owned by the appropriator,
the right is not confined to the anount of water used at the time the appropriation is made; that

tie appropriator is entitled, not onlv to his needs and necessities at that fine, but to such other
andIfurther amount of water, within the capacity of his ditch, as would be required for the future
improvement and extended cultivation of his Iuids, if the right is otherwise kept up."). This
view that anuirrigation appropriation may expand (presumably with the same priority) along with

future needs seems inconsistent and only makes sense if the irrigator always intended to irrigate
additional lands that the courts have identitied in the original appropriation. Se, e.g., Laramie
Rivers Co. v. Le Vasseur, 202 P.2d 680, 684 (Wyo. 1949).

250.
251.
252.

Union MiI& Mmhing Co., 81 F. at 94-95.
See infia Part I.E.
Union Mill& Miing Co., 81 F. at 95.
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nopoly of the water, so as to prevent its use for a beneficial purpose by other
persons.
253

This statement highlights the concern about uses that unjustifiably interfere
with or prevent other valuable uses, but it limits the standard to evaluate use
compared to use generally exercised by similar users in the satne community254
judge Hawley's statement of principles next adds "that the diversion of the
water ripens into a valid appropriation only where it is utilized by the appropriator for a beneficial use."' Thus actual beneficial had become the touchstone of the legal right.
And finally, judge Hawley states:
ITIhe surplus or waste water of a stream may be appropriated, subject to the
rights of prior appropriators, and such an appropriator is entitled to use all
such waters; that, in controversies between prior and subsequent appropriators of water, the question generally is whether the use and enjoyment of the
water for the purposes to which the water is applied by the prior appropriator have been in any manner impaired by the acts of the subsequent appropriator.5

Others may use unappropriated water, but only so long as they do not impair
the senior's "use and enjoyment."
The only general principle missing from this summary is the ability to
make a change of use so long as it does not cause injury to other appropriators. Otherwise, even today it represents a generally correct statement of the
doctrine of prior appropriation. The shift to a use-based right and the evolution of beneficial use to establish the amount of water appropriated were the
last major doctrinal changes in prior appropriation until the introduction of
instream flow laws, primarily beginning in the 1970s. This development is
discussed in Part I.G, below. The next major development in prior appropriation was the inclusion of state supervision.
E. THE EMERGENCE OF PUBLIC SUPERVISION
The original version of prior appropriation that developed in the California mining regions worked well in part because little public supervision was
needed. Courts addressed disputes as they arose. In general, the rules were
simple and easily understood. With the development of more pernianent,
irrigation-based settlement requiring regular use of large quantifies of water
during the summer irrigation season, the need for supervision arose.
Colorado was the first state to respond to this need. In 1879 its legislature
enacted a law establishing water administration units called irrigation districts,
each with a water commissioner appointed by the Governor."' Water coin-

253. Id.
254.
255.

See infa Part II.E.2, concerning local custom.
Union Mill& Mining Co., 81 F. at 95.

256. Id.
257. 1879 Colo. Sess. Laws 94, 98-99.
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missioners were empowered to apportion water amnong the various ditches according to the priorities of their water rights and to close the headgates of
those out of priority." In 1881, the legislature provided for a judicial proceeding by which the priority lates of all water uses from the same source could be
i
law established the office of the State Engineer with
Another
deterlined.
die responsibility to measure streaun flows and the authority to determine
ditch capacity upon re(liest) That law also required ditch owners to construct and maintain measuring devices.2 '
Initially, Wyoming followed Colorado's lead, but in 1888 Wyoming started to add features and took a major leap forward when it adopted its constitution in 1889 aid new statutory provisions in 1890."3 The position of territorial
engineer, established in 1888, mostly followed Colorado's approach but also
directed the engineer to make recommendations for changes in law." Wyoming became the first territory or state to adopt a statute stating that nonuse
for a specified period (here two years) resulted in "abandonment" of the
right."' Elwood Mead became the first Wyoming territorial engineer in 1888,
bringing with himr from Colorado both his own research about other water law
systems as well as direct experience working for the Colorado State Engineer
He was familiar, for example, with William Hammond Hall's scholarly review of irrigation laws in France, Italy, and Spain."'; He knew George
Perkins Marsh's writings."' He had read John Wesley Powell's Report on the
Arid Lands. ' From these readings he becamne convinced that public supervision of hunman water use was essential to ensure that society enjoyed the greatest possible benefits from its water."' Mead believed that assertion of govern258. d. at 99; )UNBAR, supr inote 4, at 88-93. (stating that motivation for the use of water
commissioners resulted from ti well-kniowu dispute bctwecn the water users in the Greeley
water colony and subsequent upstream irrigators in the vicinity of Fort Collins).
259. 1881 Colo. Sess. Ltws 142, 142-61. Upon a petition to a district court to request a(juprompted the judge to appoint a
dication of priorifies within an irrigation district (water district)
relerce to take evidence and prepare a decree, and following adjudication, the clerk was to issue
a certificate to each claimant. Ic.
260. 1881 Colo. Sess. Laws 119, 119-21.
261. Id. at 121-23.
262. See WYO. CONsT. art. VIII, §§ 1-5; 1890 Wyo. Sess. Laws 91, 91-104; IA\WRENCEJ.
MACDONNEI., TREATISE ON WYOMING WATI-R LAw 8-16 (2014) [hereinafter WYOMING
WATER LxwI.
263. 1888 Wyo. Sess. Laws 116,116-17.
264. 1d. at 121. The Wyoming statute uses the word "abandonment," but this is actually a
forfeiture statute because nonuse alone for the statutory period provides the basis for loss of the
water right.
265. JAMES R. KiLUGER, TURNING ON WATER WrTH A SHOVEL 8-12 (1992); DUNBAR, supia note 4, at 93.
266. See STATE ENG'R OF WYOMING, THIRD BIENNIAL REPORT 57-61 (1896) Ihereinafter
THIR) BIE'NNIAL REPORTI; see generallv WIIIJAM HAMMOND HALL, IRRIGATION
DEVELOPMENTr: HISTORY, CUsTOMS, L\VS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS REIATING TO
IRRIGATION, WATER-COURSES, AND WATERS IN FRANCE, ITALY, AND SPAIN (1886).
267. See gcncrallv GEORGE PERKINS MARSH, THE EARTH AS MODIFIED BY HUMAN
ACTION: MAN AND NATtJRE. (1874).
268. See generalv POwELL, supra note 186.
269. KLUGER, sopra note 265, at 12. In language probably drafted by Mead, the Wyoming
Constitution prmides that, "\Vater being essenfial to industial prosperity, of limited aunount,
audi easy of (liversion from its natural chanels, its control must be in the state, which, in provid1, § 31.
ing for its use, shall equally guard all the various interests involved." WvYO.CONST. art.
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mental ownership of water was necessary lor this purpose."0

Because he

thought of water as part of the common heritage, he strongly opposed allowing
individuals or corporations to gain control of the resource independent of the
use to which it was being placed.' He believed there was an overriding public
interest concerning uses of water that needed to be considered when approving new uses.7 He resisted the ordinary application of principles of property
to water use rights, preferring to view individual control of a portion of water
for use as a privilege conditionally granted by the public. 3 As Mead saw it,
1

270.

For example, the Wyoming State Engineer's Second Biennial Report stated:

It was based on the belief that water being one of the gifts of nature the title
thereto should forever remain in the public; that such public ownership was recognized by the people of this State prior to the adoption of our State Constitution and
prior to the enactment of any specific law on this subject, and that in the adoption our
State Constitution such public ownership was made a part of the fundamncntal law of
this State; that such public ownership is not only in accord with our laws lut that the
greatest prosperity of our citizens will be secured by maintaining the limitations above
stated.
STATE ENG'R OF WYOMING, SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT 35 (1894) [hereinalter SECOND
BIENNIAL REPORTI. Mead added:
If state ownership is to be anything but a delusion, if it is to be more than nominal, there must be the same authority and control over streams and over diversion of
water as is now exercised by the general government over the occupation and settlement of public lands. No diversion or appropriation should be permitted, therefore,
until the sanction of the territory, through its constituted authorities has been obtained, and the beneficial character of the proposed use established. Such oversight
and precaution is necessary for the proper protection of public interest (public water
supply being of grcater agricultural value than public lands) and in order that controvcrsies growing out of extravagant and injurious claims may be avoided.
TERRITORIAL ENG'R, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 97 (1890) Ihereinafter SECOND ANNUAL
REPORTI.
271. In the Second Biennial Report, Mead stated:

INjo right to tie water of our streams exists except the right of use; that this right is
restricted not only to tie use by which acquired but to the place where acquired, and
that it cannot be separated therefrom; that to recognize the right to sell water is to
recognize a property right in water not contemplated by the laws of this State, and that
its recognition would work untold injury to the material interests of the State.
SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 270, at 34.
272. The Third Biennial Report stated:
It will also show that the rights of the public in streams have to some extent been
disregarded, and that the liberality, which permits an appropriator to take and use this
public property without cost, has not been appreciated, but on the contrary it has
been perverted to mean an entire sunender of public interest therein, so that the individual who has acquired a right to use water to irrigate a field has come to believe
that he owns that quantity of water whether he in-igates the field or not.
THIRD BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 266, at 39-40.
273. The Second Biennial Report stated:
The surrender by the public to the individual of this right of use and the protection
by the public of the individual in its enjoyment is a free grant from the public, the on-
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the public is oflering the perpetual use of its water because that use produces
benefits to society. But the offer is a highly circumscribed one: it is only of the
amount reasonably needed for the use; it is only for the specified use; it is
permanently ied to that use; and it is only for so long as that use continues.
Use of water is not to enrich an individual or corporation but to benefit the
pullic.Y To enable the widest possible array of beneficial uses, each user is
obligated to exercise care with the public's water-taking only what is needed
and using that amount with prudence." If the authorized use ceases, the water returns to the public for redistribution in accordance with needs and interesLs at that time.
The flndamnental requirement of beneficial use is unchanged with public
supervision, but the premise of prior appropriation is different.2' A use of water is no longer a matter determined solely by the individual or entity building
a diversion and conveyance works. Now, before any steps are taken to gain
control of water, an application for a permit is necessary. The application has
to specify the point along the stream at which the water will be diverted or
controlled, the amount of water (i.e., rate of flow) to be taken, the purpose lor
which the water is to be used, and the intended place of user 7 Under Mead's
system, a representative of the public must review the application, determine
the sufficiency of the inloration provided, ensure the potential viability and
utility of the proposal, and determine if there is unappropriated water in time

lv consideration bcing the public benefit to be derived therefrom. So long as this protection is afforded it Furnishes an adequate incentive to the outlay which may be made
in the construction of ditches or in preparing land to use the water, and this is as far
as the surrender by the public ought to go.
SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT, sulpra note 270, at4l
274. Ic.
27.5. The Tenitorial Engineer's Second Annual Report stated:
The theory has aparently been that whoever first. laid claim to the waters of a stream
acquired therein unrestricted ownership. This is shown in the absence of any supervision or approval being required when filing claims, in the extravagant character of
many of those recorded and in the views of citizens who are tamiliar with the law.
SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supr, note 270, at 96
276. Mead believed the move to public supervision eliminated the doctrine of prior appropriation:
As the demands upon the water-supply have grown, necessity has led to a gradual decrease in the freedom of the appropriator and ari increase in the control cxercised by the public authorities. This change has been so gradual that the legislatures
of Wyoming and Nebraska have in effect abadoned the doctrine of appropriation,
adthough retaining the word in their statules. The person wishing to use water must
secure a permit from a board of State oflicials, and the right acquired is not governed
by the appropriator's claim, but Iwvthe license for the diversion issued by the State authorities. This tendency toward public si)ervision is manifest in the other arid States,
and it seems only a qtICstion of time when the doctrine of apl)ropriation will give way
to complete public supervision.
EL.WOOD MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 82 (1910); see also Moses Lasky, supra note 58, at
39-40.
277. Lasky, supra note 58, at 38.
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and amount lor the stated purpose."' In this way, not only would good records about uses be developed, but also there would be a check to ensure that
the use would in fact benefit not only the appropriator but also the public.
Assuming the reviewer was satisfied on these accounts, then and only then
would the appropriator be free to move ahead. Importantly, however, the reviewer held the authority to deny the permit."'
Public supervision did not end here. Rather, the permif established the
period of time within which the facilities had to be completed to ensure the
would-be appropriator pursued actual water development in a diligent fashion.
The common law relation-back doctrine still applied so that if the appropriator completed the facilities in a timely fashion and then applied the water to
beneficial use, the law would protect the original priority date. The Wyoming
statute allowed for extensions of tine for good cause shown, but it provided
oversight and the means of administratively eliminating claims not actually diligently pursued.
Mead's system added another major innovation: administrative adjudication. Mead had witnessed the ineffectiveness of courts evaluating water rights
claims, relying heavily or exclusively on testimony of clainants who often were
themselves unable to accurately quantify their actual uses and were perhaps

278. Wyo. ENG'R'S OFFICE & WYO.WATER Ass'N, SEIECrED WRrTNGS OF ELwooD
MEAD ON WATER AIMINISTRATION IN WYOMING AND THE WEST 13 (2000) 1hereinafter
SELECT'ED WRITINGS1. According to Mead,
The most unfortunate feature, however, is the fact that the location and manner
of construction of (litches has been left entirely to the inclination or financial resources of the settler. There has been no preliminary control of the streams and the
waters have been diverted in a haphazard fashion, rather than in pursuance of a definite policy, having for its end their full utilization and economical distribution. As a
result, while we have many works of an excellent character, leaving in their admirable
design and substantial construction nothing to be desired, considered as a whole the
result is far from satisfactory. In many instances defective works make the proper supervision and control by the state extremely ditlicult and expensive. These evils will
in time undoubtedly disappear but they could almost wholly have been obviated by
the exercise on the part of the territory of an intelligent preliminary supervision over
the location and construction of all irrigation works.
1I.at 11-12.
279. Mead stated:
The policy of the territory refusing permission under any circumstances to divert
the public water has been seriously questioned, but a brief acquaintance with the evils
growing out of over appropriation will dispel that objection. Every ditch built in excess of the capacity of a stream means one of two things, either it will be a useless and
losing investment or those entitled to water will be robbed thereby, and as a rtle it results, to a certain extent in both. Nor should ditches be permitted to carry water
where the diversion is against the public welfare, as is the case with some ditches now
constructed. A large part of the productive wealth of this territory is in our grazing
lands and the water supply which makes them available should be as carefully protected and permnalnently secured to these lands as to lands reclaimed by irrigation; if
not done their abandonment must follow. I believe, therefore, that the ultimate benefits
to be derived from the use of our public waters will as largely depend on restraining injudicious diversion as in permitting appropriations which are beneficial, and that
the duty of the government is as nmuch involved in one as in the other.
SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supa note 270, at 98.
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more often inclined to inflate their claims in the hopes of future benefits." °
His solution was to place this responsibility in a board of engineers with the
technical knowledge necessary to determine the actual extent of use that warranted recognition under law.2" The Wyoming Supreme Court, in a thoughtful and well-reasoned opinion, upheld this procedure in the face of an attack
arguing that only courts could make such deterlninations."
Yet, as Mead later remembered, "Itihe idea of a public control which
would operate was not readily accepted.".'.. He added:
In fact, it was generally objected to, outside of those whose water su))ly had
been interlered with by diversions above, and this mental attitude was (ue to
the fact that these early irrigators had built their ditches and diverted water
without having to ask the consent of anyone. They had taken and used
streans just as they used the grass on the public range, and they fought control of the streun just as they fought all leasing laws for governing the range.
They looked on their water right as they did on a homestead filing, and they
thought tie claim which they had recorded gave them a Title to the amount
of water stated in the claim, just as their homestead filing g ave them a title to
160 acres of land. The idea of absolute right to the water claimed went even
further. They looked on the stream as they (lid on the air, as something to
be enjoyed without any limitation firom a public authority, and to be taken
just as they shot game or caught fish. 8 '
While first Nebraska and then other states adopted some form of the Wyo-

ming system over the next three decades, many were reluctant to fully em-

280. See id at 71-88.
281.

STATE EN(;'ROF WYOMING;, FIRST BIENNIAl REPORT66-67 (1892). Mead nlote(d thai

The evils which extravagant grants would in the end entail, would not at once be
manifest. Few persons have an accurate knowledge of the volume of water dhy have
)cen using, and few would, at first, appreciate the possibilities of an extravagant allowance. It is probable that the making of large appropriations would, for the present,

have been a popular proceeding for the Board, because it would have more nearly

coincided with the ideas of the great lnaJority of clainnimts. Those who believed
themselves to be die owners of 20, 50 or 100 cuhic feet of water felt somewhat aggrieved at ai order which only gave two or three cubic feet, and it was only a partil
satisfaction to be assured that this volume covered all the water that had ever been
used, and was ample for all their present requirements.

Id. The role of public supervision, in Mead's view, was to enable the fullest possible benelits
From use of water to all:
It is also necessary that in our administration of water laws we give as careful consideration to tie right of the last appropriator as is generally given to that of the first.
Where all the water of a stream is used, anything which augnents earlier rights robs
later ones. A careful study of the laws of many States and of the decisions of their
courts will show that this fact has not been properly considered, but that the tendency
has been to augment the irnl)ortance and unjustly extend the control of early priori-

ties.
THIRD BIENNIAl. REPORT, suprt'a note 266, at 39.
282. Farm hy. Co. v. Carpenter, 61 P. 258, 267 (Wyo. 1900).
283. SELEUED WRiTINGS, supli note 278, at 9 (discussing Mead's Recollections of Irrigation Legislation in Wyoming).
284. Id.
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brace Mead's approach. " Nevertheless, the states generally adopted the noion of public or state ownership of water, the requirement that anyone wishing to use water first file an application with a state entity, and the caveat that
an application could be denied under appropriate circumstances. "6 The states
established agencies responsible for authorizing use of water and for administering uses in times of shortages. 8 ' Several adopted statutory measures of the
lmaximum amount of water that could be appropriated. " Many adopted statutory forfeiture provisions under which a water right might be lost if it went unused for some specified period of time. 9 Several states authorized administrative tribunals to determine priorities, but others continued to use courts for
this purpose.'
Only Colorado (and Montana until 1973) continued to embrace the California mining camps' version of prior appropriation, under which any person
was free to divert and use water without state pemaission."8 In practice, however, would-be appropriators in Colorado apply for judicial recognition of
their conditional claims shortly after taking the steps of intent and notice necessary to initiate the appropriation. 2 The intfnrniation required in this application is similar to that required for permit applications in other states.
While the water court cannot reject an application on public interest grounds,
it must find all the other necessary elements, including that there is unappropriated water available and that other water rights will not be impaired." In
Colorado, the primary difference is that these are specialized legal proceedings in which a judge, trained as a lawyer, is simply determining whether the
applicant's materials meet the minimum legal requirements." Other parties
with water rights from the same source actively monitor all new applications to
protect their interests, and they often file statements of opposition to enable
them to participate in the proceeding and potentially affect the court's decision.' Without an independent means of evaluating information included in
the application for decrees, the courts depend primarily on the adversary sys-

285. DUNBAR, supiw note 4, at 113-32.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-317 (2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-202(3) (2014).
289. KINNEY, supnm note 32, § 1119, at 2022-25. Kinney, in his 1912 treatise, identified
eight states other than Wyoming that had enacted statutory forfeiture provisions. Id.
290. Id. at 2842, 2883.
291. TARLOCK, LxW OF WATER RIGHTS, supra note 191, § 5:44, at 5-77; MONTr. DEP'T OF
NAiTRAI RES. AND CONSERVATION, WATER RIGHTS IN MONTANA 2-3 (2012), available at
hlttp://leg.mt.gov/conteint/Publications/Environmental/2012-water-rights-handbook.pd f.
292. A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMEN-: A CASEBOOK IN LAW
AND PUBLIC PoLicy 304 (6th ed. 2009); see also GEORGE VRANFSH, VRANESH'S COLORADO
WATER LAW 100-03 (James N. Corbridge, Jr. & Teresa A. Rice eds., rev. ed. 1999).
293. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-302(1)(a) (2014); see also COLO. JUDICIAL DEP'T,
APPLICATION FOR WATER RIGHTls (SURAcE) AND CERTIFICATE OF NOTICE, JDF 296W
(2013), available at http://www.courts.state.co.us/Fons/renderFonn I .cfm?Forum= 175.

294. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(1); Lionelle v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 676
P.2d 1162, 1166 (Colo. 1984).

295. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-303(1) (providing that applications are first referred to a wa-

ter referee who is to make any necessary investigations and then rule on the application);
VRANESH, sttpra note 292, at 147-48, 166-67.
296. VRANESH, supm note 292, at 146-47.
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tern to raise issues."'
Colorado notwithstanding, the major developments in western water law
between the 1880s and 1920s concerned the emergence of a strong state role
supervising the issuance of new water rights and developing records reflecting
the priority, purpose, and quantity of rights from the sane source or supply"
Water right records inproved dramatically and, with improved understanding
of irrigation, appropriations of water more nearly matched actual needs. Priority remained the basis for resolving conflicts regarding use of water when
law
supplies became scarce. Otherwise there was remarkably little change ill
or administration for use of surface water until the rise of environmental concerns in the 1960s and 1970s.'
F. PRIOR APPROPRIATION AND GROUNDWATER
The law governing uses of groundwater developed more slowly than for
surface water. Early American decisions assumed the owner of land had the
right to access and use the groundwater underlying his property." Indeed,
some courts suggested that groundwater was an inherent part of the land, in
the sane manner as the soil."' Courts were reluctant to consider whether uses
of groundwater by one landowner might unduly interfere with the ability of an
adjacent landowner to access and use groundwater underlying his property,
often noting the lack of understanding of groundwater and its underground
movements."' From these decisions grew the doctrine of absolute ownership,
under which a landowner's right to extract and use groundwater found underneath his land was essentially unlimited." Eventually some courts began to
put limits on groundwater use occurring off the property, subjecting such uses
to the test of reasonability in which harm to adjacent landowners could be
considered."' Courts began distinguishing landowners' rights to capture un297. See CoIO. RFv. STAT. § 37-92-302(l)(b) (authorizing the State Engineer to participate
as an objector). In addition, the referee is authorized to make "investigations as are necessary to
determine whether or not the statements in the application and statcments of opposition are
advised with respect to the subject matter of the applications and
true and to become fully
statements of opposition." § 37-92-302(4). The referee is to consult with the state or division
the referee. ld.
enginecer who is to write a report. l. In some water divisions, the judge acts ;is
298. Lasky, sUpi; note 58, at 35-45; see also DUNBAR, So/w)m note 4, ai 209-11.
lII.C.
Part
299. See inti;
300. See, e.g., Road v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533, 534 (1850).
301. Id. at541.

302.

Id. at 537.

303. TARLOCK, LM\V OF WATER RIGHTS, supzia note 191,§ 4:6, at 4-6. Interestingly, there
was an assertion in court decisions during this period (aid later) that underground water flowing
through "subterranean channels" would be treated in the same manner a.s surface water. Ball v.
United States, I Cl. Ct. 180, 184 (1982) ("Waters flowing in a defined and known subterranean
stream or channel are, however, generally govenied by the same rules of law applicable to natiralwatercourses or surface stieauns."); Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859, 869 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1971) ("Subtenanean and percolating waters are governed by the rules applying to natural
watercourses on the surface."); HUelsniann v. State, 381 N.E.2d 9,50, 953 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977)
("However, as stated, when dealing with subterranean waters, it is only where Underground
streams of water flow in well defined and well known channels which can be traced that rights of
omership arise to die same extent as exists between riparian owners of surface water.").
304. See, e.g., Martin v. City of linden, 667 So. 2d 732, 734 (Ala. 1995); Meeker v. City of
E. Orange, 74 A. 379, 384 (NI. 1909); Forbell v. City of New York, 58 N.E. 644, 645 (N.Y.

1900).
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derlying water from ownership of the water itself.'
In any event, the law
closely linked the right to use groundwater to ownership of the overlying land
in a manner analogous to tie riparian law principle tying rights to use adjacent
watercourses to ownership of riparian land.
Early court decisions in western states tended to follow the sane principies, associating ownership of land with either ownership of groundwater or
the right to its use. 6 California courts developed a somewhat different approach, however, under which overlying landowners hold correlative rights to
the underlying groundwater in common with all others owning land overlying
a common supply and must share the resource reasonably."° In the event of
shortage, rights are allocated308in proportion to the surface area they own overlying the groundwater supply.
The application of prior appropriation principles to groundwater developed gradually in the West, first fornialized by statute in the 1920s and 1930s
by Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, and Utah.' Groundwater use in the American West burgeoned lollowing World War Two," ' prompting the need for
development of better laws and administration governing these uses. Today
most western states follow some version of prior appropriation for allocating
and administering uses of groundwater."
Rights are based on possession
(withdrawal) and actual application of groundwater to beneficial use." ' Overlying land ownership is relevant only to the matter of access and right of surface
use, not as the basis of the right to use the water. The extent of the right, as
with surface water, is based on the reasonable needs to accomplish the purpose of the use.3 3 Priority remains an element of the right, but its application
has been modified in some important respects to account for the physical nature of the groundwater resource."' Groundwater rights are subject to the
rules of abandonment and lorfeiture.
There are attributes of groundwater that raise special concerns for rules
governing its use-attributes not necessarily shared by surface water resources.
Most obviously, we cannot directly see groundwater, so our understanding of
its presence, volume, movement, rates of recharge and discharge, and response to human uses is imperfect."' In most areas of the western states, well

305. See e.g., Schenk v. City of Ann Arbor, 163 N.W. 109, 112 (Mich. 1917).
306. See WELLS A. HUTCHINS, U.S. DEP'T or AGIIC., MISC. PUB. No. 418, SELECrED
PROBLEMS IN THE LAw OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST 155-61 (1942).

307. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 769-73 (Cal. 1902); Tehachapi-Cummings Cnty. Water
Dist. v. Arnstrong, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918, 1001 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
308. Burr v. Maclay Rancho Water Co., 98 P. 260, 263 (Cal. 1908).
309. HU'rCHINS, sqpni note 306, at 157, 255.
310. KENNETH D. FREDERICK & ROGER A. SEDJO, AMERICA'S RENEWABILE RESOURCES:
HISTORICAL TRENDS AND CURRENT CHALLENGES 45 (3d ed. 2011).
311. TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGITS, supra note 191, § 6:4, at 6-4 to 6-6.
312. JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 439 (4th ed. 2006).
313. Id.

314.
315.
316.
(1998);

Id.
Id.
Helpful introductions to groundwater science include E.C. PIELOU, FRESH WATER
RALPH C. HEATH, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATR1 SUPPLY PAPER 2220, BASIC
GROUND-\VATI.R HYDROLOGY (1987), available at http://water.usgs.gov/pubs/wsp/wsp2220;
R. ALLAN FREEZE &JOHN A. CHERRY, GROUNDWATER (1979).
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punping and natural discharges may well exceed the limited anual recharge
of aquifers, meaning our uses cause a decline in water storage. States wrestled
with tie question of managing this mining of groundwater, an issue that is not
present with renewable surface water sources. Even if depletion of an aquifer
is not an immediate concern, the decline in an aquifer's water table or hydrostatic pressure affects existing users-and raises questions about protecting existing uses from new or expanded withdrawals that further reduce water or pressure levels."' In addition, many groundwater aquifers are closely linked to
surface waters, providing their base flow in winter months and adding additional water (and sometimes diminishing flows) along the surface water's
course." ' Pumping groundwater from linked aquifers can diminish stream
flows, and putting large quantities of water on land surfaces (such as in irrigation) can recharge underlying aquifers that then add water back to the
stream. " These considerations have required recognition in associated water
laws.
The concept of priority assunes the most senior user is fully protected to
the full extent of the appropriation if required for beneficial use as against all
those whose appropriations are junior. ' This concept has not worked well as
applied to groundwater uses."' The effect of fully protecting the most senior
groundwater pumper can limit or exclude additional water users from that aq2
uifer if those uses impair the senior's right."
Thus in Noh v. Stone]; the Idaho Supreme Court limited pumping from wells determined to reduce water
levels below the bottom of the senior appropriator's well, requiring the junior
pulpers to pay the costs of deepening tie senior's well and installing a more
powerful pulnp.. The Utah Supreme Court initially followed this approach. '
Then the Colorado Supreme Court decided that all well pumpers have an obligation to maintain a "reasonable means of etfectuating [their] diversion[s],"
which may require them to deepen their wells if it is within their economic
reach.
In consequence, senior groundwater appropriators are not protected
its to any particular groundwater level or pressure. While they have a legally
recognized right to use some portion of the groundwater, they may need to
take the additional steps necessary to maintain their access to that water."'
Similarly, the concept of priority would seem to require limiting the nuinher of appropriators withdrawing water from an aquifer substantially in excess
317. Se, e.g., City of Colo. Springs v. Bender, 366 P.2d 552, 556 (Colo. 1961); Mathers v.
Texaco, Inc. 421 P.2d 771, 776 (N.M. 1966); Current Creek Irrigation Co. v. Andrews, 344
P.2d 528,531 (Utai 1959).
318. THOMAS C. WINTER 1T AL., U.S. GEOI.OGICAL SURVEY, CIRCULAR 1139, GROUND
WATER ANt) SURFACE WATER: A SINGi.E: RESOURCE 10-11 (1998), avaiible at
http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/circ 1139/pdt/circl 139.pdf.

319.
320.

Id.
See, e.g., Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Mover, 39 P.3d 1139, 1148 (Colo.

2001).
321. See, cg., Fellhater v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968); Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods,
Inc., 513 P.2d 627, 634 (Idaho 1973).
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

See, e.g., Noh v. Stoner, 26 P.2d 1112, 1113-14 (Idaho 1933).

Id.
Current Creek Irrigation Co. v. Andrews, 344 P.2d 528, 530-31 (Utah 1959).
City of Colo. Springs v. Bender, 366 P.2d 552, 555 (Colo. 1961).
Id. at 556.
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of its recharge. In fact, many states do just that for heavily used aquifers by
establishing some kind of special management regime that may limit or preclude the issuance of new or expanded permits and even regulate the rate of
withdrawals and the manner in which the water is used."' By comparison,
New Mexico allowed a new appropriation of groundwater from a supply
whose economic life for irrigation use had been determined to be forty
years. 28
The problem of integrating uses of tributary groundwater with uses of surface waters is, in some respects, made easier when prior appropriation applies
to both types of uses. The leading example is Colorado, which began the
work of integrating these uses in 1969 by applying the rule of priority.aa Junior
users of tributary groundwater can be curtailed if their uses interfere with or
harm the uses of senior surface water appropriators."
If groundwater users
are able to replace their depletions to the stream in quantity and timing, however, they are allowed to continue their pumping." Idaho has recently instituted a similar progranL." Priority remains the basic rule determining superiority of right when water is insufficient to meet all uses, but a replacement
mechanism is provided to enable out-of-priority groundwater use so long as
there is no harn to senior rights.'
While the general principles of prior appropriation now are applied to
groundwater uses in most western states, they have been modified to meet the
particular problems associated with use of this source of water. We turn next
to the most recent change in western water law-protecting instrean flows.
G. PROTECTING INSTREAM FLOWS
The emergence of interest in maintaining streamn flows for environmental
and recreational purposes ran headlong into the traditional view that diversion
of water out of a stream was an essential element of an appropriation. How
then could there be legal protection under prior appropriation for maintaining
flows of water instrean? Moreover, could leaving water instrean constitute a
beneficial use as traditionally understood? Finally, if there were to be legal
protections, who could seek and hold such protection and for what purposes?
It is perhaps- instructive to note that the franmework applied in many western
states to protect what are essentially public values of water was that initiated to
establish private rights-appropriation.
The states have proceeded to answer these questions in their own ways
and in their own time, but the trend is clear: flows needed to protect in-place
327. See Susan Batty Peterson, Designation alnd Potection of Critieal GroundwaterAreas,
1991 BYU L. Rev. 1393, 1417-18 (1991).
328. Mathers v. Texaco, Inc., 421 P.2d 771, 774 (N.M. 1966).
329. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(1)(a)-(b) (2014) (adding the consideration of mLxi mum
utilization, reflecting de state's authorization of augmentation plans to replace water depletions
fron groundwater pumnping).

330. Secid. § 37-92-301(3).
331. See id. § 37-92-103(9) (defining augmentation and stipulating that replacement occurs
under a plan for augmentation).
332. See IDAHO ADMIN. ConE r. 37.03.11.000-.010 (2014).
333. See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Out-of-Prioriv Water Use: Adding Flexibilii,to the 144iterAppropnation System, 83 NEB. L. REv. 485, 486-97, 529-31 (2004).
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values such as tishenies may be protected under state law from future appropriation, but generally only by a designated state agency and for the minimm
m
amrount of flow necessary to accomplish the intended purpose."
For those
states applying the approl)riation doctrine to protect instream flows, it becamne
necessary to eliminate the traditional diversion requirement and to declare
flow maintenance for specified purposes to be a beneficial use of water.' A
lew states have simply exercised their broad authority respecting uses of water,
either by withdrawing certain portions of watercourses from additional appropriation or by reserving some specified
portion of the remaining unappropri33
ated flows for instream purposes.
This recognition of environmental instrean values of water represented a
significant shift in thinking about water. It reflected the changing values of
many people living in the American West, their increasing interest in using
rivers for recreational purposes, and their interest in protecting the remaining
environmental functions and values of their hydrologic systems. From a doctrinal perspective the changes were modest. It had long been recognized that
a diversion might not be necessary to accomlplish the intended water use."
And courts have acknowledged that the concept of beneficial use is dynamnic,
changing with changing values and interests." In general, states have imposed
13

334.

There is a growing literature on the law of instrcam flow protection. See, e.g., Steven J.

Shupe & Lawrence J. Macl)onnell, lecogniz'ing the Vldue ofi-Plaee Uses of IWv7ter in the
West: An Introduhctionto 'the Law5, Strategies, and Issues, in INSTRI.-AM FLOW lPROTECIION IN
THE WFsr, at 1-6 (LawrTence J. MacDonnell, Teresa A. Rice & Steven J. Shupe, eds. 1993).
This state-bv-state summar' was followed by a more topical discussion of instream flow policy.
DAVID M. GILLIL\AN & THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTREA,M FLOW PROTECIHON: SE:KING A
BAIANCI: IN WESTERN WATER USE (1997). A series of law review articles followed. See, e.g.,
Cvnthia F. Covell, A Sum ev of State histream liow' Prognainsli the
estern United States, 1
U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 177 (1998); see adso Adell Louise Amos, The Use o/'State histream
on'I, lws fb FedelralDuls: Respecting State Control hVhle Meeting Iet'emal Juiposes,36
ENVTL. L. 1237, 1239-40 (2006); Charlton H. Bonlhan, Perspecivesti-oni the Field:A Review
of*l4estern Instream H'ow Issues and Reconnendations fbr a Neiv 14'hter Ptiture,36 ENVTL.
L. 1205 (2006); Jesse A. Boyd, Note, Hipj)Deep: A Suev of State histream Flow Law li-oni the
Rocv Motntains to the Pcific Ocean, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1151, 1152 (2003). The Colorado Water Conservation Board supported a comprehensive analysis of instrean flow prograis in western states. See generli]SASHA CHARNEY, COLO. WATER CONS ERVATION BD.,
)ECADES DOWN THE ROAD: AN ANALYSIS OF INSTRFAM Fi.ow PROGRAMS IN COLORADO AND
THE WESTERN JNITED STATES (2005). Trout Unlimited commissioned a report focusing on
the transactional aspects of shifting existing water uses to environmental flows. STEVEN
MALLOCH, TROUr IJNImrrIED, LIQUID ASSETS: PROTECINC AND RESTORING THE WEST'S
RIVERS AND WE IANDS THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL WATER TRANSACTIONS 17 (2005), available
at
http://wvw.tu.o-g/atf/cf/%7BED0023C4-FA23-4396-9371-85091)C5B4953%7D/
Midloch.UquidAssets.2005.pdl For a discussion of relevant laws in all states as well as the Canadian provinces, see Lawrence .. Macl)onnell, Retturn to the River: Environmental low Polic wi the United States and Canada,451. AM. WATER RI.-S. ASs'N 1087 (2009).
335. See, e.g., hi re Adjudication of Existing Rights to the Use of All the Water, Both Surface and Underground, Within the Missouri River Drainage (Bean Lake 11), 55 P.3d 396,
401-02 (Mont. 2002).
336. Se, e.g., Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Environmentall'ow: ul the Rocky Motid West:
A Progress Repol, 9 WYO. L. REV. 335, 359-61 (2009) [hereinafter Envim,01menta] Mlowsl
(discussing the Montana programn).
337. Sec; e.g., Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530, 532-33 (1883).
338. See, e.g., Bean Lake I11, 55 P.3d at 400-01; Idaho Dep't of Parks v. Idaho l)ep't of
Water Admin. (In re Permit Application No. 37-7108), 530 P.2d 924, 926-31 (Idaho 1974); In
re All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 835 P.2d 273, 279 (Wyo. 1992).
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strict limits on setting aside such flows because of continuing concerns about
the need for additional consumptive uses of water."' Nevertheless, instream
flow protection is now an accepted use of water in virtually all prior appropriation states."'
We turn now to a discussion of the existing law of prior appropriation and
proposed changes to that law.
II. A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION TODAY
A. INTRODUCTION
The following assessment is intended to be a substantially comprehensive
consideration of how effectively the major elements of prior appropriation in
their present lorn are meeting today's needs. It begins with a reconsideration
of the principle of priority, examines the legal significance of public ownership, turns to the constitutionally-protected property in a prior appropriation
water right, then moves to a suggested refraining of the beneficial use concept.
It then takes up the matter of conditional rights, addresses changes of use, examines forfeiture and abandonment, considers instream flow protection, and
concludes with a discussion of adjudication. In each topic area, the existing
law is recapitulated, its perceived shortcomings identified, and suggestions for
improvements are made. Proposals are reasonably specific and are tied directly to the existing law so that the proposed changes are evident. While
these changes are proposed in the belief that they would be beneficial, no pretense is made that they alone would resolve the many issues tacing western
states respecting uses of water." In a few cases, policy suggestions are made
that go beyond revision of prior appropriation, but the focus of this paper is
this existing body of law and ways for its improvement. This examination begins with the principle of priority.
B. PRIORITY
Assigning superiority of right on the basis of priority took root as a custom
in the frontier world of mining, in which it provided a simple and easily understood basis for sorting out disputes. It comported as well with a fundamnental sense of fairness, captured in the maxim "first in time is first in right." The
need to protect the investments companies made to build the substantial facilities needed to control and deliver water to ever changing places of use was a
compelling rationale. That rationale remained, though perhaps in less-

339. See, e.g., Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. Wash. State Dep't of Ecology, 311 P.3d 6,
8 (Wash. 2013).
340. Covell, supra note 334, at 180-90.
341. Management and use of water in the American West is heavily influenced by federal
law and policy-a matter largely unaddressed in this paper, but an important one in making a
full consideration of how law affects uses of rivers, aquifers, id their water. See generally
Getches, Aletinoiphosis, supra note 41, at 53-55. Moreover, the more fundamentd legal
changes that are necessary go beyond tie framework of prior appropriation and are foreshadowed by tie changes presently underway in Australia. See, e.g., Robert David Pilz, Lessons in
Vater Policy Innovation /ore the World's DriestInhabited Continent: Using WIater Allocaion Plans and Water Markets to Manage Vater Scarcit 14 U. DENV. WrER L. RlEv. 97,
120-21 (2010).
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compelling forn, as the predominant uses of water shifted to irrigation and
water users nore often developed their own water and generally opposed private conpanies providing water. Under these circumstances, the rationale
appeared to shift to ensuring that at least some irrigators-those first to settle in
a given watershed-could secure a reliable supply of water year after year."'
This preference for those first in time, however, ram contrary to the competing
interest in enabling widespread settlenent of the land, supported in important
part by irrigation, and with tie value of sharing in the use of water as a gift of
nature. ' These competing impulses caused sone courts to search for ways to
moderate the harshness of absolute priority and to introduce considerations
such as reasonable use to take into account the actual needs associated with a
S'
senior s use.
The treatise-writer Samuel Wiel proposed the concept of "reasonable
priority" in a 1909 law review article.:' In his view, "bjlustice is coming more
341

and nore to demand an equitable co-relation of the users for the conmon
good, and these changed conditions have caused here and there revivals of the
idea that the priority must be reasonable, all things and evidence being considered, or it will not be Fully enforced.""' More recently, Professor Tarlock
suggested that priority no longer mattered in practice."' Rather, he asserted,
"pl)riority's nodern significance lies in the threat of enlorcement rather than
the actual enforcement because it encourages water users to cooperate either
to reduce the risk of enfbrcenment to as close to zero as possible or to share
nore equitably the burdens of shortages." "

In response to this rather opti-

mistic view, Justice Hobbs argued that priority, "the iost misunderstood stick
in the bundle of a water right," remained an essential elenent of a fthnctioning
system of water rights mad that priority-based administration is necessary so
that appropriators can enjoy their legal rights."'
Priority renains the basis of water rights administration across the western
prior appropriation states.

On streams where uses exceed supplies, junior

rights are regularly curtailed so that senior users can divert their legally-authorized water. These junior users typically totally cease diversions so
that the senior users can enjoy "the full extent" of their right." No considera-

342. See, e.g., KINNEY, stpa note 32, § 780, at 1355 ("In a strictly agricultural country, it is
better that one man who was first in appropriating the water of a certain stream should have a
well irigated fum from which he can rdse plentiful crops tlan that a hundred families who
have settled near tie stream havc barely enough water for domestic purposes.").
343. SCHORR, supra note 20, at 68.
344. .See supia notes 236-42aud accompanying text.
345. Wiel, supra note 231, at 194.
346. Id.
347. Tarlock, PI-orAppropriation,sup1-i note 247, at 883.
348. Id.
349. Hobbs, Priority,supia note 24, at 44 ("To Function effectivelv, priority muns be emploved in determining if mid how much unappropriated water remains for appropration by
new users, taking into account actual river conditions in the operation of perfected water rights.
To function effectively, priorities must also be enforced in tines of short supply. If not, distribution of water is ca)ricious and water user self-help occurs to the detriment of senior rights."
(footnote onitted)).
350. See, e.g., Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1148-49 (Colo.
2001) (p,'oviding a useful discussion of priority enforcement).
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lion is given to the relative economic value of these uses; uses are made strictly
according to the time in which they first were made." Since the most senior
rights are held by the owner of the lands first settled within a watershed, these
rights most often go to support the agricultural uses of these lands. Yet today
irrigation uses of water in most parts of the West generate only a modest economic return from that use."'
The effect of priority administration on a watercourse is determined in
part by the degree to which diversions and withdrawals have been authorized
and are sought to be made in excess of the reliably available supply." In such
"over-appropriated" water sources, priority administration is likely to happen
regularly. It is not unreasonable to point out that those obtaining junior rights
from a fully- or over-appropriated source should be on notice that their uses
are likely to be restricted or curtailed. Presumably they went ahead with the
appropriation with this understanding and determined that the appropriation
nevertheless made sense. Unfortunately, it may not be entirely accurate to assume that these appropriators in fact understood that their uses would be'regularly shut down. Records of actual water use are notoriously unreliable. Uses under previously permitted rights vary, especially in irrigation, and may
legally increase if crop prices improve. Flows may have been gauged in a period of above-average precipitation, such as with the Colorado River in the
early 1900s, leading people to believe such supplies were in fact reliably available long-tenn.' 5 Apparent flows may include significant anounts of imported
water that can and will be increasingly consumed as water becomes more valu-

351. Charles W. Howe, Water Law and Econonics:An Assessment of l?iver Cdls and the
,South JPlatte Well Shut-lon, 12 U. DENy. WATER L. REv. 181, 186 (2008) ("The underlying
priority-etliciency contlict occurs because there is a low correlation between water right prioritics and the values (net incomes) those rights generate."). The economic inefficiencies potentially inherent under this system are illustrated in Howe's analysis of the effect of the priority
system on water uses in the South Platte basin during the serious drought of 2006. Id. at 183187.
352.

See EtIZABI.ETH SCHUSTER ET A1,.,UNDERSTANDING THE VALUE OF WATER IN

AGRICULTURE: TOOLS FOR NEGOTIATING WATER TRANSFERs 5-7 (2011), for a helpful introduction to determining the economic value of irrigated agriculture. See generally ROBERT A.
YOUNG, DEFERMINING THE ECONOMIC VAI.UE OF WATER: CONCEIrS AND METHOI)s (2005),
for a more theoretical treatment.
353. For many years, Colorado courts decreed ights to appropriate water so long as there
was evidence that water might be available, based on the misguided view that Colorado's constitution prohibited denial of an appropriation. Cf Humphreys Tunnel & Mining Co. v.Frank,
105 P. 1093, 1096 (Colo. 1909). Fortunately, the courts came to accept the idea that they were
not denying the right to appropriate water if there was no unappropriated water available. Lionelle v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 676 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Colo. 1984); Se. Colo.Water Conservancy Dist. v. City of Florence, 688 P.2d 715, 717-18 (Colo. 1984). The effect is
that there are decreed rights to divert and use water on streamns running east out of the Rocky
Mountains that far exceed the available waler supply.
354. See, e.g., McDonald v. State, 722 P.2d 598, 602 (Mont. 1986) ("We can also accept as
true their contention that the volune of water used by irrigators tipto or within the limit of their
appropriation rights would vary greatly from year to year depending upon circumstances not
within the control of the irrigators, such as climatic conditions from year to year, subsoil types,
lengths of the ditches, l)orosity, permeability, di, years, wet years and so on.").
355. See, e.g., John U. Carlson & Alan E. Boles, Jr., Contri, Views of the Lawofie Colorado River: An Ewanination of Rivalries Between the Upper and Lower Basins, 32 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. §§ 21.01, 21.051lllb]lil (1986); David H. Getches, Competing Dlemands
for the ColoradoRiver, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 413, 425-26 (1985).
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able.' We have learned that even the longer-term historical record cannot be
considered a reliable guide to future water availability in a warming world."
In some respects this discussion is moot because so many streams are already fully- or over-appropriated. The water rights already exist. Few new,
large water appropriations are still possible. Still it seems worth mentioning
that states should at this point be conservative when considering any new appropriations. A more significant concern is with the enormous number of
conditional rights/unused permits outstanding that may become absolute-that
8
is, may be placed to actual beneficial use.&
As we will discuss, many of these
conditional claims are potentially senior to existing uses. In an increasingly
flow-limited world, these senior conditionals will displace some already existItg uses.
The Colorado Supreme Court experimented with a concept it called
"maximum utilization" when faced with the (tilemna of potentially having to
curtail all junior tributary wells along the lower Arkansas River that were depleting surface flows used by senior rights holders."" The court explained:
It is implicit ill these constitutional provisions that, along with vested rights,
there shall be mavimum utihiation of the water of this state. As administration of water approaches its second century the curtain is opening upon the
new drama of maximum utilization and how constitutionally that doctrine
can be integrated into the law of vested tights. We have known for a long
time that the doctrine was lurking in the backstage shadows as a result of the
accepted, though oft violated, principle that tie right to water does not give
the right to waste it.3 6'
The court soon found it had opened a problematic door, with people attempting to obtain water rights through removal of phreatophytes growing oil the
banks of streamns,"2 by cutting down trees and claiming the saved evapotranspiration, 3 and by paving land surl'aces."' On the other hand, this doctrine has
been cited in support of allowing out-of-priority groundwater use under a plam

356. See Lawrence 1. MacDonnell, Colorados Law of "Undeiground Wate": A Look al the
Sout Platte Basin and Beyond, 59 U. COLO. I. REv. 579 (1988), for a discussion on imported
water in South Platte River masking the effectls of groundwater pumping.
357. BUREAU Ot, RECLAMATION, I)EP'T OF THE INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER INTERIM
GUIDEINES FOR LOWER BASIN SHORTAGES AND COORDINATED OPERATIONS FOR IAKES
POWELL AND MEAD FINAl, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, APPENDIX U: CLIMATE

TEtCHNICAL WORK GROU REPORT, at U-I (2007), available at http://wwwv.sbr.gov/lc/region/

p)rograms/strategies/FEIS/AppU.pdtl
358. See ili'd Part II.F.
359. For an exaunple involving conditional waler rights For oil shale see LAWRENCE

J.
MAcDONNELL, WESTERN REs. ADVOcATFs, WATER ON THE RocKS: O11, SHALE WATER

RIGHTS IN COtLORADO vi (2009), avmlable at http://www.westernresorceadvocates.org/media!

)(1/waterontherocks.pd(l.
360. Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968).
361.
362.

Id. at 994 (emphasis in original).
Sc. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d 1321, 1327 (Colo.

1974).
363. Giflien v. State, 690 P.2d 1244, 1246-48 (Colo. 1984); Sec also RJ.A, Inc. v. Water
Users Ass'n of Dist. No. 6, 690 P.2d 823, 824 (Colo. 1984).
364. 5eeCot.o. REV,. STAT. § 37-92-103(9) (2014).
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for augmentation that avoids injury to senior rights.36 In a subsequent opinion, the Court changed "maxinun" to "optinunl," explaining that
the policy of maxinmum utilization does not require a single-minded endeavor
to squeeze every drop of water from the valley's aquifers. Section 37-92501(2)(e) makes clear that the objective of 'maximum use' administration is
'optimum use.' Optimum use can only be achieved with proper iegard for
all significant factors, including environmental and economic concerns." '6
As refined, the doctrine seems intended to soften the sharp edges of priority,
encouraging 6decision
makers to support legitimate efforts to better utilize our
7
water supply.
Professor Tarlock concluded the purpose of priority today can better be
achieved through what he calls "alternative risk allocation mechanisms."' In
general, such mechanisms appear to depend on voluntary, cooperative water
management approaches." While there are indeed examples of such approaches, they are not common-probably because of the difficulties of obtaining the necessary agreement of all the affected parties. 7 1 More commonly,
mechanisms have developed to allow "out-of-priority" water uses so long as
they can occur without injury to senior rights. 7' These include so-called "physical solutions," in which the junior user improves the senior's use so that the
junior's use can occur without impaimient to the senior, 7 or in which the junior provides a replacement source of water to the senior."
A recent dramatic illustration of the potential consequences of strict water
rights priority administration occurred in Idaho where a trout farm with a right
to use water from a spring placed a call on all junior rights using water from
the Eastern Snake Basin aquifer, which is the source of the spring's water.
According to one account, "Itihe order would have affected more than 2,300
1

365. Cache LaPoudre Water Users Ass'n v. Glacier View Meadows, 550 P.2d 288, 294 (Colo. 1976).
366. Alamnosa-La Jara Water Users Prot. Ass'n v.Gould (In rc Rules mad Regulations Governing the Use, Control, and Protection of Water Rights for Both Surface and Underground
Water Located in the Rio Grande mid Conejos River Basins and their Tributaries), 674 P.2d
914, 935 (Colo. 1983); see also CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-501(2)(e) (stating that the Slate Engineer's rules and regulations "shall have as their objective the optimum use of water consistent
with preservation of the priority system of water rights"); Simpson v. Cotton Creek Circles,
LLC., 181 P.3d 252, 259 (Colo. 2008) ("an optimum or naximum use niust be sustainable.").
367. On the other hand, it may be viewed as a rationale for increasing consumptive use of
water. We return to this matter in the discussion of public ownership of water. See inla Part

l.C.
368. Tarlock, PiorApproiation,supra note 247, at 884.
•369. Id. at 883-84.
370. Rotation of water available tinder a water right, For examnple, requires agreement among
all the parties that hold an interest in that right. A user is not required to rotate water against his
will. See, e.g., Strole v. Guvmon, 37 P.3d 529, 532-33 (Colo. App. 2001).
371. MacDonnell, supra note 333, at507-08.
372. Harrison C. Dunning, The "PhjsicalSoludon"in Western Water Lawg 57 U. COLO. L.
REv. 445, 448 (1986).
373. Replacement water can be provided under an exchange or, in Colorado, tinder a plan
for augnentation. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-83-104, 37-92-103(9) (2014).
374.
)istribution of Water to Water Right Nos. 36-02551 and 36-07694 (Rangen, Inc.), No.
CM-DC-2011-004, at 1-2 (Idalho Dep't of Water Resources Jan. 24, 2014) (final order).
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water-rights holders, including 14 cities, live school districts, irrigators, dairies,
Jerome Cheese Co. and Glanbia. It would have shut off 3,000 cubic feet per
second of water to push a mere 9 cfs to Rangen's spring. " a3 Shortly thereafter,
the Idaho Department of Water Resources Director stayed his order for users
who were members of an organization offering to mitigate the adverse elects
Idaho has adopted procedures under which junior apof their p)umping.
propriators can continue to use water out-of-priority so long itsthey can implement an acceptable mitigation plan. : '
Still another recent case, involving use of groundwater for domesfic wells,
wrestled with how the role of priority relates to water rights administration.
Plaintiff Bounds brought an action against die New Mexico State Engineer for
issuing permits for domestic wells located in a fully appropriated water basin
as required under New Mexico statute.17' Bounds argued the allowance of
such additional water use effected an unconstitutional taking of his 1869 surface water right.Y'9 The New Mexico Court of Appeals determined that "the
priority doctrine is not a system of administration. It does not dictate any particular manner of administration of appropriation mad use of water or how
senior water rights are to be protected from junior users in time of water
shortages..". The Legislature was therefore free to authorize issuance of domestic well permits independent of die priority system "as long as senior water
rights are not in fact impaired or subject to impending impairment because of
"
water shortages requiring priority administration to protect those rights."
The New Mexico Supreme Court also found the statute constitutional in
denying Bounds's claims, but it followed a different rationale." Because, in its
view, the statute only prescribed a means of pernritting, it did not violate what
the Court held was the constitutional requirement for state protection of senior users." In the absence of evidence that Bounds's water rights had in fact
been impaired by use of water from domestic wells, the Court decided there
had been no deprivation of property. 8
Perhaps the most direct means of dealing with the effect of priority is to
purchase or lease the senior rights. New water users in locations without unappropriated water have few other options. Yet, the process of making changes in use of existing water rights is expensive and time consuming, and there is
375. Brian Smith, Slate Dekivs Rangen Cwlajimeni Orde, MAGICVALI.EY.COM (Feb. 2.5,
2014), http://mabgcvallvy.coi/news/loca/state-dclavs-rangen-curtailent.-oder/aricle-2917a96
8-157t-5b7a-9954-711227f0d912.hifil.
376. Distribution of Water to Water Right Nos. 36-02551 and 36-07694 (Rangen, Inc.), No.
CM-DC-2011-004, at 3, 5 (Idaho Dep't of Waier Resources Feb. 21, 2014) (order granting petition to slav curtailment).
377. See IDAHO ADMIN. COI)E r. 37.03.11.000 (2014); see aso 2014 (_urtalimeni Notices
and Orders, IDAHO DEP'T OF WATER RE-SOURcES, http://ww.idw.idaho.gov/lews/
ciritailent/Cuiitailenit.htm#rngn (last visited Mar. 14, 201,5); see also MacDonnell, supia note

333, at502.
378. Bounds v. State, 2.52 P.3(1 708, 709 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010).

379. Id. at 710.
380.

Id. a1721.

381. Id.
382. See Bounds v. State ex rel. )'Antonio, 306 P.3d 457, 468 (N.M. 2013).
383. Id
384. *Id.at 470.
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considerable resistance in the agricultural community to these voluntary transactions.' This issue will be discussed in the section on changes of use.'
Priority is a defining attribute of a water use under the prior appropriation
doctrine and is deeply embedded in the legal rights and expectations of those
holding valid water rights." Yet it is worth reexamining its meaning. It is most
certainly not, as was originally viewed, a guaranteed right to some fixed flow
rate of water."" At best, it is the ability to divert up to the maximum authorized amount of water as actually required for beneficial use at that period of
time, ahead of others taking water from the same source with junior priorities.

In today's world, the anount of water required for beneficial use has changed
considerably from the time in which senior rights were originally permitted
and adjudicatedY" Continued enforcement of priorities should be adjusted to
reflect those changing realities, as discussed below. '
Given our increasingly sophisticated ability to model and manage hydrologic systems, states should consider ways to better manage water uses in highconflict areas to f'acilitate more effective use of available water." While priority administration would necessarily be the starting point, such management
would seek to meet the full array of valuable uses. It would require seniors
placing a call to verify their actual need for the water. It would also search for
opportunities to meet actual needs in ways that do not necessarily require all
junior appropriators to curtail their diversions." In settings where uses unreasonably diminish the public values of the water source, additional steps should
be taken to reduce unnecessary diversions and to retain needed flows instreanm."'
A useful illustration of the problem is provided in the South Platte Basin

385.

See Charles W. Howe et al., 7he ic onoin

Inpacts of AgTiculaire-to-Urban Water

7)Tansfcls on the Area of Orign: A Case Study of ie Arkansas River Valley in Colorado, 72
AM.J. OF AGRIc. EcON. 1200, 1202-03 (1990); Peter D. Nichols & Douglas S. Kenney, Wffteiing Growth in Colorado:Swept Along by the Cunent or Choosinga Better Line?, 6 U. DENY.
WATER L. REV. 411, 420-21 (2003).
386. See ink a Part II.H.
387. Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Colo. 1982) (emphasizing priority
the most important attribute of a water right).
388. In the gold fields of California where the ditches often provided water to users, the view
prevailed that an appropriation established a claim to some certain amount of water. See, e.g.,
Smith v. O'Hara, 43 Cal. 371, 373 (1872). As the concept of beneficial use came to bc applied
as a measure of water necessary to accomplish a use, the courts began describing appropriations
in more dynamic tenns that limited the quantity of water based on actual needs. See, e.g.,
Nichols v. McIntosh, 34 P. 278, 281 (Colo. 1893) ("INlo one is entitled to have a priority adjudged for more water than he was actually appropriated, nor For more than he actually
needs.").
389. As Kinney noted in his 1912 treatise, neither users nor courts understood how much
water actually was required to grow crops in the early days of appropriation. KINNEY, suprwa note
32, §§ 875-76, at 1541-45.
390. See supra Part 11.B.
391. For many years states have been using such special management areas to address con-

flicts among groundwater users. See, e.g., Stephen E. White & David E. Kromm, Local
GroundiiterManagement EfDkctiveness in he Colorado and Kansas OgallalaRegion, 35 NAT.
RESOURcisJ. 275, 278 (1995).
392. Or it would allow junior appropriators to bid For water from a pool or bank that would
enable annual and multi-year decisions respecting uses of water.
393. See i-fa Part II.C.
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of Colorado. Here, during the record drought of 2002 around five thousand
junior wells, many of them large-capacity irrigation Wells, were shut down because they did not have sufficient replacement water to offset their depletions." ' The Legislature commissioned a study to examnine ways in which water supplies in the South Platte might be more effectively used so that juniors
wanting to continue using water might be able to do so.'5 The study recoinmended creation of a basin-wide Water management authority that would develop the tools and mechanisms necessary to more effectively use basin water
supplies." It seems very likely that sooner or later, states will put in place institutional mechanisms of this sort (as they have done in areas of intensive
groundwater development) in heavily used water systems-a point to which we
will return later."
C. PUBIC OWNERSHIP OF WATER, PUBLIC INTEREST, AND THE PUBI.C
VALUES OF WATER AND WATERCOURSES
Beginning in 1876 with the Colorado Constitution, all western states have
claimed public or state ownership of the water resources within their boundaries.
These claims represent the assertion of the sovereign right to determine uses of a common resource made available through natural processes.'
Whatever the original motivations lor these assertions, the result is that states
shoulder the responsibility on behalf of their citizens to act in a manner that
seeks to manage these water resources and to serve the best interests of these
citizens." State courts and legislatures determined that appropriation of water
394. REAGAN M. WASKOM, COLO. WATER INST., REPORT TO THE COLORI)O
LEGISIXVURE CONcERNIN;: HB12-1278 STUIY OF THE SOLTH PTXrE RIVER A.UVIAI,
AQuIFER 27 (2013).

395.

Id. at l.

396. Id. at 12 ("The HB1278 study leads us to the conclusion that the best institutional
mcehanism for attaining sustainable conjunctive use of surl ce and groundwater in tie S. Platte
basin is the formation of a basin-wide authoritv with the ability to work with all water management organizations, using comprehensive data and the best available science for the good of the
entire basin.").
397. See h'zka notes 521-26 and aecomp;aying text.
398. See GETCHES, supi-, note 6, at 84-86.
399. See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896) ("It is, perhaps, accurate to sav
that the ownership of the sove, eigm authority is in trust for all the people of the state; and hence,
by implication, it is the duty of the legislature to enact such laws as will best preserve the subjeet
of the trust, and secure its benelieial use in the future to the people of the state. But, in my
view, the question of individual enjoyment is one of public policy, and not of private right." (internal quotation marks omitted)) (quoting Magner v. People, 97 Il1. 320, 334 (1881)); see adso
Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284-85 (1977) ("The 'owinership' language of
cases such as those cited by appellant must be understood as no more than a 19th-centu.y legal
fiction expressing 'the importmace to iLs people that a State have power to preserve and iCgulate
the exploitation of an important resource.'") (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402
(1948)) (citing also Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comi'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420-21 (1948)); Richard
J. lazrus, (mnging C'onceplions ofProper, and ,5overegntvin Nati-al Resources: Queslioning the Pulic 7Tust DoetTine, 71 IOWA L. Rrv. 631, 656 (1986) ("Notions of 'sovereign ownership' of certain natural resources md the 'duties of the sovereigi as trustee' to natural resources are simply judicially created shorthand methods to justify treating ditlerently
governmental transactions that involve those resources,").
400. See, e.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Supeior Court of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 72627 (Cal. 1983); Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 841 (S.D. 2004);Jj.N.I. Co. v. State crrel.
Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982) ("Public ownership is founded on the
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to serve direct human uses was in the best interest of the state and its citizens.
They made that determination in an era of frontier settlement that depended
in significant part on taking water out of streams mad aquifers and using that
water to make living on the land possible. While that need still exists, the
West is a different place and tie public's interest in its water resources has
evolved. Yet the states hold on to the view that appropriation and use of water, often in ways and for purposes little changed from those initiated a century
or more ago, still fully serve the interests of their citizens. In fact, the gulf between the broader public values of water and the private interests served by
prior appropriation is wide and getting wider with each new appropriation of
water.
Most western states include a provision authorizing the permit decision
maker to consider the public interest associated with a proposed use of water. ' Some states also authorize consideration of the public interest in a
change of use proceeding."2 Very few provide any statutory guidance to the
decision maker regarding factors to be considered in the public interest review."3 Not surprisingly, there has been little use of this authority.
Yet the original proponent of this review criterion, Elwood Mead, appears
to have anticipated a more substantive role for the reviewer."0 ' Because he
viewed water as a gift of nature for the benefit of all, he believed in the need
lor public supervision of water use to help ensure the greatest possible benefits
to the public.' Mead's belief that the state had the responsibility to consider
the public interest when making decisions about uses of water reflected his
concern that private interest is not always consistent with the broader interests
of society. He succeeded in getting a provision inserted into Article 1 of the
new state constitution-the article setting forth Wyoming's commitment to
other such fundamental values as equality, due process of law, trial by jury,
and freedom of speech-as follows:

principle that water, a scarce and essential resource in this area of the country, is indispensable

to the welfare of all the people; and the State must therefore assume the responsibility of allocating the use of water for the benefit and welfare ofthe people of the State as a whole.").
401. Johnson & DuMars, supra note 27, at 356.

402.

Id. at 373; see aho GETCHES, supra note 6, at 176-77.

403. Douglas L. Grant, Public iterest Reviewof lVater Riht Allcation anld Transferin the
West: Recognition of Puhhc Vdues, 19 ARIZ. ST. LJ.681, 688 (1987) [hereinafter Grant, Public
Intcresd.
404. The legislation he helped draft contained this provision: "if, in the judgmient of the state
engineer, such appropriation is detrimental to l)ublic interests, the state engineer shall refuse
such appropriation." 1890 Wyo. Srss. LAws 91, 101.

405. According to the State Engineer's Second Biennial Report:
It was based on the belief that water being one of the gifts of nature tie itle thereto
should forever remain in the public; that such public ownership was recognized by
tie people of this State prior to the adoption of our State Constitution and prior to
the enactment of any specific law on this subject, and that in the adoption our State
Constitution such public ownership was made a part of the fundamental law of this
State; that such public ownership is not only in accord with our laws but that the
greatest prosperity of our citizens will be secured by maintaining tie limitations above
stated.
SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 270, at 35
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Article 1, Section 31. Control of water.
Water being essential to industial prosl)erity, of limited amount, and easy of
diversion from its natural channels, its control mutist Lbe in teistate, which, in
providing for its use, shall equally guard all the vaiious interests involved."

His belief that it was the state's responsibility to "guard" all interests in water
led direcdy to the inclusion of a public interest review provision.
Inclusion of public interest considerations is recognition of the resource's

nature and its many functions and values that extend far beyond the concerns
of a party diverting water lor an individual use. ° Its earliest recorded use receiving appellate review was to enable the New Mexico state engineer to reject
an earlier water use application in lavor of a subsequent application to use the
same water For a more beneficial use.' °8 More recently, the public interest has
been applied to consider the potential adverse environmental effects associat-

ed with proposed water uses.

9

Consideration of the public interest appears to

be a duty in some, but not all, states."0

The limited administrative use of the public interest authority may explain
in part the active interest, at least in the academic community, in promoting
judicial use of the public trust doctrine to take account of the broader consequences of water diversion and use."' This doctrine asserts a continuing duty
to protect the public trust interests associated with uses of navigable water-

courses."' Though the public's interests were initially considered to be com406.

VYO. CONST. art. I, § 31; see also Kluger, supra note 265, at 18.
Grant, Piuhh" Interest,supri, note 403, at 702; Douglas L. Grant, Two Models ol Puhb"
Interct Revi'w of I ater AIlocvation iii the West, 9 U. DENy. WATER L. REV. 485, 488-90
407.

(2006).
408. Young v. Hinderlidcr, 110 P. 1045, 1050 (N.M. 1910). nddCCl, it appears such choices
among applications were the predominant use of tifs authority, a use that caused charges of favoitism and abuse of administrative authority. See Grant, lPubl" Interest, supra note 403, at
685-86.
409. Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 449 (Idaho 1985); see also Application lor Permit No.

13-7697 in li Name of Twin Lakes Canal Co., at5 (Idaho Dep't of Water Resources Oct. 18,
2012) (final order). As Zimmerman explains, "the [Idaho )epartment of Water Resourcesl
denied an application for storage on Bear River (Oneida Narrows) lor hydroclectic and irrigation purposes where the benefits of those uses woere outweighed by the scenic, recreational, and
habitat values of the river." John R. Zimmerman, Environmentalleqtui'elents o/Allocating
Water i the WVCstern U.S, 59 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. §§ 8.01, 8.03121 (2013).
410. People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859, 865 (CA. 1980); Shokal, 707 P.2d at 448; Tanner v.
Bacon, 136 P.2d 957, 962 (Utah 1943); but see William F. West Ranch, LLC v. Ty',rrell, 206

P.3d 722, 732-33 (Wyo. 2009).
411.

Nat'l Audubon Soc'v v. Superior Court of Alpinc Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 725, 728 (Cal.

1983); see also In re Water Use Pennit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 455 (Haw. 2000); Harrison
C. Dunning, 7he Public Trust: A Fiondanental DocthnYe of American Property Iaiw, 19
Trust Iotection lbr Stream Flows and
ENVTIL. L. 515, 517 (1989); Ralph V. Johnson, PubI
Like Levels, 14 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 233, 233-34 (1980); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwater:s of the Publc 7hst: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the 7kaditional Doctrine,
19 ENViL. L. 425, 468-69 (1989). Note, however, that public interest review applies only at die
time of allocation while the public trust doctrine purports to enable review and regulation of
existing uses that are found inconsistent witlh )ul)lic trust Values. Compare Vat'l Audubon
Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 728, th WilhamE 1West Ranch, LL(; 206 P.3d at 733.
412. See Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States' PIbh 7rust
Doctfines: Public Vahes, Private Rights, and the Evohtion Toward anI EcologicalPublic 7'rust,
37 Ecot.OGY L.Q. 53, 59-61 (2010).

WA TER LA W REVIEW

Volumne 18

merce, navigation, and fishing, these interests have evolved in some states to
more broadly encompass the functions and values of the water itself, including
its importance in maintaining water-based ecosystems. ' At least in California,
the public trust doctrine is said to limit the grant of use made in a state water
right as necessary to protect and maintain public trust values.' While potentially helping to 1ill a void in state water law, the public trust doctrine is a judicial doctrine that lacks definition and can only be applied on a case-by-case
basis."'
The insream flow right is prior appropriation law's primary adaptation to
concerns about environmental uses and, to a lesser degree, recreational uses
of water. Most western states now acknowledge the value of leaving at least
some unappropriated water in streams and lakes to support fish or for other
purposes. "' These adaptations have provided a mechanism under state law to
address non-private interests in water. Instrean flow law is discussed in Section 11.1 below.
In practice, some aspects of the non-private interests in water are now addressed under federal environmental laws."' Water quality is lanaged primarily under the Clean Water Act.4 ' Wetlands also get protection tinder provisions of this law. " ' Protections under the Endangered Species Act have
perhaps motivated the biggest changes in water use management, because historical dam and diversion practices so dramatically altered the ability of watercourses to sustain native species of fish and other aquatic-dependent life." ° It
is a striking illustration of state water politics that lederal requirements are
needed to ensure that states consider the non-private values of water and watercourses.
Public interest review applies only during public consideration of the creation of new water rights or perhaps the change of use of an existing right. It is
necessarily piecemeal and ad hoc. Nevertheless, the law of prior appropriation would be improved by putting in place more comprehensive require-

413. See, e.g., Marks v. Whimey, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971); Nat'lAuduhon Socv, 658
P.2d at 719.
414. Nat'lAudubonSoc ,658 P.2d at 721.
415. Russell M. McGlothlin & Scott S. Slater, No FKctions Required: Assessing the Public
•7nhst Doctrinein Puosuit olBalanced Water Managcrent, 17 U. DENV. WATER L. REV.53,

56, 90, 97 (2013).
416. For a survey of state statutes, see Cynthia F. Covell, A Suney of State Instream 17ow
Programnsin thc Westcrn United States, 1 U. DENy,. WATER L. REV.177, 180-90 (1998).
417. Getches, Metamorphosis, supi1a l10te
4l, at 53.

418. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2011). States have given very limited consideration to the water
quality eflects of water uses. GETrCHES r AL., supra note 44, at 13-15. States have attempted
to separate the administration of the Clean Water Act from use of water rights. Gregory J.
Hobbs, Jr. & Bennett N'V. Raley, Water Rights Protection in Water Quldity Law, 60 U. COLO.

L. REV. 841, 856-57 (1989).
419. 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
420. See, e.g., Reed D. Benson, AvoidingJeopardjy Without the Questions: Recovery Inplementation Programns [br EnidangeredSpecies ii Western River Basins, 2 MICH.J. ENVTL. &

ADMIN. L. 473, 484, 498 (2013); Cori S. Parobek, Of Farmers' TaLkes and Fishes' Takings:
Fifth Amendment Compensation Claitns "hen the Endangered Species Act and Vestem llatelrRights Coide,27 HARv. ENVrL. L. REV. 177, 193 (2003); Melissa K. Estes, Comment, 7he
ElFect of the Fedenal Endangered Species Act on State W4ater Rights, 22 ENxr'I.. L. 1027, 1039,

1050 (1992).
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nients for such considerations and lor all states to include such considerations
in reviewing changes of use. To 1)e effective, state laws need to give clear direction to decision makers respecting the public values to be considered."2 ' In
addition, these laws need to establish standards to be maintained that can
translate into objective criteria so that decision makers are not faced With making subjective judgments more than necessary. The exercise of making express what these values are and how they should be protected and maintained
would be challenging but potentially enormously helpful as we move beyond
the era of water allocation and development and into an era of water management.
Restoring the public values of water and its sources requires a programinatic effort that extends well beyond simlple changes in law. It will necessitate
an assessment of the health of our rivers and aquifers, a determination respecting the potential restorability of lost important functions, andi a coordinated effort to find ways to meet established private water use interests while
benefiting the desired public values. "
D. THE PROPEIRTY RIGHT
Prior appropriation emerged in a setting in which there was no clear law
authorizing the use of water on the federally owned lands in California.
Courts worked around this problem by focusing on creating a law that concerned only who had the better right as between two competing users, using
the rule of first possession to resolve such disputes. Courts spoke in property
rights terms, following the custon of that era, but recognized that, as with mining claims,, the property interest only protected the first possessor as against
other subsequent claimants and did not vest rights ats against the actual ovner
of the land or the water, the United States." 3 As tie states began to assert
ownership of water, with at least some support from Congress, they developed
statutory systems under which persons intending to use water had to proceed.
In so doing, they began to reshape not only the procedure by which a use
must be established but also the nature of the right itself. Mhile retaining the
priority rule to resolve conflicts between two competing claimants, states asserted the existence of multiple interests in the way water is used and directed
421, Scc, e.g., Michelle Brya Mudd, Hitchinog Our Wagon to a Dim Star. l'Viy Outmoded
Water CodCes ad "PublichIlcrest" Reiw Cimnot Protect the Public 7rust i I'Vestcm VWile'r

Law, 32 STAN. EN~rrL. LJ. 283, 329 (2013); Amber L. Weeks, Note, Definnhg the Public Interest: Adminitative Narrow'ig and Broadening of the Pdlic Interest in Jcsponse to the
Statutory Silence of Water Codes, 50 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 255, 257 (2010).
422. The Draft Colorado Water Plan expressly recognizes the importance of restoring and
maintaining watershed health as a State poliCy. COLO. WATER CONS ERVATION Bn.,
COl:ORADO'S WA'i11 PLAN (FIRs' DRAFr) 212 (December 10, 2014) Ihercinafter WATER

PIANI. Unfortunately, the Draft Plan does not provide much guidance respecting how this pol5ee LAWRENCEJ. MACDONNELL & COI.O. WATER WORKING GRP.,
GH'CHES-WILKINSON CTR. FOR NATruRim. RESOURCES, ENERGY AND Tf'HE ENV'T, NAVIGATING
A PATHWAY TOWARD COLORADO'S WATER FLFIURE: A REVIEW OF AND RECOMMENDATIONS

icy will be implemented.

ON COLORAi)O's DiAF WATER PIAN (April 30, 2015).

423. In mining law, die courts have recognized the doctrine of pedis possessio that protects
the righLs of possession of a clain established mid maintained while diligently searching for a
valuable mineral deposit. Se, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 346-48 (1919).
Upon discovery of a valuable mineral deposit, the possessory right transfons into a vested
property right even as against the tide owner, the United States. Id.
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state agencies to consider those interests. ' People like Elwood Mead, responsible now for ensuring that water serve not only the interests of the individual user but also the interests of the state, saw the water right more in contract or license terms-that is, the state authorizing private use of public water
because it believes the state will benefit.2 Thus Mead said: "The surrender by
the public to the individual of this right of use and the protection by the public
of the individual in its enjoyment is a free grant from the public, the only consideration being the public benefit to be derived therefrom.'" 6 Mead believed
all authorized uses attached permnanently to tie appropriation itself, not the
individual making the use. ' In short, individual uses of water represented a
means to a larger end-the development of a prosperous society. Mead's larger social vision of prior appropriation ultimately prevailed, resulting in a narrowly circumscribed right of use subject to ongoing public supervision to
guard all the interests in water.
An appropriative water right enables the control and use of some portion
of water, in priority, reasonably necessary to accomplish the authorized purpose of use. The holder of the right has entered into an agreement with the
state under which the holder is authorized to use public water for the holder's
benefit so long as the holder follows state rules and procedures governing that
use. Thus, Wyoming's law provides: "A water right is a right to use the water
of the state, when such use has been acquired by the beneficial application of
water under the laws of the state relating thereto, and in conformity with the
rules and regulations dependent thereon.... The property interest is the conditioned right of use. While courts have struggled with how best to describe
this property interest in traditional property law terms, it is clearly a highly circumscribed property interest.' First, it is a property interest that can be lost

424. Sce, e.g., WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 31 ("Water being essential to industrial prosperity, of
limited amount, and easy of diversion from its natural channels, its control must be in the state,
which, in providing for its use, shall equally guard all the various interests involved.").
425. For a contemporary analysis favoring the use of contract principles for water uses, see
generally Shelley Ross Saxer, 7he Fluim Nature of ProperlyRights in Waicl; 21 DUKE ENVITL.
L. & P'oy F. 49 (2010).
426. SECOND BIENNIAl. REPORT, supra note 270, at 41.
427. Mead stated:
Under the rulings of die Board of Control the conditions which govern the acquirement of a perpetual right to the use of water must limit its subsequent exercise.
In other words such a right is simply a perpetual license to take and use this water for
a certain specific purpose in a certain definite place. Under these rulings water appropriated to run a mill is restricted both to that purpose and to that mill. The owner
of the right cannot use it to run another mill, nor divert it to the irrigation of land. No
transfers of appropriations to other locations or other purposes have been recognized, but, on the contrary, it has been held that rights to water for irrigation belong
neither to the canal builder nor the land owner, but attach to tie land reclaimed and
are inseparable therefiom.
SELECTFD WRrIiNGS, supia note 278, at 20.

428. \WYO. STAT. ANN. S 41-3-101 (2014).
429. Kinney noted the conditional nature of the right in his 1912 treatise. KINNEY, supra
note 32, § 762, at 1317. More recently, Professor Sax examined the nature of an appropriative
water right and concluded:
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through nonuse. Second, it is narrowly defined in terms of specifying a point
of diversion, a maximlum rate of diversion, a particular purpose of use, and a
particular place of use. The property interest cannot be used in any other
ltashion without going through a fornal change of use proceeding. Third, it
authorizes use only of an anount of water reasonably necessary to accomplish
its purpose. This is a maxinmm but not a fixed rate or volume of water, one
that may change over time as conditions change. Thus, if the quantity of water
required to irrigate an acre of land decreases because the landowner installs
more elicient sprinklers, then the diversion, right prestmably adjusts to this
lesser volume of water. In many states, water rights aue regarded as appurtenant to the land on which they are used. ' Separating the water rights from the
land requires some kind of formal legal proceeding."'
The essential interest in a water right is the opportunity to divert aid beneficially use water available in priority at the point of (liversion in accordance
wIth the terms established under the right and under state law. There can be
no guaranteed quantity of water since the amount physically and legally available is determined by hydrology and priority.
The courts have been mixed on applying takings law to governmental regulation that reduces the quantity of water historically available under a water
right.' 2 Under ordinary regulatory takings law, the exercise of legislativelyauthorized regulatory authority that only incidentally alfects the exercise of water rights should not run afoul of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment limitation on governmental takings of private property, as now outlined by the US
Supreme Court."' Law and regulation regularly al'ect the uses of property.
So long as the exercise of regulatory authority does not totally eliminate use of
IWlater rights have 1ess protection than most other property rights for several reasons
that %illbc described in this paper: (a) because their exercise may intrude on a public
common, they are subject to several original public p1ior claims, such as the naXigation ser'itude and the public trust, and to laws protecting commons, such as water
1)olh,16on laws; (b) their original delinition, limited to benelicial and non-wasteful uses,
imposes limits beyond those that constrain most property ights; (c) insofar as water
rights (unlike most other property rights) are granted by perlmit, they are subject to
constraints articulated in the permits.
Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Proper, Rights and the Ftulre of[I4 4r Law, 61 U. CoiO.
L. REV.257, 260 (1990) (emphasis in original).
430. See, e.g., WYO.STAT. ANN. S 41-3-101 (2014) ("Water always being tie property of the
state, rights to its use shall attach to the land for inigation.").
431. Arizona law, for cx~unple, provides for a "sever md transler" process. ARIZ. Rv.
STAT. ANN. § 45-172(A) (2014).
432. Several articles discuss tie application of "takings" law to water rights. See, e.g., Jamics
H. Davenport & Craig Bell, Governmental Interkrence with the Use o['aMter: Wihen )o Uiconstitutional "Takings" Oceurj 9 U. DENV. WA'ER L. REV. 1, 23-55 (2005); John D. Echcverria, 7he iublic Trust Docine as a Background Princijles )efense in 7 ahgs Litigaijon,45
U.C. DAvis L. REv. 931 (2012); John D. Echeverria, Is Regulation of Water a Constitutional
7Tking?., 11 VT.J. EN-rrt.. L. 579 (2010); Douglas L. Grant, ESA Reductions in l?eclamation of
Water Contrilat Delivciies: A flfth Amendment Tkli g oflJropertv, 3( ENVrIT. L. 1331.
1361-71 (2006); Brian E. Gray, 7he Property'Rightin Water; 9 HASTINCS W.-Nw..J. ENVri,.
L. & POL'Y 1 (2002); John 1). Leshy, A Convesation about 7Tkings anod Water J&ghts, 83 T-x.
L. REV. 1985 (2005); Josh Patashnik, Ph- icd Takings, Jcgzlatorv Tkings, anod Wter ights,
51 SAN'TA\ CLARA L. R-V. 365 (2011).
433. The Court's regulatorv taking analysis is most completely presented in Penn Cent.
Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-28 (1978).
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the property, the courts have not been inclined to find the exercise of governmental legal authority to constitute a regulatory taking.'
Some courts,
however, have apparently followed the other prong of this analysis under
which physical taking of some discrete portion of property for some public
purpose without compensation is determined to constitute a taking.'35 This
approach misconstrues the nature of a water right and assumes the holder of
the right has some property right in the water itself.'36 In ftct, a water right only
authorizes diversion and use of water in compliance with law. To the degree
new legal regulations place limitations on the historical manner in which the
water right has been used, including amounts of water that have been diverted,
the use must adjust accordingly. State authority in this area seems especially
evident since states are regarded as the legal owners of the water resources
within their boundaries.
Consequently, states have authority to enact laws regulating the manner in
which water rights are used. To date, states have been remarkably unwilling to
exercise this authority. The recommendations offered here are among the
things that states might consider to bring their prior appropriation laws up to
date.
E. BENEFICIAL USE
The original purpose for including the beneficial use requirement was to
distinguish between diversions from streambeds to enable access for mining
and diversions with the purpose of putting that water to some use."' It evolved
into the touchstone for finalizing the right-the concept that the vesting of the
right as against other would-be users of the same water did not occur until diverted water had been placed to actual use. According to the most common
definition of beneficial use, such use is the "basis" of the right.'38 The concept
has grown to encompass the notion that states can determine what types of uses are considered beneficial and thus can constitute the basis of an appropriation. ' Perhaps more importantly, it evolved into a means of objectively establishing a maximum quantity of water that may be appropriated, and as a test to
determine whether ongoing uses are reasonably efficient." This quantitative

434. ce Robert Meltz, Takigs Law Thday: A PTer for icPerplexed, 34 EcoI.ocY L.Q.
307, 328-32 (2007).
435. These cases follow Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
441 (1982). A useful summary of decisions applying takings law to regulation of water use is
provided in Patashnik, supia note 432, at 374-79.
436. Patashnik, supra note 432, at 387.
437. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
438.
c, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-101,(2014) ("Beneficial use shall be die basis, the
measure and limit of tie right to use water at all times.")
439. See, e.g., Frank J. Trelease, The Concept of Reasonable Beneficial Use in the Source
of Surface Streans, 12 WyO. LJ. 1, 6-7 (1957). The Wyoming State Engineer's Office has
compiled an extensive list of beneficial uses. Recognized Beneficial Uses, WYOMING STATE
ENG'R'S OFFICE (Sep. 24, 2012), https://sites.google.co/a/%3,o.gov/sco/hiomc (under "Home,"
click "Recognized Beneficial Uses"). Inevitably, new purposes for water use will arise that will
qualify as beneficial. An example is the arising concern whether maintenance of stream flows
for instream benefits could constitute a beneficial use. See, e.g., Idaho Dep't of Parks v. Idaho
Dep't of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 926 (Idaho' 1974).
440. For a comprehensive discussion, see Janet C. Neuman, BenelicizI Use, Waste, and For-
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aspect of beneficial use is captured in that portion of its standard definition
that it is "the measure and limit" of the right."' In this capacity, the beneficial
use requirenment helped to put objective boundaries around asserted claims to
water and to give appropriators better information about how mlch water is,
in fact, necessary to achieve an intended use. "2 In the context of irrigation, tie
duty of water emerged as a guide."' A few states even statutorily or administralively established a maximum duty of water that becamne the standard allocation used in authorizing an irrigation water use."' In a few cases, courts have
determined that an existing water use did not meet the beneficial use standard
because of unreasonably inellicient methods of diversion or unreasonably
wasteful diversions and uses of water. " Thus the beneficial use requirement
has served as an outer boundary on water uses, intended to ensure some
standard of useful purpose and reasonably efficient practice in the legally protected uses of water. Here we consider what changes, if any, should be made
to the existing beneficial use requirement. We look first at its use in the process of establishing new af)propriations and then consider its application to
ongoing uses.

1 itue: The Ilcilicient Sealch ior ElIiciencv in 'Vcster Waitcr [Jsc, 28 ENrL. L. 919 (1998).
441. I. at 920.
442. Elwood Mead in 1889 took the then Unpreeelednte step of investigating the water requirements in irrigated agriculture that he then used to establish a dutv of water. SECOND
ANNUAL REPORT, supia note 270, at 25-32. The Wyoming legislature incorporated his recomminenidations into its initial 1890 statute, establishing a limitation of one cuhic feet per second
("cfs") per seventy acres of irrigated land. 1890 WYo. S.ss. LAWS 91, 98; WYo. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-4-317 (2014). Under Mead's direction, the US )epartmnent of Agriculture produced sevcr studies in tie lhrst decade of tei1900s, providing guidance respecting the duty of water in
irrigation. See Samuel C. Wiel, Vhat iABcnelic [Jse(of WateiUF 2 CAL. L. REV. 460, 463
n.15 (1915) [hereinafter Wiel, Benecial 1icl. Subsequenty some western states, usually
through their land grant colleges, generated more state-specific analyses. See, e.g.,
Bear River
Basin Planning Team, ,Vy'oming .Sate Water Plan, Bear River Basin Water Plan 7ecHmic-a
Memoracla, Appcntcl" G: rop ConstimpLpivc [se, WYOMINC STATE WATER P1AN,
http://waterplan.statle.wv.us/plan/beai/techlnemios/cropcu.html (last visited May 22, 2014); see
also ROBERT W. HILt., UTAH AGRIC.EXPERIMENT STATION, CONSUM]I'tVE USE OF IRRIGATED
CROPS IN UTAH, RESEARCH REPORT 145 (1994); see also NCumn,, sUpIa7 notC 440, at 959 ("in
Washington, estimates of the amount of water needed for irrigating crops at various points
around tie state were developed by the Washington State University Agricultural Research
Center in 1982.This study is used by tie State Department of E-ology as a guideline in quantitying and issuing new agricultural water rights.").
443. Wiel, Benclicial Use, sopra note 442, at 462.
444. The 1913 edition of Wiel's treatise provides citations to the statutory duties existing at
that tinme. See WIEI., WATER RIGHTS, stipian note 98, § 487, at 522-25. A statutory maximm
duty of water for irrigation still remains in place in Wyoming. Wyo. STrAT. ANN. S 41-4-317
(2014). According to Janet C. Neuman,
Idaho also applies a standud water duty for new irrigation applications: one cfs per
fifty acres, which translates to 0.02 cfs per acre. Oregon applies a ran ge of (uties for

agricultural al)plications, some as high as six acre feet per acre. Utah duties range
from Iwo acre feel per acre to six acre fect per acre, depending on where in the state
the use is.
Neuman, supra nole 440, at 960 (footnotes omitted).
445. See, e.g., hi re Watcr Rights of l)eschutes River and Tlibutaries, 286 P. 563, 573-74,
577, 587 (Or. 1930), modiied, 294 P. 1049; Nichols v. Hufiord, 133 P. 1084, 1085 (Wyo.
1913); see also, Neuman, supra note 440, at 933-46.
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1. New Appropriations
In a world of increasingly limited supplies of unappropriated water it
seems worth considering whether states might want to develop more express
standards of water use efficiency that would be applied to evaluate proposals
for new appropriations. While some cities now impose such standards on
new development, states have not chosen to develop standards that must be
met in the permitting process for new appropriations. Instead, a few states
now impose requirements on urban water use intended to promote elficiency
in existing uses. " ' Nevertheless, states might want to consider incorporating a
general requirement that all new water appropriations be used efficiently.
They could implement this requirement by requiring new appropriators to periodically submit reports verifying the manner of compliance. More aggressively, states could establish best practices and require compliance with such
practices.
States might also encourage efficiency by imposing a use fee on new water
appropnations. At present, appropriators pay nothing to the state for their use
of public water. Proposals to impose such charges date back at least to the
1890s.' € Simplest would be a charge imposed per unit of water diverted or
withdrawn. An alternative would be a charge based on the quantity of water
consumed or the net depletion to the water source-intended to compensate
the public for loss of this amount of water from the source. The extent of an
appropriation's consumption or net depletion best measures the appropriation's effect on the water source. It is time appropriations are more carefully
defined so that, in addition to limits on the rate of diversion, they also include
limits on the total allowable quantity of water diverted and, importantly, on the
maximum consumptive use authorized under the appropriation."
States

446. California has
percent reduction in
§ 10608.42(a) (2015).
tablished in statute For
447. Elwood Mead
State Engineer:

been the most active in this area, passing legislation calling for a twenty
urban per capita water use by the end of 2020. CAL. WArER CODE
The State of Washington also has water use elficiency requirements esurban uses. WASH. REv. CoDE § 70.119A.180(1)-(2) (2014).
made the following statement in his Third Biennial Report as Wyoming

There is another provision, found in European irrigation laws, which is worthy
of carcful consideration by our legislators. Under these laws there is no such thing as
a firee appropriation. Every user of water must pay the state a rental therefor. These
rentals are, in most cases, very small, being only intended to pay the expenses of supervision mid to prevent the salaries of Water Commissioners and Superintendents
becoming a burden to the general tax-payer. The great value of the system is its influence in promoting economy. The nan who pays for what he gets will not be
wastefil. It also places the doctrine of public ownership in a forn to be comprehended by all, something not true of our method of free grants in perpetuity.
It is probably too eaily to seriously c6nsider its adoption. That it will come,
however, when increased use and augmented value make systematic distribution a
more important consideration than it is at present, is confidently expected.
THIRD BIENNIAL REPORT, supmatnote 266, at 59-60.
448. As Mead long ago recognized, people's use of water is influenced by its cost. See id. A
fee imposed on diversion has the benefit of encouraging ways to take only that amnount of water
necessary for the purpose. A fee imposed on depletion would have the benefit of highlighting
the most important physical effect a given water use has on the source of supply.
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should consider incorporating seasonal limitations on diversions/withdrawals
that better rellect actual water availability and the ability of water sources to
sustain such diversions.
State laws also should be clarified to ensure that the beneficial use consideration for proposed new appropriations takes into account public benefits as
well as benefits to the appropriator. In theory, the public interest requirement
should accomplish this result but, in practice, it rarely does. "' Some states already include the concept of reasonability in their prior appropriation water
law." In 1957 Dean Trelease talked about merging the concepts of reasonable and benelicial use."' The result was, he said, a rule "that a particular use
must not only be embraced within the general class of ises held to be beneficial, or must not only be of benefit to the appropriator but it must also be a
reasonable and economic use of the water in view of other present and future
demands upon the source of supply."" The significant difference from the
original benelicial use standard is iLs consideration not just of the benefit of the
use itself but its reasonability in view of other existing and potential uses of the
water source. As with riparian water uses,"0' is it reasonable in relation to the
amount of water available, to existing and desired human, biological, and
physical uses of the water, and to any associated adverse elects? Does it require a disproportionate amount of water in relation to the benefits it produces? Does it require alteration or modification of the water source in a manner
that unacceptably impairs other functions and values? Incorporation of reasonability enables consideration of ways in which existing uses inight be adijusted to better serve contemporary needs. It puts water users on notice that
historic practices are not necessarily sutficient lor new uses, that water is indeed a public resource intended to serve the full array of interests and not just
those of the appropriator, and that protection of vested rights (including priority) means using those rights in a manner consistent with the ever changing
needs of society.
2. Existing Uses
Courts have been clear that beneficial use is a continuing requirement of
an appropriation." Nevertheless, they have been reluctant to find that the
manner of use under an existing appropriation is wastefl and thus is not beneficial. ' Many writers have called for courts to apply the beneficial use requirement in a more active manner, carefully scrutinizing water uses in con-

449. See sulpnia Part II.C.
450. California inco-porated the standauml of reasonable use through constitutional amendment. CAL. CONST. arl. X, § 2.
451. Treleasc, supra note 439, at 16; Sec also Frank E. Maloney ctal., 17ricta",iR] CRsonablc
lBeneliciad" Vater Use Standard: Have East and West Mci?, 31 U. FLX. L. REv. 253, 254
(1979).
452. Trclease, supiii note 439, at 16.
453. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850 (1979).
454. Set e.g., Hofeldt v. Eyre, 849 P.2d 1295, 1298 (Vyo. 1993); Basin Elc. Power Coop.
v. State lid. of Control, 578 P.2d 557, 563 (Wvo. 1978) ("Beneficial use is not a concept which
is considered only at the time an appropliation is obtained. The concept represents a continuing obligation which must be satisfied in order for the appropiiation to remain viable.").
455. See Patshlnik, supil note 432, at 412-13.
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troversy and requiring those uses to meet some higher standards of efficiency. '5 Thus, for exanple, instead of applying the traditional "consistent with
local customs" standard for evaluating uses, these writers would rather have
the court require uses to meet something like a "best practices" standard. ' So
far, no court has accepted this invitation, nor has any state legislature chosen
to require improvements in existing use efficiencies.4 8
Courts, presumably, are reluctant to take up this issue because of its
somewhat technical nature-water use practices are not an area of normal legal
expertise. But why have legislatures not sought to require more efficient water
uses? One possible explanation is an unwillingness to impose the improvement costs on its major user-the agricultural community-based perhaps on a
fear that many would not be able to afford such costs. 5 " Another may be the
fear that changes in long-standing water use practices would alter flow patterns
and disrupt established water supplies." ° Still another explanation is that no
clear case has been inade for why such changes should be made and such
costs imposed. What is the policy purpose for requiring improved efliciency
in existing water uses? Without such a clear objective in mind, it would seem
that improving irrigation efficiency would primarily benefit junior appropriators who would see more water available in the strean than before.
The strongest case for requiring more efficiency in existing uses, in my
view, is to help restore river health and regain some of water's lost public values. The purpose of efficiency, then, would be to achieve the existing authorized water uses with less water and thereby improve strean flows and either
maintain or reduce declines in groundwater levels.' There are many possible
456. See, e.g., George W. Pring & Karen A. Tomb, License to Waste: Legal Banies to
Conscrvation and Ilicient Use of Water in the West, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 25-1, at
25-44 to -47 (1979).
457. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 440, at 982 (suggesting a "best practicable conservation
technology" standard).
458. Id. Nevertheless, there is evidence that water uses are in fact becoming more efficient.
Increasingly widespread use of sprinklers for irrigation appears to be one important factor affecting this trend. See, e.g., Irriation& Water Use: Backgrouncl, U.S. DEP'T.OF AGRIc. ECON.
RE FARCH SERV., http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/1ai-n-practices-managemen/inigaton-wateruse/backgrotmd .aspx#.U398CShaagO (last updated.June 7, 2013) (showing increase in pressure
sprinkler use efficiency and overall reduction in water use).
459. See, e.g., Neumnan, supra note 440, at 988-89.
460. But in practice, these uses that are clearly ineflicient from today's perspective have existed for decades. The excess water diverted from streams has returned back to the hydrologic
system and become a source of supply for other appropriations. Reducing these return flows
by improving efliciency almost always will also reduce water historically available to these other
appropriators. Many in the inigation community oppose efficiency changes for just this reason.
The US Supreme Court decision in Montana v. Wyoming suggests that irrigation water rights
contemplate more efficient use of water; thus any effects on other appropriators resulting from
such efliciency improvements, including reductions in historical return flows, are not compensable injury. Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S.Ct. 1765, 1768 (2011).
461. From an appropriator's perspective, the purpose of efficiency can be to reduce the Iabor associated vith traditional methods of irrigation (say, by installing sprinklers in place of furrow irrigation). It may increase the amount of water physically available at the point of use
(eliminating leaks, reducing seepage and evaporation) and enable increased use for the purpose
(e.g., more water available to the plants). From a public perspective, it might help reduce the
need to develop new or increased supplies of water-using the conserved water to meet increasing demands instead. In short, we need to think about the objectives of improved efficiency
and what measures are appropriate to accomplish these objectives.
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approaches, ranging from prescription of practices, to imposing an across-theboard reduction in authon'zed diversions/wlithdrawals, to charging for diversions/withdrawals. Whatever the means chosen, it must be backed up with a
limitation on additional diversions/withdrawals by juniors or on new appropriations so the water stays in the source to help provide public benefits.
F. CONDITIONAL RIGHTS
In recognition that there can be legitimate reasons for a gap in time between an appropriation's initiation and actual beneficial use of water, prior
appropriation law early adopted the concept of relation back. " Relation back
allows an appropriator to enjoy the priority of the date on which he initiated
the appropriation rather than the (late on which he actually placed water to
benelicial use, so long as he pursued the development and water use under
the appropriation in a diligent nianner." Permitting states incorporated conditions that require the pennittee to complete construction of the necessary
facilities within a certain time and then apply water to beneficial use within an
additional specified time thereafter. " ' While the state permitting authority can
extend these time periods for good cause,'" the specified periods were expected to ensure that would-be appropriators actively pursued the development and water use in a timely manner.
In practice, it appears that states have allowed initial appropriation claims
to remain in active status despite nany years passing and little diligent development. For example, in Green River Development Co. v. IGMC Cotp., decided in 1983, the Wyoming Supreme Court considered a proposed change
in the place and purpose of water use under permits issued in 1908, 1910,
1920, and 1921 but not yet put to beneficial use. ' This situation does not appear to be especially unusual. A study completed in 1967 found 260,000
acres of land in the Wyoning's North Platte Basin covered by pernits in good
standing on which there had never been any actual irrigation."' The problem
is by no means restricted to Wyoming. A recent water rights records study in
Colorado found outstanding conditional water right clains for 157 million
acre-feet (mat) of water annually, compared to 258 maf lor perfected rights."
Moreover, ninety-two percent of the conditional rights were older than six

See, e.g., Union Mill & Mining Co. v. Dangberg, 81 F. 73, 95 (C.C.D Nev. 1897).
Id.
ee, c.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-506 (2014) (requiring construclion to be completedt
witlin five ycaus,
vcar.in and proof of beneficial use
live years atler construction completion).
465. Id.
466. Green River Dev. Co. v. FMC Corp., 660 P.2d 339, 340-41 (Wyo. 1983).
467. Michael V. Mclntire, The 1)isparity Between State Water Rights Records and Actual
Water Use Patterns,5 IANn & WATER L. Rrv. 23, 30 (1970) ("In the North Platte River Basin,
in which the acreage having adjudicated water rights already exceeds tie actual irrigated acreage
by over 220,000 acres, there are an additional 260,605 acres oflhind covered bv such conditional perits still in good standing.") (citing Richard T. Clark, Water Uses in the North Platie River Basin of Wyoming, 4 UNIV. OF Wyo. AGRIC. EXPERIMEN'" STATION REs..j. 23 (1967)); see
also Jackson 1. Battle, Paper Clouds Over the Waters: Shell Filings and Hiperextended Ier462.
463.
464.

mits in Wvotnig, 22 LAND & WATER L. REV. 673, 674-75 (1987).
468. Charles J.l. Podolak & Martin Doyle, Conditional Water Rights in the Western United
States: htrodueblg Uncetlainty to PriorAppropnaon, 51 J. AM. WATER RES. Ass'N 14, 25

(2015).
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years and 23 percent were older than thirty years."
The original purpose of a conditional right was to protect the priority date
of valid appropriators while they diligently moved ahead with the actions necessary to be able to divert and use water.'7° While this purpose may continue
to be a legitimate concern for large-scale water projects that require many
years to plan, finance, and build, it seems to have been subverted instead to
become a means of claiming an early place in line while determining whether
there is in fact sufficient water demand to warrant constructing the necessary
facilities. This approach has charitably been labeled a "planning" approach,
but others have labeled it speculation."' No doubt there are legitimate reasons
why proposed water projects may require years to construct, but the extent
and nature of many conditional claims suggest the need to require more stringent review of the continuing validity of such claims. In a world of heavily appropriated water sources and increasingly uncertain future water supplies, not
only do such inchoate claims pose considerable uncertainty for those now
seeking an appropriation, they would, if finally developed, move ahead of existing but junior development in priority status. The threat of such displacement likely places a chill on legitimate new water development.
In theory, there are checks on such ongoing claims-procedures by which
their continued validity is reviewed. However, in practice, states have been
generally unwilling to invalidate conditional senior claims. For example, the
Colorado Supreme Court upheld the continuing validity of conditional claims
established as much as fifty years earlier for the purpose of oil shale development. " ' The court relied on the oil company's ongoing efforts to find an economic means for developing oil shale as the basis for finding diligence for the
associated water development.'
In the unlikely event that oil shale ever becomes economically viable, the water uses associated with that development
would have senior priorities to years of actual water development and use for
demands both on Colorado's growing western slope and for the Front
Range."'
The burden placed on conditional claimholders to maintain these claims
should increase with time. After an initial period determined to be necessary
for the diligent development of the facilities necessary to put water to beneficial use, the claimant should be required to satisfy strict standards to maintain
the claim. Failure to meet these standards should result in a court invalidating
the claims.
G. FORFEITURF/ABANDONMENT

Appropriators must continue to beneficially use their vested water rights
for the rights to remain valid. Early courts applied the common law doctrine

469. Id.
at 27.
470. Union Mill & Mining Co. v. Daigberg, 81 F. 73, 95 (C.C.D Nev. 1897).
471. See Podolak & Doyle, supra note 468, at 17.
472. Mun. SubdisL, N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. OXY USA, Inc., 990 P.2d 701,
705, 708 (Colo. 1999).
473. Id. at 708.
474. MACDONNELL, supra note 359, at 33.
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ofabandonment to invalidate unused. water rights.

'

The need to demonstrate

intent to abandon, however, limited the court's application of this doctrine. "6
In the 1880s, states began to establish statutory requirements under which
rights could be lost based on a specilied period of nonuse, without regard to
intent.' Nevertheless, courts in particular ais well as state administrators have
been reluctant to apply these use requirements. Citing the maxim that the law
"abhors" abandonment of property rights, courts have often avoided determining loss of water rights even in the face of decades of nonuse." Moreover,
courts have sometimes overruled administrative determinations of forfeiture
despite clear evidence of extended periods of nonuse where the courts could
find some extenuating circumstance or technicality. ' For example, courts developed the theory that a party did not have standing to bring a forfeiture action unless it could demonstrate that it would directly beneit. ' The result is
that there are large numbers of established water rights that, despite not being
used, continue to be considered valid claims to divert and use water. " ,
Once again,.each state already has legal mechanisms For eliminating unused rights, but they are not used or, when they are, courts have tended to resist their application. It appears that state legislatures need to act to make their
intent clear to eliminate unused water rights from existing state records. To
this end, such legislation should establish as state policy the objective of eliminating all unused claims and direct both tie courts and administrators to use
their authorities as necessary to achieve this end. In addition, legislation
should direct state administrators to establish annual use records and, if there
is no use during the statutory period of time (say, live years), to send a notice
to the holder requiring evidence submission within a specilied time (say, three
months) that establishes a permissible basis for the nonuse. Failure to provide
a permissible justification would result in proceedings to invalidate the claim.
There is a view that the so-called "use it or lose it" aspect of abandonment/forfeiture law causes appropriators to divert the Fully authorized extent
of the appropriation even when there is no actual need for the water.'" This
has caused calls to eliminate this requirement.'" Legislatures should consider
ways to assure appropriators that there is no benefit to diverting or withdrawing water that is not benelicially used. Kansas, for examnple, recently changed

475. Se KINNE.Y, supra note 32, § 1100, ai 1978-79.
476. Id. § 1101, at 1979-83.
477. See, e.g., 1888 Wyo. Sess. Ltws 115,.121; see also KINNEY, supra note 32, § 1119, at
2022-23.
478. See, e.g., WYOMING \VATER LAW, supia note 262, at 156 n.842 (providing a list of cases); sec. e.g., Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. OXY USA, Inc., 990 P.2d
701, 705, 708 (Colo. 1999).
479. See, e.g., Snider v. Kirchhefer, 115 P.3d 1, 5-6, 8 (Wyo. 2005); Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v. Lincoln Land Co., 92 P.2d 572, 574, 578, 581 (WVo. 1939).
480. See, e.g., Snide; 115 P.3d at 8; Hagie v. Lincoln Land Co., 18 F. Supp. 637, 639-40
(D. Wyo. 1937).
481. We ate referring here to rights that have been placed to use initially, but for whatever
reason, are no longer in use. Thus, this group of rights is diffierent from the conditional claims
(iscussed in the previous section that have never been placed to Ienelicial use.
482. .See, e.g., Pring & Tomb, supranote 456, at 25-20 to -22.

483. Id. at 25-65; Arlene J. Kwtsniak, IVter Searcity and Aqutic Sustainability:Moving Bejond loliey li'nitations,13 U. DENY. WATER L. REv. 321, 332-334 (2010).
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its laws governing groundwater use to make clear that nonuse of water from an
aquifer that has been closed to new appropriation is not a basis to apply the
state's forfeiture requirement."
H. TRANSFERS/CHANGES OF USE
'While all western states now authorize a water rights holder to make certain changes in the originally authorized use without losing priority, all limit
such changes by a "no injury" standard.'" To demonstrate al absence of injury, the change proponent generally must demonstrate that water legally available to other appropriators from the same source will be unchanged in quantity
and timing from before the change is made; the analysis necessary to demonstrate this condition can be complex and expensive to make. " Many factors
complicate the analysis and can be challenged by those seeking to prevent or
limit the change. The goal of requiring no discernible change in the hydrologic system benefits all existing users while substantially burdening the party
seeking change. There is a need to facilitate the changes in a manner that
avoids unnecessary interference with existing uses.
It is worth pausing on the matter of what is meant by the no-injury standard. A strong property-rights proponent might ask why this standard should
limit a property right holder's ability to change uses. " Why should a senior
appropriator be required to protect junior appropriators? It appears to be an
application of the longstanding limitation that one's use of his property cannot
unreasonably interfere with another's use of his property, in the context of
rights to the use of a shared resource." But note that this nuisance law limitation does not require no-injury whatsoever; it only precludes significant
harm. " A standard that limits changes to those not unreasonably interfering
with other uses would help moderate the degree of proof that the change proponent is obligated to put forward. Thus, as with new uses under the riparian
system, ' a change of an appropriative right should be pernitted so long as the
effects on other users are not unreasonable.
Prospectively, all new direct flow appropriations and changed water rights
should be quantified volumetrically. " ' Thus, in addition to having an authorized maximum diversion rate, the right would be defined in terms of a maximum water volume over some specified time period. In theory, the duty of

484. H.B. 2451, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2012) (amnending KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-718
(2011)). NonusC of water rights enrolled in the conservation reserve programalso does not
trigger the abandonment statute. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8 2a-718 (2014).
485. See Hobbs, sup-a note 24, at 165; see aso supra Part I.D.
486. Nichols & Kenney, supra note 385, at 420-22; see also David C. Taussig, 7he Devoluton ofthe No-lhjiny Standard in Changes of Water Rights, 18 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 116,
146-47 (2014).
487. L. M. HARTMANN & DON SEASTONE, WATER TRANS ERS: ECONOMic EFFICIENCY AM)
ALTERNATIVE INsTrrUTIONS 7-10 (1970) (explaining that limiting water transfers is econonically inefficient).
488. See, e.g., RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8211) cmt. a (1979) (discussing private
nuisance).
489. Id. § 821Fcmt. c (explaining"signilicant harm").
490. TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGIrS, supra note 191, at § 3:60.
491. See supra notes 280-82 and accompanying text.
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water serves this purpose, but in practice direct flow water rights are limited
only by a maximum diversion rate. In addition, at least With water rights
changes, the courts or agencies should specify the consumptive use portion of
the changed right. It is common to limit consumption to the historical consumption under the right as a means of meeting the no-injury rile."' Specifying the authorized maximum total consumption of a changed light both serves
to make more explicit the actual claim to deplete water held under the right
and to tacilitate future use changes. States should consider quantifying water
rights on the basis of consumptive use units that can be readily transferred to
new uses without the need for detailed hydrologic analysis.''
More broadly, there is a growing interest in enabling more flexible water
uses, both annually and over time. Traditionally, changes from irrigation to
urban use have followed purchase of agricultural water rights (and usually the
irrigated land ats well) and total cessation of agricultural activity (so-called "buy
and dry")."' Concern about agriculture loss, especially in rural areas with few
other economic alternatives, prompted increasing interest in what are now
called "alternative transfer methods," intended to enable transfers of water
without necessarily transfering ownership of the associated water ights. According to the Colorado Water Conservation Board,
[clonceived transfer methods include, but are not limited to: 1) interruptible
water supply agreements; 2) long-term agricultural land lallowing; 3) water
banks; 4) reduced consumptive use through efficiency, deficit irrigation
cropping changes while maintaining historic return flows; and 5) purchase by
end users with leaseback under defined conditions.
Many people see such approaches as a means of shifting some water from agriculture to other uses without unreasonably impairing the associated agricultural economy. Some legal changes will be necessary to enable such approaches, but the primar-y challenges are economic and administrative, not
legal.'9
492. See, e.g., Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 53 (Colo. 1999); see alsoTaussig, supa note 486, at 132-37.
493. Lawrence .1.MacDonncll, Public Water- Private 144,tcr An6-Specalion, 147ter Reallocation, and High Plains A&M, LLC v. Southedstern Colorado Water Conservancy District,
10 U. DENV. WATER L. Ri:v. 1, 15-19 (2006).
494. For an early example that generated litigation, see Strickler v. City of Colo. Springs, 26
P. 313, 314 (Colo. 1891); se also Lawrcncej. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice, iWoving Agicultiuial Water to Cities: The Search [r Sin;uler Appioaches, 2 HASTINGS W.-Nw.J. ENvrIL. L. &
POL'Y 27, 28 (1994).
495. See, e.g., COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., AI:ERNATIVrl ACRICUIrURAt. WATER
TRANSFER METHODS CRITERIA ANI) GUIEuIN.S FOR THE CoMPETnIVE GRANTi PROGRAM
(Sept. 16, 2010), available at http://cwcb.statc.co.us/LoansGrants/lterafiv-agricultural-watertr;usfer-methods-granLs/Docume nLs/AltAgGimatProgramCriteriaGuidelincs.l)df.
The Draft
Colorado Water Plan strongly discourages transfers based on dry up of irrigated land and encourages use of alternative mechanisms that would not involve the sale of die water right.
WATER PLAN, stupn'i note 422, at 193.
496. Id.
497. Colorado adready authorizes intelrruptible supply agreements. COiO. RY. STAT. § 3792-309 (2014). Colorado also made an ill-fated attempt to establish a water bank in the Arkansws River. See AIAM SCHEMPP, ENVri. L. INST., WESTERN WATER IN THE 21sT CENTURY,
27-28 (2009).
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I. INSTREAM FLOWS
To address the growing demand to protect some remaining unappropriated water flows for fishery maintenance and other purposes, most prior appropriation states now have adopted some mechanism for this purpose. The effect of these mechanisms is to keep a specified water flow between two
designated places on a stream, free friom future appropriation and diversion.
Coming as they did more than one hundred years after the creation of thousands of diversionary prior appropriation rights, these instream flow protections can only apply in places where flows still remain. But they require the
continuing availability of this water in this location, thus potentially limiting future upstream appropriations and requiring protection during change of use
proceedings. " Western states still hesitate to dedicate stream flows permanently to maintain instream values-learing that out-of-stream human needs
might be unduly restricted.' 9 Protection mechanisms are generally limited to
designated state agencies, which operate under carefully defined limits for
maintaining instream flows." While some point to state recognition of instream flows as evidence of the prior appropriation system's adaptability, it is
fair to note the constraints placed on such appropriations are not applicable to
other appropriations!'
Three modest changes would substantially improve use of instrean flow
laws. First would be to allow leasing of diversionary or storage appropriations
and their temporary change to instream flow use.6" Any interested party
should be allowed to do this, not just a state agency."3 The consumptive use
calculation for the leased right should be tolled during the leased period to
remove a disincentive for such leases.?' Injury issues are essentially nonexist-

498. See, e.g., Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. City of Central, 125 P.3d 424, 439 (Colo.
2005).
499. Sec, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316(11) (2014). According to Montana statute:
Except as provided in 85-20-1401, the department may modify an existing or future
order originally adopted to reserve water for the purpose of maintaining minimum
flow, lcvel, or quality of water, so as to reallocate the state water reservation or portion
of the reservation to an applicant who is a qualified reservant under this section. Reallocation of water reserved pursuant to a state water reservation may be made by the
department following notice and hearing if the department finds that all or part of tie
reservation is not required for its purpose and that the need for the reallocation has
been show by the applicant to outweigh the need shown by the original reservant.
Reallocation of reserved water may not adversely alrect the priority (late of the reservation, and the reservation retains its priority date despite reallocation to a different
entity for a different use. The department may not reallocate water reserved under
this section on any stream or river more frequently than once every 5 years.
Id.
500. John D. Leshy, histream Flow Rights: 7he Private and Puhblic ?oles, C616 ALI-ABA
163, 165 (1991).
501. See, e.g., Covell, supla note 334, at 191-95 (surveying statutory provisions regarding
limits on who may appropriate, the purposes of instrean flows, and water quantity amounts).
502. See EnvironnenalFlows, supra note 336, at 340-41 (providing a more extensive discussion).
503. 'There is no new appropriation of water, only a change of tise of an existing right.
504. Colorado has adopted this sal'eguard. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2014) (revised
by 2008 Colo. Sess. Laws 587 (enacting H.B. 1280, 66th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo.
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ent since more water would be available in the stream. Second, diversionary
or storage water rights owners should themselves be pennitted to change their
use to instreamn flow purposes.' The water right has been placed to beneficial
use and a portion ol the diverted water has been consumed in the use. The
right holder seeks only to return that portion historically consumed to the
stream, a choice the holder should have. Third, direct flow appropriators
should be allowed to reduce their historical diversions to improve flows between their headgate and the point at which return flows from the diversions
would have otherwise reentered the stream.i'
Such a change would, ifanything, increase downstream flows thereby eliminating the need for traditional
no injury anafysis.5 °7 It would also provide a disincentive for appropriators to
divert water simply to avoid concerns about the "use it or lose it" requirement,
ultimately enhancing flows in specific river reaches.
While these modest changes would potentially facilitate some flow restoration, the work of restoring water-based systems to desired conditions goes
well beyond changes in law. It requires a more comprehensive eflbrt by states
to assess the existing health of their water-based systems, to set restoration and
protection goals, and to begin a long-term effort to accomplish those goals? °
Reducing diversions/withdrawals under existing appropriations would provide
tie primary means of achieving these goals.
J. GROUNDWATER RIGHTS

Prior appropriation groundwater law, developing as it did later than, and
separate from, surface water law, is still somewhat rudimentary. Important
physical differences in the nature of aquifers compared to surface water systems have created some problems. Inadequate knowledge about available
groundwater supplies, recharge rates, aquifer permeability and porosity, connectivity between aluifers and between aquifers and surface water sources,
and water quality affects our ability to make good decisions about gr-oundwater
uses. As our understanding of individual aquifers improves, so too will our
decision making respecting their use.
Perhaps the most pressing legal problem related to groundwater in most
states is the need to integrate uses of so-called tributary aquifers with interrelated surface water source usesi5 Conflicts between users firom these related
2008))).
505. Water rights holders are otherwise Iree to make a change of use so long as no harin will
result to other appropriators.
506. A bill to this effect passed the Colorado General Assembly in 2014 but was vetoed by
the Governor. See S.B. 14-23, 69th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg Sess. § 2 (Colo. 2014); Goi' Hickenlooper veloes bill over unresolved concern for water righis, suppots pilotprognuln to keep
more
un/wer
in streams
(June
5,
2014),
httl)://wv.colorado.gov/cs/Satcllite?c-

lPage&childlpgenimc=GovHickenlooper%2FC BONLavout&cid = 1251653748188&pagenarne =

CBONWrapper.
507. See Environmentalliows, supriinote 336, at 381-82.
508. See id. at 385.
509. The need for such integration has long been recognized. See, e.g., Samuel C. Wiel,
Need of libed
Liw lbr Sufsce and Underound Wate,; 2 S. CAl.. L. REv. 358, 364-65
(1929). The process ha s been slow, seemingly occurring only when enough conflicts bcetwcen
surface arld groundwater users arise in a state. The state struggling with this issue most prominentlv now is Idaho, where, despite several years of effort to develop procedures to integrate

WA TER LA W ?EVIEW

Volume 18

sources are increasing. 501 Applying a.strict priority rule is likely to result in curtailment of more recent groundwater uses to protect longer-standing surface
water uses. States are taking steps to develop at least some rules respecting the
management of conflicting uses!"
The first step is simply to acknowledge that many aquifers are physically
connected to surfatce water sources and to make that express in law. Wyoming, for example, has identified this possibility with its recognition that
sources found to be closely interrelated should be treated as a single source of
supply.' The more difficult challenge is to decide how to manage conflicting
uses from these connected sources. Colorado has taken a very broad view of
what constitutes tributary groundwater, beginning with an assumption that all
groundwater is tributary!"3 In addition, Colorado allows for augmentation
plans whereby junior tributary groundwater users can pump water out of priority if they also account for and replace all depletions to surface water tlows.' 4
Other states have taken a more narrow view of which tributary groundwater
uses must be regulated to protect surface water sources. ' 5 Once again, this issue is complicated by a general lack of knowledge respecting the actual degree
of connection and the amount and tining of depletions to surface water
sources associated with groundwater pumping. Despite increasing efforts to
model these connections and the eflects of pumping, considerable uncertainty
remains.' 6
Ultimately, it seems less important to seek certainty respecting the precise
degree to which pumping from any particular groundwater well affects surface
water availability. Rather, a generalized fonnula for attributing responsibility
should be developed under which groundwater pumpers would be assessed
depletion fees based on the annual quantity of water pumped. These funds
should be used by an entity established for this purpose to take steps necessary to ofl'set depletions. This entity would use the depletion funds to build
groundwater recharge facilities and to acquire storage and groundwater rights
that can be released as necessary to ensure that surface water users receive the
water they require to continue to meet their actual needs.
A second area of uncertainty concerns the rules governing conflicts among
users from the samne aquifer. The strict rile of priority that applies to surface
uses, conflicts continue. SceJeliey C. Fereday & Michael C. Creamer, The Maximtmn Use
Docaetnhc ad Its Relcva;ce to Water Rights Adninistraion in Idaho 's Lower Boise River Basin, 47 IDAHO L. REv. 67, 68-70 (2010).
WATER FOLLIES, supra note 83, at 222.
511. Se, c.g., Rulcs for Conjunctive Management of Surface and Ground Water Resources,
IDAHO ADMIN. COnE r. 37.03.11.000 (2014).
512. SceWYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-916 (2014).
7bwn of
513. The Colorado Supreme Court recognized this presumption in Safirnek

510. See GLENNON,

lLjnon, 228 P.2d 975, 977 (Colo. 1951) (citation omitted). The Colorado Supreme Court has
also held that proposed pumping from wells to be located thirteen miles from the nearest river
would affect the flows of surface water. Hall v. Kuiper, 510 P.2d 329, 330 (Colo. 1973).
514. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(8)(c) (2014).
515. Wyoming, for cxamnple, does not assumne that groundwater is tributary to surface
sources. WYOMING WATER LAxW, supra note 262, at 151. Nebraska struggled w'ith this issue
for many years because laws governing groundwater uses existed entirely separately fron those
governing surface water use. Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d 116, 125 (Neb.

2005).
516. See GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES, supla note 83, at 75.
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water users, under which new appropriations are not permitted if they interfere with existing rights, would preclude additional groundwater use. Thus,
most states do not protect groundwater appropriators from any particular
drops in water elevations or aquifer pressure levels' 7 In some cases, states
have adopted limitations on groundwater withdrawals that reduce elevations
below "reasonable pumping levels."'. Such levels are typically based on the
cost of pumping water and the expected value of its use.59 Above that level, all
pumpers are expected to take whatever actions are necessary to continue to be
able to pump their allocated water. Most states allow mining of groundwater
with only modest efforts, if any, to regulate the rate at which that mining occurs.j20

States need to take a more active role in making decisions regarding
groundwater use, especially in areas with high levels of development. The use
of special management districts is one mechanism states employ that can
help).;2 '1 Often, the creation of such areas makes it possible for the state or a
designated management authority to limit or cease issuing new permitsi2
Usually there are procedures for establishing more managed use of the aquifer
or aquifers within the district, including well spacing requirements, rotation
agreemnents, limits on punping, and even efficiency requirements lor continued use.5 1 In practice, states have been reluctant to impose active management in such areas and have attempted to encourage groundwater users to develop agreement on any management regiies.54 While a commendable bow
to local control, these elffltis are generally fated to failure because few users
are likely to volunteer themselves for reduced ises.a Rather, this is a problem that requires strong state management, based on the best possible understanding of the long-term water supply potentially achievable from the aquifer.
It is in the state's interest to maintain viable aquifers that can support urban
and rural econonies today and into the future." ' The states need to exercise
stronger control of these aquilers with special management needs.
A third problem is the growing number of so-called "exempt" wells that
27
support new exurban development across the West5
First, the ready availa517.

See, e.g., WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-933 (2014).

518. See, e.g., Douglas L. Grant, Reasmablc Grotmdwater Pumping Levels UIJdcr the Apprvpn'ation Dotoin~e: 7he Liw an(l Underlyig &lonrOniGoal.s, 21 NAT. R.SoURCES.j. 1, 1
(1981) Ihereinafter Grant, Economic Goalsj; see also Douglas L. Grant, I?easonablcGro,,ndwuaicr Iumping Levcls Under the AppropuialJon J<cijine: Underlving Social Goals, 23 NAT.
RE-SOURCE'S.I. 53, 53-54 (1983).
519. Grant, Economic Goals, sup.ra note 518, a( 14.
520. For a discussion on Arizona's ongoing efforts to reduce groundwater mining, see Rita
Pearson Maguire, Patching the Holes in the Bucket: Sak Vieki and the Fture oflVater Managemeit inArzona,49 ARIz. L. REv. 361, 362-63 (2007).
521. See generallyWhite & KI-omm, supra note 391.
522. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-91 2 (g) (2014).

523.

See, e.g., i. § 41-3-915(a)(ii)-(v).

524. See White & Kromm, supi-a note 391, at 304-06.
525. Id. at 306; see alsoJULENE BAIR, THE OGAIAIA ROAD: A MEMOIR OF LOVE AND
RECKONING 186-87 (2014).
526. The move by Kamsas to eliminate the concern about "use it or lose it" as a threat to the
maintenance of a groundwater right in aquifers closed to new appropriations is a common sense
step other states should consider. See H.B. 2451, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2012).
527. Nathan Bracken, Eemnpt Well Issues il the 14est, 40 ENVrtL. L. 141, 145 (2010).
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bility of permits for such wells encourages an unfortunate spread of development into areas with little or no services that are often not well-suited to residential use."8 While counties typically control the actual land use decision, the
state determines whether permission should be given to use underlying
groundwater as the development's water supply sourcef5 Second, the exemption of these wells from regulation provides no means to resolve the growing
number of conflicts between exempt well users and other groundwater users."
States should eliminate the "exempt" well category. They should require a
stronger state role in determining the type of water supply that is necessary for
new development in rural areas, promoting where possible the use of renewable surface water supplies. States should also place the use of water from such
wells under state supervision, enabling state administrators to resolve conflicts
resulting from their use.
K. ADJUDICATIONS

While the states long ago developed relatively efficient permitting systems
for managing the initiation of new appropriations, they have struggled with archaic, unnecessarily legalistic processes for validating that these appropriations
3
have been completed and that the permitted use has been achieved.5
Because of notions that only courts can determine the existence of property
rights, states have continued to rely on cumbersome court procedures called
general adjudications that are regarded as necessary to legally determine the
priority date of all water appropriations from the same source."' Even in a
state like Wyoming where the 1890 legislature gave tie authority to an administrative board to make both general and individual adjudications, courts were
used to perfbrn a general adjudication of all uses in the Big Horn River basin-a process begun in 1977 and finished in 2014.5"
With the modern development of due process procedures in administrafive processes, there is no legal reason why state adminstrative boards cannot
make tie necessary determinations respecting water rights, with the ordinary
recourse of appeal to the court system if needed." ' As the Wyoming Supreme
Court noted in 1900, knowledgeable state administrators are far better suited

528. A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Growth ManagerentandWestern Water L'w.m From Urban Oases to Archipelagos, 5 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 163,

165-66 (1999).
529. Id. at 174.
530. Bracken, supra note 527, at 199-200.
531. A. Dan Tarlock, The Illusion of Finalitv jYi General Water Rights Adjudications,
25 l)AHo L. REv. 271, 272-73 (1988); Thorson I, supra note 86, at 358-59; Thorson II, supra
note 33, at 304-05. For a critical examination of general stream adjudications, see Lawrence J.
MacDonnell, Rethidnbklg the Use of General Streiun Adjudications, 15 WYo. I. REv. (forthconfing 20.15).
532. Thorson I, supra note 86, at 358, 409.
533. The statute establishing the Big Horn adjudication is found at Wvo. STAT. ANN. § I37-106 (2014). For a website pro(iding history and major decisions, see BIG HORN RIVER
ADjuI)IcATION, http://hr'ac.courts.state. w.us/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). For a thorough discussion of this adjudication process, see Jason A. Robison, W3voming's Big Horn General
Stream Adjudication, 1977-2014, 15 WyVo. L. REv. (forthcoming 2015).
534. See generally Lon L. Fuller, 7he Forms and L'nits ofAdjudicatioi, 92 HARv. L. REv.
353,365, 368-69, 400 (1978).
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to make these kinds of determinations than judges." Moreover, the property
interest is the ability to use a state resource. Since tie state is acting as the legal water owner, the legislature has authority to establish the procedures it
deems appropriate for establishing its use, including use of an administrative
process.
Adjudications are used initially for verifying that the proposed use authorized under a permit has in fact been accomplished. They serve as a record of
the nature and extent of the use as finally achieved and represents the best
record title to the legal right." Colorado's water court system is considered a
continuing general adjudication so that each newly decreed right is directly incorporated into the state's official water rights tabulation." ' Its monthly resume system is regarded as adequate notice to all existing appropriators so that
a special general adjudication process is not requiredf 8 While this process
operates through a court system in Colorado, other states could initiate a
comparable process for its administrative proceedings. As with Colorado, it
should be required that all pernitted appropriators file notice of actual beneficial use with the state and obtain a certificate verifying the vesting of the water
rightf 9
States have initiated general adjudications primarily to force the federal
government and Indian tribes to adjudicate their reserved water rights
clailns.5' Because the McCarran Amendment only waives federal sovereign
immunity in the context of a general adjudication, states are obligated to go
through a process that must review and determine the priority of every claim
to water within a basin, not just federal claims"' Typically there are thousands
of such claims that must be determined in a process that requires review of
each appropriation, each priority date, and each authorized right of diversion
or storage; this is likely to provoke controversy respecting the continuing validity and extent of at least some of these claims, and-at the end-does little
more than update state records." There are more efficient ways to improve
state water right records.
The real purpose of these general adjudications is to force the federal
government and tribes to submit claims for reserved water rights to state
535.
536.
537.

Farm liv. Co. v. Carpeniei, 61 P. 258, 266-67 (Wyo. 1900).
Thorson 1,supra note 86, at 424-25.
See Coio. RFv. STAT. § 37-92-306 (2014). Known as the "postponement doctrine,"

the result is that "no decree may be awarded with a priority (late earlier than the most junior
decree awarded in the previous calendar year." TARLOCK Er AL., supia note 292, at 304.
538. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302(3)(a); Pueblo W. Metro. Dist. v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 689 P.2d 594,601-02 (Colo. 1984).
539. Wyoming, fbr example, provides for obtaining a certificate of appropriation. WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 41-4-511 (2014). The Wyoming Supreme Court, however, deciled that failure
to obtain a certilicate did not affect the validity of the right. Larmnie Rivers Co..v. LeVasseur,
202 P.2d 680, 684 (Wyo. 1949). States should consider adopting a policy that failure to file
wouldn't cause loss of right but would shift prioritv date to date of actual use.
540. SecTa'lock, supra note 531, at 272.
541. Secid.
542. TARLOCK ir Al.., supra note 292, at 305; see also Adjudicatjon, IDAHO DEP'T OF
WATER R.s., http://%wvw.idw-.idaho.gov/WaterManageicnu/Adjudicationl ureau/dcfault.ht
(last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (describing die Snake River Adjudication: "The SRBA was art administrative and legal process that began in 1987 to determine the water rights in the Snake River Basin drainage.").
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courts. While slate courts are required to apply federal law in determining the
existence of such rights, experience to date demonstrates that state courts may
well interpret federal law differently. "a The result is that reserved rights are
determined differently from state to state and often in ways that seek to limit
these rights in order to protect state interestsi" It is unrealistic to expect the
US Supreme Court to bring uniformity to these decisions. While this is an
issue that reaches beyond prior appropriation, it is a matter that requires congressional attention as we seek to improve water decision making in the
West.'
A better way to keel) up to date on state water right and water use records
is to establish annual reporting requirements for all water users under state water rights. With online filing, the burden on water users would not be undue.5' Failure to report for some specified period would create a presumption of forfeiture that would be subjected to review at periodic intervals.
Conversely, reported uses would be presumptively correct and would help develop. better information that could be used to help improve water decision
making and management. Individual disputes about actual water use would
be heard through state administrative processes. Water ownership and use
records are woefully inadequate in the western states.5 1 While considerable
care is applied in issuing the initial right, little is done thereafter to keel) track
of ownership, actual use, or changes of use under this right. Many states are
now creating online systems that enable access to state records regarding existing rights." Unfortunately, these records are often incomplete and do not
provide an accurate reflection of actual water use. It is time for states to take
the next step in providing a more up-to-date and accurate record of water use
and ownership under state water rights." '

543. Justin Huber& Sandra Zellmer, 7he Shalows Where FederalReselved Water Rights
1ounder: State Court Derogation of the Winters Doctrine, 16 U. DENy. WATER L. REv. 261,
262, 289 (2013); see also Lawrence J. MacDonnell, GCene;d Stream Adjudications, the McCarran Amendment, and Reserved Water Rights, 15 Wyo. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
544. Il at 275-76.
545. Congress should shift review of federal reserved rights to the federal court within the
state. Once adjudicated, there should be a process for their integration with state water rights.
546. Users would need to have appropriate measuring devices.
547. Mclntire, supra note 467, at 23-24.
548. See, e.g., e WRIMS - Eleetronie Water Rights InIfOnation Management System,
STATE
WATER
Rr:s.
CONTROL
BD.,
CAIJFORNIA
ENVTL.
PROT.
AGEINCY,
http://wwwv.waterboards.ca.gov/wateirights/water-issues/programs/ewims/index.shml
(last updated Oct. 8, 2014); Water Rights, COLORADO'S DECISION SUPPORT SYSTENIS,
http://cdss.slate.co.us/onlineTools/Pages/\VaterRights.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2015); Seatehing Water Right Records, UTAH l)IV. OF WATER RIGHTS, http://www.waterrights.itah.gov/
wrinfo/quety.asp (last updated Mar. 26, 2004).
549. Colorado attempted to require all water rights holders to simply register their ownership
with the State Engineer's Office, an effort that was successfully resisted hy the water user comnunity. Consequently, ownership infoniation is not available on the state's decision support
system.
See generally Water Rights, COLORADO'S DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS,
http://cdss.state.co.us/onlineTools/Pages/WaterRights.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). It is difficult to understand why those holding the valuable privilege of use of a state resource should
not be required to provide requested information to the state, including making an annual report of uses.
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BE. SUMMING UP: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY STATE WATER LAW AND
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The task of water appropriation to establish use rights is essentially comnplete. The work now is to rationalize the millions of existing appropriations to
better address contemporary and future needs. As part of this transition,
states should consider updating their basic water laws along the lines suggested
here. "-; The basic framnework of valid and active water rights would remain,
but the large number of conditional claims would probably diminish substantially. There would be few new appropriations-only those that could meet
vigorous benelicial use requirements and protect a more robust set of public
values as well as private rights. Through a mix of incentives and requirements,
existing uses wOuld continue to become more elicient to reduce diversions
and improve stremn flows. Water use charges would motivate more ellicient
use. Reporting on actual water use would aid water management and would
help clear state records of unused claims to water. New institutions and
mechanisms would emerge to help meet changing water demands requiring
consumnptive water use, and to improve local water management. Tributary
groundwater uses would be fully integrated into the systems governing surface
water uses. Continued special attention to water sources with high ecological
or recreational values would result in improved conditions to support and
maintain those values. These ob jectives are all achievable, but not with existing law. It is time for some changes.

550. The pressures potentiallv motivating such changes seem to be growing. Perhaps lbremost is the inescapable reality that a fully approprialed water supply taces an ever-growing popilation wid a changing set of (lemands. To the degree these new amd changing demands are eitier not being met, or not met qiickly enough, there will be pressure for legislative change.
Uncertainties associated with climate change exacerbate this situation. Competing dermuids for
an increasingly constrained water supply are likely to produce new kinds of conllics that will
prompt courts to look for ways to gradually modify existing law to favor new interests. New direction from legislatures and courts will cause water administrators to more actively ad creatively administer water rights mid manage water. Chlange will likely be slow, but it will come.
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I. INTRODUCMION

To those who think of Colorado just as purple mountain majesties above
the fruited plains, the northwest corner of the state may come as a surprise.
Out there, the landscape levels ofl into an emptiness of sagebrush and sandstone, of antelope and bizarre flat-topped mesas. The torpid rivers belie their
colorful nanes mad flow tepid and flat. It is a lonely place.
But underneath all of that is the Green River Formation, an oil shale formation that lies beneath parts of Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming.' The Formation contains about three trillion barrels of oil, an "amount about equal to
the entire world's proven oil reserves."'
It is hard not to get excited about the prospects of oil shale development."
That much oil could lead to energy security and independence. Jobs Would
be created.' Taxes would be collected. Federal and state governmenLs would
collect royalty payments.
It is also hard not to he discouraged about the prospects of oil shale development: interest in oil shale is over a hundred years old," commentators
have been noting the unlikelihood of its development for over forty years, and
it renmins undeveloped to this day. To extract the oil from the rock, the rock
must be heated to somewhere between 650 and 1000 degrees Fahrenheit.!
Because the oil shale in the Green River Formation is so deep underground,
the most likely technique for extraction is an in-situ process, in which drillers
insert heaters into holes in the rock and collect oil as it is released.' No one
has ever demonstrated this technology on a large scale.'
In-situ oil shale development demands significant amounts of water: one
to twelve forty-two-gallon barrels of water are required to extract each barrel of
oil."0 This is, of course, a tremendous amount of water, especially in such an
arid region, but the companies interested in oil shale hold enough water
rights-or are confident that they can purchase additional rights-to begin de1
velopment." The vast majority of these rights are conditional water rights.'
In Colorado, water is the property of the public, not subject to private
1. U.S. GOV'T AccoUNTABIIJTY OFFICE, GAO-11-35, ENERCY-WA TER NEXus: A
BEFlER ANI) COORDINATED UNDERSTANDING OF WATER RISOURCES COUID HI'LP
MITIGATE THE IMPACTS OF POTENTIAL, O1. SHALE DEVEIOPMENT 1 (2010) [hereinafter
GO'r ACCOUNTABILrITY OFFICE..

2.

Id.

3. Nothing in this article is meant to minimize the serious potential social, economic, ,i'(d
environmental problems posed by oil shale develo)ment. See id. at 7-14.
4. See, e.g., jm Falstad, Pace of Constnmcoon in Billings Jumped iL 2013, BII.1NGS
GAZTIr'E, Dec. 29, 2013 (stating that Billings saw record levels of commercial construction in
2013 thanks to the shale oil boom in Nord Dakota).
5.

5eeGoV'TAccouNTABIIJTY OFFICE, supla note 1, at 4.

6. Richard L. Dewsnup, Assembling IVater Rights br a New [e: Needed Refornms ji the
Lm4 17 ROCKYMTN. MIN. L. INsT. 22 (1972).
7. GoV'T AccoUNTABILITY OFFICE, supii note 1, at7.
8. Id.

9. See d.
Id. at 15.
Id.at 25.
12. See geneialy LAWRENCE J. MACI)ONNI.L, W. RESOURCE ADVOCATFS, WATER ON
TH- ROCKS: OIL SHALE. WATER RIGHTs IN COLORADO (2009).
10.
11.
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ownership," but private individuals can-acquire the right to use water by appropriating it and putting it to beneficial use. 4 Between users, the priority of
the appropriation gives the better right" so that in times of scarcity those appropriators with junior rights will have to defer to those with senior rights. Finally, beneficial use is the "basis, measure, and limit" of that right.'6 Conditional rights act as a placeholder in this priority system by allowing
alpropriators to preserve seniority in the time that it takes them to complete
the project to put water to beneficial use.'7 All water rights, both absolute and
conditional, must be appropriated for beneficial use, rather than speculative
investments.'8
The oil companies are not the only holders of conditional rights.
Statewide, conditional claims constitute sixty-one percent of perfected claims,
and some of these are nearly a century old.'" Consequently, holders of conditional rights have been able to retain senior priorities without ever putting the
water to beneficial use.
This Article argues that the current test for canceling conditional rights has
proven ineffective. Part II outlines the policies served by prior appropriation
and analyzes the prohibition against speculation. Parts III and IV examine the
necessity of conditional rights and the general legal doctrines used to grant or
limit conditional rights. With these policy and legal underpinnings in place,
this Article moves to the current state of the law. Part V studies a number of
the most important cases over the last fifteen years, which have substantially
modified the nature of conditional water rights. Part VI discusses these cases
in light of the policies discussed in Part II and argues that current doctrine has
been ineffective at achieving a chief goal of prior appropriation: the wide distribution of water to potential beneficial users.

I. POLICIES SERVED BY PRIOR APPROPRIATION
The prior appropriation system, with its requirement of beneficial use,
serves three fundamental purposes: (i) to prevent speculation and monopolies,
(ii) to prevent waste and overuse, (iii) and to provide users with flexibility in
the water's use.' Of these, this Article focuses prinarily on the problem of
speculation.
Speculation and monopolization are not the same. " Monopoly"refers to
super-concentrated market power, whereby the monopolist controls so much

13.

CoLo. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.

14. Id.§6.
15. Id.
16. High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710, 719
(Colo. 2005).
17. See intii Part III.
18. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3)(a) (2014).
19. Charles J.P. Podolak & Martin Doyle, Condionai Water Rights il the 1WVestern United
States: Introducing Unertainft, to Prior Appropiiation?,51 J. AM. WATER RESOURcES Ass'N
14, 14,25,29 (2015).
20. Janet C. Neuman, Jencicial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: 77he Inellicient Search for
Eliciencv in WesIer7 Vater Use, 28 EN'TL. L. 919, 963-66 (1998).
21.

Id. at 964.
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of a resource that lie canldepress supply and/or quality and inflate price.""2 In
economic theory, speculation is much more difficult to define, and "a satislactory general definition is still not availahle (and probably never will be)."' To
make matters even more colplicated, tie Colorado Supreme Court has not
always been consistent. The Court has sometimes differentiated between
speculation and monopolization" and sometimes has collapsed the distincFollowing previous commentators, this Article will consider
tion."
"IsIpeculation las] the act of acquiring a resource for the purpose of subse(luent use or resale." ' This definition focuses entirely on intent. But, since
conditional rights may become speculative over time,'7 this Article includes as
speculative those appropriations that have the effect of hoarding water rights
without putting those rights to beneficial use.
In order to analyze how the prior appropriation doctrine tries to prevent
speculation, Subpart A first lays out the philosophical underpinnings of prior
appropriation itself' Subpart B then looks at the two modern rationales for
preventing speculation-that it is a moral wrong and tiat it prevents the wide
distribution of water amnong potential users-and argues that this latter rationale is the better of the two and should forn the basis lor critiques of current doctrine.
A. THE LOCKEAN UNDERPINNINGS OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION
John Locke wrote the second of the Two 7T'eatises of Government in

1690. " Neither the Colorado Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals has
cited him. Yet Locke remains important for a number of reasons. As scholars have noted, Locke's insights are particularly helpful for understanding
both die roots of Western water law and for developing the law for the future."9 Further, recent scholarship by David Schorr has argued that prior ap22.

M.

23. Oliver D. Haut & )avid M. Kreps, Prke Dcstahihlzing Specution, 94 J. Iot. EcON.
927, 928 (1986).
24. Se, e.g., Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Vidlcr Tunnel Water Co., 594 P.2d
566, 568 (Colo. 1979) ("The right io appropriate is for use, not merely for profit.... To recognize conditional decrees groundced on no interest beyond itdesire to obtain water for sale
would-as a practical matter--discourage those who have need and use for die water from (leveloping it. Moreover, such a rule would encourage those wilh vast monetary resources to monopolize, for personal profit rather than fir beneficial use, whatever unappropriated water rcmllains.").
25. See Pagosa Area Water Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (IJagosa 1),170 P.3d 307, 313 (Colo.
2007) ("Colorado's systiem of public ownership of water, combined with tie creation of public
and private use rights therein by appropriation, circumscribes monopolist pitdalls. When tie
benclicial use requirement was put into practice in the nineteenth centuly, its fundamental p)urpose was to establish tie means for making the public's water resource available to those who
had the actual need f"or tie water, in order to curb speculative hoarding.") (citing David B.
'Schorr, Approprltion as Agp-annisin: Distrilbtive.lusficein the Creation oflropertv Rights,
33 EcoL.. L.Q. 3, 9, 22 (2005)).
26. Sandra Zcllmer, The Anti-Speculation )octrine and At Imnpications /r C'l/abmative
W1;terMamgement, 8 Nrv. Lj. 994, 1005 (2008).
27. Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservney Dist. v. OXY USA, Inc., 990 P.2d 701,
709 (Colo. 1999).
28. JOHN LOCKE, SE.COND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. MacPherson ed., Hackett
Publishing Co. 1980) (1690).
29. See KENICHI MATsui, NATIVE PEOPLFS AND WATER RIGHTS: IRRIGATION, DAMS, AND
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propriation developed as an expression of radical Lockeanism. ° Schorr's
work is particularly important because the Colorado Supreme Court has repeatedly embraced it when striking down conditional water rights as unduly
speculative."
Locke dedicates much of the Second 7Teatise to his theory of property."
For Locke, one's own labor belongs to oneself, and applying that labor to nature creates a property right in that resource." Labor is essential, and tie application of labor is the moment of creation of private property-the applied
labor distinguishes the natural resources now held as private property from the
resources still held in common.' Locke's example is particularly relevant:
Though the water running in the fountain be every one's, yet who can doubt,
but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out? His labourhath taken it
out of the hands of nature, where it was common, and belonged equally to all
her children, and hath thereby appropriateclitto himself.'
But appropriation has limits. The law of nature forbids appropriation if it
leads to spoilage," and the appropriator can only appropriate that which could
be traced to actual labor: "As muc]h land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property." " The law of nature and the theory of property thus linit a person even in the absence of others. One could not take all the apples or shoot all the game lor him or
herself, for the inevitable spoilage would violate the law of nature. Nor could

THE LAW IN WESTERN CANADA 31 (2009); Alfred G. CuzAn, Approp~ators VesLus Expropatos: The Political Economy of Water i the West, in WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE
ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 13, 14-17 (Terry L. Anderson ed.,
1983); Joe B. Stevens, John Locke, Eniironmental Property and Instrean Water Rights, 72
LAND ECON. 261,262 (1996).
30.

DAVID SCHORR, THE COLORADO DOCTRINE: WATER RiGrrs, CORPORATIONS, AND

DISTRIBUTIVEJUSTICE ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 26-27 (2012). This is not to say that early miners were reading the Second Treatise by candlelight. Instead, Locke is helpful for understanding the political environment of the nineteenth century. C Laura J. Scalia, The Mamy
Faces of Locke ln America's Early Nineteenth-Centu-y 1emocTatic Philosophy 49 POL.
REs. Q. 807, 814-21, 30-32 (1996) (explaining that no other philosopher more closely paralleled the views of politicians and citizens in early nineteenth-century America, but warning that
Locke's teachings are too ambiguous to be considered a single political belief).
31. See Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Jeviving the Public OwmrershiA Antispeculation, ald Ieneliciad Use Moorings of Pn'or Appiopriation Water Lalw, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 97, 105-06
(2013) (noting Schon's "brilliant work"). Justice Hobbs has been Schorr's primary advocate,
but his speculation opinions have garnered a majority of the Court. See Pagosa 1, 170 P.3d
307, 313 n.5 (Colo. 2007) (citing Schorr, supin note 25, at 9, 22; David B. Schorr, 7he First
Water-PvriiatjationDelate: Colorado Water Corporationsin die Gilded Age, 33 ECOL. L.Q.
313, 319-20 (2006)); High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d
710, 719 n.3 (Colo. 2005) (citing Schorr, supl-a note 25, at 33, 41, 55-56). Justice Hobbs has
relied on Schon in other water law contexts as well. See In re Title, Ballot Title, & Submission
Clause for 2011-2012 No. 45, 274 P.3d 576, 585 n.2 (Colo. 2012) (Hobbs, J., dissenting) (citing Schorr, supra note 25, at 4).
32. Much of the following discussion is indebted to Stevens, supra note 29.
33. LOCKE, supra note 28, §§ 27-28.
34. Id. §28.
35. I. § 29 (emphasis in original).
36. Id.§31.
37. Id.§ 32 (emphasis in original).
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one claim land without applying labor to it. The law of appropriation thus has
a moral element for Locke, expressed in two ways. First, there is the sense
that spoilage is immoral. Second, the act of working-and being rewarded with
the fruits of one's labor through tie creation of private property-is a moral act
in itself, a kind of virtue ethics. "God gave the world.., to the use of the indlustrious and rational, (and labourwas to be his title to it;) not to the fancy or
covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious.
The second limitation on appropriation comes from the presence of others. For Locke, the appropriation could not harn others. By limiting one's
property to that to which one has applied labor, one could not appropriate
away from others, and could not exclude others who had a better claim to the
property. " Again, Locke's example is relevant:
No body could think himself injured by the drinking of another man, though
he took a good (fraught, who had a whole river of the sate water left him to
quench his thirst: and the case of land and water, where there is enough of
both, is perfectly the same."

There comes a point, however, when one cannot appropriate water without hurting others-the entire problem of the West is that there is not enough
water to begin with. In this scenario, Locke argues that society is better off because of the prior appropriations, that "he who appropriates land to lhimself
by his labour, does not lessen, but increases the common stock of mankind.""
This is an early example of cost-benefit balancing,2 where, "Iflor those without
rights, money and commerce have allowed them to share in the social product
created by the initial appropriators."'
From this, one can build the doctrine of prior appropriation from
scratch." In the state of nature that was the early mining camnps, ' the water
was a public resource, available for use by appropriation." A person could
38.
39.
40.

Id. § 34 (emphasis in original).
Id. § 36.
I.§ 33.

41.

Id§37.

42. See Stevens, supra note 29, at 264.
43. Id. at 267.
44. Locke's English example most appropriately describes the re sonable use requircmcnt
of riparian water law. See JOSHUA G-iIZLER, A HISTORY OF WATER RIGHTS AT COMMON
LAW 1 (2004). Even so, western prior appropriation is an evolution of Locke's property theory.
MA'rsuI, supi-ii note 29, at 31.
45. See Stevens, supra note 29, at 262-63 (describing the mining camps as "a most
Lockeat setting" iii which the development of de doctrine of prior appropriation developed
"in the Lockean tradition of how man evolves out of a state of nature into civil society-via private property amd assent to a government that would protect that )ro)erty").
46. C(ompare LOCKE, supi note 28, § 26 ("The earth, Mad all that is therein, is given to
men for the support and comfort of tiheir being. And dio' all the fiits it naturally produces,
and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in comnion, as they are produced by the spontamcous
hand of nature; and no body has originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest of nankind,
in any of them, as they arc thus in deir natural state: yet being given for the use of men, there
must of necessity be a mneals to appropriate ihcm some way or other, before they can be of any
use, or at all beneficial to any pauiicular man." (emphasis in original)), wit1h COLO. CONST. art.
XVI, § 5 ("The water of every naural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the state of
Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public, and the sume is dedicated to the
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appropriate water, but could not waste it. From these principles-that one
must apply water to a beneficial use and that one can acquire property only
through labor-comes the topic of this Article, the prohibition against speculation.
B. THE CRITIQUE OF SPECULATION
1. Speculation as a Moral Wrong
Western water has a distinctive feature: the right to use water is a property
right that can be bought and sold like other property rights,' but it cannot be
held and sold purely for profit.
That any speculation is evil or is a moral wrong is well-engrained in popular culture,'9 though laws in other areas tly to regulate and control speculation
rather than prohibit it altogether. The laws that apply to water "are highly distinctive and apply to 'virtually nothing else."'" In western water law, then,
there is "a strong sense that speculation in water is just plain wrong.""
Courts have sometimes resorted to this type of moral language. The Colorado Supreme Court has called speculation the "sinister purpose, "5' and it
has noted that "IsIpeculation on the market, or sale expectancy, is wholly foreign to the principle of keeping life in a proprietary right and is no excuse for
failure to perform that which the law requires. " 5

use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided.").
47. Compare LOCKE, supra note 28, § 31 ("As much as any one can make use of to any
advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in: whatever is
bcyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others."), Kith COLO. REST. STAT. § 37-92103(4) (2014) ("'Beneficial use' means the use of that amount of water that is reasonable awd
appropriate under reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the purpose for
which the appropriation is lawfully made."), and High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo. Water
Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710, 719 (Colo. 2005) ("Actual beneficial use is the basis, measure, and limit of an appropriation.").

48. See Zachary Donohew, Propety Rights and WIVcstclm United States Water Markets, 53
AUSTL.J. AGRIC. & RESOURCt ECON. 85, 90 (2009).

49. See, e.g., Sebastian Lot & Andrea R. Fix, Not All FiancdSpeculation Is heated
Equally: LIypeople's MoralJudgments About Speculative Short Selling, J. EcON. PSYCHOL.,
Aug. 2013, at 34, 35 ("More or less implicitly, financial speculation-either short or long-has
always been subjected to moral judgnent. In fact, financial speculation has been viewed as
somewhat similar to gambling, which is-to say the least-more closely associated wvith immoral
behavior than moral behavior."); Marc Levinson, An Eil Virus Is Upon Us- 7he Real Problem
Is am Old Scourgc: Spueculation, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 13, 1995, at 49; Sarah Mclnerney, Labour
TI) Sugests bind Plice Cap to Stop Booms, SUNDAY TiMEs (London), Oct. 20, 2013, at 2
(speculation of real property); David Warren, lditorial, A Weapon Agaist the Great Inflationar, Evls, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Mar. 18, 2012, at A9 (speculation of currency); Joe Zhang, China
Deprives Itself of Monetary Tools, WA1i. ST. J. (Asia), June 5, 1995, at 6 (speculation of filtures); cf. People v. Weller, 207 A.D. 337, 347 (N.Y. App. Div. 1923) (discussing speculation
and theatre tickets).
50. Zclhncr, supra note 26, at 1011 (quoting Joseph L. Sax, Understanding Transfers:
Communi, Rights and ie Pnvatization of latei; I HASTINGS W.-Nw. .1.ENIL. L. & POL'Y
13, 14 (1994)).
51. Id. at 1030.
52. Metro. Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 365
P.2(1 273, 284 (Colo. 1961).
53. Knapp v. Colo. River Conservation Dist., 279 P.2d 420, 427 (Colo. 1955). Of course,
this is circular: the doctrine of beneficial use was designed to prevent speculation, and specula-
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The Court came closer to articulating the rationale for the prohibition of
speculation in Ciy & Count, of Denver v. ANorhern Colo1i1lo 14aler Conservancy Distric,5' in which the Court condemned "promoters and speculators-not appropriators" who had "d[onel only token work to give pretense of
a right which they might sell."" Indeed, "mere speculators... caninot by
survey, plat and token construction compel subsequent bona lide appropriators to pay them tribute by purchasing their claims in order to acquire a right
guaranteed them by our Constitution." ;
This last passage hints at two of the primary reasons why speculation in
water seems morally wrong. The right to appropriate-unlike, say, the right to
purchase land or commodity f-utures-is a right the Colorado Constitution
guaraitees.5 In other words, to deprive those who would actually use the water is to deprive them of their constitutional right. This raises the second reason why speculation in water seems morally wrong: there is a strong suggestion
that those who do work-here the "bona fide appropriators" against the "mere
speculators"-are morally preferable to those who do not.
This leads back to Locke, for "Locke's injunction that a person has a right
to that property which 'he hath mixed his Labour with' can be used to attack
the speculator and trader in the name of the 'workingman."'.. In other words,
"Ipiroperty derived from trade or speculation Idoes] not possess the same
moral justification as property derived from 'real' work."
Of course, the moral justification for the antispeculation doctrine is hardly
compelling, especially when the law permits speculation in any number of
Further, in light of economists' strong.
other natural resources."
pro-speculation arguments, it is hard to justify the law's approach in promoting personal virtue ethics.
2. Hoarding and Distributive justice
A better argument for the antispeculation doctrine is that it helps to distribute the scarce resource among potential beneficial users. This is consistent
with Professor Schorr's interpretation of radical LockeanisIm.
The prohibition against speculation is part of prior appropriation itself:
fon is wrong because it is inConsiStent with benClicial use.

54. 276 P.2d 992 (Colo. 1954).
55.

Id.at 1008.

56. Id. at 1009.
57. Sec Lotz & Fix, supi- note 49, at 35 (suggesting that laypcrson's bias conics from a general intuitve notion of fairness, "whereas understanding the upsides of speculaion usually requires reflective judgmnent").

58. Richardj. Ellis, Raitcdlxockeanism ,hl Aincuican PolitcalCturec, 45 W. IOl.. Q. 825,
827 (1992) (citation omitted).
59. Id. at 828.
60. Sec c.g , UI.RICH KRACH, THE SECRETS OF SUCCFSSFUL SPECl'I\TION: WHAT \VAIL
STREM1 DOESN'T WAINT You To KNow 224 (2008) ("Timber as an investment has actually
beaten the stock mauket, %ith less risk, over the long run.... lAldding timberland to a welldiversified portlolio enhances the return potential, while reducing risk (volatility)."). To be lair,
though, this raises tie reverse question: If speculation in water is so wrong, why is speculation in
other natural resources not? See infira note 257 for a discussion of the problems of timber
speculation.

61.

See inlia Part II.C.
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courts established the beneficial use requirement as a "general anti-speculation
doctrine of appropriation law targeting big water corporations in practice.""
The beneficial use requirement came directly from the mining carps, and its
purpose was to prevent absentee owners from selling the water at a profit and
to make the water available for actual users."
Fears of speculation and monopolization were not limited to water law,'
but were "expressions of an agrarian, populist world view widespread in the
western United States in the nineteenth century, an ideology locked in a secular struggle with corporate capitalism and speculative investment, particularly
in western lands."' Scarce resources created concerns amnong western settlers
that the resources would not be available to the actual settlers and miners, but
instead would "be disposed of to absentee speculators and corporations controlled by eastern and European investors."'
The earliest Colorado reference to the prohibition against speculation appears to be in Combs v. Agricultural Ditch Co." The Court in Colnbs cited
no precedent for the prohibition against speculation-rather, the prohibition
derived directly from the requirement of beneficial use.6" This prohibition was
62. SCHORR, supra note 30, at 75. There is occasionally some confusion about the difference between the general prohibition against speculation and the Vdler mtispeculafion doctrinc, awd sometimes the two are conflated. See, e.g., Doug Cannon, Closing the I)oor on Waler Speculations: Nevada's Adoption of the Anti-Speculation Doctrine, NEV. LAW., Sept. 2009,
at 12, 13; Casey S. Funk & Daniel J. Arnold, Pagosa-7he Great and Growing Cities Doctrine
rnpeneled: An Objec've Look from a Biased JPerspeetive, 13 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 283,
293 (2011); see also City ofThornton v. Bijou Inigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 37 (Colo. 1996). The
distinction is this: courts have always prohibited speculation, but Vidler established an important bright-line test.
63. SCHORR, supra note 30, at 19-22.
64. See id. at 26-27, 96-97.
65. Iclat 25. Water law is not the only area where these concerns have been relevant. See,
e.g., Douglas M. Spencer & Abby K. Wood, Citizens United, States Divided: An Emnpfiiad
Analysis of Independent Politica Spending, 89 IND. Lj. 315, 331 (2014) ("Modern campaign
linance laws are rooted in tie Progressive Era of the early 1900s and were a part of a broad political reforn movement to limit the power of corporate interests over state legislatures (e.g.,
railroad 'robber barons' in California and 'copper kings' in Montana) ...." (footnote omitted)).
After the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Citiens United ir Fed. Elections Conmn 'n, 558
U.S. 310 (2010), Montana unsuccessfully tried to defend its campaign expenditure law on its
unique state history of corruption. Spencer & Wood, supra, at 337-39.
66. SCHORR, supra note 30, at 25, 71. The fear of outsiders is still alive and well today. See
Aaron Pettis, Note, 7hkings and the Right to Fish and Float in Colorado, 89 IND. LJ. 473, 474
n. 10 (2014) (describing a widespread xenophobic attitude of Coloradans toward Texan outsiders).
67. 28 P. 966 (Colo. 1892).
68. Id. at 968 ("The constitution provides that the water of natural streams may be diverted
to beneficial use; but the privilege of diversion is granted only for uses truly beneficial, and not
for purposes of speculation."). The doctrine in Combs was unremarkable among the Western
states at the time. See, e.g., Miocene Ditch Co. v. Campion Mining & Trading Co., 3 Alaska
572, 585-86 (D.Alaska 1908) ("The evidence shows that even the leading officers of the Miocene Ditch Company regarded the Hammond location and diversion as made, or at least held,
for speculative purposes merely. If made with no intent to construct a ditch to be devoted to
some beneficial or useful industry, the law would annex to the location no validity as an appropriation of the water attempted to be converted to tie locator's benefit. I1That tie locator,
with intention to locate a water right and hold it for speculaive and not for beneficial uses, gains
no rights by going through the forms of locating a vater right, is supported by numerous auithorites ... ."); Weaver v. Eureka Lake Co., 15 Cal. 271, 272-73 (1860) ("To render valid a claim
of water by appropriation, the claim must be for some useful or beneficial purpose, or in con-
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bolstered by the public policy argument that speculation would drive consuiners out of the market and would prevent irrigation." The argument retains vitality today and is often deployed by the Colorado Supreme Court.7 That rationale-that the opporttnity to use those priorities would not be fairly
distributed-remains the most convincing argument for the prohibition against
speculation.
C. A BRIEF DEFENSE OF SIECULATION
Among the criteria bandlied about in public discussions on the allocafion of
water supplies are such phrases as "fair shares," "reasonable requiremenLs,"

"nieeds," "beneficial uses," etc.; in some cases these can only be regarded as
7

noises with emotive content used its substitutes for rational analysis.

Locke took one more step that never made it into Colorado water law: he
reevaluated appropriation rules in light of the introduction of mroney.2 Since
tImplation of a future appropriation for such purpose by the parties claiming it. A claim I'r
mere speculation will not answer.
A] bare claim to a water right without some actual steps

towards appropriation, could confer no rights capable of ownership or" sale."); Toohey v.
Campbell, 60 P. 396, 397 (Mont. 1900) ("The policy of the law is to prevent a person from acquiring exclusive control of a streamn, or any parth eireol, not for )resent and actual beneficial
use, but for mere fturre speculative profit or advantage, without regard to existing or contemplated beneficial uses."); Nev. Ditch Co. v. Bennett, 45 P. 472, 482-83 (Or. 1896) ("The water
of a public streal is evCntualdly applied to a benelicial use .... Nor is such a rule consistent or
congenial with the creation and fostering of monopolies in tie use of the waters of public
streams. The appropriator cannot withhold the water from a beneficial use .... IThe plaintfil']
had a reasonable expectation that there would he a denand for water as soon as they could
convey it to a convenient place for the intended use, aud in this respect the scheme could not
be said to be merely speculative, impracticable, or visionary."). But ce Scherck v. Nichols, 95
13.2d 74, 78-79 (Wyo. 1939) (acknowledging the Thohety rule but noting that mere speculation
"is hardly possible under the extensively regulative laws of tfis state"). While these cases might
come out differcntly today (especially Nevada Ditch Co.), the point is simply that early coums
were concerned about speculation and monopoly and derived this doctrine directly from the
requirement of benelicial use.
In tie years following Comls, parties occasionally raised the argument that an appropriation was unduly speculative, but early cases were decided on other grounds. See, e.g., Bijou
Irrigation Dist. v. Weldon Valley Ditch Co., 184 P. 382, 385-86 (Colo. 1919); Blakely v. Ft.
Lyon Canal Co., 73 P. 249, 255 (Colo. 1903). Trial courts were receptive to tie argument,
dtough, and were %illing to cancel water iights that they found speculative. See, e.g., Hough v.
Lucas, 230 P. 789, 790 (Colo. 1924).
69. Combs, 28 P. at 968 ("1l1f ditch companies were at liberty to divert water without limit,
and at the satie time make the ownership of stock an absolute condition precedent to the right
to procure water from their inigating canals,-water rights would soon become a matter of speculation and nmonopoly, and tillers of the soil would have to pay exorbitant rates for the use of
water, or our arid lands would becomc untproductive."). But c/ Zelliner, suipai
note 26, at 1023
(noting that speculation and monopoly are distinct problems).
70. lK.g., Natural Energy Res. Co. v. Upper Gunnison River 'Watcr Conservancy Dist., 142
P.3d 1265, 1277 (Colo. 2006) ("'He pu)ose of the 'can and will' statute is to subject conditional rights 'to contintued scrutiny to prevent the hoarding of priorities to die detriment of those
sceking to apply de state's water beneficially.' . . . Accordingly, the 'substantial probability'
standard is eip)loyed to curb indefinite speculation, not to protect a conditional water right
where only tie thiinest possibility remains that the project can ard will be completed." (citations omitled)).
71. .ACK HIRSHLEIFER, JAMES C. D HAVEN & JEROME W. MILLIMAN, WATER SUPPx:
ECONOMICS, TFCHNOLOGY, AND POIcY 36 (1960).
72. See LOCKE, supi-a note 28, §§ 36-37.
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money cannot spoil, appropriators could avoid the strictures of the law of nature by over-appropriating and selling natural resources." Appropriators
could accumulate money without the fear of spoilage.
Colorado water law refused to take this step. The. prohibition against
speculation in water treats water as something fundamentally different from
other sources, often couched in the necessity of water to both life and livelihood." While this notion is deeply engrained in western water law, it produces much eye-rolling among economists, who reject the "nonsense [that] has
been written on the unique importance of water supply to the nation or to particular regions.... Ibecausel Iwihatever reason we cite ... the alleged unique
imnportnmce of water disappears upon analysis."73 In this view, water is just like
any other economic good-that is, "an economist might be defined as someone who doesn't see anything special about water.". For the economist, the
true evil is not speculation on the market, but speculation taking the place of
reason.

Despite the popular antipathy toward speculation, economists typically favor it because it is economically efficient. In general, economists argue that
speculation serves a number of goals: it shifts the risk of failure onto those
who are most able to bear it," it helps adjust market prices to more accurately
reflect supply and demand,"9 it allows development to take place at an appropriate time' ° mad in creative or innovative ways,' and it allows the marketrather than the judiciary-to correct failures."
These justifications for speculation are not exclusive to water, either.
73. Id. § 37.
74. See Zellmer, supla note 26, at 1008.
75. HIRSHLEIFER .'AL., supra note 71, at 4-5.
76. Timothy D. Tregarthen, 1Watcr in Colorado:Fearand Loatidng of the MaukctpIlac, in
WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOcATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT,
supra note 29, at 119, 119-20 ("Neither water's great usefulness nor its scarcity pose problems
that distinguish it Frtom other economic goods.").

77. See Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators:Regulation anod Private Ordering
in dte Market for OTCDeivatives, 48 DUKE LJ. 701, 707 (1999).
78. See Richard A. Epstein, Whj' Restrui Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 989
(1985).
79. Stout, supia note 77, at 707.
80. Daphna Lewisohn-Zamir, More Is Not Alays Better than Less: An ELplomztion in
PropertyLim, 92 MINN. L. REv. 634, 694 (2008).
81. See Epstein, supranote 78, at 989.
82. Tregarthen, sup,a note 76, at 124 ("One wonders how other markets would function if
such judicial determinations of usefulness were required."). A nineteenth-century newspaper
put it like this:
To make a long matter short, what has tie government to do with speculation or
overtrading, that this continued war upon all credit should 'be kept up for their prevention? Why not enjoin it upon all to fill the ground, because tie price of grain is
high? Why not establish a curfew-bell to ring all subjects to bed, because they burn
too much whale-oil? Why not lay an excise on butcher's meat, because, forsooth,
men eat more beef than is wholesome? Ordinary nien have supposed that such matters were better left alone than meddled with; but our rulers choose to try experiments for the purpose of settling the question to their own satisfaction.
Editorial, Speculation and Overtrading,DAILY HFRALD & GAZETrE (Cleveland), May 2, 1837,
at 2.
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Speculative investing shifts risk onto investors in two ways. First, investors
bear the risk of uncertain water supplies, caused both by year-to-year fluctualions in rain and snowfall and the persistent threat of climate change."3 For
economists, this uncertainty makes water especially suitable for the marketthat is, adjustments to the water xnmaket can reallocate risk just like any number of other markets. " If the value or supply of water plummets, the investor
bears the loss.' The second way that speculation shifts risk is that it allows investors, rather than consumers, to bear the risk of failed projects.' In this
sense, speculaion is not limited to a strict econonic definition but includes
any right that would be canceled by a court. Because Vidler requires that an
appropriator have either firmi contractual commitments or an agency relationship with the end beneficial user, only users of water itself-not investors--carry
the risk of faed projects .
Furthermore, the antispeculation doctrine is undesirable to the extent that
it hampers viable water markets. Commentators have argued that treating water like any other economic good has the potential to solve the very real probWater
lems of inefficient agricultural use mid environmental degradation.
markets facilitate the distribution of water according to its most valuable econonic use. Thus, since "Itihe economic value of [agriculturall water to cities
dwarfs the value of the same water to the farmers1,] lilt makes economic sense
to let the water support the higher value activity." Thus, the argument goes,
the result under Colorado water law is the unnecessary injection of the judiciary into matters that the market should regulate.'

83. This is apparent to anyone who has ever lived in Colorado. Sec City & Cnty. of Denver
v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 838 (Colo. 1939) ("The water flow in ]the South Plattel is extrcnely
die water rights of the city originating therefrom is far
diom
variable. The stream and the yield
from uniform."); Van Tassel Real Estate & Live Stock Co. v. City of Cheyenme, 54 P.2d 906,
908 (Wyo. 1936) ("The climate in WNyoming and throughout the Rocky Mountains is semiarid;
tie precipitation of rain mid snow is light, irregular, and uncertain as to time."). Not only does
annual precipitation vary wildly, but climate change shortens tie snow season, causes faster
snow melt, increases run off, and creates higher evaporation losses. Robert Glennon, Wulaer
Scacitv, Marketing, and hvatiaion,83 TEx. L. Rrv. 1873, 1874-75 (2005) ("Higher temperattires produce a shorter snow season (more precipitation falls in the lorm of rain), faster snow
melt, and increased runoff. . ..Globd warming also creates higher evaporation losses from the
suifaces of lakes, reservoirs, and rivers.").
84. Tregarthen, .s'upia note 76, at 120-21.
85. Metro. Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 365
P.2d 273, 288 (Colo. 1961) (asserting those who invest time, money, and energy into unsuccessful water supply prqjects bear the loss); Stout, supra note 77, at 736-37 (arguing speculators in
trade agreements, such as farners, risk bearing a loss by selling later at market price rather than
early at a lower price).
86. See Tregarthen, supia note 76, at 132.
87. Id.
88. Glcnnon, supia note 83, at 1888.
89.
d.
90. Trega-then, supra note 76, at 135-36 ("The courts that regulate this market have exhibited, in ruling after ruling, a fundamental lack of contidence in the eflicacy of private-market
solutions. The result is a needlessly costly and unceilain system in which innovation is difficult.
The fea -ad loathing of teiprivate market. under prior appropriation doctrine, of course, does
have one other signilicmt result-a greatly expanded role for tie judicial system that administers
it."); cf mIia text accompanying note 119. Of course, those on tie losing side ol judicial decisions are often wont to argue that the courts have overstepped their authority. Cf Funk & Arnold, supra note 62, at 312 (criticizing the role of trial courts after Pagosa 1). But see Pagosa
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This discussion is not an exhaustive defense of water speculation; cornmeenters have raised some important counterarguments.9' Rather, this brief
defense highlights the problems with a moral prohibition on water speculation-in other words, that it is not as easy as sinply dismissing it as "evil" or
"sinister." The perception that there is something intrinsically different about
water is so deeply engrained within the culture and courts that it is unlikely to
change. Still, the arguments based on the presumed evil of speculation are
not persuasive. A more persuasive argument is that water held without being
put to beneficial use removes that water firom the pool of resources available
to those who could use it immediately.
This is important conceptually as well. If speculation is evaluated by how
it affects third parties, then it is more appropriate to talk about speculative elfects rather than speculative intent."

III.CONDITIONAL RJGHTS
The problem with the beneficial use doctrine is readily apparent: if water
rights do not form until appropriators put the water to beneficial use, then appropriators cannot secure rights until after they complete a project, at which
time other appropriators may have gained seniority over them. Without protection, appropriators have no incentive to engage in long-term, complicated
projects. To solve this problem, early courts developed the doctrine of conditional water rights. '
Conditional water rights are an exception to the rule that appropriators
must put water to beneficial use before they can establish a right."4 A conditional water right is "a right to perfect a water right with a certain priority upon
the completion with reasonable diligence of the appropriation upon which
such water right is to be based." " Conditional rights thus serve as placeholders
within the priority system and allow an appropriator to preserve seniority

Area Wafer & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa I4, 219 P.3d 774, 788 (Colo. 2009)
(dedicating half a page to rebutting Funk and Arnold's argument). While Colorado has the
strictest antispeculation doctrine in the West, Zielhner, suplta note 26, at 1027, its water law is
practicafly laissez laire compared to the permit systems of other states, which allow applications
to be denied for any number of grounds, see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-153 (2014)
("[WIhen the application or the proposed use conflicts with vested rights, is a menace to public
safety, or is against the interests and welfare of the public, the application shall he rejected.");
NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.370(3) (2014) (requiring the State Engineer to conside r, among other
things, "Iwlhether the proposed action is environmentally sound as it relates to the basin from

which the water is exported," "Iwihether the proposed action is an appropriate long-tenn use
which will not unduly limit the future growth and development in the basin from which the water is exported," and "lalny other factor the State Engineer deternines to he relevant").
91.

SeegencildlyZellmer, supra note 26.

92. The Colorado Supreme Court has sometimes used this type of language. Se, e.g.,
Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. OXY USA, Inc., 990 P.2d 701, 709 (Colo. 1999) ("IAI conditional right, or some portion of that right, may become speculative over
time.... ").
93. See Sieber v. Frink, 2 P. 901, 903-04 (Colo. 1884). In a case of reciprocity, Nevada
recently adopted Colorado's antispeculation doctrine. Bacher v. Office of State Eng'r, 146 P.3d
793, 798-99 (Nev. 2006).
94. See Centennial Water & Sanitation Dist. v. City & Cnty. of Broomlield, 256 P.3d 677,

684 (Colo. 2011).
95.

Cot.o. REV'. STAT. § 37-92-103(6) (2014).
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while completing the necessary steps for the project.'
The rule has generally remained unchanged since Siebe,; 7 though the
Colorado Supreme Court has interpreted the statute as requiring a three-part
test. To establish a conditional water right, the applicant mus( demonstrate
that (i) it has taken a first step toward appropriation, (ii) its intent is not speculative, and (iii) "there is a substantial probability that the applicant 'can and
will' complete the appropriation with diligence and within a reasonable time.""
The first requirement is a notice requirement for other users. The second requirement is the statutory version of the Vidlerantispeculation doctrine. The
third requirement is the statutory imposition of the can-and-will doctrine.
Even though an appropriator can use the doctrine of conditional water
rights for any size of water project,' the doctrine is especially important for the
type of large-scale projects that are increasingly dominating the most important
questions in Colorado water law.' °" As the Colorado Supreme Court has noted, "The doctrine of relation back is a legal fiction in derogation of the consti.
tution for the benetit of claimants tinder kuger and more dillicult )roLjecs.'
While tei prohibition against speculation is intrinsic to the doctrine of
prior appropriation itself, ' the prohibition can be separated into two general
eras, divided in 1979 by Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Vidler
7unnel Water Co., which established the modern bright-line test for determining speculation.'
A. BALANCING BEFORE VIDLER
Before Vidle,; courts were able to approach the antispeculation doctrine
with more discretion. These cases show that courts would give substantial
leeway to important projects as long as the applicant put in some effort to develop the project.
The definitive example of balancing speculation against prospective de96. Rocky Mountain Power Co. v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 646 P.2d 383,
387 (Colo. 1982) ("The purpose of a conditional water decree has always been to dlow an ultim
appropriation of water to relate back to (lhe lime of tie 'first step' toward that appropriation.").
97. Compare Sichce; 2 P. at 903-04 ("Although the appropriation is not deelmed complete
until th6 actual diversion or use of the watrer, still, if such work be prosecuted vith reasonable
diligence, the right relates to the time when the first step was taken to secure it." (quoting Ophir
Silver Mining Co. v. Carpenter, 4 Nev. 534, 544 (1869))), wilh COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92103(6) (2014) ("'Conditional water right' means a righl to perfect a water right with a certain
prioity upon the completion with reasonable diligence of the appropriation upon which such
water right is to be based.").
98. Vermillion Ranch Ltd. P'ship v. Raftopoulos Bros., 307 P.3d 1056,1064 (Colo. 2013).
99. Se, e.g., Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27, 42 (Colo. 1997) (project using
ten c.f.s. of water); Talco, Ltd. v. Danielson, 769 P.2d 468, 469 (Colo. 1989) (project using
0.555 c.fs.); Orchard Mesa Irrigation Dist. v. City & Cnty. of l)enver, 511 P.2d 25, 28 (Colo.
1973) (project. using one hundred c.t.s.).
100. Cf A. 1)an Tarlock, JriorAppropn'aion: Rule, Princile, or Rheioi'?, 76 N.D. L.
REV. 881, 895 (2000) (discussing the decreasing importalIe of agriculture, especially small in-igation comnmunities, anod die associated rise in importance of urban water planning interests).
101. City & Cnty. of Denver v. N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 276 P.2d 992, 1001 (Colo. 1954).

102. Se supia Pat II.B.2.
103.

594 P.2d 566, 568-69 (Colo. 1979).
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velopment appears in City & County of Denver v. Sheri[f in which the Colorado Supreme Court held that it would not hold cities to the same scrutiny for
speculation as it would other appropriators."' Indeed, "it is not speculation
but the highest prudence on the part of the city to obtain appropriations of water that will satisfy the needs resulting from a nornmal increase in population
within a reasonable period of time."'03 The Court chastised the defendants'
lawyers who, in approaching the rights as if they were for agricultural use,
"dlidl not fully comprehend the issues involved in this case" and "missledl entirely the outstanding fact that more than one-third of the population of the
state is seeking a measure of security in water supply."'0 6 The balancing struck
in Sheriffis so important that the entire antispeculation doctrine would likely
be unworkable without it."'°
Mid-century cases reflect the Colorado Supreme Court's willingness to
support large-scale projects. The point is apparent: large projects are essential
to the wellbeing of the state and they need some lexibility. No matter what
evil the Robber Barons wreaked upon the West, they were instrumental in
developing the country, creating a national infiastructure, and "creatling]
enormous national wealth and dramatically raisling American living standards."' Likewise, significant prQjects-especially complicated projects that require tunneling through the Continental Divide-need some sort of leeway in
their development.
In Taussig v. Motllt Tunnel Water & 1Development Co.,"' the Colorado
Supreme Court upheld conditional rights for a transmountain project that carried Western Slope water into the South Platte basin."0 The water company
had spent money trying to develop the water,"' but there was no indication of
how the water would be used or who would use it."' The Court, in upholding
the conditional rights, emphasized the necessity of large-scale projects and the
protection that courts should give these projects."'
Twenty years later, the Court relied heavily on Taussig in upholding another transmountain diversion in Metropolitan Suburban Water Users Ass n
v. Colorado River Water Conservation District."' There, appropriators

104.
105.
106.
107.

96 P.2d 836, 840-42 (Colo. 1939).
Id.at841.
Id.at 840-41.
C Zellner, supi-a note 26, at 1029. The doctrine has seen important changes in recent

years. Sec inifra Part V.B.2.
108. Christian C. Day, Risky Business: PopularImages and Reality of Capital Markets HandligRisk-Fron the Tulip Craze to the Decade of Greed, 113 PENN ST. L. REv. 461, 507-08

(2008).
109. 106 P.2d 363 (Colo. 1940).
110. Id.at 365-68.
111. Id. at 366.
112. Seeid.at367.

113. See id. at 366 ("All the Facts and circumstances surrounding these claims indicate an
Only under the circumstances before us would it be
possible for private enterprise to bring water firom the Western Slope to the South Platte basin
enterprise of considerable magnitude.

on the Eastern Slope. Until there is a reasonable assurance culminating in conditional decrees,
such as are before us, it would not be possible for any private enterprise to risk such a large
").
anount of capital ....
114. 365 P.2d 273, 285-86 (Colo. 1961).
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sought to divert Western Slope water from the Eagle River, then transfer the
water across the mountains into the Arkansas River Basin, and finally
transport the water into the South Platte River Basin."" The Arkansas water
would reach Pueblo and the South Platte water Denver, Aurora, and Colorado Springs."' The trial court found, among other things, that the entire "project Iwasi speculative, the financing uncertain and that there Iwas] no need for
the water to be appropriated."' The Colorado Supreme Court quickly rejected these findings as having no evidentiary basis."' The Court dismissed the
fear of speculation that had compelled the trial court:
Similar views and fears prevailed with reference to the Big Thompson, Molat Tunnel, Roberts Tunnel and other major projects-to many if not most people, flese projects appeared to be the dreams of visionaries; today ihey are bencicent realities.
The trial court had no right to substitute its opinion as to the course of fiture events,
for that of those char'ged wid the duty of supplying adequate walcr for municipalities
and other public bodics, who have made eareful studies of the questions and problems presented and have in good iith put their vision, work, money and energies into a1s)rogram by which they seek to put the public waters of the state to beneficial
use.

While the Court had called speculation a "sinister purpose" earlier in its
opinion,' 0 this passage reads like a modern economic justification for speculation-that markets, rather than courts, should determine the allocation of water.'"' The Court even concluded with a straightfon'ard endorsement of the
risk-shifting justification of speculation: "If they have miscalculated and fail,
the loss is theirs-if they succeed, it will be for the eternal benefit of the peoples of the state of Colorado .....
.Inthis, the Court, channeling Locke,' found
that proper appropriations imbued with labor increase the overall wellbeing of

everyone as a whole. Consequently, the loss of opportunity for others to appropriate is less significant, since everyone would be better off if the project
succeeded. The Court's reliance on Tausslalso siggests that it was not relying on a public work's involvement; instead, it appears as if the Cout's rationale could apply equally to private appropriators.'2 '
This is not to say that courts were unwilling to find speculation. Brnger v.
Uncompaigr'e Valley Waler Useirs Ass 'n' represents one of the more tentative projects proposed, and one of the easier cases to decide. 1ungerinvolved
a "complex and massive" plan that collected water froim multiple Western
Slope rivers and redistributed the water to rivers and unbiilt reservoirs on

117.
118.
119.
120.

ld. at 275.
kd.at 275, 277-78.
Id.
at287.
Idat287-88.
ld.
at 288.
Id. at 284.

121.
122.
123.

See spila Part I I.C.
Metro. Suburblm,365 P.2d at 288.
See supia Part II.A.

124.

See Melo. Suburtban, 365 P.2d at 285.

115.
116.

125. 557 P.2d 389 (Colo. 1976), dhavowmed on othergounds by City of Aspen v. Colo. Rivcr Water Conservation Dist., 696 P.2d 758, 763-65 (Colo. 1985).
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both sides of the Continental Divide. ' Unused water would flow back into
the Gunnison River,'" with the "only purpose in seeking an appropriation was
to save the water for Colorado. JBunger] merely expressed Hopes to irrigate
600,000 acres of land-where and owned by whom he had no idea."' " Bunger's intent was probably not speculative in the sense of an appropriation made
solely for its sale expectancy. Instead, it seems like a harebrained scheme that
was high on hopes but low on logistics. The move between Metropolitrm
Suburban and Bunger has less to do with speculation per se but with the practicalities of the projects at hand.
B. VIDLER

In 1979, the Colorado Supreme Court decided Colorado River vater
Conservation District v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., a which established the beginning of the modern era of the antispeculation doctrine by establishing a
bright-line test for speculative use. To survive a challenge of speculation, the
appropriator must demonstrate either a firm contract or an agency relationship with a proposed user who will put the water to beneficial use.' 0 Vidler
has become more than just precedent: it has become the talisman that the
Court invokes whenever it decides to cancel a right as speculative, a ceremony
in which the high priests begin by intoning, "Our constitution guarantees a
right to appropriate, not a right to speculate."''
Indeed, the Colorado Supreme Court today no longer cares to justify the rule on policy grounds: "It is
now too well-settled to merit elaboration that the intent to appropriate water
for a beneficial use ... cannot be based on the speculative sale or transfer of
the appropriate rights.' 32
The Colorado Supreme Court has consistently insisted that Vidler was
not new law and that it "expressly relied upon prior holdings" and "reaffirmed
[the Court'sj longstanding view."'" It is true that the prohibition of speculation
has always been inherent in prior appropriation. But, Vidle,; in requiring a
contract or an agency relationship,'3 ' went beyond what precedent required,'
126.
127.
128.
129.
(2014),

Id. at 391.
Id.
Id. at 394.
594 P.2d 566 (Colo. 1979), superscdcd by statute, COLO. R v. STAT. § 37-92-305(9)(1)
as recognLized in FWS Land & Cattle Co. v. State, Div. of Wildlife, 795 P.2d 837, 840

(Colo. 1990).
130. Id.at 568.
131. Id.; see also Vermillion Ranch Ltd. P'ship v. Raftopoulos Bros., 307 P.3d 1056, 1064
(Colo. 2013); Upper Yampa Water Conservancy Dist. v. Wolfe, 255 P.3d 1108, 1111 (Colo.
2011); Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Lmd Co. v. Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist., 256
P.3d 645, 662 (Colo. 2011); High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist.,
120 P.3d 710, 720 (Colo. 2005); Colo. Ground Water Coinm'n v. N. Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater Mgmt. Dist., 77 P.3d 62, 79 (Colo. 2003); Bd. of Cnty. Cmm'rs of Arapahoe v. United
States (Arapahoe J), 891 P.2d 952, 959 (Colo. 1995); Water Supply & Storage Co. v. Curtis,
733 P.2d 680, 684 (Colo. 1987); Jaeger v. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, 746 P.2d 515, 518
(Colo. 1987); Rocky Mountain Power Co. v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 646 P.2d
383, 388 (Colo. 1982).
132. Upper Yampa Water Conservancy Dist. v. Dequine Family L.L.C., 249 P.3d 794, 798
(Colo. 2011).
133. See, e.g., RockyMountain Power,646 P.2d at 388.
134. Vidler; 594 P.2d at 568.
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and it is apparent that the Court was more interested in creating a predictable
rule of law than in reaching a precise result in every case, especially since
"Vidler's efforts possibly went beyond mere speculation. " " The Colorado
legislature has codified Vidle;'37 and the case now stands as the first defense
against speculative appropriations. The second is the can-and-will doctrine.
IV. THE EARLY CAN-AND-WILL TEST

After an applicant takes the first step toward appropriation and satisfies
the Vidler antispeculation doctrine described above, the applicant must show
"there is a substantial probability that the applicant 'can and will' complete the
appropriation with diligence and within a reasonable time."'.. Like the Vjdler
antispeculation doctrine, the Colorado legislature has codified the can-and-will
doctrine' 9 in order "to reduce speculation associated with conditional decrees
and to increase the certainty of the administration of water rights in Colorado.". Of the two doctrines, the can-and-will doctrine is "slightly more stringent."' Importantly, however, the two doctrines do separate work, and the
Colorado Supreme Court has resisted arguments -to collapse the two into a
single test.''2
The most thorough review of the can-and-will doctrine is a twenty-oneyear-old student comment by Mark E. Hamilton."' Hamilton's comment
drew the attention-and citation-of the Colorado Supreme Court"' The following Subpart provides a brief overview of Hanilton's argument and evaluates his predictions in light of the intervening twenty-one years.
A. OVERVIEW

Hamilton's comment analyzed the can-and-will doctrine in light of four
Colorado Supreme Court cases decided between 1984 and 1993-

135. Scc, e.g., Metro. Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist.,
365 P.2d 273, 287 (Colo. 1961); Taussig v. Moffat Tunnel Water & Dev. Co., 106 P.2d 363,
367 (Colo. 1940).
136. VidlcT, 594 P.2d at 569 (citing Bunger v. Uncompahgre Water Valley Users' Ass'n, 557
P.2d 389 (Colo. 1976), disavowed on other g.'umnds by City of Aspen v. Colo. River Water
Conservation Dist., 696 P.2d 758 (Colo. 1985)).
137. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (2014).
138. Vermillion Ranch Ltd. P'ship v. Raftopoulos Bros., 307 P.3d 1056, 1064 (Colo. 2013).
139. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(9)(b) ("No claim for a conditional water right may be
recognized or a decree therefor granted except to the extent that it is established that the waters
can be and will be diverted, stored, or otherwise captured, possessed, and controlled and will be
beneficially used and that the project can and will be completed with diligence and within a reasonable time.").
140. FWS Land & Cattle Co. v. State, Div. of Wildlife, 795 P.2d 837, 840 (Colo. 1990).
141. Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. OXY USA, Inc., 990 P.2d 701,

708 (Colo. 1999).
142. See City of Aurora v. ACJ P'ship, 209 P.3d 1076, 1088 (Colo. 2009). But see Pagosa I,
170 11.3d 307, 320-21 (Colo. 2007) (Coals, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the ma-

jority had collapsed the distinction).
143.

Mark E. Hanilton, Comment, 7he "Can and Will" Doctrine of Colorado Rei4sed

Statute Section 37-92-305(9)(b): Changing the Nature of Conditional Water Rights5 in Colorado,
65 U. COLO. L. REV. 947 (1994).
144. Seeih- note 177.
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Southeasern Coloiado Water Conservancy District v. City of Florence,"'
FIVS Lind & Cattle Co. v. State, Div. of Wildlife," Public Service Co. of
47
Colo1-ado v. Board of Water Works of Pueblo, Colorado,'"
and Gibbs v.
Wolf Land Co.'
In Florence, the city and town applicants sought a conditional right for
100 c.f.s. from the Arkansas River to cover their anticipated population
growth.' 4' The Court noted that "Itihe Arkansas River is severely overappropriated, mad expert witnesses testified that water might be available under the right for approximately once every 25 years.""'0 Testimony at trial suggested five to ten c.Ls. of water could meet applicants' future needs, but the
applicants were about $1 million short on financing, and their infrastructure
could only handle about 4.7 c.f.s.' The Court rejected the argument that an
applicant should not have to prove the existence of available water at the time
of the conditional right was decreed, since "the availability of water depends
upon unpredictable factors such as climate, economics and technology.""'
Hamilton, interpreting this rejection, found that Florence "held that an applicant for a conditional water right must show that unappropriated water is
available mad Hill be diverted .... [which] is not unlike the law in most other
western 'prior appropriation' states, which often requires permit applications
to demonstrate available unappropriated water. ' '5
In EWS Land & Cattle, the applicant appealed a summary judgment dismissal of a conditional storage right for water in lakes partially owned by the
state.'" The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the water court's determination
that FWvS could not prove that it could mad would use the water because it had
neither complete ownership of the lakes, nor permission to use the state lands
for water storage.'5 Hanilton argued that 1WS Land & Cattle "marked the
emergence of the 'can and will' doctrine as the primary deteriinant of conditional rights.... Ibyl broadenling] the interpretation of section 305(9)(b) to
require an applicant to demonstrate than an indeterminate number of hurdles
(regulatory, legal, economic, engineering, etc.) 'can and will' be surmounted. ,-"'
In Public Service Co., the water court dismissed an application for conditional rights of exchange on the Arkansas River.'" The water court, as part of
a 1984 change decree, mandated that the Public Service Company of Colorado ("PSCo") build an off-channel reservoir to go along with a proposed power

145.
146.
147.
148.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

688 P.2d 715, 718 (Colo. 1984).
795 P.2d 837, 840 (Colo. 1990).
831 P.2d 470, 476 (Colo. 1992).
856 P.2d 798, 803 (Colo. 1993).
Florence, 688 P.2d at 716.
M.
Id.at 716 n.1.
I. at 717-18.
Hamnilton, supia note 143, at 955.
FWS Land & Cattle Co. v. State, Div. of Wildlife, 795 P.2d 837, 838 (Colo. 1990).

155. Id at 839, 841.
156. Hamnilton, supra note 143, at 958.
157. Put). Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Bd. of Water Works of Pueblo, Colo., 831 P.2d 470, 472

(Colo. 1992).
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plant. 8 In 1987, the water court granted conditional storage rights in that
same reservoir." PSCo postponed construction of the new plant indefinitely
"[biased on many factors, including decreased demand for electrical power,
the changing economics of generating such power, and Public Utilities Coinmission regulatory standards concerning the authorization of new power generation facilities.". At the time, a PSCo executive testified that the company
still planned on building the plant, perhaps within the next ten to twenty years,
"but the decision wiouldl be based on future developments, many of which
Iwerel not within PSCo's control.'' PSCo subsequently sought to exchange
the rights for use in its existing upstream power plant."'2 The water court dismissed the application, concluding that PSCo did not intend to construct the
reservoir in accordance with the 1984 change decree, a prerequisite for the
exchange."'
On appeal, PSCo argued, amnong other things, that the water court's finding that PSCo had no present intent to construct the reservoir was in conflict
with and was a collateral attack on the 1987 storage decree.'"' The Colorado
Supreme Court rejected this argument, concluding that the can-and-will doctrine applied at the time that PSCo applied for the exchange.' "IT]hat PSCo
no longer intended to construct [the reservoir is not inconsistent with a finding that it did not have such an intent at the time it secured the 1987 storage
decree.'.. For Hanilton, the Public Services Co. court used the can-and-will
doctrine to invalidate a conditional decree instead of the Vidler antispeculation doctrine or diligence doctrine, thus "widenjing] the reach of the 'can and
will' doctrine
and establishling] its use as a catch-all objection to large pro67
Jects.'
In Gibbs v. Wolf Land Co., the water court granted a conditional water
right for a well located on the protestor's property."" The Colorado Supreme
Court affinred the decision, holding that the applicant could rely on the private right of condemnation to meet the can-and-will statute." The Gibbs
court distinguished itself from IV/S Lmd & Cattle Co. on the grounds that
"FWS is premised on the fact that under no circumstances, absent the consent
of the DOW, could the applicant have obtained access to the [protestor's]
lands.""' Thus, for Hamilton, Gibbs "retained the scope of the 'can and will'
doctrine's broad inquiry enunciated in previous cases while limiting the preponderance standard to a legal impossibility test ....

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.at.
473.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 4 7 6.
Id. at 477.
Id.
Id.
Hamilton, supra note 143, at 961.
856 P.2d 798, 799 (Colo. 1993).
Id. at 799, 803.
Id. at 802 (emphasis in original).
Hamilton, supra note 143, at 962. But see intiha notes 183-193 and accompanying text.
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From these cases, Hamilton drew two primary conclusions. First, "the
can and will doctrine has substantially broadened the scope of the permissible
72
inquiry a water court can make when adjudicating a conditional water right."1
Second, because of this broadened inquiry, the can-and-will doctrine has
made Colorado water law resemble the permit systems of other western
states.
B. ANALYSIS
While Hamilton's comment was accurate and admirable at the time, the
Colorado Supreme Court has stepped away from some of his foundational
principles, and his predictions have not come to fruition.
First, the Colorado Supreme Court has not used the can-and-will doctrine
as a judicial permit system. Hamilton relied on Florence and a decision by
the water court in the Union Park Reservoir litigation to argue that courts
should take into account other conditional rights in determining whether there
was sufficient unappropriated water in the strean.' 4 Hamilton argued that
"Il]ailure to consider existing conditional decrees would be tantamount to disregarding adjudicated property rights. The consideration of senior conditional
rights by water courts is comparable to the power of most water permitting
agencies in other Western states.""' The Colorado Supreme Court rejected
this argument a year later in Board of'County Colnmissioners v. United States
(Arapahoe/), in which the Court held that senior conditional rights were not
to be considered in determining the amount of unappropriated water available.' The Court, in reaching this result, relied on the policies of maximum
utilization or maximum beneficial use. '
Second, it is not apparent that the can-and-will doctrine has become "the
primary determinant of conditional rights."'
Rather, courts have used the
can-and-will doctrine in conjunction with the Vidler antispeculation doctrine.
In some cases, an applicant will lose on both doctrines.'
In others, each doctine will do independent work-for instance, in a case of competing conditional claims, one party might lose on the antispeculation doctrine while the
other loses on the can-and-will doctrine.'' It seems that the can-and-will doctrine has become a secondary inquiry, applied when the Court senses that
there is some speculative intent: "ITihe 'can and will' requirement should not
be applied rigidly to prevent beneficial uses where an applicant otherwise satis-

172. Hamilton, supra note 143, at 968.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 967 nn.124-26.
175. Id. at 967
176. 891 P.2d 952, 958-59 (Colo. 1995).
177. Id. at 961-62. Compare id. at 961 (majority favorably citing Hamilton's comment),
with id. at 976-77 n.27 (Mullarkey, J., dissenting) (responding directly to Hamilton's comment
by rejecting the argument that the can-and-will doctrine was a judicial version of other states'
pennitting systems mad noting that such a system was purview of the legislature).
178. Id. at 962.
179. See Hanilton, supranote 143, at 958.
180. E.g., PagosaI,170 P.3d 307, 309-10 (CQolo. 2007).
181. E.g., Vermillion Ranch Ltd. P'ship v. Raftopoulos Bros., 307 P. 3d 1056, 1059, 1062
(Colo. 2013).
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lies the legal standard of establishing a nonspeculafive intent to appropriate for
a beneficial use. ' 'n
Third, the Colorado Supreme Court has rejected the notion that the canand-will doctrine is a legal impossibility test. In TI',S -uid& Catde Co., the
Court held that FWS could not satisfy the can-and-will requirement because it
could not legally obtain access to the land necessary to complete the appropriation.'83 This issue arose later in Gibbswhen the applicant sought conditional
rights to a well located on the protestor's land. ' The protestor argued that
Gibbs had failed the can-and-will test because Gibbs had not established an
unrestricted right of access across the private property." Both the water court
and the Colorado Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that Gibbs
had safisfied the can-and-will Lest by "relylingl on the potential right of private
condenmation."'.
Front this, Hamilton concluded that Gibbs established a
legal impossibility test-"Idthat is to say that the 'can and will' doctrine should
not inhibit issuance of a conditional decree unless it is a legal impossibility that
the water will be applied to a beneficial use in the future
(e.g., a necessary
7
permit cannot be obtained, under any circumstances).'1
While Gibbs remains good law, the court has emphasized that it should
be interpreted as a factor in detemining whether applicants have satisfied the
can-and-will test. In Vermilion Ranch, the water court had held that "the application should be denied under the 'can and will' requirement 'only if the
impediments make it impossible' for the applicant to complete the appropriation. ... ." The water court erred, however, for the proper test "is a balancing
test that turns on several factors .... In Civ ofi3ack Hawk v. City of'Cemnua,' '
the Court held that Black Hawk satisfied the can-and-will test even after Central City had passed a nonbinding general resolution that barred third parties
front using its property for water projects."' The Court in Vermillion Rich
interpreted City of[Black Hawk as a factor case: "We based our holding on
the lbtct that the lack of current access to property is not typically dispositive of
whether the 'can and will' test is satisfied, and on the water court's inding that
Black Hawk had satisfied all the other requirements of the 'can and will' statute.". Thus, "Iprecedentl dolesi not suggest that a court has no basis to deny
an application Linder the 'can and will' requirement unless the impediments
make the project impossible to complete.'"" "In other words, absence of a
182.

City of Thornton v. BiJou Irigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 43 (Colo. 1996); see also City of

Aurora v. ACJ P'ship, 209 P.3d 1076, 1089 (Colo. 2009); lagosa 1, 170 P.3d, at 322 (Eid, J.,
specially concurring); City of Black Hawk v. City of Central, 97 P.3d 951, 957 (Colo. 2004);
Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Conservatory Dist. v. OXY USA, Inc., 990 P.2d 701, 708 & n.3 (Colo.
1999).
183. FNVS Land & Cattle Co. v. State, Div. of Wildlife, 795 P.2d 837, 839, 840 (Colo. 1990).
184. Gibbs v. Woll Land Co., 856 P.2d 798, 799 (Colo. 1993).
185.

See id. at 800.

186.

M. at 803.

187.

Hamilton, supa note 143, at 962 n.95.

188. Vermillion Ranch Ltd. P'ship v. Raliopoulos Bros., 307 P.3d 1056, 1070 (Colo. 2013).
189. Id.at 1071.
190. 97 P.3d 951 (Colo. 2004).
191.

Id. at 958.

192.
193.

Vermillion Ranch, 307 P.3d at. 1071 (citing Cin, of Black Hawk, 97 P.3d at 951,958).
1i.
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final denial of access is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for satisfaction
of the can and will requirement."'. Thus, applicants have failed the can-andwill requirement when authorization was possible, but would have required
congressional
approval" or when the proposed use was possible but unlike96
ly.'
The can-and-will test has substantially more leeway than Hamilton predicted from the early cases. Courts today have the option to emphasize either
the Vi/idler doctrine or the can-and-will doctrine and have the ability to cancel
conditional rights based on a number of factors. This has developed into the
substantial probability test.
V. THE MODERN CAN-AND-WILL DOCTRMhNE
A. SUBSTANTIAL PROBABILITY
The most important development in the can-and-will doctrine since Hamilton's comment is the development of the substantial probability test, first articulated in 1995 in Arapidpoe 1." For the Arapahoe I court, the substantial
probability test was a more precise articulation of the can-and-will statute and
was inherent in the traditional doctrine that applicants should pursue conditional rights with diligence.' Under the substantial probability test, "the applicant bears the burden of proving, through evidence, a substantial probability
that the project can and will be completed, with diligence and within a reasonable time, and ...whether an applicant has demonstrated that it has met the
'can and will' requirement is a balancing test that examines several relevant
factors."" Because the future is uncertain, courts must evaluate evidence in
terms of factors instead of elements.' The presence of future contingencies is
a nondispositive factor that courts must consider together with all the facts and
194. City of Aurora v. ACJ P'ship, 209 P.3(1 1076, 1085 (Colo. 2009).
195. Natural Energy Res. Co. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 142 P.3d
1265, 1278-79 (Colo. 2006).
196. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Arapahoe v. Crystal Creek Homeowners' Ass'n, 14 P.3d 325,

344 (Colo. 2000).
197. Arapahoe 1, 891 P.2d 952, 962 (Colo. 1995) ("The 'can and will' statute was intended
to prevent approval of a conditional water right that cannot or will not be completed with diligcnce and within a reasonable timc. Therefore, to acquire a conditional water right decree, an
applicant must establish that there is a substantial probability that within a reasonable time water
can and will be appropriated and put to a beneficial use. The applicant must prove, as a
threshold requirement, that water is available based upon river conditions existing at the time of
the application, in priority, in sufficient quantities and on sufficiently frequent occasions, to enable the applicant to complete the appropriation withl diligence and within a reasonable time.
When river conditions existing at the tine of the application for a conditional water right decree
prevent completion of the proposed appropriation, there is no substantial probability that the
project %ill be completed with diligence within a reasonable time. Conditional water rights under which no diversions have been made, or are being made, should not be considered, and
absolute water rights should be considered to the extent of historical diversions rather than on
the assumption that maximum utilization of the decreed anount is the amount used. Our construction of the 'can and will' statute is in accord with our prior case law, with the intent of the
intent of the General Assembly, and with the policy of nixximuini beneficial use of water.").
198. See id.
199. Vermnillion Ranch Ltd. P'ship v. Raftopoulos Bros., 307 P.3d 1056, 1071-72 (Colo.
2013).
200. Arapahoc 1, 891 P.2d at 961 n.9.
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circumstances of each particular case.2'
cludes:

A nonexhaustive list of factors in-

(1) economic feasibility; (2) the status of requisite permit applications and
other required governmental approvals; (3) expenditures made to develop
the appropriation; (4) the ongoing conduct of engineering and environmental
studies; (5) the design and construction of facilities; and (6) the nature and
extent of land holdings and contracts demonstrating the water demand and
beneficial uses which the conditional right is to serve when perfected."2
While the substantial probability test renmins the standard test for the canand-will statute, some of the most important cases in the last fifteen years deal
with how the can-and-will statute interacts with other policy decisions made by
the Colorado General Assembly.
B. RECENT CAN-AND-WILL CASES
This Subpart outlines some of the most important can-and-will cases of
the last fifteen years. Part \I evaluates these cases more fully.
1. The Oil Shale Cases
Over the course of 1999 and 2000, the Colorado Supreme Court decided
three cases concerning conditional water rights for oil shale development in
northwestern Colorado. All of these cases were appeals from hexennial diligence findings.
In MunicipdSubdl'tici, Northern Colorado Water ConservanvDi tic
v. Chevron Shale Oil Co., ' the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the water
court's finding that Chevron had demonstrated reasonable diligence in developing its conditional rights."°4 Chevron's conditional rights were dated in the
early 1950s but were still not absolute; the Subdistrict argued that "Chevron
intendled] to hold these water rights for over 100 years without exercising reasonable diligence and that such inaction constituteId] unlawful speculation in
conditional water rights. ''1 °1 Chevron had deferred its oil shale development
after oil prices dropped in the 1980s and its number of employees dropped
from fifty or sixty to only one. ' Further, Chevron had not started construction of any necessary facilities, even though its conditional rights were fortyfive years old."' Chevron had spent $1.5 million over the six-year diligence
period, but "nearly one-third was spent on litigation unrelated to perfecting the
conditional water rights.""° For these and other reasons, the Subdistrict argued that Chevron had failed to meet its statutory burden of showing a steady
effort to complete the appropriation in a reasonably expedient and efficient

201. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 43-44 (Colo. 1996)
202. Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huev, 933 P.2d 27, 36 (Colo. 1997).
203. 986 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1999).
204.

Id. at 920.

205. Id.
at 922.
206. Id.
207.
208.

Id.
Id.
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manner.2"

The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the Subdistrict's claim and affirmed the water court's finding of diligence because Chevron's efforts, albeit
minimal, were sufficient to demonstrate "a steady application of effort to
complete its appropriation in a reasonably expedient and efficient manner"
given that the production of oil from shale was not then economically feasible.2'0
The Subdistrict's final argument was that the water court had misapplied
the "current economic conditions" limitation in section 37-92-301 (4)(c), which
provided that:
neither cunent economic conditions beyond the control of the applicant
which adversely affect the feasibility of perfecting a conditional water right or
the proposed use of water from a conditional water right nor the fact that one
or more governmental permits or approvals have not been obtained shall be
considered sufficient to deny a diligence application, so long as other facts
and circumstances which show diligence are present." '
It contended that the court should not have relied on the fact that the current
state of the economy made shale oil production economically unfeasible in
considering whether Chevron's efforts constituted reasonable diligence because that allowed Chevron to delay the project indefinitely.'
Again, the
court rejected this argument, noting that not only should the water court consider the statute but that such interpretation was implicit in the case law that
established that economic feasibility was one of the factors to be considered in
a diligence proceeding."'
Chevron Shale was clarified and expanded four months later in Municipal
Subdistnct, Northern Colorado Water Conservancy Distaict v. OXY USA,
Inc. "' For the second time, the Colorado Supreme Court affirned the water
court's findings of diligence. The water court held, and the Court agreed, that
the can-and-will test applies even during the hexennial review proceedingsthat is, the diligence proceedings are not merely backward-looking, evaluating
how the applicant has moved toward beneficial use, but require an inquiry into whether the applicant has a substantial probability of putting the water to
beneficial use. 2 '
Even though OXY admitted before the water court that it could not extract the oil shale because low oil prices made the project economically infeasible, and that it was unlikely to extract any shale until oil prices increased or
the government subsidized the project, the Court held that OXY had met its
209.

Id. at 921.

210. Id. at 923. The minimal efforts were activities within the following categories: "planning
for a diversion facility, planning a damn on Roan Creek, planning for pipeline facilities, preparing environmental baseline studies, preparing a detailed master planning document for Chevron's Parachute Creek Unit, and participating in miscellaneous activities related to the conditional water rights such as litigation, research projects, and studies." Id. at 921.
211. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-301(4)(c) (2014).

212. Chevrion Shale, 986 P.2d at 923.
213. Id. at 924 (citing Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27, 36 (1997)).
214. 990 P.2d 701 (1999).
215. Id. at 707-08.
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burden."6 OXY had spent $5,052,235 during the six-year period, including
drilling natural gas wells that provided data on oil shale reserves and income to
offset the cost of maintaining the oil shale assets, and had conducted some
other activities. 7 The Court reaffirmed its holding in Chevron Shale and emphasized its deference to the legislature: "ITIhe General Assembly has made a
policy decision that the inleasibility of development of oil shale under current
economic conditions should not cause applicants like OXY to lose their conditional rights. We are bound by that policy determination."'
The Colorado Supreme Court decided the third of the oil shale cases the
following spring. In Municipld Subcltrict, Northern Coloraido Watier Consevucy J)istrict v. Getty Oil Exploi-ation Co.,29 the Court once again upheld
the water court's finding of reasonable diligence.2 Like Chevon and OXY,
Getty had spent some money and some resources in developing its rights.'
The result was foregone: noting section 37-92-301(4)(c), Chev'on Shade, and
OXY USA, the Court held that Getty had been sufficiently diligent to retain
economic factors makits conditional rights, "despite the presence of adverse
22
..
ing the project's ultimate completion date uncertain.
2. Pagosa
In 2007, the Colorado Supreme Court embarked on "a new era of judi'
cial scrutiny of conditional water rights applications by municipalities." ' Mu-

216.
217.

Id. at 705.
Id. These other activitics included tie following:

1) completing technological and economic fcasibilitv studies for the property'; 2) attempting to solicit financial partners for the project; 3) participating in the Colorado
River Project on Threatened mid Endargered Species, the Colorado River Siniulation Model Project (CORSIM), the Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association, Oil
Shale Committee, ard the Colorado Wiater Congress' Colorado river Project on Water Quality Standards; ard 4) gathering data regarding water supply. OXY incuned
additiond expenses for salaries, engineering fees, legal fees, and litigation costs to protect its water rights.

I.
218. Id.at 708.
219. 997 P.2d 557 (Colo. 2000).
220. Id. at 564.
221. Id.at 563-64 ("Although the rock barrage was never constructed, the water court found
that the following work in three site-specitic areas was pertborned at an approximate cost of
$325,000. In regard to tie diversion facility, a preliminary design and cost estimate was prepared; geologic Field conditions were investigated; planned specifications and cost estimates
were prepared; an existing permit was amended to include tie proposed rock barrage; Colorado River morphology was reviewed; and monitoring and recording of Colorado River water levels was conducted for use in designi work and operation studies. In regard to tie Roan Creek
dan, geological and geotechnical investigations of fie dam foundation, outlet works, and spillways were performed, as well as investigation of cmtbankment borrow areas for the dam. In
regard to e pipeline facilities, a preliminary desigli aid cost estimate for a pumping plan were
performed; pipeline ahernative aligmient studies were performed; gcotechnical invesligations of
alternate pipeline routes were performed; and cost estimates of the alternative pipeline alignments were revised based on the geotechnical investigations.").
222. Id. at 564.
223. Derek L. Turner, Comment, IPagosa Area Water & Smitation District v. Trout Unlim-

ited and an Ant-speculation Doctrine lr a New Era of Water Supply Plnnnhg,82 U. CoLo. L.
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nicipalities had traditionally received significant leeway from both the courts",
and the legislature." In 1996, the Court held that municipalities did not enjoy
complete immunity from speculation challenges."' While a municipality can
appropriate without firn contractual relations or agency relationships, as required by Vidler, a municipality can only conditionally appropriate an amount
that is "consistent with the municipality's reasonably anticipated requirements
based on substantiated projects of future growth." 7
The Colorado Supreme Court went even farther in Pagosa Area Water
Ditrict v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa4."2 Though the water court had upheld
extensive conditional appropriations by the small Western Slope town of Pagosa Springs, " the Court held that the water court had failed to make sufficient findings that Pagosa Springs had satisfied both the antispeculation doctrine and the can-and-will statute. " ' In doing so, the Court established, for the
first time, a series of elements that a government water supply agency had to
demonstrate:
(1) what is a reasonable water supply planning project; (2) what are the
substantiated population projections based on a normal rate of growth for that
period; and (3) what amount of available unappropriated water is reasonably
necessary to serve the reasonably anticipated needs of the
governmental agen2 3
cy for the planning period, above its current water supply. '
The Court disagreed about the length of the planning period involved. In
Bijou, the Court had upheld a fifty-year planning period, which the Court
used as a model in Pagosa L2"2 The majority noted, "Although the fifty year
planning period we approved in Bijou is not a fixed upper limit, and each case
depends on its own facts, the water court should closely scrutinize a governmental agency's claim lor a planning period that exceeds fifty years." Three
justices disagreed. Justice Coats argued that the approval of a fifty-year planning period eliminated the reasonable time requirement of the can-and-will
statute, and Justice Eid, joined by Justice Rice, argued that the majority had
imposed a mandatory fifty-year cap on development in the state.tm The full
effects of these questions are still unclear and are discussed in the following
Part.

REV. 639, 668 (2011). Or, in more moderate terms, the court made "further... relinements"
to the municipal exception to the antispeculation doctrine. Sarah A. Klahn, 2A CowO. PRAc.,
Anti-S"peculation Doctrine§ 76:8 (2013).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 104-07.
225. See Cow. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (2014) (excluding municipalities from the Vidler
requirements).
226. City of Thornton v. Bijou In. Co., 926 P.2d 1, 38 (Colo. 1996).
227. Id. at 39.
228. 170 P.3d 307, 309-10 (Colo. 2007).
229. Id. at 309.
230. Id. at 309-10.
231. Id.
232. Seeid. at315-17.
233. Id.at 317.
234. Id. at 320-21 (Coats, J., concun-ing in the judgment only).
235. Id. at 322 (Eid, J., specially concurring).
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VI. DISCUSSION
To summarize the preceding discussion: The prohibition against speculation is deeply entrenched in Colorado water law, and, while there are strong
economic arguments to allow speculation in certain circumstances, these reasons will not be persuasive before the court. The most powerful justification
for the prohibition against speculation is that water should be distributed to
those who will put the water to beneficial use-that is, water rights should not
be tied tp to the detriment of others. This means that courts should study the
speculative effects of a project as readily as the speculative intent of the appropriator. This Part argues that the can-and-will doctrine, as currently applied,
has led to significant speculative effects. To curb these effects, this Part argues
that the legislature should adopt a statutory time limit for conditional rights.
A. THE PROBLEM WITH THE CAN-AND-WILL DOCTRINE

It has been argued that the combination of the Vilerantispeculation doctrine and the can-and-will doctrine has been successful in curbing speculation." But this is only true in the very narrow sense of prohibiting the treatment of water as a commodity to invest in. This Subpart argues that the
current doctrine has been ineffective at achieving the policy that grounds the
antispeculation doctrine to begin with: the distribution of water to potential
beneficial users.
The oil shale cases discussed above-Chevron Shale, OXY USA, and
Getty Ol--demonstrate the problems with the Vidler antispeculation doctrine
and the can-and-will doctrine of section 37-92-305(9)(b). In each of those
three cases, the appropriator was a private party appropriating water for itself,
so Vidlci; which applies to private parties only when they are appropriating for
another use, ' never applied. Thus, the only check on the companies was the
can-and-will doctrine."
The oil shale cases stand not just for a point of law, but for an empirical
fact as well. Each of those three cases demonstrates an instance in which a
single user was able to retain conditional water rights that were half a century
old, even when the rights had not been put to beneficial use and the user had
no intention of putting the rights to use within the foreseeable future." Conditional rights for oil shale have priorities that date back to 1936," ' and the holders of those rights still have not put them to beneficial use.
The oil shale cases are perhaps the highest profile example of' this, but
they are not the only example. " Conditional rights are common in every ba-

236. See Hunilton, supi-a note 143, at 948-50, 961.
237. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 594 P.2d 566,
568-69 (Colo. 1979).
238. See Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Chevon Shale Oil Co., 986
P.2d 918, 922-23 (Colo. 1999); Mon. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. OXY
USA, Inc., 990 P.2d 701, 705, 707-09 (1999); M1n. Subdist.,

N. Colo. Water

Dist. v. Getty Oil Exploration Co., 997 P.2d 557, 564-65 (Colo. 2000).
239. See Chevron Shde, 986 P.2d at 923.
240. MACDONNELL, s1pa note 12, at 46 tbI.B- 1.
241. And the point here is not to demonize the oil shale companies.
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sin in the state, including ilTigation, municipal, and industrial uses.2 ' Charles
Podolak and Martin Doyle recently demonstrated how extensive conditional
claims are, finding that conditional claims equal 61% of the amount of perfected rights and that some of these claims are nearly a century old. '3 They
found that, at the end of 2012, 92% of conditional rights (by amount of flow)
were older than six years, and 23% were older than thirty years.! " They also
reported that, in the last thirty years, the primary reduction in conditional
rights was due to abandonment and not to perfection." In other words, not
only are conditional rights holders hanging onto these righLs for a long time,
they are not putting them to benelicial use.
1. The Can-and-Will Doctrine Has Been Diluted
It is hard to say that the Colorado Supreme Court got the oil shale cases
wrong as a matter of law. Because section 37-92-301(4)(c) prohibits the water
court from denying an application solely because economic conditions have
affected the feasibility of the project when the applicant proves other diligence," ' the Court could not consider the economic infeasibility of the oil
shale project.
But these cases strain credulity. The Court accepted the economic feasibility argument, noting that "ItIhis interpretation has been implicit in [the]
caselaw that sets forth the requirements for an ad hoc finding of reasonable
diligence.
But this is an important doctrinal shift: while economic feasibility
has always been important, commentators traditionally interpreted it as a factor for c'mceling conditional rights rather than as a tool to delay development."' This is why Hamilton predicted that the can-and-will statute would be
such a powerful tool for courts,t9 and earlier cases supported this proposition. °
Furthernore, the current application of the can-and-will statute is at odds
with the fundamental purpose of conditional rights. Conditional rights should
protect appropriators during the construction of large-scale, long-tern projects- Taussigand Metropolitan Suburban illustrate this well-rather than allow
companies to choose when to put the water to beneficial use. This was not
the case in the oil shale cases. In Chevron Shale, the company had reduced
its entire operation to one person;s' in OXY USA, the company had admitted
that it was not immediately planning to extract oil." In Gelly Oil, the Colora-

242.
243.
244.

Podolak & Doyle, supra note 19, at 14, 25 tbl.2.
Id/ at 14.
Id. at 27.

245. Id. at 28.
246. Coio. REV. SrAT. § 37-92-301(4)(c) (2014).
247. Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Chevron Shale Oil Co., 986 P.2d
918, 924 (Colo. 1999).
248. Klahn, supra note 223, § 76:7.
249. See Hamilton, supra note 143, at 960-6 1.
250. See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Bd. of Water Works, 831 P.2d 470, 478-79 (Colo.
1992).
251. Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Chevron Shale Oil Co., 986 P.2d
918, 922-23 (Colo. 1999).
252. Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. OXY USA, Inc., 990 P.2d 701,
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do Supreme Court seemed to shrug its shoulders: even though "the project's
ultimate completion date [was] uncertain," Getty had satisfied the can-and-will
test." 3 The Court concluded:
As in OXY, the water court in the instant case found that the oil shale project
is technically feasible given current technology, thus demonstrating that Getty
"can" complete the project. The water court also found that Getty "will go
forward with the project when it becomes economically feasible." Therefore,
we hold that the water court properly interpreted and applied section 37-92201 (4)(c) to the facts of the instant case.
Getty was able to appropriate the water but chose not to because it would be
unprofitable. Under this interpretation, the reasonable diligence and can-andwill tests become effectively meaningless: if a court is going to protect conditional rights under the can-and-will test, then the court cannot at the same time
require that the appropriator take steps to put the water to beneficial use.
When both the appropriator and the court know that development will be
postponed until the market changes," any work done for a diligence proceeding will be token construction." As such, appropriators have been able to
hoard priorities in a way that is reminiscent of other resources that are not limited by speculation prohibitions."7 Consequently, the notion that the antispeculation doctrine provides a "judicial 'check' on speculative transactions that
adversely affect third parties and ecological needs by depriving them of water"28 is largely rhetorical.
Holders of conditional rights initially seem different from other hoarders.
While timber companies once hoarded vast forests and waited for the price of
timber to increase," the holders of conditional water rights can maintain their
conditional rights until the project becomes economically feasible and, as
such, do not share a speculative intent. But, as discussed above, the prohibition against speculation only makes sense as a prohibition against speculative

705 (Colo. 1999).
253. Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Getty Oil Exploration Co., 997
P.2d 557, 564 (Colo. 2000).

254. Id.at 565.
255. Se also OXY USA, 990 P.2d at 705 ("OXY admitted before the water court that it
currently cannot extract the oil shale because low oil prices make the project economically infeasible. Until oil prices rise or the government subsidizes the project, OXY is unlikely to extract any shale.").
256. Cf supiatext accompanying notes 54-56.
257. The experience of the Pacific Northwest, where a select few timber companies gained a
monopoly of the timber reserves and held them speculatively, is illustrative. See U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE &

LABOR,

BUREAU OF CORPORATIONS, THE LUMiER

IN)USTRY:

STANDING

TIMBER, at xxii (1913) ("The largest holders are cutting little of their timber. They thus reserve

to themselves those incalculable profits which are still to accrue with the growth of the country,
the diminishing of timber supply, and the further concentration and control thereof. Many of
tie very men who are protesting against conservation and tie national forest system because of
the 'tying up' of natural resources are themselves deliberately tying them up far more efiectively
for private gain. The fact that mature tiiber is thus withheld from use is clear evidence that
great additional prolits are expected to accrue through further increase in value.") [hereinafter
U.S. BUREAU OF CORPORATIONSi.
258. Zelliner, supa note 26, at 998.

259. See U.S.

BUREAU OF CORPORATIONS,

supra note 257, at xxii.
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effects, not intent." The effect on potential beneficial users is the same, regardless of whether the water is being held until its price increases or indelinitely and until the project becomes feasible.
2. Colorado Water Law Has Created Basin-Wide Monopoly Without

Beneficial Use.
It has been said that "Itihere is no Wal-Mart, ExxonMobil or General
Electric of the water world.
",," Agricultural users make up the vast majority
of water users, and those rights are distributed among hundreds of thousands
of individual users."' Single users are permitted to appropriate and own its
much water as they can put to beneficial use, which may give them control
over a single streamn or other localized area."' While some buyers may entertain thoughts of vast accumulations of water rights,"6 ' large-scale monopolies
are unlikely to control water rights today.'t
But the ExxonMobil of the water world is ExxonMobil.
Localized control is not a monopoly in an economic sense,6 but rights holders may be able
to hoard priorities to the detriment of potential benelicial users." This is what
the Pagosa I court had in mind when it addressed the "monopolist pitalls" '
of speculation: the concern should not be on large-scale monopoly, but it
should be on whether a user has unfairly driven out any other potential beneficial users..2 As long as water is put to beneficial use, the law must tolerate
monopoly. This is the return to Locke implicit in Colorado law. For Locke,
proper appropriation took something away from the common property, but
this did not harm the public, because the act of applying labor developed the
resource, thus bettering humankind as a whole' by effecting an efficient allo"

260. See supra Part II.C.
261. Zellmer, supra note 26, at 1023; see adso Neuman, supia note 20, at 969 ("ITilhere is no
Microsoft® of western water.").
262. Se Zelhner, supra note 26, at 1023.
263. Neuman, supra note 20, at 969.
264. See Zellmer, supra note 26, at 1000 (2008) ("IT. Boonel Pickens has been acquiring
more land overlying the [Ogalallal Aquifer [in Texasl so that he can l)ump and sell as much as
200,000 acre-feet per year of water to one of the state's large metropolital centers. Pickens' owni
website proclaims that his company ... is the largest private holder of groundwater rights in the
United States.").
265. See Neuman, supra note 20, at 969.
266. This point is not to single out ExxonMobil, but it is worth mentioning that ExxonMobil
is the only remaining major oil company with federal leases in northwestern Colorado since
Shell and Chevron left. Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Shell Quits Colorado Oil.Shale E/lirt, HousTON
CHRON., Sept. 26, 2013, at 3. ExxonMobil also holds more conditional water rights (in c.f.s.) in
both the Colorado and 'White River Basins than any other oil company. See MAcDONNELI.,
supra note 12, at xiv, 19-21.
267. .See Zellner, supranote 26, at 1023.
268. See generally Podalak & Doyle, supia note 19, at 16-17 (discussing purchasing senior
conditional rights as a possible way for junior users to gain certainty).
269. Pagosa1, 170 P.3d 307, 313 (Colo. 2007).
270. Natural Energy Res. Co. v. Upper Gunnison Water Conservancy Dist., 142 P.3d 1265,
1277 (Colo. 2006).
271. LOCKE, supra note 28, § 37; see also Allen v. Petrick, 222 P. 451, 452 (Mont. 1924)
("The use of water in Montana is vital to the prosperity of our people. Its use, even by an individual, to irrigate a frmn, is so much a contributing factor to the welfhue of the state that the
people, in adopting the Constitution, declared it to be a public use."); id. at 453 ("It is to the
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cation of resourcesY' Presumably, Coloradans are better off27" when users put
water to beneficial use, expressed in any number of ways: jobs, local agricultural, cultural identity. This is the point of the mxximum utilization policy.
3. The Extensive Number of Conditional Rights Creates Uncertainty for
Water Users.
Statewide, Podalak and Doyle discovered that 88% of conditional rights
are abandoned or perfected after the initial six-year diligence period. " ' After
that, 30% of perfected rights took longer than twenty-four years to perfect, and
5% took longer than seventy-two years.17 Twenty-four percent of rights that
were eventually abandoned took longer than twenty-four years to be abancloned, and 4% took longer than seventy-two years.'
While conditional rights provide their holder with certainty of seniority,
the conditional right also creates uncertainty for users farther clown the priority list. 77 When senior rights remain conditional, it effectively gives the junior
appropriator a much higher priority. But if those senior rights are ever put to
beneficial use, then the junior right will be bumped down the chain. Of
course, this is how the system is supposed to work, but the problem is the uncertainly created when the junior user cannot predict when it will lose its deliveries, especially when conditional rights take so long to be perfected or
7
abandoned.1
A junior user who is behind decreed appropriations can plan
for future deliveries and likely predict with reasonable accuracy how much water it will have available for the coming year. ' But the junior user behind
conditional rights cannot predict il, or when, those conditional rights will mature. Not only does this create planning uncertainties, but junior users will also lose any investments they make if the conditional rights are perfected.' A
rights holder who is hoarding priorities for a single large-scale project may be
unlikely to sell off those rights to junior users, making market solutions ineffective."'
The corollary of this is that the system leads to perpetual litigation. In order to guard against this uncertainty and to protect their investments, junior

interest of the public that every acre of land in this state susceptible to irrigation shall be irigat-

cd.").
272. Stevens, supra notc 29, at 264.
273. Gencrdlv ann broadly speaking, that is. This is not to den' iml)ortant environmental
consequences.
274. Podalak & )oyle, supra note 19, at 28.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See generallv Podalak & Doyle, supna note 19.
278. See id.
279. That is, even though precipitation is highly variable in Colorado, there are certain repeatable events that provide some measure of consistency. After runoff peaks, the flow of Colorado's rivers gradually decreases over tie summer, and users have some idea when die senior
rights will put a call on tie river. The variability of precipitation changes the base levels of this
process-dat is, runoff may begin earlier or later, may last shorter or longer-but the overall

trend will remain the same.
280. See Pagosa 1, 170 P.3d 307, 316 (Colo. 2007).
281. See Podalak & Doyle, supra note 19, at 29-30 (discussing purchasing senior conditional
rights as a possible way for junior users to gain certainty).
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users must protest every hexennial diligence finding, all in the hope that they
can knock out some of the senior conditional rights. 2 As the oil shale cases
show, the current substantial-probability doctrine makes it very difficult lor users to successfully challenge these rights.
B. WHY PAGOSA GOT IT RIGHT
The judicial scrutiny of municipalities in Pagosa isfar removed from the
7
deference in She.
riff Municipalities do need flexibility to plan for growth,'"
and some have criticized PagosaIfor the restraints that it imposed on municipalities.' Because courts are generally reluctant to substitute their judgment
in other municipal decisions, such as zoning, annexations, rate making, and
condemnations, they should likewise exercise caution in interfering in municipalities' water use decisions.'
But this argument only makes sense if water is like other resources and
water planning decisions are like other municipal decisions. Since the policy
of the state constitution, the courts, and the legislature is that water is a unique
resource, then it is appropriate for courts to hold municipalities to some form
of an antispeculation doctrine, for the impact of speculative appropriationsthat is, hoarding priorities-is the same whether the holder of that priority is
private or public. Indeed, Pagosa Springs' very intent was to hoard priorities. " For that reason, the Pagosa I court got it right as a matter of policy,
since "Itihe need for flexibility, of course, does not relieve a governmental entity from demonstrating that the conditional decree it seeks is non-speculative
and ineets the 'can and will' requirement."'
The full fall-out of Pagosa I has yet to be determined, and several questions remain uianswered.
First, one commentator has raised-but has not answered-the question of
whether the Pagosa doctrine should extend to private appropriators. " Because the Colorado Supreme Court explicitly noted that it derived the doctrine from law that applies to both public and private appropriators, the argument goes, a broad reading of the Pagosa doctrine may extend to private
appropriators as well."
It is unlikely that the Pagosa doctrine will extend to private appropriators
as a matter of law. The fifty-year planning period in Pagosa serves the same
function as a normal application for a conditional water right. If a private applicant wants to apply for a conditional right, they must apply for a certain
282. See Pagosa I, 170 P.3d at 316-17; see alsoJan G. Laitos, 7he Elikct of Water Law on
the Development of Oil ShAe, 58 U.I).ENy. Lj. 751, 757 (1981); Podalak & Doyle, supra note
19, at 30.
283.
284.
285.

See text accompanying supra notes 104-07.
Zellmer, supra note 26, at 1029.
Funk & Arnold, supni note 62, at 312.

286.

Id.

287. See Pagosa I, 170 P.3d at 321 (Coats, J., concuning in the judgment only) (noting that
testimony had made clear that the conditional rights were sought only "as a bid to preempt intervening appropriations for more immediate needs").
288. Id at 322 (Eid,J., specially concuring).
289. Turner, supranote 223, at 670.
290. Seeid.at669-70.
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quantity of water. The reasonable planning period in PagosaIdoes the sane
thing hy trying to quantify, a certain amount of water while attempting to provide municipalities the flexibility they need to develop. In this sense, the
planning period in Pigosa is a compromise position, and, while it is a significant departure from early cases like SheriI, the application of some constraints on municipalities is consistent with the policies underlying the antispeculation doctrine as a whole.
Second, as Justice Coats noted in concurrence, the Pagosa /court seemed
to collapse the requirements of the antispeculation doctrine with the can-andwill doctrine. " ' Justice Coats argued that imposing a planning period requirement overlooked the reasonable time requirement of the can-and-will statute
and would "encourage governmental agencies and water courts alike to fie up
the state's water resources with conditional decrees long beyond the time reasonably required to complete a particular project and actually put the resulting
water to a beneficial use.".. His test would be simply that "the 'can and will'
statute requires completion within a reasonable time, in light of the legal, engineering, and economic circumstances of the project. " Even though Justice
Coats would have canceled Pagosa Springs' conditional rights for ftilure to
meet this standard, :" his proposed test falls victim to the problems discussed
above-that, as a matter of flact, conditional rights are allowed to continue indefinitely.
C. A WAY FORWARD
The most significant relorm that the Colorado legislature could make is to
establish an expiration (late on conditional rights. Utah, for instance, has already established a time limit on how long an appropriator has to put the water to beneficial use. Initially, appropriators are given a seven-year time framne
to put the water to beneficial use,"9 " but this time fraune can be extended on
two conditions: not only must the applicant show reasonable due diligence or
a reasonable cause for delay, but the extension cammot be granted after fifty
years from the date the application is approved.' Further, while the Pagosa
doctrine represented a significant change in Colorado,"7 Utah has a codified
version of the doctrine, which provides, "The reasonable future water requirement of the public is the amount of water needed in the next 40 years by
the persons within the public water supplier's projected service area based on
projected population growth or other water use demand."' Utah solves tie
problem highlighted in Metropolitan Suburbum-that is, that massive projects
may take a significant amnount of time-by allowing public water suppliers and
wholesale electrical cooperatives to extend beyond the fifty-year deadline if
they meet certain requirements and have constructed or have made substantial

291. Pagosa, 170 P.3d at 320 (Coats,j., concun'ing injudgment only).
292. Id.
293. Id at 321.
294. Id.
295. See UTAH CoDE ANN. § 73-1-4(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2014).
296. Id. § 73-3-12(2)(b)(i)-(ii).
297. .Scc supra Pmt VI.B.
298. UTAH Comi; ANN. § 73-1-4(2)()(i).
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expenditures to construct the works necessary to put the water to beneficial
use.' Utah has made the policy decision to use statutory authority to ensure
that water hoarding is limited." Utah's reasoning is unsurprising in light of the
preceding discussion, but what is surprising is that Colorado courts have made
the same types of pronouncements while hoarding is allowed to continue. °
Other states have fashioned statutory deadlines that account for problems
that might be encountered in the development of a project. While Idaho requires applicants to put water to full beneficial use within five years from the
(late of approval, it also grants certain extensions." For instance, the law will
not penalize an applicant if litigation holds up the project.
So long as the
applicant "is proceeding diligently and in good faith," the department of water
resources will extend the permit to cover the time that the project has been
delayed."' Large projects in Idaho may be extended for an additional twelve
years beyond the initial development deadline contained in the permit, so
long as the applicant has expended at least $100,000.&
Similarly, Washington allows extensions if projects are held up by the imposition of federal laws.' In New Mexico, projects must be completed within
live years, and water must be put to beneficial use within four years after that
9
period."
Applicants must pursue their projects diligently, but they will not be
penalized by acts of God, operation of law, or other causes outside of their
control that interfere with construction."0 Generally, extensions will only be
granted up to ten years from the date the application was approved, but the
state engineer may choose to waive this deadline if at least one-lourth of the
actual construction project has been completed within such period, the applicant demonstrates good faith, and "the project will be to the interest of the de-

299. Id. § 73-3-12(4).
300. Sec Carbon Canal Co. v. Sanpete Water Users Ass'n, 425 P.2d 405, 407-08 (Utah
1967).
301. Compare id. ("lApplicantl's successful extensions for decades leaving but few years to
go, impel this court, in a conceded equity case, to canvas the facts to deterine if, in this arid
state, where a drop of water is a drop of gold, one, by extension after extension, may equitably
prevent bencicial use of water by others through procedural stagnation for about forty years.

We think not."), nith City & Cnty. of l)enver v. N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 276 P.2d

992, 1005 (Colo. 1954) ("Illn order to sustain Denver's claim, we should have to establish as a
law of Colorado that a great city or a great corporation, by the filing of a plat of a water diversion
plan and the fitful continuance of surveys md exploratory operations, could paralyze all development in a river basin for a period of nineteen years without excavating a single shovel full of
dirt in actual construction and without taking any step towards bond issue or other financing
plan of its own for carrying out its purpose; that for nineteen years no farmer could build a ditch
to develop his farm and no other city or industry could construct a project for use of water in

that area without facing loss of their water when and if the city or corporation which filed the
plat should actually construct its project. This we cannot do."). In other words, "lolne should
not be pernitted to play the (log in the manger with water he does not or cannot use for a beneficial purpose when other lands are crying for water." Allen v. Petrick, 222 P. 451, 453 (Mont.

1924).
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

IDAHO CODE ANN.

§ 42-204 (2014).

Id § 42-204(1).

Id
Id. § 42-204(2).
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.320 (2014).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-6 (2014).
Id. § 72-5-8.
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velopment of the state."'
III other words, Colorado could craft a nuanced statute that would allow
active developers to pursue their projecLs while curtailing those projects that
have been postponed until development becomes profitable."' A tine limit
would prevent sone projects, but that is the necessary trade-off for a predictable rule of law. This is the detennination the Colorado Supreme Court made
in Vidle:--while tie company may not have had speculative intentions, it was
preferable to have a bright line rule that helped prevent priorities hoarding.
VII. CONCLUSION
Colorado water law is based on the egalitarian principle that water should
be broadly distributed anong potential beneficial users. The application of
beneficial use changes the distribution, however, by allowing appropriators to
accumulate as imuch as they can beneficially use. Until then, potential beneficial users should have equal opportunity to appropriate water. Without COnditional rights, long-term, forward-thinking projects would never reach fruition. But the purpose of conditional rights is to provide security until a project
is completed, not to allow appropriators to postpone developlment until it is
most profitable. Under current law, appropriators have the ability to preserve
conditional rights indefinitely, and judicial checks, often in deference to tle
legislature, have been ineffective at curbing appropriators from abusing conditional rights. Some conditional rights have been waiting for development for a
century. This is not consistent With the purpose of conditional rights, nor is it
consistent with the policies underlying prior appropriation as a whole. Because of this, Colorado should adopt a statutory expiration date for conditionA rights. This would build certainty back into tie priority system, consistent
with the principles of egalitarianism and justice on which prior appropriation
was founded.

309.

Id.§ 72-5-14.

310. See Podolak & Dovic, supra note 19, at 16, 29 ("A small percentage (9%) of conditional
water rights are perfected in the first two diligence periods (12) years. The remainder seems to
he held until they become more valuable to tie user.").
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7he Chancellorinterrupting himn said, 'What, More, you wish to be considered H'A'er arod of better conscience than al the bishops iand nobles of the
redin?' To this More replied, 'My Lord, l6r one bishop of your opinion I
have a hundred Sa11ts of mine; and for one pauiament of'yours, ud God
knows of what kind, I have all dhe Generaid Councils lbr 1,000 yejus, aid lbr
one kingdom I have F,'nce and dl the kaingdomns of Cluistendon.'
For now, though, it seems that the chancellor rides again. And ifthe
the sac/dle, then his iot is hack Hi tie stkrvp.'
ciancelloris back ill
I. INTRODUCTION
A. THR EE STATES

"The sinuous Colorado River and its slew of man-made reservoirs lorn
the Rockies to southern Arizona are being sapped by 14 years of drought
nearly unrivaled in 1,250 years."' Indeed, "many experts believe the current
drought is only the harbinger of a new, 'drier era in which the Colorado's flow
will be substantially mad pernanently diminished." California has also endured a harsh drought.' California's drought is extraordinary, as the United
States Geological Survey reports that "California's 2014 Water Year, which
ended September 30, 2014, was the third driest in 119 years of record."
Conditions in New Mexico have resulted in the state's "worst drought since
[thel 1880s."'
The effects of drought in the West risk being felt on a national level. In
2012 California's 80,500 ranches and larnms were the nation's top producers of
almost eighty crops and livestock. products ranging from almonds to scquab.'
The same year, Colorado's 36,300 ranches and farms were among the nation's top ten producers of products ranging from cantaloupe to lkntb.' New
Mexico's 23,800 farms mid ranches were among the top ten producers of

1. PAUL STROHM, CONSCIENCE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCrION 22 (2011).
2. Samuel L. Bray, ?The Supreme Court and die Vew Equity, 68 VAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 60), available at http://papers.ssrn.conl/so13/pal)crs.cfi ? abstractid=2436614.

3.

Michacl Wines, C'olondo River l)rought J.rvces a lPaifilReckonig fbr States, N. Y.

TInr-S, Jan. 5, 2014, lit ti)://www.nytimes.coin/2014/0 1/O6/tIs/coloirado-ivertrotight-lorces-apainful-reckoning-lor-statcs.htnil?Pr-0.

4. Id.
Calilbni'a Drought, CA.cOV, http://ca.gov/droight/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2014).
6. Cal. Water Sci. Cr., Cdifrinia Drought Inlbrmation, U.S. Gt;/O1.OCICAI, SURV.,
http://ca.watcr.usgs.gov/data/drought/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2015).
7. John Fleck, New MAexico miits Worst Droughl Sioce 1880s, ALBUQUFRQUEJ., Feb. 18,
2014, ltthp://www.aqoLiua.cojm/354854/ews/iew-iexicos-droLughtwoirst-since-1 880s.html.
8. NAT'L AGR1C. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEt'r OF AGRIC., CALIFORNIA ACRIcuirURAI.
STATISTIcs 2012 CROP YEAR 1 (2013), availahle at http://wwv.nass.usda.gov/Statistics-byState/
California Dep't of
Califoniia!ubliealions/CaliforniaAgStatisfics/Reports/20l2cas-all.)dl';
Food aid Agric., Califomnia Agicultual Broduction Slatislics, CA.GOV,http://wwV.cdfa.ca.gov/
statistics/ (last visited Apr. 12,, 2015).
9. NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., COLORADO AGRICUurURAL
STATISTIcs 2013, at 2 (2013), ai'aiable at http://wwwmv.nass.usda.gov/StatisicsjyState/
Colorado/hlblications/Ain nualStatistical_Bulletin/Bulletin2013.pdl'.
5.

WA TER LA W REVIEW

Volume 18

products ranging from pecans to calves.'" These western states predict significant population growth in the future as well. California projects that its population will swell by almost fifteen million people hy 2060." Colorado forecasts
that its population will grow by almost 2.5 million by 2040. 2 New Mexico's
population may grow by almost seven hundred thousand by 2040.'"
These three states are pivotal for an understanding of water rights.'4 Each
state follows the doctrine of prior appropriation, which enjoys constitutional
protection in Colorado and New Mexico, and statutory protection in California.'5 In Colorado and New Mexico, prior appropriation is exclusive. In California, prior appropriation coexists with the riparima doctrine.'6 Colorado is a
major water rights jurisdiction. Over the past few years, the Colorado Supreme Court has issued a number of opinions bearing on the doctrine of prior appropriation. New Mexico has innovated the "Colorado Doctrine." California is a foil for the strict application of the appropriative regime.
Each day, roughly lorty-six million Americans are subject to some lorm of

10. NAT'i. Actuc. STATISTICS SEIRV., U.S. DI"'T oiF Aciuc., NEW MEXIco 2012
AGRICULTURAL STATISTIcs 4, 11 (2013), avalable at http://www.nass.usda.gov/Staisics-by_
State/NewMexico/Publicatons/Ainual_StaisticalBulletin/2012/2012_NMPu.plf'.
11. Cal. Dep't of Fin., Jeport P-li: Surmmy PopulationProjections by Racc/Ethnicit'y and
By Major Age Groups, CA.GOV, http://www.dof.ca.gov/rescarc/dcmographic/reports/ projections/P-l/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2015) (webpage providing access to population projection
spreadsheets).
12. Cindy DeGroen, Population hbrecasts, Coi.o. DEP'T OF LOCAL AFF. (Nov. 2012),
http://wvw.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite%31q)lobcol%3Durldata%26blol)hcadername 1%
3DContent-Disposition%26blobheadername2%3DContent-Type%26blobheadervaluel %
3Dinline%253B%2Bfilenanm%253D%2522Population%2BProjctions.l)df%2522%
26blobheadcrvalue2%3Dapplication%252Fpdl%26blobkey o3Did%26blobtable%
3DMungoBlohs%26blobwhere%3D 1251833653289%26ssbinia-yLDtrue.
13. UNM Geospatial and Population Studies Group, Population Pi'jectionslbr New Mexico and Counties, UNM BUREAU OF Bus. AN) EcON. RESEARCH, http://bber.unm.edu/demo/
lPopProj'able 1.htn (last updated Dec. 4, 2012).
14. I use the tern "rights" similarly to David Takacs. Takacs explains:
"Rights" are legal privileges that may be temporary or fungible. For example, when I
quote the California Constitution below on the "right to water," I am discussing a limited "right": it can easily (at least when compared with rights or rights) be revoked or
conditioned. These "rights" correspond to what Sax refers to as usufructary, a "right"
that incorporates the interests; of others and thus a "right" that one does not own "in
the same way he owns his watch or his shoes."
See David Takacs, The Public 7 ust Doctrine, ElnitroninentalHuman Rightq, and the Future
ofPrivate Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENNTL. L.J. 711, 721-22 (2008). The scope of my argument is
narrower than Takacs's, as I focus on state law in tie United States while Takacs engages with
international human rights as part of his discussion of the public trust doctrine.
15. Co o. CONST. art. XVI, § 6; N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1414
(2014). See also CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (enshrining the beneficial use requirement).
16. DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTrSHELL 8 (4th ed. 2009). There are several
other states that use a similar system, including California, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington. I. (explaining that these
states "originally recognized riparian rights, but later converted to a system of appropriation
while preserving existing riparian rights."). In riparian systems, "the owner of the ripaian land,
i.e., land bordering a waterbody, acquires certain rights to use the water. Each riparian landowner may make reasonable use of the water on the riparian land if the use does not interfere
with reasonable uses of other riparian owners." Id. at 16.
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prior appropriation in these three states.' 7 The doctrine generally provides
that the first person to divert water from its source for a recognized beneficial
use holds a superior right to subsequent users.'8 The doctrine governs tie use
of surface, underground, and other sources of water. It affects farming, ranching, and recreational activities involving streams and rivers, and it has bearing
on the river habitats of endangered and other species. Indeed, the state agencies that make water available to millions of Americans for a number of domestic uses in the West each day are subject to some form of tie appropriative regime.'" Prior appropriation is thus intertwined with western economic
and social livelihood.
B. EQIJITABILE APPORTIONMENT

In water matters, western litigants have relied on a range of legal remedies
to indicate their water rights in prior appropriation cases, not least anong
which are equitable remedies. 0 Equity and prior appropriation are often ad-

17. 2014 Populalion Esinmates, US CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 2014), http://facttinder.census
.gov/taces/tahleservices/jsl/pages/producview.xhtln?src=l)kntk. The prior appropriation doctrine governs water rights in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Utiah, and Wyoming. GETCH.S, sjpra nole 16, at 7.
18. Gclches, supni- note 16, at 6.
19. Id.
20. A remedy can be described as follows:
The remedy is what the client gets, the practical pavoll of litigation, the bottom line of
justice. Even when the client cares about the precedent, the precedent is impotant
because it will lead to tic grant or denial of remedies in fture cases, and because the
deterrent eflect of those remedies, or the prospect of not having to worry about any
more rtemedies, will guide the defendant's behavior. Without the prospcct of an effectivc remnedy, a claim of right is meaningless.
Douglas Laycock, Spnposium Remedies: Justi~c and the Bottom Line Introductioi, 27 REV.

LrTIG. 1, 2 (2007). Additionally:
A "remedy'," as I use the tenn in this Article, is what a civil court can do on hehalf of
a claimant who has prevailed on the substantive legal issues. A remedy difl ers frot
the procedural path that a plaintiff's lawsuit takes through the system and the substantive rules the court applies. This Article takes a fluid, contextual view of a court's
characterizations as remedy, procedure, arnd substance; it assumes the characterization will often depend on the coittr's put)osc and may vary from decision to decision.
There is nothing to be gained from characterization in the abstract as remedy, proce(lure, or substauce. Moreover, it %Vill often be a mistake for a court to use a characterization for one purpose in an unrelated context.
Doug Rcndlemnan, hrreparal1ity ?esurrected?: )oes a IRecalib,ated heprablnle htfiy Rule
Thrneaten the 'VanWen Court's Estalishncnt Clause LqIcy?, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1343,
1353 (2002). However:
This Article rejects any theory of remedies that segregates right from remedy. "As
a work of art, so adjcctive or reform cannot always be separated from substance ill
" Instead, it sugmedial aspects cannot be parted entirely from substantive ones ...
gests that the "unified right theory" of remedies - in which the remedy and the delinitional guarantee are two components of the unified substantive whole-more
appropriately describes tie real interrelationship between these two legal conceplts.
Tracy A. Thomas, Congress' Sect'on .5 Power and Remcal' Rightl.,

34 U.C. DAvis L. REV.
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dressed in the context of equitable apportionment. Although equitable apportionment arose as early as 1907 in Kansas v. Coloi-ado, equitable apportionment of the Colorado River's waters among western states was only codified in
the Colorado River Compact of 1922." The 1922 Compact's major objectives
include provision "for the equitable division and apportionment of the use of
the waters of the Colorado River System. " '
Numerous federal courts have since interpreted equitable apportionment
between the states. The inost compelling line of cases is that chronicling the
decades-long battle between Arizona and California (which includes US Supreme Court decisions in 1931, 1934, 1936, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1979, 1983,
1984, and 2000).3 In the most recent iteration of that contest, the United
States Suprene Court held that it would not preclude a Native American tribe
from asserting rights to a greater share of the Colorado River's water.2' As
comnentators have noted, equitable apportionment has procedural and substantive implications based on fairness.' Indeed, in "all of the equitable apportionment cases before 1963, the Supreme Court discussed fundamental
fairness, equity, and flexibility in the application of the doctrine."'
C. EQUITABLEJUSTICE
Although there are many ways to understand equity, one way to define it
is holistically. Under this definition, equity can include notions of participatory justice attentive to the multiple values attributed to water in a given place.
Equity can imply environmental justice concerns, equal political access, and
sensitivity to the effects of water-related decisions on disfavored communities.3
It can also imply social justice that is responsive to political and econonic
concerns.' Equity can be deployed to examine comity concerns in international treaties governing water.' Equity*can mean that, "one person's use of

673, 687-88 (2001) (quoting Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 116 (1945) (Rutledge, J.,

dissenting)).
21. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-1311 (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-61-101 (2014); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 72-15-5 (2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-12a-3 (LexisNexis 2014); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 41-12-301 (2014); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 104-05 (1907).
22. COlO. RWUER COMPACr art. 1 (1922); CoLO. Rrv. STAT. § 37-61-101 (2014).
23. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); Arizona v. Califonia, 292 U.S. 341 (1934);
Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558 (1936); Arizona v. Califonia, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Arizona
v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964); Arizona v. California, 383 U.S. 268 (1966); Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419 (1979); Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983); Arizona v. California,
466 U.S. 144 (1984); Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392 (2000).
24. Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 418 (2000).
25. SeeJason A. Robison & Douglas S. Kenney, Equity and the Colorado River Compa, t,
42 EN\rL. L. 1157, 1173-76, 1208 (2012).
26. Richard A. Simms, Equitable Apportionment - Priorities and New Uses, 29 NAT.
RESOURCESJ. 549,558 (1989).
27. See Thomas Clay Arnold, 7he San Luis Valley and the Moral Econony of Water, in
WATER, PLACE, ND EQUrry 37,38 (John M. Whiteley et al. eds., 2008).
28. See Sheldon Karnieniecki & Amy Below, Ethical Issues in Storm 14Water Policy Implementation: Dispanties in Financial Burdens and Overall Benefits, in 'VATER, PLACE, AND
EQUry, supra note 27, at 69, 78-79.
29. See Margaret Wilder, Equity and Water in Mexico's ChangingInstitutionalLrndscape,
in WATErR, PLACE, AND EQUrrY, supra note 27, at 95, 95-96.
30. See Stephen P. Mumme, From Equitable Utilization to Sustainable Development: Ad-
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[rivers and the fish in themi should not preclude or damage another person's
use or enjoyment of them, without formal assent and compensation for losses." 3' It can mean that "democratic participation and active citizenship" are
necessary elements of a water privatization policy."
A holistic view of equity includes other definitions. It might also attend to
the local context, which is often subordinated to national and international
Indeed, equity might mean that, "although fornal institutional
concerns.'
rules are a necessary condition for participation, they are by no means sufhicient to foster effective participation, both in terms of outcome (i.e., more eflicient and eqtuitable management) and process (i.e., more democratic, transparent, and accountable decision making)."' In this sense, "equity can only be
served through processes of decision making that reflect the full range of valties with which water is associated."'
A holistic view of equity is concerned with the future of a scarce resource,
and its effects on communities across the globe.' Under this view, which is
primarily concerned with social and environmental justice ("equitable justice"),
"later will dominate world natural resource politics by the end of the twentyfirst century much as oil dominated the late twentieth century.""7 As that possibility becomes more distinct, the commodification of water, alone, cannot
address the many values attached to water. ' Equitable justice concedes that
economic incentives can be successful.' Nevertheless, efficiency is only one
tool aunong many.'
Equitable justice's desire to acknowledge and address the effects of past
injustices on historically disfavored communities reflects its concern for cornmunities across the globe." Some elfects can be "irreversible-or, at least, dill
Equitable justice demands a "strong sense of injustice"
licult to reverse."
which can include "indignation or anger followed by a policy response on a

viancing Equity in US.-Mexico Border Water Managemlent, in WATER, PLACE, AND EQurrY,
supi note 27, at 117,118.
31. Paul W. Hir, Developing a Plentilil Rescource: iTalishoullan, Rive:s inl hc Pacilic
Northwest, In WxrE,

PIACE, AND

EQUrY, supria note 27, at 147, 162. For Hirt, prior appro-

priation is thus inimicd to equity because it privileged the interests of "private enterprise" 1o the
detlriment of others. Id. at163.
32. Madeline Baer, The Globad ater Cinsis, Privat2Ltin, and ihe Bolivian 14'Vlter Wll,
in WATER, PI ACE, AND EQUrIY, SUpia note 27, at 195, 218-19.
33. See Ismael Vaccaro, Modernizing Mountai Wat1er State, Industry, and Teritoo, in
WATER,PlACE, AND EQurry supra note 27, at 225, 226.
34. Maria Carmen Lemos, lhose Water Is It An_- ay? Water Management, Knowledge;
and Equitvin NortheastB-alil, ,n WATER, PIACE, AND EQUIrTY, supra note 27, at 249, 250.
35. Helen Ingramn et al., Water and Eqjuity in a Changing Climate, in WATER, PLACE, AND
EQurI, supi-a note 27, at 271, 271.
36. See Helen Ingun et al., The Importance of Equity anod the lnits of EIllciency in 1Vter ResoUtces, 1i' WATER, PIACE, AND EQurrY, supia note 27, at 1, 1.

37. Id.
38.
39.

See id.at 3-8.
See id.at 5.

40. Id. at 5,8.
41. David L. Feldman & Michelle \Vhiuman, As ifEquityMa'ttered-Comimllon Themes and
EndulingIsues in die Svmposiun, 50 NAT. RESOURCF.l]. 291,294-300 (2010).

42. Id. at 305.
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geographically far-flung scale."' It might include "the power to seek redress
lor prior wrongs," and it envisages inclusive ways of resolving conflicts regarding contested resources.' Most compellingly, equitable justice proposes an
extension of the vocabulary and assumptions pertaining to natural resources.
Not only should human communities be the subjects of greater sensitivity in
discussions of contested resources, but so too should other species.' Equity
should incorporate discussions of empathy, however challenging the turn to
empathy might initially appear.' Equity should become so entrenched in the
human experience that it results in "values, actions, and laws promoting sustainable pathways that maximize the health and potential of all individuals,
communities, and ecosystems.""
D. EQUITABLE REMEDIES

Equity also refers to a class of legal remedies. For John D. Leshy, interloctitory injunctive relief-an equitable remedy-plays a prominent role in environmental litigation, and Leshy is invested in providing a "[pirilner lor the
IpIractitioner."' By focusing on the plaintiff in federal environmental cases,
Leshy shows that the availability of interlocutory relief is a matter of timing
and strategy." Although standards apply to preliminary injunctive relief, individual facts have great bearing on the outcome at equity, and "ItIhere is almost
never any sound strategic reason for holding back important factual evidence
6r legal arguments. " '° The plaintiff should document the nature of the threatened irreparable harm, which can amount to a showing of standing.5' Showings of irreparable hanr, however, can be difficult where there is incremental
damage, cumulative harm, or where the harm is uncertain or latent 2 Courts
engage in a "mysterious process that results in a judgment."'" A "strong presumption" favors legislative and agency actions, and courts encourage environmental lawsuits by requiring a nominal bond as surety.5 '
For Douglas Laycock, the inferior instinct in remedies is "segregationist,"

43. Id. at 297-98.
44. I. at 300-03.
45.
46.

Id. at 306-14.
Id. at 306-08. "Empathy" in this context seems a fluid tenn since it also embraces the

protection of endangcred and threatened species, and includes both "tie moral capacity to regard non-sentient beings as objects to be cared for and to be regarded as having intrinsic-not

merely utilitarian-value," anod "comnunicatling, negotiatlingl, or engaglingl in an inter-active
decisional process so as to acknowledge not only the moral standing of these organisms, but
also tie possibility that they have 'agency' (i.e., tie ability to act independently)." Id.
47. Takacs, supra note 14, at 760 (emphasis in original).
48. John D. Leshy, Inicrlocutoy Injunctive Relief in Environmental Cases: A Pnmner lor
the JPractitionei;6 ECOLOGY L. Q. 639, 639 (1977).
49. Id. at 654 ("Environmental cases are not all brought by those seeking greater protection
for tie environment. Increasingly, as new environmental regulations seek to change traditional
industrial modes of behavior, industrics are instituting litigation seeking to delay or avoid such

regulation.").
50. Id.at 643.
51. Id.at 644-45.
52. Id. at 647-54.
53. Id at 658.
54. Id. at 662-63, 671-75.
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as exemplified in Delaware.i In Delaware, equity exists as a "separate and
self-conscious" remedial regime that fancies itself somewhat aristocratic.56 Tile
superior approach is Laycock's "integrationist" approach, for which a remedy's history is "wholly irrelevant," and "lwle should invoke equity just as we
invoke law, without explanation or apology mad without a preliminary showing
that this is a case for equity. " For Laycock, equity has emerged victorious, as
the merger of law and equity has incorporated equitable "innovations" into the
"
law and rendered the distinction between the law and equity meaningless.
Legislatures "should quit enacting references to law and equity" as "judges and
lawyers no longer understand what such references mean," including the Supreme Court of the United States, which displayed its misunderstanding of
equity in an opinion.
Laycock argues that judges have largely abandoned the irreparable injury
rule, which allows equitable remedies only when legal remedies would be inadequate. Except where fungible goods can be replaced in an orderly market, courts find damages insufficient, resulting in a rebuttable "preference for
specific relief if Ithel plaintiff wants it."' In fact, specific relief is not only
available at equity. "IWihether we call such a command legal or equitablemandamnus or injunction-is a natter of history and doctrine, not a matter of
function." ' History itself shows that the irreparable injury rule has been on
the decline.' Only in "remarkably few" cases that amount to "remnants" of
the rule do courts apply it, including in cases where courts "are hostile to the

Douglas Lvcock, The 7T'iumph ofEcluiti; 56 IA\w & CONTEMP. Pitis. 53, 53 (1993).
d. While Laycock does not use "intferior" and "superior," he does argue that his view
56.
is de sounder one, and he deploys "segregationist" 2uod "integrationist" in this regardt. d.
55.

57.
58.
59.
60.
688-89
61.
62.

IcLat54.
kI.at 81.
Id.
Douglas Laycock, 77c Death of the hreparable Iuo,Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV.687,

(1990).
hd at691,767.
i.at 697. Rencleman adds:

An Establishment Clause plaintiff has two alternative remedies instead of an injunction: a writ of ms(lanuis in a state court or a (cclaratoly judgment in either federal or state court. Although some state-court Establishment Clause plaintiffs have
sought injunctions, other state-court Establishment Clause plainitlis have sued for
mandamus. Generally, a court grants a plaintiff mandamus to order "a public officer
to carly out a ministenal duty about which the lofficeri had no discretion." Mandamus is the equivalent of an injunction, ithout, however, an irreparable injury rule.
A state court's writ of mandaunts hats both am injunction's compulsory feature
lor the defendant and its preventive quality for the plaintiff. A writ of mnandamus (iftkrs somewhat from an injunction. A mandamus is coercive relief at "common law,"
an extraordinary or prerogative writ issued by a court of law, not a court of chancery
or equity. A writ of mandanuis is limited to guiding a public official's specific ministerial functions that the court can supervise easily. In short, the court cannot use
mandamus to correct all the misconduct the court can enjoin.
Rendleman, supir note 20, at 1365.
63. Laycock, supra note 60, at 698-701; see also Douglas Laycock, Iffinclons and the IrrepaableIfmry iule, 57 T-X. L. REV. 1065, 1065 (1979) (reviewing OWEN M. Fiss, THE Civitl.
RICHTS INJUNCTION (1978)).
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plaintiffs case on the merits." " Courts should thus be freed of the rule.
While the Supreme Court can accomplish this with a sweeping opinion, a legislative solution is more promising.'
"ILless hostile" to the irreparable injury rnle, Doug Rendleman is concerned that Judge Gerald B. Tjollat of lhe Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit would change the threshold inquiry for an injunction. ' Judge Tjoflat
would only apply the irreparable injury rule in the plaintiff's favor if he "can
enforce the plaintiffs proposed injunction with coercive contempt."" However, if judge Tjoflat's "only responses to a defendant's violation would be compensatory contempt and criminal contempt," he would not issue an injunction
because he would conclude that an adequate remedy was available at law.
For Rendleman, Judge Tjoflat's view constitutes either a "frontal assault" or
"an indirect incursion" on the Warren Court's Establishment Clause legacy,
in
which injunctions "play indispensable roles" because conversion of a plaintiffs
complaint into monetary awards can be very difliculty" According to Rendleman, "Itihe world is too complex and future events are too unpredictable for
the judge, when asked to grant an injunction, to be able to predict the injunction, the defendant's violation, and the available solutions."
A judge should
find monetary danages inadequate when: "a) the plaintiffs substantive right is
too important to allow the defendant to violate it and pay damages; b) the subject matter of the dispute may be unique; or c) the plaintiff's injury may be difficult or impossible to monetize."'
More recently, Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden, and Henry E. Smith"2

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Laycock, supra note 60, at 723, 755.
Id. at 770.
Rendleman, supira note 20, at 1345, 1376.
Id. at 1345.
Id.
Id. at 1344-45, 1359, 1406. Moreover, as Rendleman argues:

The judge ought not allow a defendant to thwart the plaintitl's Establishment Clause
rights and pay her money danages, if indeed money damages are possible or feasible.
This is because money damages would transmogrify the plaintiffs constitutional right
to be free of oflicially sanctioned religious observances in fact into a right the defendant can invade and covert into an inferior and often illusory right to money.

Id at 1406.

70. Id. at 1400.
71. Id.at 1374.
72. Smith disagrees with Laycock and Rendleman regarding equity's place:
Some commentators such as IDouglas] Lavcock have called into question whether
this requirement of irreparable injury actually holds true. As Laycock has argued, the
irreparable injury cases (in which damages are found to be inadequate, thus paving

the way for an injunction), seem to be all over the lot. It is hard to give an example
that would be worth litigating that some court or other has not fbund to meet the criteria for irreparable injury (hence the "death" of the rule). But if equity is,as I argue,
a decision-making mode that is directed against hard-to-prove opportunism, we
should not be asking for a rle in tie first place. Therc is little point in tracing tie
outer contours of the cases to find such a rule, because what is really going on, according to this theory, is an effort to stop opportunism.

Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity 24 (Oct. 22, 2010) (unpublished
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("Gergen et al.") have expressed alarm at a Supreme Court opinion, eBay nc.
v MercExchnmge, L.L.C, which imposed a four-part test lor permanent injunctions in patent cases.73 For Gergen et al., eBay has "overrun and abrogated prior judicial approaches, all in the name of restoring traditional equity
practice."" The opinion is a "doctrinal straitjacket of a sort that courts sitting
in equity have commonly resisted."7 It obscures and "relegatlesi ...to second class status" the highly nuanced traditional approach of courts at equity,
which rely on a panoply of detailed equitable criteria, ranging from equitable
maxims to rebuttable presumlptions and safety valves in their determination of
a case" Such equitable criteria endow equity with predictal)ility. The eBay
test disturbs that predictability and is even more troubling because federal and
even state court decisions "have left in tatters any notion that the significance
of the Supreme Court's el3avtest will be largely confined to patent law or even
intellectual property law more generally.""
A specific concern for Gergen et al. is that the eBavtest has a noisome effect on the complex and more traditional judicial approach to injunctions."
That approach is sensitive to "historlies] of continued infringement," as well as
other "triggers" like "difliculty of measuring danages, difficulty of purchasing
substitutes, or violations of civil rights," which the eBay test elides."' Significandy for Gergen et A., traditional injunctive relief served as a counterweight
to opportunism, which restrains acts that might be compensable or objectionable at law (e.g., trespass, preventing a murderer from proliting from the will
of a victim). As such, equity serves as a moral or ethical antidote to opportunism, which prohibits the conduct of "bad-faith violators.""
manuscript),avaial)lc at

http://wv.law.vale.edu/documents/pdf/LEO/HSmidi-L-wVersus Faluity7.pd fl.
73. Mark P. Gergen et al., The Suprlme Courls Accidental Revolution? The Test I6r
Pemmicni Iunctions, 112 CoLUM. L. RFv. 203,204 (2012). As Gergen ct al.explain:
[Tj he Court stated that to obain such au injunction the 1novmt must show: "(1) that
it has suffered an inreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering tie
halace of hardships between de plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted;
and (4) that die public interest would not be disscrved by a permanent injtnc'
tion. "

Id. (quoting eBay Inc. v. McivExchge, L.L.C, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)).
74. IcL at 206.
75. I at211.
76. Id. at 208, 219-20.
77. I. at 214.
78. Id. at 233.
79. I. at 236-37.

80. I. at 237-38.
81. Id. at 239. For some, Gergen etal.'s work will bring to mind Calabresi and Melamed's

work on property and liability rules, and they will want to know ifmy argument is not a recitation of Calabresi and Melaned's argument under a different guise. Calabresi and Melamed
deal witl entitlements, which are determinations made by tie slate to sanction one interest in-

stead of another. Calabresi and Melamed identify three types of entitlements. The first is protected by propery rules, which assume a voluntary transaction between a buyer and seller, in
which tie parties to the bargain decide its value. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
PIoperty Rules, LIabililv Ru/es, and Imdicnabilitw One View of the (thedraI, 85 HARv. L.
Riv. 1089, 1092 (1972). The presence of property rules is generally reflected in grants of

WATER LA IVWREVIEWl

Volume 18

Henry Smith's "holistic" and "functional" approach to equity underscores
equity's "individualized justice" in its fight against opportunistic conduct,
which is often only clear in hindsight."5 For Smith, equity is an exceptionally
rich and textured remedial province with history, rules, and vocabulary of its
ownl." Although the historical aspect matters less for Smith's argument, it is
implicit in his attention to equitable maxims, which "have not disappeared.""
So, for example, the maxim that equity acts in personun and not Li rein applies to decrease third-party infornation costs (such as those of a good-faith
purchaser) by acting against the person of the opportunist (with a finding of
contempt, for example) in his attempt to benefit from the purchaser's lack of
knowledge.' In such a case, the court does not invalidate the transaction (j i
rein), but enforces "its direct action upon the person tailored to a particular
problem."
E. PRIOR APPROPRIATION
While no commentators appear to have dealt with equitable remedies,
equitable justice, and prior appropriation, equitable justice is implicit in many
treatments of prior appropriation.Y Charles F. Wilkinson's influential proc"mandatory relief (an injunction or no liability)." THOMAS W. MERRILL, HENRY E. SMITH,
PROPERTY: lPRINCIPLES AND POLICIEs 58 (2007). The second type of entitlement is protected
by liability rules, in which the entitlement's value is objectively set, not by the parties to the bargain, but by the state in "what amounts to a forced sale." Id.; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note
.81, at 1092. Awards of damages are generally evidence of the presence of liability rules. The
third type of entitlement is "inalienable to the extent that its transfer is not permitted between a
willing buyer and a willing seller," and the state will intervene to "determine who is initially entitledl, to determine the compensation that must be paid if thc entitlement is taken or destroyed,
landl also to forbid its sale under some or all circumstances." Calabresi & Melarned, su.pra
note 81, at 1092-93. My argument differs from Calabresi and Melamed's on a number of
grounds. First, while my argument has benelited from some insights of the law and economics
movement, my argument is not offered from that perspective. My work has an historical foundation that is invested in the interpretation of terms considered subjcctive and therefore difficult
to value, such as conscience, and empathy. Second, as Rcndlemnan has observed, distinctions
between "property" and "liability" rules are challenged, for example, when "the defendant can
violate an injunction and convert the plaintiff's irreparable right into a cause of action for compensatory contempt, money. By breach, the defendant has remitted the plaintiff to that inadequate remedy, for it is now too late for the plaintiff to enjoy the substantive right." Doug

Rendleman, Rejectig Properly Rules-LJability Rules for Boomer's Nuidancc Remedy: 77e
Last 7our You Need of Calabresiand Melamned's Cathedrd, at 28 (Washington & Lee Pub.
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2013-02, 2013), available at
http://papcrs.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfiiabstract id-2212384. Further, Rendleman notes that
the distinction between property and liability rules "de-emphasizes real litigants' emotional and
cultural responses to conflict." Id. at 34. My essay is invested in unearthing such responses and
their potential mneanings.
82. Smith, supra note 72, at 4, 8, 17-18, 26.
83. To be sure, the terms of the characterization are mine, as Smith does not adopt similar
language in his cngagement with equity.
84. Id at 18.
85. Id. at 22-23.
86. Id. at 23.
87. For a quick overview of prior appropriation, seeJ. Byron McCormick, he Adequacy
of the Prior Appropiiation Doctnne Today, i WATER RESOURCES ANt) THE LAw 33, 34
(1958). I neither present the articles that follow in chronological order nor do I claimn that they
present themselves as part of the equitable justice argument. However, I argue that their general concerns can be seen to reflect and incorporate those of the equitable justice line of argu-
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lamation that prior appropriation died in 1991 states how the venerable doctrine of prior appropriation finally succumbed to the concerns at the heart of
equitable jus6ce:
Prior has now passed on. He died this january 19th when his heart seized
up afdter receiving a t*ix informing him that, on that very clay, the new Director of the Denver Water Board had recommended that the water developers
not file a lawsuit challenging EPA's rejection of the dam at Two Forks. In
truth, however, he died of multiple causes. The publication of Milagro
Beanliel lu" ("It's lies, lies top to bottoif," Prior would fume. Ramona,
who seldom teased Prior, would say, "It's just fiction, love," and, she would
add with a gleam in her bright eyes, "Oh, but it's a funny book, Prior.").
Carter's Hit List in 1977 ("We need a good conservative Republican trom
the West, preferably California," Prior ranted.). President Reagan's moratorium on federal funding of water projects. The Mono Lake opinion and the
public trust doctrine (Prior raged, "What kind of a court is this? Talking
about brine shrimp, gulls, Wilson's Phalarope, tufa-whatever the hell that is.
'This was supposed to be a case about water."). The serious illness of the
General and the ridicule he is su'ffering just now, in his last days. Indiam water settlements ("They don't deserve a single drop."). Environmentalists-just
the mere existence of them. Academics who relentlessly criticized Prior's
ideas ("The bastards wotldn't know the real world from a beachball."). Federal reserved water rights. State water planning ("We've got a plan. It's
called 'first in time, first in right."'). An especially cruel blow was when they
adoplted an instream flow prograam-in Utah.8
Donald J. Pisani similarly reflects an, equitable justice bent when he argues that
"[einterprise triumphed over equity" in the nineteenth century West when
speculators and monopolists gathered vast water rights under the doctrine of
prior appropriation, beneficial use of the water to which they were entitled often went unchecked, and waste occurred."
Others echo these arguments. David B. Schorr returns to prior appropriation's birth, and responds to many of Pisani's concerns." Schorr argues that
prior appropriation's nineteenth-century inception "expressed a concern for
broad and equitable distribution of resources" that was "radical" in its opposition to monopolies and speculation.' Christine A. Klein exaunines how judiInents.
88.
xvi-xvii
89.
1centih

Charles F. Wilkinson, hi Memoian: PriorAppropriation,1848-1991, 21 ENVTL. L. v,
(1991).
DonaldJ. Pisani, Ente;priseand luity: A Critique of Western Water LaIw hi the NineCentwj; 18 W. HIST. Q. 15, 23, 36-37 (1987); see also MARYBELLE D. ARCHIBALD,
GOVERNOR'S COMM'N TO REVIEW CAL. WATER RIGHTS LAW, AIPROIRIATIVE WATER
RiGIrrs IN CALIFORNIA: BACKGROUND AND IssUEs 48-53 (1977), available at lttp://ww
w.waterboards.ca.gov/)tiblicafioosonirs/pulicafions/gcneral/locs/1597.pdf (noting that the
appropriative doctrine has been criticized for (1) waste through "premature or excessive (evelopment" when (a) water is diverted from more socially advantageous uses so as to generate private rents, (b) there are speculative water applications by municipxditics, (c) there is overinigation; for (2) perverse incentives created by threats of abandonment of water rights iuid by
disuse; for (3) a chronological system of rights ap)ortionment that is agnostic to where the

rightsholders are located on a stream, meaning that overuse upstream can lead to no water
downstream; and (4) because junior appropriators are inequitably affected during shortages).
90. See David B. Schorr, Appropriationas Agra)7alnsn: Di~sriljutiveJusticei1 the Creation
of PropertyRihts, 32 EcotnOcY L.Q. 3, 3 (2005).
91.
i. at 11, 27-28, 32. According to Schorr:
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cial recognition of instream uses struck at the heart of the "myth" of the diversion requirement of prior appropriation, which had been elevated to constitutional status." Michael Toll pursues a "comprehensive" approach to prior appropriation, examining the beneficial use requirement."
Toll's holistic
approach borrows from the riparian doctrine used in eastern states to argue
for a renewable water right permit system within the doctrine of prior appropriation." Reed D. Benson similarly pursues Wilkinson's argument and examines recent jurisprudence from Washington, Idaho, and New Mexico to
note that there is an "ongoing exodus" from prior appropriation as states deviate from core doctrinal principles. 5 For Benson, "[plirior Appropriation has
lost its hold over western water law. " 96
Efficiency concerns arise for other commentators. Janet C. Neuman argues that beneficial use encourages inefficient water use in western states as
"Itlhe prohibitions against waste-even the threat of forfeiture for nonuse-are
mostly hortatory concepts that rarely result in cutbacks in water use."" For

Therefore, rather than seeing Colorado water law as oiginating no farther back
than the mining camps, with tie appropriation docuine springing fully-grown, Athena-like, fron the heads of the miners; viewing it as a spontaneous response to the arid
conditions of the Colorado plains; or describing it as a natural outgrowth of the Spanish and Mexican law formerly in force in the region, it would be more accurate to describe miners' laws, claim club regulations and the appropriation doctrine as part of a
complex of pro-settler and anti-speculator laws and rules prevalent in mid-nineteenth
century America, particularly in the West.
d. at 32. For other views on the history of prior appropriation, see Wells A. Hutchins & Hany
A. Steele, Basic Water Rights Doctrines and Their Ilmphictions for River Basin Development,
22 LAW AND CONrEMP. PROBS. 276, 280-81, 288-89 (1957) (describing prior appropriation as
arising from Roman civil law and local custom, and noting that both ripa-ians and appropriators
can waste water); Edwyna Harris, 77e Evolution of Water Rights in the Ninetecnth Centuly:
7he Role of CljinateandAsset 7ype, 35 NAT. RESOURCE.SJ. 217, 217, 256 (2013) (providing a
predictive franework to argue that climate alone does not account for tie evolution of water
lights systems in the United States and Australia, but also the kind of asset deployment that
made use of the resource).
92. See Christine A. Klein, 7he ConsLitutionalMythology of Western Water Law, 14 VA.
ENvrL. Lj. 343, 367-68 (1995).
93. Michael Toll, Comment, Reinaginhg Western Water Law: Tne-Limited Water Right
'ernits Based on a Comprehensive Beneficial Use Doctane, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 595, 598,
626 n.167 (2011).
94. I. at 626-31; see a/so Joseph W. I)ellapenna, Dual Systems, in I Waters and Water
Rights, § 8.02(b), at 7-8 (Any K. Kelley, ed., 3d ed. LexisNexis/Matthew Bender 2015) ("Colorado courts at times have seemed intent on eradicating every conceivable vestige of riparian
rights, yet even Colorado courts have fallen back on riparian language to justify their conclusions that there are a few rights in the owner of the bed of the river and no other rights other
than those held under ant appropriative right."). For more on the riparian doctrine, see Lynda
L. Butler, Allocatiig Consumptive Water Rights in a i?,voann Jurisdicdon:Defining the Relationship Between tAilic and Pivate Interests, 47 U. Prir. L. REV.95 (1985) (arguing that the
liparian systen arose in al agrarian society to privilege water uses by private individuals and
thus needed to be reformed to allow greater use by public entities).
95. Reed D. Benson, Alive But Irrelevant: 7he lJior Appropiation Doctnh'e i 7bday's
Western Water Law, 83 U. COLO. L. REV.675, 708 (2012) ("Municipal water lights and doinestic wells are two areas in which stales have long been willing to deviate from [prior appropriation] in order to accommodate other important goals.").
96. Id.at 711.
97. Janet C. Neuman, Beneticial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: 7he Inellicient Search lbr
Jlticiency in Westeri Water Use, 28 EN'vrL. L. 919, 922 (1998). For Neuman, "elficie'ncy"
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Neuman, efficiency might be increased if courts questioned customary water
uses, state agencies applied aid enforced efficiency-enhancing standards, and
legislators strengthened water conservation prograns." A. Dan Tarlock argues that prior appropriation "is often more rhetoric than rule. Like all drastic
rules, the rule's importance lies more in the threat of its application rather
than the application. ' For Tarlock, "lilt is perhaps more accurate to describe
prior appropriation as an extreme default rule of decreasing marginm importance,' and the focus should be on whether prior appropriation protects
"investment-backed expectations from the risks of variable water years and
perhaps now global climate change."" Nicole L. Johnson argues that the current appropriative system lends itself to inefficiencies.'°' Johnson is invested in
the transfer and marketability of instream uses, and she proposes instreani
rights quantification to increase both elliciency and access to instream rights by
private entities.' 2
Other commentators have mounted a defense of prior appropriation.
justice Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr. argues in favor of "IpIriority's continuing role,"
which has come to include many of the concerns at the heart of equitable justice."'0 For justice Hobbs, priority is not dead; it is, instead, "the most misunderstood stick in the water rights bundle .... Justice Hobbs examines recent
jurisprudence from the Colorado Supreme Court to argue that prior appropriation is resilient.' ° Derek L. Turner shows that, while anti-speculation and

mcans "accomplishment of he desired result with a minimum amount of water. This is distinct
from an economist's definition of efficiency." Id. at 922 n.7. Yet, the "economist's definiton"
is implicit in Neuman's analysis of waste when she argues, for example, that "[nmo one should
use water wastefuilly, becatise someone else could probably use that same water productively

Id. at 965. It is also cxplicit in her
anl l)eneicially, thus increaLsing the overall value to societ.
treatment ofimarkets. Id. at 991-95.
98. Sce id. at 978-91.
99. A. l)an Tarlock, PriorApproprluiaon: Rule, Puinciole, or Rhetorici, 76 N.D. L. REV.
881,883 (2000).
100. Id. at 884, 894.
101. Nicole L.johnson, lovperty 14ithout Possession, 24 YALEJ. ON REG. 205,205(2007).
102. Id. Johnson thus only very loosely can be seen to fit into equitable justice insofar as she
is in favor of private instrealn rights. CT Shelley Ross Saxer, 7ihe J'lud Natme oflProertv
JRis il' lVae; 21 DUKE ENv-rL. L. & PoI.'Y F. 49, 50 (2010) (arguing that "water is too unlike
land to be subject to private property holdings"). Saine H. Knudsen similarly argues:
It seems much easier, albeit detrimental, to accept a world with bright line divisions
between "yours" and "mine." Fortunately, tlere are historical examples that shed
light on how a workable relationship between public rights and private ownership can
be achieved. The area of water law and water rights is a good example. Given the
continuous, interconnected characteristics of water, not to mention its importamce to
public welfare, water has never been considered a good candidate for total privatzation. As a result, water has long belonged to the people collectively, even when it
runs underneath or through private property-private owners possess only conditional
rights to use the water resource.

Sanne H. Knudsen, Remedving the Mis,,se of-Nalurc, 2012 UTAH L. RI:v. 141, 165-66 (2012).
103. Gregory J. Hobbs, jr lrioriv: 77ie Most Misunderstood Sick in the Bundle, 32
ENvrI.. L. 37, 42 (2002).
104. Id. at 37.
105. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Reviving the Phlic Owneuuhip, Antispeculation, and Benelicial
Use Moorings olThorAppropdion Water L w, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 97, 104 (2013).
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anti-monopolization are at the basis of Colorado's prior appropriation doctrine, recent jurisprudence from the Colorado Supreme Court has tightened
the burden of proof for municipal water providers to satisfy conditional water
appropriations.'"
Tension thus appears between critics and apologists.' 7 The implications
of this debate are important. Revisions to the prior appropriation doctrine
mean not only that a contested resource like water takes on new values, but
also that readings of state constitutions accommodate and even promulgate
those meanings. Equity, in its various guises, is important in this discussion
because it goes to the heart of the values infonning discussions of water rights.
F. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Prior appropriation and traditional equity are supposed to be abolished or
moribund. My argument shows that both traditional equitable remedies and
prior appropriation are resilient and adaptive. For this, I rely generally oil two
lines of inquiry.
The first is Smith's approach to equitable remedies as a functional tool of
ongoing significance to litigants and courts. As Smith's is a powerful defense
of traditional equity from a law and economics perspective, my argument
adopts the broad strokes of Smith's argument, even though my argument does
not rest on that perspective. As Smith shows, equity's structure, vocabulary,
maxims, and rules still matter. They matter because a discussion of equity involves more than outcome; it also includes process. For me, process matters. ' Process includes history. History helps explain equity's ongoing practi106. See Derck L. Turner, Comment, Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation District v. Trout Unlimited and An Anti-Speculation 1)octine for a New Era of W'ater Supply l'lalming, 82 U.
CO.O. L. R1v. 639,643-44,677 (2011).
107. I use the terms "critics" and "apologists" more as general guideposts than as taxonomic
certainties. Indeed, elements of each can be found in the other.

108. See generally,Joseph L. Sax, 7he Public 7rust Docrine in Natur-dJesource Law: Efkctive JudicildIntervention,68 MICH.L. REv.471, 558 (1970) ("'Thus, as is usually the wont of
lawyers, die author has attended essentially to problems of process"). For some, my reliance on
process will recall process jurisprudence. Process jurisprudence, whose foremost expositors
were Lon Fuller, Henry Hart, Albert Sachs, Herbert Wechsler,John Hart Ely, and Alexander
Bickel, is:
[Aln attitude about the point and the value of law, about the social role of the lawyer
and the law school, and about the purpose of legal scholarship. It is an attitude premised, in every instance, on the belief that those who respect and exercise the faculty of
reason will be rewarded with the discovery of a priori criteria that gives sense and legitimacy to their legal activities.

Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process 7radition in American Jurispnidence, 15
CARDozo L. REv.601, 605 (1993). Process jurisprudence is normative insofar as it advocates
an ideal vision of die law. Id. at 704. Itrelies upon and seeks to unearth die rational underpinnings ofjudicial discourse through "purposive interpretation of legal rules" as reasoned elaboration of neutral judicial principles is "possibly the fundamentalll legal value." Id. at 624, 627,
679. It believes that "reason fosters accountability and restraint." Id. at 639. Scholars and students must identify whether different judicial org-ans are performing their distinctive task as assigned. "Jurisprudence, in other words, is conceived as quality control." Id. at 636. Outcome
should be subordinated to process, and discretion should succumb to reason. Id.at 665, 686;
see also Laura Kalman, EatingSpaghetti with a Spoon, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1997) (reviewing
NEIL DUXBURY, PATIERNS OF AMERICANJURISPRUDEINCE (1995)). While indebted to process
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cal appeal for litigants and adjudicators,'" and why certain constituencies can
make compelling equitable subjects. History includes tie evolving meaning of
equitable remedies. Meaning is importat in water cases because of the particular values that individuals and commnities attach to a resource like water.
The second line of inquiry on which I rely is the equitable justice line of
arguments, with its holistic approach to resource management. Equitable justice shows that decisions regarding water affect multiple constituencies. These
constituencies include humans as well as flora and fauna, which should have a
say, however indirectly, in the lawmaking processes affecting their survival. As
such, various constituencies are stakeholders in water rights cases. Under the
equitable justice line of inquiry, an equitable remedy involves more than a traditionally equitable result. It. also encompasses, and is responsive to, the
broader needs of the various constituencies implicit in any litigation regarding
water.
My goal is thus to unearth the meanings and appeal of prior appropriation
and e(luitable relief, which is not always explicit in a judicial outcome. As part
of this excavation, I implicitly argue in favor of judicial discretion and its continuing appeal to litigants."' Equitable watchwords like "conscience," equitable
maxims, and their equivalents, persist in water rights cases as they bear particular meaning for litigants and judges. Far from being meaningless or defunct,
therefore, both prior appropriation and traditional equitable relief play a vital
role in western water rights cases.
In part It,I set a historical foundation for ny discussion by exploring in
detail the first prior appropriation cases fron Colorado, New Mexico, and
California. From the appropniation doctrine's inception, plaintiffs have relied
on traditional equitable relief to enforce their claims to water. The injunction
insight that outcomC is not everything, and judicial reasoning is central to
jurisprudence for its
the legal project, I would not subordinate discretion o rcason but would attempt to lind ways of
making themn, at the very least co-equal.
109. Indeed, history mad traditional equity are enjoying a noteworthy, if somewhat controversial, return in recent precedent from the Supreme Court of teiUnited States. &cegenerullv
Bray, suplma note 2, at 4.. My own engagement with equity in the nineteenth century precedes
my reading of Bray's work, but Bray's insight is geriane here. Bray notes that "atevery point,
the Court has suplorted its new equity jurisprudence by appealing to history and tradition," and
it should "not come as a surprise then that the Court is constructing an artificial history of equity. Although the justices range over the whole history of equity, they tend to draw fiom the equily of the middle-to-late nineteenth century mid the early twentieth century." Id. at 4, 27.
110. According to Bray:
Discretion, too, is deeply rooted in the tradition of equily. Much of the literature on equity over the last five hundred years has focused on this characteristic, and
the argunnents arc predictable. Critics, such as John Selden or more recendy Daniel
Farber and John Yoo, have objected that equity is a cloak lor arbitrary judicial policynaking. They see "the chancellor's conscience" as mere personal whim, as varying
as mch froin one chancellor to the next as "the chancellor's flot." In contrast, judgcs granting equitable remedies have traditionally emphasized both the value and the
limits of equitable discretion. As to its value, judges have said that equitable discretion allows them to fashion equitable remedies that are appropriate to the justice of
the particular case, to choose rigor or forlbearance as the case demands. As to limits,
it has long been a commonplace in judicial opinions that ecquitable discretion is
bounded. Even in equity "there are signposts for the traveler."
AcLat 46-47.
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and its equitable equivalents have proven central in this regard.' Injunctive
relief has provided a preventative remedy to many plaintiffs that have alleged
irreparable damage, and it has allowed litigants to anticipate prospective enforcement of their water rights. As such, injunctive relief has facilitated the
appropriative regime's future because the injunction has symbolic meaning in
water rights cases. Injunctive relief serves as a validating tool both of prior appropriation's history mad of its importance for the West. Simultaneously, injunctive issuance has historically undermined the riparian doctrine in all three
states.
Conscience is preeminent. Lawyers often disfavor appeals to conscience.
"Conscience, so the argument goes, 'is too amorphous a concept to be susceptible to analysis by abstraction', and is therefore of no use to a court of law."....
Yet the law protects subjective conscience as "liberty of conscience," for exanple, in the case of conscientious objectors."' A strong legal approach to
conscience might be one in which "the call of conscience sounds as if it is talking to us, because it embodies moral standards with a truth value that is cornpletely impartial."'" In other words, the "'voice of conscience' . . . is an expression of a powerful inclination to abide by what we perceive as our moral
duty, even in the face of consequences contrary to our interests."" In this
paradigm, those bereft of a conscience are subject to "such a fatal Ilaw in
Itheiri moral psychology that [they are] not part of the moral game. '""
"IDloctrines of Equity are there to introduce moral norms to dealings anong
strangers."'
The three foundational cases I highlight imply an evaluation of conscience. That equity acts inpersonam is implicit in these foundational cases
as equitable relief traditionally acts only on the person."' By relying on a nine111. See generally David W. Raack, A Histoiy of lIZunctions in England Before 1700, 61
INI). 1J.539 (1986) (tracing the evolution of injunctive relief from Roman Law to the seventeenth century, and focusing on the oft-contentious relationship between law and equity).
112. hit Samet, What Conscience Can Do Ibr Equity, 3 JURISPRUDENCE 13, 14-15 (2012)
(arguing that the "vociferous opposition to 'conscionability' ... assumes a very specific, and
controversial, concept of conscience" that is highly subjective and discretionary which is better
replaced by a "Kantian objectivist reodel" that "has a strong public aspect as the reasons thai it
quotes to the self apply to all reasonable human beings at all times.").

113. Id.at
114. I. at
115. Al.at
116. Id.at
117.
118.

19.
24 (emphasis in original).

25.

27.
Id.at 13.
See Smith, supra note 72, at 22. According to Smith:

[Elquity originally only acted against the person. Equity courts could order a person
wvithin its geographical jurisdiction to do something and if such person did not, the
court could hold the person in contempt, meaning a line or jail. Originally courts of
equity could not give remedies other than an order to a person, in personam. Injunc-

tions themselves cannot be "in rem": an injunction generally cannot bind all who had
notice of it but rather only those who were specilically named and those acting in
concert with them. Gradually this principle was loosened, for certain categories of
cases and certain trivial ministerial acts that the court could then peronn directly.
For example, now statutes at both the state and federal levels give courts power to
transfer property within the jurisdiction, ith in rei effect, and courts have made
creative use of equitable liens. And in some cases of liens and contractual specific
performance, such short cuts came to be allowed.
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teenth century case that discusses the generalized conscience of a court of equity, I show how the litigants' subjective consciences appeal to tie court's ability to enforce an objective judicial conscience in water rights cases. In so doing, a court can innovate the law while relying on local or other influences in
arriving at a conscientious outcome. As such, the presence of conscience does
not necessarily imply an abuse of discretion, but, instead, that a court will base
its opinion' on generalized criteria of some public importance to a specific ju-

risdiction.

In part III, I move beyond historical foundations and examine in detail
more recent case law from Colorado, New Mexico, and California. Beginning
with Colorado, I show how expansive application of the appropriation doctrine involves tie persistence of the traditional irreparable injury requireNew Mexico and California precedent then show the limitations
ment."
placed upon the appropriative regime, which has had to adapt. In particular,
New Mexico case law shows the continuing importance of traditional equitable
relielr I conclude with California case law, which implies that a substantive
holding can be equitable even if the court does not grant injunctive relief. In
California, equitable justice thus broadens tie meaning of an equitable remedy.
Before concluding, I return to conscience. Conscience can be outcomedeterminative because conscience engages with the morals mad ethics to which
courts and litigants are responsive. Although the three recent water riglts cases I evaluate do not mention conscience, it is, nevertheless, implicit in all of
them. Conscience is an integral part of any grant or denial of equitable relief.
Conscience permeates substantive discussions of doctrines like the public trust
doctrine. Conscience remains a powerful equitable tool, the ongoing importance of which should be underscored.
II. FOUNDATIONAL RELIEF AND PRIOR APPROPRIATION
As one of the most important equitable maxims holds, equity acts in peisonun.'" By acting on the person, equity acts to prevent or stop injustice. As
equitable renedies are discretionary, the plaintill appeals to the court's con-

ic/
119. 1 have followed the exanple of jurisdictions that have statled that "unconscientious" is
preferable to "unconscionable," because the fonier avoids conflation %ith doctrines of unconscionability.

PETER RADAN & CAMERON STEWART, PRINCIPL.ES OF AUSTRALIAN EQuITy AND

TRusTs § 2.5, at 26 (2d ed. 2012).
120. While ny argument proceeds by state, my intention is not to argue that only in Colora(1o does a court deny an injunction in water rights cases and expand the reach of the appropriat-

ive regime; only in New Mexico does a court deny injunctive relief while fivoring a constitutional attack in water rights cases; and only in California does equitable justice prevail. In some
respects, these arguments apply in all three-and other-jurisdictions. Here, these arguments
are predominant and applicable to individual states insofar as my searches for cases responsive
to injunctive relief and/or equitable relief in general prOduced the results with which I engage in
my argument.
121. "In essence the maxims of equity reflect and represent fundamiental moral ideas or
themes that lie at the heart of equitable jurisdiction. The function of a maxim is 'to prox4de
general principles as points of departure, and not to capsule answers to sI)ecitic pNroblemS.'"
RADAN & STEWART, supra note 119, § 2.14, at 28.
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science for a finding of irreparable harm." The court often engages in an intensive factual analysis before issuing its findings at equity. If the court agrees
with the plaintiff, an equitable remedy like injunctive relief issues. Issuing injunctive relief implies a process in which consciences are evaluated and the
injurious ties that bound plaintiff and defendant are often dissolved. Should
the defendant fail to obey the court's command, a finding of contempt may
follow.' 3 Injunctive relief is about one litigant appealing to another's conscience through the legal conscience as intermediaiy.
A. SYMBOLISM IN COLORADO
Injunctive relief was available as early as 1882 in the seminal prior appropriation case, Coflin v. Lefi Hand Ditch Go.'2' Coffin established the water
rights regime that later became known as "The Colorado Doctrine." " In Cof

122.

See Smith, supra note 72, at27-28. This has long been the case:

The use of conscience in equity cases goes back to the Middle Ages. At chancery was kept the sovereign's conscience, and ecclesiastics, who were also confessors,
were the first chancellors. The predominant position among commentators is 'that
Chancery principles were based on, or influenced by, canon law.' As such, chancery
procedure was a legalized form of procedure, based on the Bible. Such a biblicallyinspired approach required rigorous examination of the facts, so that the eror alleged
before the chancellor might te fully appraiscd and understood. As part of such an
examination, the chancellor was often called upon to question the dlefendant and
even obtain a confession.
Duane Rudolph, How Equity and Custon 7ranslbimedAmerican Waste Lauyw, 2 PROP. 1I4. 1,
60 (2015). For appeals to conscience in more recent jurisprudence, see, e.g., Quon v.Stans,
309 F. Supp. 604, 607 (N.D. Cal. 1970) ("ITihe request for injunctive relief is directed to die

conscience of the court and within its discretion to grant."); see also Wash. Capitols Basketball
Club, Inc. v. Bany, 304 F. Supp. 1193, 1196 (N.D. Cal. 1969) ("The grant or refusal of injunctive relief is a matter of equitable jurisdiction. 43 CJ.S. Injunctions § 12, p. 419. A Court of
Equity will grant the relief when it determines it essential to restrain an act contrary to equity
and good conscience. 43 CJ.S. Injunctions § 1,p).405.").
123. See generallyjohn M. Golden, Injunctions as More (or Iess) than "OffSwitches" Patent-hifringement Injuncons'Scope, 90 Trx. L. REV. 1399, 1409 (2012). According to Goldell:
Generally speaking, injunctions are in personam orders that are enforced through
comparatively summary proceedings invoking a court's contempt power. Such proceedings can be criminal or civil in nature. If anr enjoined party is found guilty of
criminal contempt, a court may order determinate sanctions, such as am unconditional fine or jail term, to punish tie contemnor and "vindicatell the court's authority."
Id.
124.

Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 444 (1882).

125. 5ee Sternberger v. Seaton Mountain Electric, Heat & Power Co., 102 P. 168, 169 (Colo. 1909) (distinguishing the Colorado from the California doctrine); Hagerman Irrigation Co.
v. McMurry, 113 P. 823, 825 (N.M. 1911) ("The 'Colorado Doctrine' as it is termled, first appears as a dictum in Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Company, 6 Colo. 443, (1882). It declared that,
on the ground of imperative necessity, no settler can claim any right aside from appropriation."); Bailey v. Tintinger, 122 P. 575, 582 (Mont. 1912). In 13ailejy the court stated:
Our Act of 1877, above, specifically recognized the right of an individual to appropriate water to rent or sell to another; but if the Colorado doctrine be invoked here,
such individual could never make his appropriation, for, under the Colorado theory,
the user and not the first individual would be the appropriator, and this is the .only
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tin, an individual who was first to appropriate water from a darn ad divert it
lor the purpose of irrigation sued another who had destroyed part of the darn
to irrigate his own lands during a period of scarcitv.'" The defendant argued
that he had the right to the water under the ripahian doctrine because his lands
lay "along the margin and in the neighborhood" of the water resource. ' The
Colorado Supreme Court rejected the argument as "ungenerous and inequitable."'" The court held that, "in the absence of express statutes to the contrary, the- first appropriator of water from a natural stream for a beneficial purpose has, with the qualifications contained in the constitution, a prior right
'
The court allinned the disthereto, to the extent of such appropriation. "a
tlrict's court issuance of an injunction and award of damages.'"
The prayer for injunctive relief in Co/tin was preventative as "Itihe action
Iwasl brought for damnages arising from the trespass, and lor injunctive relief to
prevent repetitions thereof in the future."' 3 The court was concerned about
the possibility of repeated injury.' 2 As such, the court could not countenance
the defendant's continued reliance on the riparian doctrine, which was "disastrOUS":
In the absence of legislation to the contrary, we dink that tei right to water acquired by piority ol appropiation thereof is not in any way dependent
consistent position to assume, if actual use is a necessary step to a completion of thi
appropriation.
i3;flct4 122 P. at 582. 1 am aware that Yulkcr v. Nichol ;anticipates Collii "discussion of the
appropriative doctrine. See Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 555 (1872) Wells, j., concurring).
However, I locate die beginning of tic appropriative doctrine in Collin because of its explicit
and stronger engagement widi tie doctrine as we recognize it todav. However, as Schorr iargucs:
It is worthwhile noting that while today tei Colorado Doctine of water rights is
generally traced to tie Coffin decision, this was not always so; eariv commentators, as
well as the author of Coffin, tound its earliest expression in Yunker. The issue is not
one of mere pride of place, for on it depends our conception of what the Colorado
)octrine embraces. Thc convention that Collin, decided ten years after Yunker,
marks the beginning of the doctrine, reflects a narrow conception of Colorado water
law, focusing on appropriation. The older (and, it is submitted, soinder) view, rcecognizing Yunker as the foundational decision, gives the variety of rules embraced under the Colorado l)octrine their due, and recognizes that tie primary aim of tie law
was to effect equal access to water resources, to which the earlier decision contributed
by forcing riparian landowners to allow access over their lands to streams.

Schorr, supra note 90, at 58-59.
126. (ollin, 6 Colo. at 444. The plaintiff also sought damages. Id. Nevertheless, for tie
pttrpOsCs of y argument, I foeus on the plaintiff's pnoyer for injunctive relief.

127.
128.
129.

d. at 449.
Id
d. at 447.
Id. at 452.

130.
131.
d. at 444.
132. See gcneillhalns. Co. of N. Am. v. Bonner, 42 P. 681, 683 (Colo. App. 1895) ("There
must be some special circumstances attending a threatened injuy of tis kind, distinguishing it
from a common trespass, and bringing tie case under some recogmized head of equity.jurisdiction before the preventive remedy of injunction can be invoked."); Proper v. Greager, 827 P.2d
591, 597 (Colo. App. 1992) ("Generally, an injunction is a preventive and protective remedy
aimed at future acts. It is not intended to redress past wrongs.").
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upon the locus of its. application to the beneficial use designed. And the disastrous consequences of our adoption of the rule contended for, forbid our
ivina such a construction to the statutes as will concede the sane, if they will
properly bear a more reasonable and equitable one.'"

The plaintiff's request for relief was thus prospective (to avert repeated injury),
anid tie court wanted to avert disaster.
Prospective relief in the case was retrospective in scope. While injunctive

relief in general cannot undo past wrongs, an injunction can help reach into an
injurious past and offer new readings of that past. The Coflin court rebuffed
as "ungenerous and inequitable" the defendant's reading of the statute. 3 ' The
Supreme Court of Colorado "Icouldl not believe that any legislative body
within the territory or state of Colorado ever bilended these Iriparian consequences to flow from a statute enacted.""a The court reasoned that the legislature had anticipated water diversion, and that it could not have anticipated the
diversion without prior appropriation of the water.' The court thus looked
back to impose a remedy going forward. The defendant's arguments against
injunctive relief could not have been right in the past because the court read
prior appropriation into the earliest uses of water in Colorado. The court
lound that prior appropriation "hald] existed from the date of the earliest appropriations of water within the boundaries of the state.' 3. Prior appropriation had always been a doctrine governing water in Colorado.
SCoffin's grant of injunctive relief was also practical and symbolic. As a
practical matter, it penranently inhibited further trespasses against a senior
appropriator's water rights; Symbolically, it enabled the transition between
competing water rights regimes (riparian and prior appropriation). It also located prior appropriation from "the date of the earliest appropriations of water within tie boundaries of the state.'.. The defendant was also wrong on
other grounds. Prior appropriation was foundational to western economic development and to the property rights on which that development depended:
It has always been the policy of the national, as well as the territorial and state
governments, to encourage the diversion and use of water in this country for
agriculture; and vast expenditures of time and money have been made in reclaiming and fertilizing by irrigation portions of our unproductive territory.
Houses have been built, and permanent improvements made; the soil has
been cultivated, and thousands of acres have been rendered immensely valuable, with the understanding that appropriations of water would be protected.
Denv the doctrine of Drioritv or sunenoritv of rieht by tnrioritv of anorovriation, and a great part of the value of all this property is at once destroyed. s

The plaintiff's rights to water by appropriation thus extended to the acquisition

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Coffin, 6 Colo. at 449.
Id.at 449.
Id.at 450.
Id.at 451-52.
Id. at 446.
Id

139. Id.
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of the patent through which he held itle.' ° Indeed, the appropriative doctrine's subsequent sanctity, and its constitutional status in Colorado, had precursors that the court was intent on recognizing."' The injunction that issued
captured these meanings.
B. DEVELOPMENT IN NEW MEXICO

Injunctive relief was also available from the adoption of the appropriative
regime in New Mexico. In the foundational case, 7Tr unbley v. Luiermunm, the
plaintiffs, gristnill owners, sued to enjoin the defendant, a wool and pelt manulacturer, from diverting water fiom the plaintiffs' ditch.''2 The gristmill ownlers and their predecessors-in-interest had used water from the ditch for more
than twenty yeaus, and their use had preceded that of the manufacturer." The
Supreme Court of New Mexico aflirmed the lower court's holding that the
manuf cturer had infringed upon the plaintiffs' water rights, and issued a restraining order.'" The court rejected the defendant's estoppel argument and
held that the plaintiffs' long use had established a prescriptive easement to
which the defendant was subject."' The Supreme Court of New Mexico rejected the riparian doctrine and noted that "common law, as to rights of riparian owners, is not in force in this territory, nor in California, Nevada, and other Pacific states. '"'
That the 7T-,Ynbley court issued a restraining order to enjoin offending
conduct''7 might suggest that the case had little to do with injunctive or equitable relief' New Mexico cases issued around the time of 7Trambley suggest,
however, that a "restraining order" was issued at equity and possessed the attributes of an injunction." Precedent from other jurisdictions around the ime
of the 77;unble' decision also indicates that courts often referred to injunctions and restra'ining orders interchangeably." ' Injunctive relief was thus im-

140.

Id.at448-49.

141. ,Sce gencmllv Tarlock, supra note 99, at 886 ("To tie wcstern irrigation community,
prior appropriation represents a sacred and eternd coven;uit between the federal government
and settlers. It is the reward for enduring the risks and hardships of settling the harsh, arid
West and thus the right to use water is eternal and God-given.").
i
142. Tramblcy v. Lutennan, 27 P. 312, 312 (N.M. 1891).
143. Id.
at312, 315.
144. ld.

145.
146.
147.

Ad.at314-15.
I. at 315.
I. at 314.

148. Keencvt, CanIllo, for example, indicates that a "restraining order" in a water case was
issued "In Chancery" against both plaintiff and defendant so dat they did not impinge upon
each other's water rights. 2 N.M. 480, 490 (1883). In fact, while the Kecncycourtlmentioned a
rcstraining order, counsel had only argued about the propriety of an injiunction, suggesting that
"restraining order" and "injunction" were interchangeable. Id. at 485. Similarly, in Vadis of tlie very essence of
dingham v. Robledo, the Supreme Court of New Mexico noted that, "it
equi,'that a restraining order should be definite and certain in its terms." 28 P. 663, 673 (N.M.
1892) (emphasis added). Further, still odier cases show that New Mexico granted injunctions as
carly as 1857, and the Tramblcy court was, tius, aware of injunctive relief. See Chavez v.
McKnight, I N.M. 147, 149-50 (1857) (granting a "perpetual" iijunction to a wife to "restrain I
and cijoinll the sale of the property"); Munis v. Herrera, I N.M. 362, 364 (1862) (granfing a
"perpetual" injunction to plaintiff, rcstraining tie sale of a horse).
149. See, e.g., Gould v. House, 40 Ind. 403, 404 (1872) ("In connection with this action a

WA TER LA W REVIEW

Volume 18

plicit at the foundation of the appropriative regime in New Mexico.
Injunctive relief in 7rambley mirrored that in Coffin. Both foundational
cases provided preventative equitable relief and established a hierarchy of water users. As in Coffin, injunctive relief in 7Trambley established the boundaries between tie riparian doctrine and prior appropriation. The 7-anbley
court did so in the context of mills, which had been at the heart of riparian
doctrine in the east and the drive for economic development there.' 0 Injuncfive relief in 7)nunbley was also aligned with western industrialization (mills
and manufacture), and concerns about scarcity (the omnipresent watchword
associated with the appropriative regime). Equity thus helped advance the appropriative regime in New Mexico, as it had done in Colorado.
C. BALANCING IN CALIFORNIA

In the foundational case of, Ilrw2 v. Philips, the California Supreme
Court issued injunctive relief. In Irmin, a miner sued another miner for trespass who later arrived on the banks of the stream mad began using the plaintifl's water."' In holding that the equitable maxim quipijorest lempore, potlrestuaining order or temporary injunction was granted to suspend proceedings under the order
of thc common pleas until the further order of the circuit court."); Floyd v. Gilbreath, 27 Ark.
675, 676 (1872) ("The bill was presented to the judge of the Circuit Cour, in vacation, who
granted a temporary restraining order.... IThc injunction was made perpetual and the dcfendant appealed"); State cx rel. Miller v. Lichtenberg, 30 P. 716, 717 (Wash. 1892). The
Lchtenbcg court stated:
It seems to us, however, that under the language of the chapter relating to that subject,
there will be no great violence done to the language used to interpret the words "injunction" ull "restraining order" as substantially synonymous, and that the legislature,
in speaking of iniunctions and restraining orders, meant to use terms which would
make it proper for the court to put its order in the shape of a formal iniunction, as
known to the common law, if it saw fit to do so, and that if it did not see fit to go into
all the formalities required by the use of such a writ, it could accomplish the same
purpose by issuing a simple order restraining the acts complained of.
LichIenbeg, 30 P. at 717; but see Burnett v. Nicholson, 79 N.C. 548, 550 (1878) ("We are not
prepared to say that in a proper case tie defendant may not seek redress for an inqiury done by
such temporary restraining order as well as by an injunction. Both operate in the same way and
produce the same results in a greater or less degree."); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Dey, 38 F.
656, 664 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1889) ("The prcliminary injunction will be refused, and the restraining
order will be set aside.").
150. See Carol M. Rose, F'rom -lO to CO,: issons of Water Rights for Carbon 7'iading,
50 ARiz. L. REV. 91, 96 (2008). Rose notes:
Mill developers built dams to power a burgeoning textile industry along the eastern
rivers, particularly in the northeast. Prior to and during the early years of New England's industrial growth, courts and public officials sometimes required mill-builders
to construct fish passages to placate the other major instreamn users, that is, fishing interests, even though these consenation efforts were not successful on the big new
manufacturing dams.

I.
151.

Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 145 (1855).

I am aware that Eddy v. Simpson, anticipates

Irwin's discussion of the appropriativc doctrine. See Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 249 (1853).
Nevertheless, I locate the beginning of the appropriative doctrine in hIrin because of its explicit
and stronger engagement with the doctrine as we recognize it today. See Douglas R. Littlefield,

Watcr Rights Duing the Calimarni Gold Rush: Conflicts Over Economic Points of View, 14
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or esture (first in time is first in ight) applied, the Supreme Court of California alirtmed the trial court's finding in the plaintils fiavor. 2 The court reasoned that the common law riparian doctrine was applicable to those who
owned lands along a waterway, but the defendants were only tenants at will,
and "their tenancy [was] of their own creation, their tenements of their oWn
selection, and subsequent, ini point of time to the diversion of the stream. '" '
The land, in fact, belonged to the public. 4 The court favored the "political
and social condition of the country" over which it had jurisdiction to provide a
kind of customary rule enjoying "the force and effect of resjJcticaia.' ". --hat
condition recognized both appropriative rights and miners' rights, but should
a conflict arise, priority trumlped.'"
While the court in h-win did not mention injunctive relief, the plaintifts
complaint had requested it.' In ruling lor the plaintiff, the court prohibited
the defendant's offending actions and thus prevented Further incursions on the
plaintifl's diverted water in his canal. While the court recognized the right of
miners, priority mattered because of the effort and investment of those who
had diverted water, that is:
the rights oflthose who, by prior appropriation, have taken the waters fiom
their natural beds, and by costly artificial works have conducted them for
miles over mountains and ravines, to SUl)ply the necessities of gold diggers,
and without which the most important interests of the mineral region would
remain without developmen't.

The riparian defendant was thus forbidden firther trespass, and the h'wn decision can be read as preventative on the basis of economic development, as
in Colin and 7hriunblev.'
Irwin also displayed an equitable balancing of competing interests reminiscent of courts at equity. Mining and movement of water (along a ripanian
waterway) were at odds in California at the tine. A miners' committee had
heard the Irwin case before the case had gone to court, and the miners' com-

v. Simpson foreshadowed the western doctrine of prior
W. HIST. Q. 415, 427 (1983) ("lMy/
appropriation but did not specifically define it."). Littlefield also notes that the Irw~i plaintiff
was a water salesnam who made quite a profit from diverting watey, id the case can thus be
read as sanctioning "legitimate economic activity distinct Fiom mining." Id. at 431.
5 Cal. at 147.
ri'Wi",
152.
153.
d. at 146.
154. IM.
155. Id.
156. id. at 147.
157. See Ittlefield, sup-ii note 151, at 430. With California's adoption of the comnion law
in 1850, shortly before statehood, it had implicitly established a riparian rights regime in tie
state. I. at 420. The result was that, only a year later, both riparian aid appropriative regimes
co-existed 6th the enactment of a statute recognizing "customs, usages or regulations established and in force at the bar, or diggings." Id.
158. Irwin, 5 Cal. at 147.
1.59. I at 146.
160. See W. Aggregates, Inc. v. Cntv. of Yuba, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 436, 447 (Ct. App. 2002)
("Long before this legal point was resolved or die California lands were surveyed, thousands of
miners had begun work: They were trespassers.") (citing Boggs v. Merced Mining Co., 14 Cal.
279, 374-75 (1859); 1-in, 5 Cal. at 146).
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mittee had favored the riparian "free progress of water" argument espoused by
the defendant miners who had used tie plaintiff's water.' The miners' committee had balked at the fact that the plaintiff, nominally a miner, was in the
habit of selling much-needed water.62' The court in Irwi posed questions
about the riparian defendant's standing to bring suit and it acknowledged the
riparian defendant's right to mnHe (but not to take appropriated water).'" The
right to mine stood "upon an equal footing" with the appropriative right, and
only when they conflicted did priority prevail." ' In fact, if the miner were to
select land adjacent to a waterway whose waters were unappropriated, those
waters "cannot be taken to his prejudice; but if they have been already diverted . .. he has no right to complain, no right to interfere with the prior occupation of his neighbor, and must abide the disadvantages of his own selection."
Thus, the California court applied equity to provide injunctive relief that privileged the appropriative regime while attempting to balance competing interests.
D. THE EQUITABLE CONSCIENCE
Injunctions in the foundational cases show that equity acts on or against
the person. Understanding equity's ability to act on the person in prior appropriation cases goes to the heart of why requests for injunctive relief can
have a subjective dimension that is not always reducible to monetary danages.
Etymology is responsive in this regard, as it not only appeals to the history of a
word, but also helps capture the subjective dimension of a request for equitable relief.'6 "Injunction," after all, can mean to join, yoke, or command.'7
What then, could litigants ask courts to command, yoke, or join at equity in
the foundational prior appropriation cases? What of conscience? None of
the foundational cases mentioned it.
In the three foundational cases, the court started "with a plaintiff in an
imperfect world, one marred by the defendant's violation."'6
Such a world

161.

See Littlefield, supranote 151, at425.

162. Id.
163.

Irwin, 5 Cal. at 145-46. As the court states,

It is certain that at the common law the diversion of water courses could only be
complained of by ripariam owners, who were deprived of the use, or those claiming
directly under them. Can the appellanLs assert their present claim as tenants at will?
To solve this question it must be kept in mind that their tenancy is of their own creation, their tenements of their own selection, and subsequent, in point of time, to the
diversion of the stream. They had the right to mine where they pleased throughout
an extensive region, and they selected the bank of a stream from which the water had
been already turned, for the purpose of supplying the mines at another point.

Id.
164. Id. at 147.
165. Id.
166. See Bray, supra note 2, at 14-18.
167. BENJAMIN W. DWIGHT, MODERN PHILOLOGY: ITs DIscovRiEs, HISTORY AND
INFLUENCE 428 (1877).
168. Rendleman, supra note 20, at 1404. To be sure, Rendleman does not offer this insight
as part of a defense of traditional equity, or conscience, as I do here. Instead, for Rendleman,
ny use of his citation to buttress my argument about traditional equity might well be another
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implied conscience, equity's old watchword. All three courts had noted the
link between onscience and equity. Before Coflfn, tie Supreme Court of
Colorado had referred to "equity and good conscience..'' Before 7]iunbley,
the Supreme Court of New Mexico had Inentioned "mortification which this
court feels in seeing a party with hands thus stained entering a court of equity
and asking that relief which none but those having a pure heart and a clear
conscience have a right to demand."'.. In California, but a year before 1mm,
tie state supreme court had referred to "tie conscience and equity of tie
court ..... The courts were thus aware of conscience's place in a discussion of
equity, and the fact that they did not mention conscience in the three loundational cases does not mean that conscience was not implicit in their grants of
equitable relief. The very idea of a conscience may imply its tacit but influential effect on tie outcome of a case.
Two consciences were at odds in tie foundational cases. The plaintiff's
conscience, originally at ease in its appropriative engagement with water, met
the defendant's (lack of) conscience, and, marred thereby, the plaintiff sounded its claim in equity because, while the law could act on a thing-that is, Jh
rem-equity could act on the person. Both parties then appeared before what
the Supreme Court of California would refer to just two years after 1l-n as
"the conscience of a Court of Equity.'.. That judicial conscience, grounding
itself in an impartial and generalized conscience, evaluated the consciences before it. One litigant was found "ungenerous and inequitable" (Coflin), "untenable" (7)-iunblej, or simply subordinate to the other (Irwaq), and equitable
7
relief issued to the more conscientious litigant in the. way of injunctive relie.'
A ninteenth-century faminly law case from California, issued around the
time of the three foundational water cases, underscores conscience's centrality
to evocations of equity. In Galland v. Gadland, a woman driven fromh her
spousal home with her infant child, "wholly without the means of support,"
sued for alimony without asking for a divorce.' 4 InI such circumstances, the
law allowed her to purchase on her husband's credit. " But, the court Ciuestioned, was this "the only remedy for a deserted and dependent wife, who either haidi no subsisting cause for divorce, or who, having just grounds for dissolving the marriage, hopeldi for a refornation in her husband, and therefore
Ididi not desire a divorce? '"' The statute only provided for alimony after divorce had been granted and for divorce if the wife had been abandoned for
1

example of tie "romaice" of equity with its "warn andl fuzzy connotations of individualized
justice," with which he does not agree. See Doug Rendleman, IrTcpanahilht Irep;uallV Damaged, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1642, 1653 (1992) (reviewing I)OUGLAs LxYCOCK, THE DEArH OF THE
IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE (1991)). I cite Rendleman here, therefore, as part of my own argument of the continuing viability of traditionad equity, whose languagc and principles infuse
and shape de arguments of even its detractors.
169. Clear Creek, Colo., Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Root, 1 Colo. 374,375 (1871).
170. Martinez v. Lucero, I N.M. 208, 214 (1857).
171. People ex rel. Smith v. Olds, 3 Cal. 167, 177 (1853).
172. Kinder v. Macy, 7 Cal. 206, 208 (1857).
173. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 449 (1882); Trambley v. Luternmn 27 P.
312, 315 (N.M. 1891); Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 147 (1855).

174. Galland v. Galland, 38 Cal. 265, 266, 268 (1869).
175. Id.at 266.
176. Id.
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two years.'" "[Was] the law so deplorably deficient as to afford no remedy to
a deserted and starving wife under these circumstances? If so, it [wasi a reproach to the civilization of the age, and the law-making power should
promptly correct the evil.".. 8
Only equity could provide relief.' 9 The husband had moral responsibilities to his wife and child, and equity was well-placed to compel him to act in a
conscientious manner:
It is clear that strong moral obligations must lie on any husband, who has
abandoned his wife, to support her. The marriage contract, and every prin-

ciple, hind him to this. To fail to do it, is a wrong acknowledged at common
law-though that law knows no remedy, because there the wife cannot sue the
husband. But in equity, the wife can sue the husband; and it is the province

of a Court of Equity to afford a remedy where conscience and law
acknowledve a right. but know no remedv. Why, then, should the Chancellor shrink at this case and refuse a remedy? 8
Conscience acted as a moral corrective and imperative. As a corrective, it rectified a delicit in the law that was disadvantageous to women. As an imperafive, it commanded the husband to act in a manner consistent with his "strong
moral obligations." Conscience operated "independently of the statute," and
free of the husband's claims that would subordinate his wife and child to his
refusal.'"' An equitable morality could thus be read into a contract to reaffirm
the husband's marital obligations.
Whose conscience did the Galland court apply, and was it generalized
and impartial? It likely was not the legislature's conscience since the statute
did not provide a remedy for the wife and child tinder the circumstances.' 2 It
likely was not a conscience reflecting generalized public morals given the husband's argument that holding against him would "tend to breed discord in
families, and to encourage discontented wives to abandon their husbands on
frivolous pretexts of ill-usage, relying on the Courts to compel the husbands to
support thei ."''
In other words, the fact that the husband could make such
an argument to the state's highest court implied that he anticipated-and received-an approving response, even among some judges on the Supreme
Court of California.' 4

177. Id.at 267.
178. Id.
179. Id.at 268.
180. Id. at 268-69 (quoting Butler v. Butler, 14 Ky. 201, 204-05 (1823)).
181. Id. at 268 (quoting Butler, 14 Ky. at 203-04).
182. Indeed, a legislature may act against the generalized morality of its constituents. In
1810 Congress "decreed that the nation's post offices must remain open on Sundays." WAYNE
E. FULLER, MORAIxIY AND THE MAIL IN NINETEENTH-CEN'TURY AMERICA 1 (2003). "ITIhe
passage of a measure [wasl so repugnant to so many Americans." Id. at 4. "To evangelicals,
Ithe law] was a monstrous act that they felt compelled to oppose with all their being." Id. at 10.
183. Galland, 38 Cal. at 272.
184. According to the dissent:
It is clearly the duty and common law obligation of the husband to provide a suitable
maintenance for his wife, if %ithin his power, during the existence of the marriage relation. Yet, Courts of Equity have no original jurisdiction to enforce specific perfor-
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How then did the Supreme Court of California hold that the stronger, and
thus more conscientious argument was "that if such redress be denied to tie
wife in proper cases, dissolute and unprincipled husbands would be encouraged to abuse their wives, by a consciousness that any ill-treatlment which
stopped short of a lawful ground for divorce, was without redress in tie
Courts."'' The court relied on extra-statutory values and, in so doing, validated morals other than those held by unconscientious husbands. The court
turned to a kind of transcendent morality that trumped legislative inaction on
women's behall, which trumped, too, the arguments of abusive husbands.
GalanCI surmounted jurisdictional limitations to join itself to the holdings of
other courts at equity so as to stay an immoral result in California. The court
in Galland relied on Kentucky precedent at length, and it also noted that
"Itihe power of a Court of Equity to decree alimony, where no other relief was
asked has been upheld, in well-considered cases, by the Supreme Courts of
Virginia, Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina and Alabama."'.
Conscience was thus something beyond the subjective passions of all individual
justice, as it was rellected in the considered opinions of other judges at equity.
By appealing to a trans-jurisdictional conscience, Galand affirmed conscience's potential outcome-determinative importance for individual litigants.
The case also implicity anticipated a change in public morals in California

fanily natters.'7 The court in Galland also implied that a court of equity was
a court of outrage."' After all, was "the law so deplorably deficient as to afford
mance of this obligation. "'Tihe proper remledy," says Mr..justice Story, "whci the
husband abandons the wifc, or drives her from his house, aud neglects or refuses to
provide her suitable maintenance, is, bv an action in a Court of law, to be brought
against the husband by any person who shall, under such circumstances, supph' the
wife with necessaries according to her rank and condition; for, by compelling the wife
thus to leave him, die husband sends her abroad with a gencral credit for her maintenance." (2 Story's Fl..ur. See. 1422.) And I apprehend this is the only remedy
against the husband for the maintenance of ie wife, in this State, prior to the commencnement of an action for divorce by either husband or wife, tpon allegation of
statlilory Cause.

IM. at 278 (Sprague, j., dissenting).
185. Id. at 272 (majority opinion).
186, Id.
at 268.
187. Itmight be tempting to read Galldas a trailblazer, and, on this basis sumnise that
women's rights were subject to greater judicial sensitivity after it. Gallandwas decided in 1869,
the year that the National Woman Suffrage Association was founded in New York City, yet
women would only get the vote in 1920. But see PETER CHARLE'-S HOFFER, THE
I
\w's
CONSCIENCE: EQurFAIBts. CONSTrJLTriONALISM IN AMERICA 4 (1990). According to Hoffer:
Iirom Iv. Board otvducalionl was and remains the greatest 'equity' suit in our country's history, perhaps in tie history of equity. Though fully blended into the lahric of
Modern law, equity suits and equitable relief remain distinct in their cast-the chancellor is vitally concerned with the workability mid flairness
of his decrees.

Id.
188. ,See Cass R.Sunsicin, Some EI1tis olMojal Jndgation 01)

L7llw,

33 VT. L. REV. 405,

405 (2009). Sunstein provides an exanple:
As we shall see, indignation is responsible for a number of puzzling practices in politics and law. Recurring thehies are that people's moral judgments are often aUtOmiatic, that their attonatic responses play a significmuit role in both legislatures and in
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no remedy to a deserted and starving wife under these circumstances? If so, it
[wasl a reproach to the civilization of the age, and the law-making power
should promptly correct the evil." 8 In some sense, too, Galmd either institutionalized or referred to an institutionalized conscience at equity." Where an
individual litigant's conduct was aberrant and the statute was "deplorably deficient" in its response, enter equity to reach across state boundaries to provide
a remedy. As the Ga/landmajority put it, "Iwihy, then, should the Chancellor
shrink at this case and refuse a remedy?"'
How, therefore, might Galland's insights apply to the three foundational
water cases? Each foundational court valued the plaintiffs individual investment in water and elevated the plaintitfs investment in the resource to level of
a public good. Whether that individual had erected a dam (CoItin), founded

a gristmill (Trxnb/ey, or mined (Iw), the court made it worthy of legal protection. In some sense, it was as if each plaintiff had innovated by being the
i'st to harness the resource, and, as the first, had embarked upon an entrepreneurial undertaking on which the institution of property depended. As the
court in Coffin noted, "Idleny the doctrine of priority or superiority of right by
priority of appropriation, mad a great part of the value of all this property is at
once destroyed.' As Ihwi, noted, innovators warranted equitable protection
because they had "taken the waters from their natural beds, and by costly artificial works have conducted them for miles over mountains and ravines ...
without which the most important interests of the mineral region would remain without development.' 4 The Coftin court would similarly note that
"Ihiouses have been built, and permanent improvements made; the soil has
been cultivated, mad thousands of acres have been rendered immensely valuable, with the understanding that appropriations of water would be protected."' And 7-ambleywas about manuflacturing. The plaintiffs in these foundational cases had been the first to conduct themselves consistently with
public needs, and, thus, conscientiously."
courtrooms, and that it is often valuable but difficult to attenpt to constrain automatic
rcsponses by reference to more deliberative processes.

Id.
189.

Ga/land, 38 Cal., at 267.

190. 1am grateful to Elizabeth Sepper's article, Taking C'onsciece Seiously, for drawing my
attention to institutional consciences in die medical arena, which can be in conflict with those of
the individuals who work there. See-Elizabeth Sepper, Takihg Conscience Scriously, 98 VA. L.
REV 1501, 1509 (2012). Sepper exposes the probing ethical and legal questions that arise when

consciences clash. She notes, in this regard, that legislatures across the country have enacted
"conscience clauses-to protect refusing providers from discrimnination in hiring, stall
privilegcs,
or promotion; professional discipline; civil actions (typically malpractice); and regulatory or

d. While Sepper does not mention equity or discuss equitable remedies,
her discussion is germane, as it shows the wide-and often disturbing-contours of a discussion
criminal sanctions."
of conscience.
191.

Gallan, 38 Cal. at 269 (quoting Butler v. Butler, 14 Ky. 201, 205 (1823)).

192. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882).
193. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 146 (1855).
194.

Co/in, 6 Colo. at 446.

195. First possession is also implicit in the related property doctrines dealing with original
acquisition: accession, adverse possession, creation, and discovery. See THOMAS W. MERRILL

&HENRY E. SMITH,THE OXFORD INTRODUCriONS TO U.S. LAWv: PROPERTY 18 (2010). Mer-ill
and Smith explain first possession as follows:

ISStle
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And yet, in the three jurisdictions, the conscience on which the three
Foundational cases relied was neither tras-jurisdictional, nor did it anticipate a
change in local morals. Conscience relied on conditions prevailing in each
jurisdiction, making it localized. Collin relied in part on local agricultural necessity, which made prior appropriation an "imperative necessity,"" 7Thmblev
relied on local laws,"' and hmln on the "political and social condition of the
country."'" Conscience was thus localized, not within the proverbial judge's
foot, but within the jurisdiction in which the court sat.
III. BEYOND FOUNDATIONS
Injunctive relief and its equivalents remain powerful remedies 130 years
alter Cbllin. Equity, in these cases, ranges in meaning from its traditional remedial understanding to equally complex iterations of equitable justice. Conscience remains preeminent.
A. COLORADO: EQUIY WITHOUT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The appropriative regime and the irreparable injury rule thrive in Colorado. In Archuleta v. Gomez, an individual appealed the trial court's denial of
his request for preliminary injunctive relief.'0 The plaintiff wished to stop an
individual who had plowed under the plaintifi's ditch, diverted his water, and
claimed adverse possession of his water rights.2" For the plaintiff, adverse possession of water rights in Colorado incorporated the beneficial use requirement implicit in all appropriative uses."°' The Colorado Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff had to show that he had suffered an injury for injunctive relief
to issue."' The defendant would also have to show that he had put the water
to beneficial use for the eighteen-year statutory period since his interception of
the plaintiff's water through a "sealed-off pipe" and "a by-pass device" was, by

The most general mode of original acuisition is first possession. Possession...
Iwhichi is a ubiquitous concept in l)ropertv, with dilerent shades of meaning depend-

ing on context. Generallv speaking, to possess some thing means to be in control of
it. Control implies intention. One does not generally control sonie thing one does
not know one has, or one is trving to throw away. Control also implies power. To

possess some thing is to have Power or dlominion over it. The basic idea of first posperson to possess un otherwise uinowned obiect becomes tihe
session is that the first
owner. This means, generallv spealng, that the first person who both intends to assert control over die obiect and who establishes a si.niticamt degree of power over the
object is deemed to be the owner-provided no one else has any claim of ownership

to it.
d.
f96. Coffin, 6 Colo. at 449.
197. Trambley v. ILterman, 27 P. 312, 314 (N.M. 1891).
198. hin,5 Cal. at 140.
199. Archuleta v. Gomez, 200 P.3d 333, 336-37 (Colo. 2009).
at 338-39.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 336-37; see also ic.at 336 n. I (stating one of tie issues for review as "whether the
trial court erred in finding the requirements of tde 18-year statute of limitations and adverse
possession statute had been met, where there was no evidence the de endant made actual, contiruotis, and exclusive use of all of the plaintiff's water").

202.

1d.at 346.
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itself, insufficient to establish adverse possession."'
Injunctive relief appeared in the context of the expansion of the appropriative doctrine since Archuleta read prior appropriation's beneficial use requirement into adverse possession of water. Over the dissent's objection that
beneficial use was "not directly raised at trial" and had "not previously been
articulated in our adverse possession law," Archuleta implicitly equated the
initial acquisition of water rights through prior appropriation with its hostile
acquisition through adverse possession."' Both are now recumbent on beneficial use. Before Archuleta, 'the elements for adverse possession of a water
right were the same as other real property rights: actual, adverse, hostile, and
under a claim of right, as well as open, notorious, exclusive, mad continuous
for the eighteen-year statutory period."" After the court's decision, however,
"Icilaimants now have the additional burden of showing both a diversion of a
water right owned by another, and application of that water to their acreage in
an amount not exceeding the requirements for crop production (or whatever
the beneficial use may be).""6
Archuleta enforced a basic equitable requirement. It was not enough that
the plaintiff claim that the defendant had ploughed up his water ditches and
had used devices to intercept his water rights. ' The plaintiff had to show that
he had continued to make actual beneficial use of his appropriated water for
the statutory period. As such, the injunctions thus acts as a gatekeeper both of
plaintiff rights and of the sanctity of the prior appropriation doctrine. It evaluates both the conduct of the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff must
establish that there is a wrong. A breach of conscience is only implicit when
the plaintiff can show that he has maintained possession of the thing, the res,
as a result of which he prays for a court's in personain intercession.
B. NEW MEXICO: PROCESS, NOT OUTCOME
If Archuleta can be read as reinforcing the vitality of the appropriative
doctrine, recent New Mexico precedent can be read to show its limitations.
New Mexico precedent goes to the heart of the constitutional battles waged in
203. 1(1. at 337, 839.
204. Id. at 349-50 (Martinez, J., dissenting). justice Martinez took issue with the majority's
pronouncement:

I agree with the logic that, because new appropriations remuire benelicial use, an
adverse possessor of water lights should also show beneficial use. However, this clement is not statutorily rcquired and has never before been articulated by a court in

this state. Tbe maiority states the beneficial use requirement as if it has alwavs been
part of adverse possession law. This re(tuircment may be a logical addition to the clements of adverse possession of a water right; however, it is a new Proposition. I believe that, given the small amount of water in question, the anount of time this litigation has alreadv taken, and the issues at stake, this is an inappropriate case in which to
announce a new legal requirement.

A.
205. D. Austin Rueschhoff, Case Note, Archuleta v. Gomez: Re iforcing the Requirement
ofBeneficial Use of l'Vater inColorado Adverse Possession LaI, 16 U. DENV.WATER L. REV.
431,431,442 (2013).
206. Id.at 442.
207. Archuleta, 200 P.3d. at 337, 339.
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the name of prior appropriation, as aggrieved plaintiffs seek equitable relief
and the upholding of core constitutional principles governing water. As such,
New Mexico's jurisprudence dramnatizes the tension between, on the one
hand, a holding that could be read to undermine the appropriative regime,
and on the other, judicial rhetoric that could be read to uphold it. Yet, the
same precedent could simply be read to mean that prior appropriation is not
an all-encompassing regime touching all water; it only governs so much of it.
The doctrine thrives as it adapts to the limitations courts' readings imposed
upon it.

New Mexico's precedent shows how plaintilts seek more than injunctive
relief to validate their water rights. In Bomds v. State ex rel. D'Anionio, a
rancher and farmer with a senior adjudicated irrigation right, in a fullyappropriated basin, made a facial constitutional attack on the domestic well
statute that "requires the State Engineer to issue domestic well permits without
determining the availability of unappropriated water. ''21' Such wells were considered exempt. 20 As the statute did not mandate the issuance of notice and
permits for domestic wells, the plaintiff cried violation of the constitutional
doctrine of prior appropriation and of due process.21 The trial court held that
the statute violated the prior appropriation doctrine. "' Even if the plaintiff had
not shown injury, the trial court held that the statute was unconstitutional, because "lilt is not what has been done, but what can be done under a statute
that determines constitutionality.".... The court further held that the plaintiff:
had failed to show that he was entitled to an injunction or that he had suffered
a taking."
The appellate court reversed the determination of unconstitutionality and
held that the well statute did not violate the doctrine of prior appropriation.2, .
The appellate court declared that, "Itihe Constitution's priority doctrine estabThe Supreme Court of
lishes a broad priority principle, nothing more .....
2
New Mexico engaged in extensive statutory and regulatory analysis and at

208. See Hobbis, sttpfa note 103, a 55.
209. Bounds v. Statc cv rel. D'Antonio, 306 P.3d 457, 459-60 (N.M. 2013). As Richardson
andi Dowell note:
Importantly, current New Mexico law allows a prior appropriator whose right of'
use is harmed by a domestic well to request a priority call or to seek an injuiction in
order to protect his or her rights (See, e.g., State of New Mexico v. Lewis 2006).
Thus, the 'exemption' grantcd to domestic and stock well users is an exemption trom
the permitting process normally required for drilling a well, not an exemption from
the application of the doctrine of prior appropriation.
Jesse J. Richarclson, Jr. & Tiffany Dowell, The Implications ofl3ounds v. State of New Mexico,
148J. OF CONFTEMP. WATER Rts.s. & EDUC. 17, 19 (2012).
210. 1d. at 18 ("Note that the tenn 'exempt well' is an oxymoron in several respects. First,
no state totally exempts a ground water use from regulation. Secondly, the well itself is not the
target of the relaxed requirements. The regulations affdcct the activity of withdrawing water.").
211. Id.at 20.
d.
212.
213. Bounds v. State, No. CV-2006-166, slip op. at 3 (N.M. 6th Dist. Ct. July 8, 2008).

214. 1l at 5-6.
215.
216.

Bounds v. State, 252 P.3d 708, 722 (N.M. Ci. App. 2010).
d. at 719. Bounds abandoned his due process claims. Id at 711.
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finned, but it rejected the appellate court's declaration regarding prior appropriation, which had inflamed water passions in New Mexico."' Given these
facts, it is unsurprising that Bounds "has attracted the attention of a diverse set
of stakeholders from across the United States and internationally."" 8
The analysis of Bounds should begin with the trial court's denial of injunctive relief. After all, the trial court had found that, as matter of constitutional
law, it was not the damage that had been done, but the damage that could be
done that mattered under New Mexico law:
Bounds does not have to suffer actual impairment to attack the constitutionality of the statute. It will do little good for Bounds, and others similarly situated, to sit idly and wait for actual impairment. When the water is gone it
will be too late. Any litigation then will result in claims of laches, waiver,
statute of limitation, estoppel and the like." 9
The trial court's argument was speculative. To prevent the possibility of fitture damage, the well statute had to be declared unconstitutional. In other
words, the plaintiff" had suffered no injury yet still retained standing, and the
case remained ripe for detemrination."
In response to the lower courts, the Supreme Court of New Mexico both
offered muscular rhetoric in favor of prior appropriation, and declined to extend the doctrine's constitutional reach. In response to the appellate court,
the supreme court noted that the appellate court was wrong about prior appropriation:
We do take issue with the Court of Appeals' opinion in certain of its observations regarding the priority doctrine. For example, its conclusion that
'[tlhe Constitution's priority doctrine establishes a broad priority principle,
nothing more' simply goes too far. One could read that statement to mean
that priority water rights are nothing more than an aspiration, subject to legislative whim and administrative discretion. Such a reading would be wrong,
and it would be a mistake for future litigants to cite the Court of Appeals
opinion for any such proposition'

217. Bounds v. State exrel. D'Antonio, 306 P.3d 457, 468-69 (N.M. 2013).
218. Richardson & Dowell, supna note 209, at 17.
219. 13ounds, No. CV-2006-166, slip op. at3.
220. Wishing to reach the constitutional issue, the appellate and supremc courts sidestepped
the standing issues. As the Supreme Court of New Mexico, noted:
[TIhere can be no constitutional challenge to the statute without at least a specific probability of impairment in a given case. The constitutional principles of prior
appropriation are not in peril when senior water users cannot demonstrate a concrete
risk of impairment-that they are in danger of losing the very water guaranteed them
by that same prior appropiation doctrine.
Under our precedent, we could decline to reach the merits of this case. That
said, however, we exercise our discretion to decide these important issues....

In the present case, it would make little sense to disiniss Petitioners' claims be-

cause the issues would remain. We would merely be forcing these parties or others
to litigate the same issues from the beginning, but in an as-applied challenge, all the

while the legal questions regauding the constitutionality of the DWS statute would
remain.
Bounds, 306 P.3d at 463; see also Bounds, 252 P.3d at 711.
221. Bounds, 306 P.3d at468-69.
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The Supreme Court of New Mexico's holding that the statute did not violate
prior appropiiation would thus appear to validate Tarlock's observation that
prior appropriation is "more often" the stulf of "rhetoric than rule."' 2 Indeed,
it may be that "Ipirior Appropriation has lost its hold over western water
law" ... And yet, Bounds could simply be read to realfimi the importance of
the appropriative regime while delimiting the doctrine's boundaries.
C. CALIFORNIA: EQUITY, SHRIMP, AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

California's jurisprudence goes further, and shows that a substantive claim
can be equitable in its validation of broad environmental concerns. Take, for
examnple, the impressive National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine Countvopinion.2' There, an environmental organization sought a writ of
mandate to order the trial court to vacate its grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power ("DWP").
The trial court had held in favor of DWP in a suit to enjoin DWP from (iverting water from Mono Lake to make hydroelectric power for the City of
Los Angeles "on the theory that the shores, bed and waters of Mono Lake are
protected by a public trust. 2 ' As the Supreme Court of California noted, the
case brought both prior appropriation and the public trust doctrine before the
court. 22 The court issued the writ of mandate.
In a delicate balancing act
reminiscent of California's hybrid approach to water law, the court held that
the public trust doctrine neither was subsumed by prior appropriation, nor did
it function independently of it.2' Echoing the foundational prior appropria222. Sec Tarlock, sup7 note 99, at 883.
223. See Benson, suiif note 95, at 711.
224. Nat'l Audubon Soc'v v. Superior Ct. of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 709 (Cd. 1983).
225. Id. at 711-12.
226. Id. at 712. The trial couri also held in favor of DWP on the question of exhaustion of
alininistralive renedies before the Caifornia Water Resources Board. Id. at 711 -12.
227. The court stated:
This case brings together for the first tine two systems of legal thoughlt: the appropriafive water rights system which since the days of the gold rush has dominated Cdifornia water law, and the public trustldoctrine which, after evolving as a shield for the
protection of tidelands, now extends its protective scope to navigable lakes.

d. at 712.
228. d. at 732-33 ("Iet a pcremplory writ of mandate issue commnmding the Superior
Court of Alpine County to vacate its judgment in this action and to enter a new judgment consistent with the views stated in this opinion."). As Laycock stated:
On the other side of the traditional e(tuation, courts can grant personal communands at
law imdenforce them with the contempt power; mandlamus is al exampile. Some
specific relief requires a personal command to le effective, but whether we call such a
conliand legal or equitable-mandamus or injunction-is a matter of history aid doctrine, not a matter of function.
LIvcock, sutn7 note 60, at 697.
229. Nal7Audubon SocVI 658 P.2d at 732. Tle court stated:
The ptublic trust doctrine mid the apt)ropriative water rights system arc parts of an integrated system of water law. The public trust doctrine serves the function in that integrated system of preserving the continuing sovereign power of the state to protect
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tion cases, the court reasoned that appropriation was at the heart of economic
development, and "it would be disingenuous to hold that such appropriations
are and have always been improper to the extent that they harm public trust
uses, and can be justified only upon theories of reliance or estoppel." 5 An
injunction did not issue, but the plaintiff's broader argument regarding the
centrality of the public trust doctrine was vindicated.
Such vindication followed intensive fact recitation characteristic of courts
at equity. The opinion opened with a description of Mono Lake, and of the
wildlife for which it provides sanctuary."3 Then followed mention of how
there was "little doubt" that DWP's diversions "imperiled" "both the scenic
beauty and the ecological values of Mono Lake. ' DWP's diversions resulted
in drastic increases in salinity.' Shrimp and migratory birds would sufler significant reductions in population."2 The California gull had become easy prey
for coyotes. 2- Human economic and recreational interests would also suffer,
simply because "there [wouldi be less lake to use and enjoy."2 ' DWP's "continued diversions threaten to turn it into a desert wasteland like the dry bed of
Owens Lake."2
Immediately following this description was the phrase that
predicted the court's holding and that implied that an irreparable injury had
already occurred: "To abate tins destvction, plaintiffs filed suit for injunctive
and declaratory relief in the Superior Court for Mono County on May 21,
1979. 128
The opinion was about the public trust, which had a long and illustrious
history. " There was Justinian on the origins of the public, trust doctrine, then
the English common law, and then its Californian progeny.2' The public trust
public trust uses, a power which precludes anone from acquiring a vested right to
hann the public trust, and imposes a continuing duty on the state to take such uses into account in allocating water resources.

Id.
230. Id. at 728.
231. Id. at 711. 1 only present a sampling of undisputed facts
here. Indeed, it can be difficult to separate the court's findings of fact from the plaintiffs' allegations of fact, as they often
flow into each other. For example, on page 715, the court begins with the plaintiffs' allegations
in one paragraph: "Plaintiffs predict that the lake's steadily increasing salinity, if unchecked, will
wreck havoc throughout the local food chain." Id. at 715. In the next paragraph the court can
be read either as continuing the plaintiffs' allegations or as inteliecting the court's approval of
the plaintils' allegations: "DWP's diversions also present several threats to the millions of local
and migratory birds using the lake." Id.
232. Ild. at 711.
233. Id. at 715.
234. Ild.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 716.
237. Id.
238. Id.(emphasis added).
239. See Takacs, supra note 14, at 711-12. National Audubon cites to Sax, and is influenced by him even in tone. Sce NatlAudubon Soc),,658 P.2d at 719 n.16; compare Sax, supra note 108, at 492 ("Mount Greylock, about which the controversy centered, is the highest
summit of an isolated range which is surrounded by lands of considerably lower elevation."),
with Nat'lAudubon Sock; 658 P.2d at 711 ("Mono Lake, the second largest lake in California,
sits at the base of the Sierra Nevada escarpment near the eastern entrance to Yosemite National
Park.").
240. Id.at 718-19; but see Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Propertyand Soi-
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doctrine was "an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people's
common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering
that right of protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right
Even the compelling history of
is consistent with the purposes of the trust .....
of
the
appropriative regime in the
genesis
their
and
early
miners
California's
state (lid not evoke such powerful rhetoric from the Court. True, the Court
did note that "lals a matter of practical necessity the state may have to approve
appropriations despite foreseeable harm to public trust uses."'. Nevertheless,
the state had to honor its duty to the public trust. " '
Equity in NaionalAudubonwas about more than the plaintiff's prayer for
injunctive relief. Nationad Audubon, "Itihe biggest coup for environmental' ' "
protection based on California's public trust doctrine in the last fifty years, 2
.was about the stakeholder interests implicit in the court's discussion of a depleted resource. First, the environmental organization could bring suit without
exhausting its administrative remedies. "' Second, species at Mono Lake were

Questioningthe Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REv. 63 1,.
631 (1986). Lazarus opens his article with the following:
creigntv in NaturalResowces:

With thle public trust doctrine], the Califoinia Supreme Court appears enthusiastically to have embraced a new legal Renaissance, in which modern "humanists" rediscover old texts and invoke the distant past to liberate the spirit from the confining "shackles" of a more conventional era. But we are not witnessing Petrarch, mildly
unorthodox in reviving Cicero, or Boccaccio retelling irreverent stories borrowed
fiom Ovid. Here, the half-firgotten ancient models are the codes of the Emperor
Justinian and Alonso die Wise of Castille, the Magna Carta wrested from King John
and-the Treatise of Henn, de Bracton. \Ve may question whether such a revolution,
not in literature or philosophy, but in the law of property, even on the claim of returning to an earlier wisdom, is equally to be applauded.
Id. (quoting Brief of the United States as Aricus Curiae, Summa Corp. v. California ex rel.
State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984) (No. 82-708)); see generally Charles F. Wilkinson,
The Ptddic Trust Doctrinein PublicLand Law, 14 U.C. DAvIs L. Ri.;v. 269 (1980).
241. Nat'!Audubon Soc'v, 658 P.2d at 724. However, Laarus argues that the public trust
doctrine "rests on legal fictions," and is "superfluous and, at worst, distracting and theoretically
inconsistent with new notions of property and sovereignty developing in the current reworking
of natural resources law." ILaanis, .supia note 240, at 656, 658. For Lazaius, standing requirements, modern nuisance law, the state's police power, administrative law, and governmental environmental protection make the public trust doctrine irrelevant. Id.at 658, 664-91. Further reliance on the doctrine "ultimately threatens to impede environmental protection and
resource conservation goals and possibly render Pyrrhic earlier advances." d. at 692.
242. Nat'lAudubon Sotv, 6,58 P.2d at 728.
243. Id.
244. Jordan Browning, Unearthing Subterrawean Water Rights: The EniironimentalLaw
Foundation s Etfor t to Extend Cahfoia'sPublic 7ust Doctine, 34 ENVIRONs 231, 236-37
(2011)..
245. Nat'|Audubon Soc'v, 658 P.2d at 732. As the court stated:
The federal court's second question asked whether plaintiffs must exhaust an adininistrative remedy before filing suit. Our response is "no." The courts and the Water
Board have concurrent jurisdiction in cases of this kind. If the nature or complexity
of the issues indicate that an initial deternmination by the board is appropriate, tie
courts may refer the matter to the board.
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individuated by paragraph and particularized." Third, previous "notice to tile
legislature and agencies" was issued that "local public interests may interfere
27
with the public trust in the same manner as private profit-oriented interests."
NationalAudubon was about equitable justice. It was about more than a
traditional equitable remedy, which loomed in the background through the
request for injunctive relief. It was about how, for a while, "leinterprise triumphed over equity" when the "beneficial use" to which water was put went
unchecked.2 1 It was about "Itihe Mono Lake opinion and the public trust
doctrine (Prior raged, 'What kind of a court is this? Talking about brine
shrimp, gulls, Wilson's Phalarope, tufa-whatever the hell that is. This was
supposed to be a case about war). ' 2' a It was about judicial recognition of
instreaun uses that struck at the heart of the diversion "myth" of prior appropriation.' It was about the rise of the environmental movement and the swelling of city populations dependent on resources that they depleted. It was
about a return to the origins of the appropriative regime, which "expressed a
concern for broad and equitable distribution of resources" that was "radical"
in its opposition to monopolies and speculation.2
Uluitable justice also implied traditional equity. After all, if traditional
equity continues as a moral or ethical antidote to opportunism, the public trust
similarly "perseveres as a value system and an ethic" targeting "immoral and
illegal" conduct that is injurious to the public weal. "2 As such, opportunistic
conduct where the public trust is involved does not involve a bad faith violation of the law as much as how "self-interested and powerful minorities often
have undue influence on the public resource decisions of legislative and ad246. Id. at 715-16.
247.

Sax, supra note 108, at 514, 532-34. Also, as Sax points out:

In this respect ... it may be imnportlult to distinguish between a project which is
authorized by the state itself, either thlrough the legislature or through one of iLs adininistrative agencies, and one which is initiated and advanced merely by a local goveminent. The distinction does not suggest that a local project cannot be valid, but rather that local initiation invites a more substantial judicial scrutiny of the question
whether the public interest-the "general statewide intercst"-is being adequately advauced.

Id. at 541.

248. Pisani, supr, note 89, at 37.
249. Wilkinson, supra note 88, at xvii.
250. Klein, supm note 92, at 344.
251. Schorr, supra note 90, at 3, 11. Indeed, NationalAudubon stands in contradistinction
to some of the first California cases dealing with the public trust. There was similar sentiment at
the state's fornation:
A delegate to the state Constitutional Convention in 1879 said, "If there is any one
abuse greater than another that I think the people of the State of California has suffered at the hands of their law-making power, it is the abuse that they have received in
the granting out and disposition of the lands belonging to the State." Swanp lands,
tidelands, and overflowed lands had been taken in such vast quantities, he said, that
'now the people are hedged off entirely from reaching tide water, navigable water, or

salt water."
Sax, supra note 108, at 525 n.162.
252. Takacs, supra note 14, at 711-12.
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ministrative bodies and cause those bodies to ignore broadly based public interests." 3 Both traditional equity and the public trust weigh individual concerns against the public's larger policy imperatives.
That the public trust identifies the state "as a trustee of certain public resources" also aligns the public trust with traditional equity." F. W. Maitland's
influential work on equity lauded the creation of the trust, which was a "distinctive achievement" at equity.2 5 A trust was something created for the benefit of another:
IVhen a person has rights which he is bound to exercise upon behalf of another or for the accomplishment of some particular purpose he is said to
have those rights in trust for that other or for that purpose and he is called a
trustee. 2,

The public trust doctrine similarly holds that "those in power" should act as
stewards of the "gifts of nature's bounty." ' Indeed, that a trust at traditional
equity is also "'an institute' of great elasticity and generality; as elastic, as general as contract" recalls Sax's observation that the public trust doctrine "has no
life of its own and no intrinsic content. It is no more-and no less-than a
name courts give to their concerns about the insufficiencies of the democratic
process.'
For Sax, the public trust doctrine has a "substantive overtone"
even as it is not substantive itself since the doctrine is a "technique or name
courts used to mend perceived imperfections in the legislative and administrative process or the democratic process generally. 2' ' As Richard Lazarus has
noted, the "doctrine [is]
historically bound up in notions of property law and
equitable trusts. ....
Thus both traditional equity and the public trust doctrine
share fiduciary concerns regarding a trust and the trust's content. The trust
imposed legal obligations on those who held the trust res for another's benefit.
National Audubon was thus about a holistic-and possibly empatheticapproach to the various constituencies dependent on water. What would become of them if the assault on their habitat continued? What elfect on the
humans who had long benefited from its waters?
D. THE TAINTED CONSCIENCE
Conscience matters. Although conscience appears as dictum in the recent
case law from Colorado, New Mexico, and California, the cases show that
conscience has a continuing place in discussions of equity. The Colorado Supreme Court has referred to "good conscience" in the context of trusts. ' The
253. Sax, supranote 108, at 560.
254. Id. at 478.
255. F. W. MAITLANI), EQUITY: A COURSE OF LFCrURES 23 (1947).
256. Id. at 44.
257. Takacs, supra note 14, at 711, 716.
258. MArrLAND, suprai note 255, at 23; Sax, supra note 108, at 521.
259. Iazarus, supia note 240, at 642-43 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marls omitted).
260. Lazarus, supra note 240, at 648, 692 ("The public trust doctrine ... inevitably dcpendlsi on traditional notions of property law and trusts").
261. Peterson v. McMahon, 99 P.3d 594, 598 (Colo. 2004) ("Because equity courts devel-
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Colorado Court of Appeals has noted that the "doctrine [of unclean hands] is
rooted in the historical concept of court of equity as a vehicle for affirmatively
enforcing the requirements of conscience and good faith. This presupposes a
refusal on its part to be 'the abetter of iniquity. ' The year of the Bounds
decision, tie Supreme Court of New Mexico referred to "equity and good
conscience" in a discussion of subrogation.'
Similarly, the year of the NationalAudubon decision, the Supreme Court of California referred to "equity
and good conscience" in a discussion of debt apportionment,"6 ' and the Court
of Appeal of California stated that "[the doctrine of punitive damnages has
never found favor in equity, the repository of the law's conscience" only a few
years before."
But on whose conscience did Ai-chuleta, Bounds, and NationalAudubon
depend? A recent family law case makes the versatility and power of a court
of equity more explicit. In that case, a spouse sued her husband for equitable
distribution of the marital assets. " ' The court held that a "court of equity, as a
court of conscience, can never permit itself to become party to the- division of
tainted assets nor can it grant the request of an admitted wrongdoer to arbitrate such a distribution."" The husband had "conspired with his employer to
skim large corporate and institutional oil deliveries (billing for more oil than
delivered). They would then sell the undelivered, excess oil to third parties." 8
Most galling was that "no inheritance, gift or income taxes were ever paid or
ever declared." 6 9
The court applied a historical understanding of equity:
Historically, courts of equity have reflected the collective public conscience
of what should and should not be done. Equity involves the obedience to

dictates of morality and conscience. The morality of which equity speaks is
oped the concept of a trust and equitable principles such as the requirements of 'good conscience' are used to enforce trusts and the fiduciary duties underlying trusts, litigation relating to
trusts has been treated as equitable even when solely monetary relief is sought.").
262. HealthSouth Corp. v. Boulder Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 220 P.3d 966, 977 (Colo. App.
2009) (Bernard, J., dissenting) (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach.
Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814-15 (1945)), rev'd, 246 P.3d 948 (Colo. 2011); see also Hickerson v.
Vessels, 316 P.3d 620, 623 (Colo. 2014) (laches); People v. Lanari, No.1 1CA2440, 2014 Colo.
App. LEXIS 934, at *P8 (Colo. App.June 5, 2014) (laches);Jehly v. Brown, 327 P.3d 351, 352
(Colo. App. 2014) (fraudulent concealment); Maxwell v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, No.
12CA1802, 2014 Colo. App. LEXIS 2, at *P1 (Colo. App. Jan. 2, 2014) (fraudulent concealment); People v. Shiftin, Nos. 11CA1853 & 11CA1881, 2014 Colo. App. LEXIS 308, at *P4,
12 (Colo. App. Feb. 27, 2014) (restitution); Kelso v. Rickenbaugh Cadillac Co., 262 P.3d 1001,
1004 (Colo. App. 2011) (independent equitable action).
263. Sunnyland Farms, Inc. v. Cent. N.M. Elec. Coop., Inc., 301 P.3d 387, 402 (N.M. 2013)
("The remedy is for the benefit of one secondarily liable who has paid the debt of another and
to whom rmiequity andgood coll cicnce should be assigned the rights and remedies of the original creditor." (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Found. Reserve Ins. Co., 431 P.2d
737, 741 (N.M. 1967))).
264. Jessup Farms v. Baldwin, 660 P.2d 813, 815, 820 n.7 (Cal. 1983) ("Under these circumstances, Jessup Farns paid no more than what in equity and good conscience it should
have paid.").
265. Rosener v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 168 Cal. Rptr. 237, 251 (Cal. Ct.App. 1980).
266. Sheridan v. Sheridan, 589 A.2d 1067, 1068 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990).
267. Id.at 1068.
268. Id. at 1069.
269. Id.
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that of society and not the judge's personal view of right and wrong. Likewise, equity may not disregard statutory law but looks to its intent rather than
its form. As the ultimate respository [sic], the gatekeeper of that conscience
and morality, equity's forum can never be used to promote or condone
crime or clearly delined breaches of public moralit. -'0
The court reaffirmed its equitable obligations, noting that the "Legislature did
not intend its judges to be tellers or its court rooms counting houses for the
division of tainted assets purchased with dirty money. The policy of this state
is unambiguous in that regard: We do not reward wrongdoers!""' Appalled,
the court ruled that it would "report such wrongdoing to the appropriate authorities .....
Sheridim is about "conscience and morality" of which equity is both the
"gatekeeper" and "ultimate repository .... . That equitable conscience is generalized, as embodied in statutory and other laws, as well as public policy. Consistent with these principles, a court of conscience will not allow itself to be
"the abetter of iniquity."2"

The morality on which Sheridan relied was thus

local and equitable.Y5 A court sitting at equity was a court of outrage that could
not reward tainted consciences. 2 As such, the court could take extraordinary
steps to uphold its historical obligations.Y
Archuleta and Bounds similarly returned to traditional equitable principles. The Archuleta plaintiff had to show that he had suffered an injury for
injunctive relief to issue.
It was not enough that the plaintiff claim that the
defendant had ploughed up the plaintiff's water ditches and intercepted the
plaintiff's water.' In Bounds, it was not enough that the plaintiff claim that an
injunction should issue on the basis of his takings and other claims without
"substantial evidence of impairment..... It would thus be unconscientious for
a court of equity to succor someone who had not shown harm. Without such
a showing, a court of equity itself might succumb to the very conduct that it
seeks to cure.
"'

270. Id. at 1070 (citations omitted).
271. Jd.at1071.
272. Id at 1074. Although the wife had unclean hands, the court exercised its discretion in
the wifie's favor on her alimony, child support, and counsel fcc claims, noting that
Plaintiff's misconduct which resulted in the dismissal of her equitable distribution petition does not bar her request before the court for alimony, child support and counsel fees that are related to these issues. Courts of equity in applying the maxim of unclean hands must use just discretion in determining under what circumstances, to
what extent and what policy reasons will constitute cause to banish a litigant or to bar
her relief.
Id. at 1075.
273. [d.at 1070.
274. HealthSouth Corp. v. Boulder Cnty. BI. of Comnm'rs, 220 P.3d 966, 977 (Colo. App.
2009) (Bernard,J., dissenting), rev'd, 246 P.3d 948 (Colo. 2011).
275. See Sheridan, 589 A.2d at 1071-72.
276. See Sunstein, suipra note 188, at 407.
277. See Saunet, supra note 112, at 35.
278. Archuleta v. Gomnez, 200 P.3d 333, 346 (Colo. 2009).
279. Id. at 337, 349.
280. Bounds v. State, No. CV-2006-166, slip op. at 6 (N.M. 6th Dist- Ct.July 8, 2008).
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Conscience is also critical to the outcome of NationalAudubon. National
Audubon involved changing morality and public policy regarding water. 8 ' As
the court noted, "Itihe objective of the public trust has evolved in tandem with
the changing public perception of the values and uses of waterways." 82 As
such, the public trust doctrine both responded to and incorporated the moral
implications of treating a resource like water in a particular manner. 83 Previous treatment resulted in "apparent disregard for the resulting damage to the
scenery, ecology, and human uses of Mono Lake ."8 . Now the public trust
imposed a "duty" on the state "to protect the people's common heritage of
streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right of protection
only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent with the
purposes of the trust."+
If both traditional equity and the public trust doctrine nirror similar fiduciary concerns regarding a trust, then NationalAudubon is also about a fiduciary's failure to perform its equitable duties to the trust. Though National
Audubon never frames its opinion in these terms, the opinion catalogs the
damage wrought by a state agency's understanding of its duty. The agency argued that the public trust doctrine was "'subsumed' into the appropriative wa86
ter rights system and, absorbed by that body of law, quietly disappeared."
Following this argument, the depletion of the trust's resources was no legal
damage at all. The court not only rejected the claim, but also implied that the
agency's position was unconscientious. The opening of the case elucidated
this fact. As if the court described an imperiled community of various plaintiffs that could not sue on their own behalf, NationalAudubon opens with a
description of Mono Lake and its non-human inhabitants.8 Equitable justice,
281.

See generallyT. Leigh Anenson, From Theorv to Practice:Analyzing Equitable Estop-

pcl UnderA PluralisticMIodel of Law, 1I LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 633, 659 (2007) ("equity has
come to be regarded as public policy. It bears repeating that equity and public policy promote
the same purpose of change based on modem morality."); see also Larry A. DiMatteo, Fquity's
Modification of Contract: An Analysis of the Twentieth Century's Equitable Reformation of

Contract Law, 33 NEW ENG. L. REv. 265, 333 (1999) ("In short, the equitable principles are
often synonymous with the public policy behind the legal rules of contract. 'Public policy, like
equity, is the name for a precise set of legal standards which lie at the bedrock of the legal systen.'").
282. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct. of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983).
283. See generally Emily L. Dawson & Lincoln L. Davies, EnvironmentalLaw and Policy:
Nature, Law, and Society, 19 STAN. ENvrt.. L,. 469, 473 (2000) (reviewing ZYGMUNT J.B.
PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND Poiicy: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY (1999)) (noting that the "portentous" first chapter includes discussion of the moral implications of the public trust doctrine).
284. Nat'lAudubon Soc)v, 658 P.2d at 729.
285. Id. at 724.
286. Id. at 727.
287. Id. at 711. The court stated:
Mono Lake, the second largest lake in California, sits at the base of the Sierra Nevada
escarpment near the eastern entrance to Yosemite National Park. The lake is saline;
it contains no fish but supports a large population of brine shrimp which feed vast
numbers of nesting and migratory birds. Islands in the lake protect a large breeding
colony of California gulls, and the lake itself serves as a haven on the migration route
for thousands of Northern Phalarope, Wilson's Phalarope, and Eared Grebe. Towers and spires of tufa on the north and south shores are matters of geological interest
and a tourist attraction.
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with its attention to the many constituencies dependent upon a given resource,
was thus about conscience. It demonstrated how a failure of conscience-for
some, a failure of empathy-could lead to a tainted landscape."
But whose conscience did Archuleta, Bounds, and National Audubon
apply? Sheridan, the family law case, applied state precedent reflecting local
morality, and also local ethical rules governing judicial conduct."a Archuleta
and Bounds similarly applied traditional equitable principles that are familiar
to almost every equitable court; no injury means no equity. These principles,
and the morality inhering in them, are the province of equity in general and
are not limited to a specific jurisdiction. In NalionalAudubon, the court relied almost exclusively on local precedent when discussing perceptions of the
public trust doctrine, which had predecessors at both English common law
and Roman law. The three cases were not about subjective inklings of individual chancellors, but were highly attentive to local equitable needs.
IV. CONCLUSION
From the first prior appropriation cases, injunctive relief proved critical, as
it allowed litigants to anticipate prospective enforcement of their water rights.
Conscience matters. Through conscience, courts can innovate the law while
relying on local or other conditions to arrive at a conscientious outcome. As
such, conscience is of continuing importance in water rights discussions as it
provides the moral grounding on which a court might build its response to a
question of public importance. Conscience can be outcome-determinative.
Conscience thus remains a powerful equitable tool of ongoing importance
whose importance should not be elided in water rights discussions.
Prior appropriation thus needs equity for a variety of reasons. Roughly
forty-six million Americans are subject to some fonn of prior appropriation in
Colorado, New Mexico, and California each day. Equity is key because it can
help courts attend to the conscientious needs of citizens, agencies, and organizations, as well as laws with which courts must contend when adjudicating water rights cases. A failure of conscience can lead to damage. Such damage
can be long-lasting, and multiple constituencies can feel its effects. Indeed,
some constituencies have no way of articulating or resisting the threat to their
existence posed by unconscientious and inequitable conduct. Thus, they have
no way of being actual "plaintiffis] in an imperfect world, one marred by the
defendant's violation."
Especially in such cases, it may, therefore, be good
"that the chancellor ride[] again." 9'

I,
288. See Feldman &Whitman, supra note 41, at 307-08 (arguing that empathy is "the moral
capacity to regard non-sentient beings as objects to be cared for and to be regarded as having
intrinsic-not merely utilitarian-value," and "communicat ing], negoiiatlingl, or engagling in an
inter-active decisional process so as to acknowledge not only the moral standing of these organisms, but also the possibility that they have 'agency."').
289. Sheridan v. Sheridan, 589 A.2d 1067, 1071-72 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990).
290. Rendlemnan, supra note 20, at 1404.
291. Bray, supranote 2, at 60.

NINTH UPDATE TO COLORADO WATER LAW:
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
THE HONORABLE GREGORYJ. HOBBS, JR.
To provide our readers with the most up-to-date water law information,
the editors periodically include updates of works previously published in the
Water Law Review. The following is the ninth update to Colorado Water
Law: An Histoica Oveiview, Appendix-Colorado Waer Law: A Synopsi.s of
Statutes and CLse Law,' selected by the Honorable Gregoryj. Hobbs, Jr. '

Reynolds v. Cotten
"If, as the plaintiff-ditch owners assert, and the language of the 1952 and
1960 decrees appears to support, their appropriative rights with regard to nondrain native water were merely subordinated to those of River Ranch, the W3894 court's reference to their non-imported supply of water as drain water
simply reflects the fact that historically the full amount of their appropriative
right had not exceeded the water flowing into La Jara Creek from the Drain.
As the water court itself appeared to recognize, in the absence of any indication that the W-3894 judgment was intended as a declaration of all rights on
the stream, this language of the judgment would simply be understood as a
quantification of the appropriative right of the Reeds, any or all of which could
be satisfied from the Drain ahead of either River Ranch or any of the other
plaintiff-ditch owners. It would suggest nothing, however, about the rights or
priorities of the Reeds to non-drain native water, in the event their full appropriation could not be completely satisfied from the Drain.
Because the matter that was explicitly determined by the W-3894 judgment-the amount of water from the Drain for which the Reeds were senior to
River Ranch-can be rationally understood without necessarily implying a determination of the asserted issue-whether the plaintiff-ditch owners appropriative rights in LaJara Creek were merely subordinated by the 1952 and 1960
decrees to River Ranch's rights to non-drain native water rather than altogether extinguished-the ditch owners cannot be collaterally estopped from litigating that issue in the current proceedings."

1. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Coloado 14acr Law: An Hjiorical Ovcneies 1 U. Drv.
WATER L. REv. 1, 27 (1997). The first update to justice Hobbs's article appears at 2 U. DrNv.
WATER L. REv. 223 (1999); the second update is at 4 U. DNV. WATER L. REv. 111 (2000);
the third update is at 6 U. DENY. WATER L. REv. 116 (2002); the fourth update is at 8
U. DrFN'v. WATER L. REv. 213 (2004); the fifth update is at 10 U. DENY. WATER L. REv. 391
(2007); the sixth update is at 13 U. DFNy. WATER L. REv. 389 (2009); the seventh update is at
14 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 159 (2010); the eighth update is at 16 U. DENY.WATER L. REv.

137 (2012).

2. Internal citations and fbotnotes have been omitted from all of the segnents of the
Court's opinions reproduced below.
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Reynolds v. Cotten, 274 P.3d 540, 546 (Colo. 2012).
In re Revised Abandonment List of Water Rights in Water Division 2
"Because Harrison neither proved historic use of the right for which he
sought a change nor was excep.ted from the requirement that he do so as a
precondition of changing its point of diversion; and because denying a change
of water right for failing to prove the historic use of the right does not amount
to an unconstitutional taking of property, the water court's dismissal of Harrison's application is aflirmed. Because, however, Harrison did not stipulate to
an order of abandonment as the consequence of failing to succeed in his
change application, but only as the consequence offaliling to timely file an application reflecting historic use, a condition with which he complied, tie water
court's order granting the Engineers' motion for abandonment is reversed."
In re Revised Abandonment List of Water Rights in Water Div. 2, 276
P.3d 571, 572-73 (Colo. 2012).
"Nor does the denial of a change of water right for faliling to prove historic
use unconstitutionally deprive an applicant of property without just comlpensation, in violation of either the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution or article II, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution. Although we have
characterized a water right, including the right to change its point of diversion,
as a property right, we have also made clear that the right in question is usuf'ructuary in nature, merely permitting the use of water within the limitations of
tie prior appropriation doctrine. The right itself is created by appropriating
unappropriated water and putting it to a beneficial use. As we have often
held, an absolute decree does not represent an adjudication of the lull measure of the right but is implicitly further limited in quantity by historic beneficial
consumptive use according to the decree. Limiting a change in water right to
the extent of established historic use, therefore, does not deprive an applicant
of an existing property right but rather ensures against an enlargement of that
right."
Id. at 574-75.
Archuleta v. Gomez (Archuleta ]I)
"We affirm the judgment of the water court in part, concluding that
Gomez adversely possessed Archuleta's legal interests in the Archuleta Ditch
and Manzanares Ditch No. 1. We reverse the water court's judgment in part,
ordering it to enter an injunction for reconstruction of Manzanares Ditch No.
2 and an easement across the northern part of Gomez's lower parcel to Archuleta's adjoining parcel, so that Archuleta will receive the flow of water his
legal interest in this ditch entitles him to divert."
Archuleta v. Gomez (ArchulelaI, 290 P.3d 482, 484 (Colo. 2012).
"Gomez held no decreed appropriation that entitled him to benefit from
the return flow resulting fron Archuleta's use of his legal interest in Manzanares Ditch No. 2. Nevertheless, according to Thompson's calculations,
Gomez increased his consumptive use of Manzanares Ditch No. 2 water by
3.7 acre-feet after he severed the ditch from its connection with Archuleta's
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adjoining property. Thompson testified that Manzanares Ditch No. 2 is so
short in length, and so close to the Huerfano River, that return flows from irrigation get back to the river within a very short tine. Because Archuleta neither abandoned his legal interest in Manzanares Ditch No. 2, nor did he cease
to have the benefit of it on his lands, Gomez's increased use of the waters
flowing in the ditch constituted an illegal enlargement of use of Manzanares
Ditch No. 2 water. As the evidence in the record demonstrates, Gomez did
not dispossess Archuleta of his legal interest in Manzanares Ditch No. 2. All
that Gomez accomplished by severing the ditch and increasing his use of ditch
water was to possess an amount of water that would otherwise have returned
to the Huerlano River, thence to the Arkansas River, as return flows from Archuleta's irrigation use.
Thus, the record demonstrates that Gomez committed two wrongful acts:
illegal enlargement of a water right and illegal destruction of a ditch."
IM.at 490.
"As to the Archuleta Ditch, the water court found that Gomez had increased his consumptive use by 8.9 acre-feet annually on his upper parcel,
above the amount of water available under his rights and to the exclusion of
Archuleta, by adversely possessing Archuleta's interest in the ditch, and this
use did not enlarge the historical beneficial use belonging to Archuleta's legal
interest in that ditch.
As to Manzanares Ditch No. 1, the water court found that Gomez had increased his consumptive use by 5.5 acre-feet annually on his lower parcel,
above the anount of water available under his rights and to the exclusion of
Archuleta, by adversely possessing Archuleta's legal interest in the ditch, and
this use did not enlarge the historical beneficial use belonging to Archuleta's
legal interest in that ditch.
Evidence in the record supports the water court's findings, and we uphold
them. We conclude that Gomez has adversely possessed Archuleta's legal interests in the Archuleta Ditch and Manzanares Ditch No. 1."
Id. at 488-89.
"Because Gomez wrongfully interfered with Archuleta's water and easement rights for Manzanares Ditch No. 2 and enlarged the use of that ditch's
water, we direct the water court to enter an injunction ordering Gomez to reconstruct the ditch, provide for an easement for the ditch across the northern
part of his forty-acre lower parcel to Archuleta's adjoining parcel, and cease
diverting any water that Archuleta's legal interest entitles Archuleta to divert to
his parcel. The injunction may include the terms the water court set forth Hi
its belated January 19, 2012, order and any additional terms appropriate to
prevent illegal enlargement and accomplish protection of Archuleta's legal interest in Manzanares Ditch No. 2."
Id. at 491.
Town of Minturn v. Tucker
"In regard to monthly limitations to be contained in the decrees, the stipulations provided for a consumptive use accounting 'based on the historical actual use of applicant.' Following the water court's entry of the original decrees,

Issue 2

NINTH UPJDATE TO COLORADO VA 7

IA

W

Minturn realized that several monthly consumptive use numbers in those decrees did not reflect the actual monthly historical use numbers attributable to
exercise of the town's water rights. Instead, they were derived from billing
statements provided by the Eagle River Water and Sanitation District that run
a month behind the actual month of use. Minturn petitioned the water court
to correct the decrees, using the actual use numbers by month of use. Of all
the Opposers, only Tucker opposed the decree corrections. After receiving
briefs and affidavits from both parties, the water court granted the petitions
and entered the corrected decrees.
Based upon the record in these proceedings, we uphold the corrected
findings of fact, conclusions of law, judgment, and decrees of the water court.
Section 37-92-304(10), C.R.S. (2012), grants the water court discretion within
a three-year period to correct substantive errors in a water decree. The parties' stipulations anticipated that actual monthly historical consumptive use
numbers would be utilized in the decrees' monthly limitations. The original
decrees mistakenly did not contain these numbers, contrary to the intent of
the parties. The water court did not abuse its discretion in entering the corrected decrees."
Town of Mintum v. Tucker, 293 P.3d 581, 584 (Colo. 2013).
"One of the essential Finctions of water rights proceedings is to prevent
injury to other water rights in operation of the judgment and decree. Central
to the water court's review of an augmentation plan is the express requirement
that augmentation plans must be non-injurious to vested water rights and that
they only be approved upon terms and conditions that prevent injury to those
rights. A classic form of injury involves diminution of the available water supply that a water rights holder would otherwise enjoy at the time and place and
in the amount of demand for beneficial use under the holder's decreed water
right operating in priority. Thus, the parties intended the 'no less restrictive'
provision to prevent injury to other water rights should the water court enter a
decree differing from the parties' stipulations. This provision effectively preserved Tucker's right to object to implementation of monthly maximums and
consumptive use factors that could have an injurious effect on any water rights
he held."
Id.at 595.
City and County of Denver v. City of Englewood
"Users of imported transmountain water enjoy greater rights of use and
reuse than do users of native water.... [Tihis Court has recognized transmountain water users 'rights to reuse and to make successive use of imported
transmountain water to the maximum extent feasible to 'minimize the amount
of water removed from Western Colorado.'
An appropriator who imports transmountain water need not have the intent to reuse or successively use that water at the time of the original appropriation to maintain the subsequent right of use. Rather, 'the right to reuse simultaneously and automatically attaches' upon the water importer's
appropriation of the relevant transmountain water. In sumn, then, 'the owner
of a water right which has been imported into a stream system has the right to
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successive reuse, to extinction, of the water.' Water users commonly use
transmountain water, and reusable transmountain effluent, as substitute water
supplies in exchanges."
City and Cnty. of Denver v. City of Englewood, 304 P.3d 1160, 1164 (Colo. 2013).
"lust like reusable transmountain efiluent, properly quantified LIRFs
(transnountain lawn irrigation return flows) are a legitimate source of substitute supply in an exchange because these two types of return flows are legally
indistinguishable. For example, the volume of water attributable to properly
quantified transmountain LIRFs originated in a foreign stream, in this case the
Colorado River, just like the volume of water that makes up reusable transmountain effluent. In addition, the foreign water comprising both reusable
effluent and transnmountain LIRFs was originally appropriated by a water user
for beneficial use-here, as substitute supply for exchanges on the South Platte
River. Finally, the importing water user acquires 'the right to successive reuse,
to extinction, of the Itransnountainl water' upon appropriation. Transmountain effluent and properly quantified transmountain LIRFs are two forms of
imported water that may be successively reused to extinction under this right.
As such, properly quantified transmountain LIRFs are legally indistinguishable
from reusable transmountain effluent.
Therelore, the water court correctly concluded that Denver's intent at the
time it appropriated the South Platte River water for exchange purposes in
1921... included the intent to use properly quantified transmountain LIRFs
attributable to the volume of the imported Colorado River water for substitute
supply purposes, just as it included the intent to use transmountain effluent
from Metro Sewer.*
Id. at 1165.
Cherokee Metropolitan District v. Felt Monson & Culichia LLC
"Cherokee Metropolitan District, a goverrurent body responsible for
providing water to its landowners and residents, is participating in the underlying litigation in order to minimize loss of its water rights in some of its wells.
In a separate legal malpractice action, Cherokee sued its former attorneys
James Felt and James Culichia, and their firm Felt, Monson & Culichia, LLC
(collectively "FMC") alleging that FM\C's negligence led to the loss of water
rights that is the subject of the underlying litigation. FMC sought to intervene
in the action pursuant to C.R.C.P. 24(a) and (b), arguing that intervention was
necessary in order to minimize damages it may suffer in the legal malpractice
case. The water court denied FMC's motion to intervene.
We find that, despite their adversity in the legal malpractice action, Cherokee and FMC share an identical interest in the underlying water rights litigation-namely, minimizing the loss of Cherokee's water rights. Because FMC
has not made a compelling showing that Cherokee may not adequately represent the interest that it shares with Cherokee, we affirm the water court's denial of FMC's motion to intervene as of right. Similarly, we dismiss FMC's appeal of the water court's denial of FMC's motion for permissive intervention
because the water court did not abuse its discretion.
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Cherokee Metro. Dist. v. Felt Monson & Culichia LLC, 304 P.3d 1167,
1168-69 (Colo. 2013).
"Because FMC has not made a compelling showing that Cherokee may
not adequately represent Cherokee and FMC's identical interest, we affirm
the water court's denial of its motion to intervene as of right. Similarly, we
dismiss FMC's appeal of the water court's denial of FMC's motion for pennissive intervention because the water court did not abuse its discretion."
Id.at 1174.
Raftopoulos Brothers v. Vermillion Ranch Limited Partnership
(Concerning Raftopoulos water right claims) "Here, the water court concluded that Raftopoulos met its burden to demonstrate a non-speculative intent to use the requested water for commercial and industrial purposes. The
water court reached this conclusion based on Mr. Raftopoulos' testimony that
two to four thousand wells 'may be developed in the area supplied by these
rights' and that such wells 'may need four to seven acre feet of development
water'; Mr. Raliopoulos' testimony that the partnership owns mineral rights in
Mollat County that 'may be developed in the future'; evidence of a contract to
supply water to Moffat County for dust suppression; and the contract with
Precision Excavating obtained in the month before trial. The water court further observed that the parties' water rights are the only water source for a thirty- to forty-mile radius; that water has been sold to the developers of existing
wells from the basin; that fracturing of gas wells is a technology available to
well owners in the vicinity; and that this basin is geographically well located to
meet the future demand for water.
This evidence does not, however, support a conclusion that Raftopoulos
denonstrated a non-speculative need for the water for industrial and commercial purposes. The mere fact that wells 'may be developed in the area' or
that the partnership owns mineral rights that 'may be developed in the future,'
without evidence of actual plans for such activities, does not demonstrate a
non-speculative intent to actually put the water to beneficial use. Moreover,
Raftopoulos provided no estimate of the quantity of water that might be needed for such activities."
Raftopoulos Bros. v. Vemillion Ranch Ltd. P'ship, 307 P.3d 1056, 1065
(Colo. 2013).
(Concerning Vermillion water right claims) "The record supports the water court's initial conclusion drawn from the evidence at trial. Vermillion presented no evidence in Case Nos. 08CW54 or 06CW61 regarding the technical feasibility of any of the reservoirs, no studies regarding the proposed
locations, no testimony regarding the ability to obtain necessary permitting,
and no estimates of the cost of construction or Vermillion' s ability to finance
such costs. Raftopoulos, on the other hand, presented expert testimony that
raised serious questions about the feasibility of the Sparks LA in light of the
conclusions in the Ingberg-Miller report regarding the soil conditions at that
location. In addition, Raftopoulos' expert testified that total design permitting
and construction costs for the Sparks IA could be between $1.5 and $2 million, not including the cost of land acquisition or the cost of addressing the soil
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conditions. This evidence raised serious doubts as to whether the project "can
and will" be completed with diligence and within a reasonable time. After
considering all of the evidence in both cases, the water court correctly concluded that Vermillion' s evidence of factors supporting the substantial probability of future completion of the project were not sufficient to outweigh tie
presence of contingencies identified by Raftopoulos."
Id. at 1070.
"We conclude that Vernillion failed to meet its burden to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence at trial that there is a substantial probability
that tie reservoirs necessary to effect the appropriation 'can and will' be cornpleted with diligence within a reasonable time. The 'substantial probability'
standard is employed to curb indefinite speculation, not to protect a conditional water right where only the thinnest possibility remains that the project
can and will be completed. Accordingly, we reverse the water court's grant of
a conditional water storage right for the Sparks Reservoir and the three alternate storage locations in Case No. 06CW61. In addition, we reverse the water
court's order in Case No. 08CW54 concluding that Vermillion has been reasonably diligent in developing its previously decreed conditional water storage
right in those reservoirs."
Id. at 1072.
Pawnee Well Users, Inc. v. Wolfe
"H.B. 1303 grants the State Engineer authority under section 37-90137(7)(c) of the Ground Water Act to 'adopt rules to assist with the administration of this subsection (7),' which pertains to 'caseIs] of dewateing of geologic fonnations by withdrawing nontributary ground water to facilitate or
pernit mining of minerals.' § 37-90-137(7). There is no dispute that H.B.
1303 authorizes the State Engineer to promulgate the Fruitland Rule. Indeed,
on its flace, the legislation applies to all areas of the state, and contains no exception for tribal or other lands within the state. The heart of the Plaintiffs'
challenge is that the Tribal Rule divests the State Engineer of that authority.
We disagree.
The Tribal Rule states that 'ItLIhese Rules and regulations shall not be construed to establish the jurisdiction of either the State of Colorado or tie
Southern Ute Indian Tribe over nontributary ground water within the boundaries of the Southern Ute Indian Reservation.' The water court, agreeing with
Plaintiffs, interpreted the Tribal Rule as recognizing that the State Engineer's
jurisdiction over nontributary ground water within the Reservation had not
been established. See Order at 22 (concluding that, because the Tribal Rule
does not establish such jurisdiction, 'the State engineer promulgated a rule in
an area where his jurisdiction was not established'). In other words, the water
court determined that the Tribal Rule somehow divested the State Engineer of
the jurisdiction which H.B. 1303 provided.
The Tribal Rule does not, mad indeed cannot, divest the State Engineer of
his authority as established in H.B. 1303. The Tribal Rule explicitly states
that the Final Rules do not 'establish' the State Engineer's jurisdiction. But
simply because the Final Rules do not establish the State Engineer's jurisdic-
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tion does not mean-as the water court believed-that jurisdiction was not established elsewhere. In this case, H.B. 1303 established jurisdiction. Moreover, the State Engineer cannot establish or disestablish his own jurisdiction.
As we have held, state agencies are creatures of statute and have 'only those
powers expressly conferred by the legislature.' The State Engineer possesses
the authority granted to him by H.B. 130 3-no more and no less. Indeed, the
State Engineer Maintained throughout the rulemaking process and these proceedings that H.B. 1303 granted him jurisdiction to delineate nontributary
ground water in the Fruitland Fornation through die Fruidand Rule. We
therefore conclude that die water court erred in invalidating the Fruitland Rule
based on the Tribal Rule."
Pawnee Well Users, Inc. v. Wolfe, 320 P.3d 320, 325-26 (Colo. 2013).
YellowJacket Water Conservancy District v. livingston
"Under section 37-45-114(l)(b) (of the Water Conservancy )istrict Act),
a director may remain in office beyond his term when no successor has been
appointed mad qualified: 'Each director shall hold office during the tern for
which he is appointed and until his successor is duly appointed and has qualilied....' Since our earliest days of statehood, we have held that as long as a
statute provides that the incumbent should hold over until his successor is dily qualified, the incumbent remains in office at the expiration of his term as a
de jure officer. The WCA provides, without limitation, that a director shall
hold office for the original term and for the interim period between the termination of the term and the appointment and qualification of a successor. The
legislature did not impose any additional temporal or reasonableness requirement regarding the length of a holdover term in this particular statute.
As such, we decline to read either limitation into the statute.
Therefore, under the WCA, the holdover directors serve as de jure otlicers and had the authority to act as Board members. Consequently, because
seven of the nine Yellow Jacket directors attended the September 29, 2009,
meeting, a majority of directors were present, meaning the Board assembled a
valid quorum. Therefore, the Board had authority to approve and file the diligence applications with the water court."
Yellow Jacket Water Conservancy Dist. v. Livingston, 318 P.3d 454, 457
(Colo. 2013).
Widefield Water and Sanitation District v. Witte
"The purpose of an HCU Ihistorical consumptive use] analysis in a
change proceeding is to detemine the 'amount of water available for use tinder the changed right.' As such, the analysis measures the anlount of water
lawfully used tinder the existing water right. But as our case law makes clear,
irrigation of lands not contemplated by the originally decreed appropriation is
unlawful absent a subsequent applicable decree .... 'An irrigation water right
cannot be lawfully enlarged for application to acreage beyond that for which
the appropriation is accomplished ... in the absence of an adjudicated priority for the enlargement.' 'An appropriator may not enlarge an appropriation,
even iThe enlauged use does not go beyond the decreed amiount, without es-
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tablishing all of the elements of an independent appropriation.' (emphasis
added)). Here, no valid decree for the Subject Water Rights features the Enlarged Acres. Thus, Applicants may not include these acres in their HCU
analysis.
In a change proceeding where the relevant decree for a water right expressly identifies the precise acres to be irrigated, we hold that an applicant
may only conduct an HCU analysis on acreage lawfully irrigated in accordance
with the decreed appropriation. Because no decree here authorizes irrigation
of the Enlarged Acres, Applicants must restrict their HCU analysis to the
Original Acres. Accordingly, we allinn the judgment of the water court and
remand the case to that court for proceedings consistent with this opinion."
Widefield Water and Sanitation Dist. v. Witte, 340 P.3d 1118, 1125 (Colo. 2014).
Wolfe v. Sedalia Water and Sanitation District
"Backed by multiple amnici briefs in its favor, Sedalia argues a polar opposite theory from that of the Engineers in this case. Fundamentally, the Engineers contend that the amount of historical beneficial consumptive use allocated to a water right under a change decree must be requantified each and
every time another change decree is sought. To the contrary, Sedalia and
amici argue that, once the historical beneficial consumptive use quantification
for the original appropriation has been made, it is fixed and carries through to
all future change cases, ad infinitum.
Neither of these propositions conforms to existing statutes and case law.
Resolution of the case now before us calls for no such cosmic pronouncement. Although the preclusion doctrines apply to water adjudications, their
application is not without reservation. The original priority date of an appropriation continues into the future under each change decree. But a changed
circumstance, such as an extended period of unjustified nonuse, calls for an
inquiry into whether the representative period of time used for calculating the
amount of consumptive use water available under the prior decree should remain the same for subsequent change applications.... Claim preclusion
serves an important role in the 'stability mad reliability of Colorado water
rights,' because it bars an objector opposing an augmentation plan from litigating historical usage claims that could have been brought when historical usage
was previously at issue and actually determined....
Every water right decree contains the implied condition of beneficial use.
Prolonged unjustified nonuse of a water right between entry of a prior change
decree and application for a successive change decree may constitute a
changed circumstance. The change process facilitates transfers of water rights
and allows continued application of the appropriated water to specified beneficial uses at identified locations, which may be different from those of the
current decree, and under conditions necessary to prevent injury to other water rights. A change proceeding confirms that a valid appropriation will continue in effect under provisions that differ from those contained in the prior
decree.
Prolonged unjustified nonuse calls into question the appropriate repre-
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sentative period of time for calculating the annual average consumptive use
amount and therefore, tfie anount legally available for the subsequent change
decree. The water court erred by invoking issue preclusion against inquiry into the alleged nonuse of the water right after entry of the 1986 change decree
and by allowing only an abandonment claim."
Wolfe v. Sedalia Water and Sanitation Dist., 343 P.3d 16, 26-28 (Colo.
2015).
Wolfe v. Jim Hutton Educational Foundation
"Because the Engineers proved that over ten years of nonuse of the decreed diversion point had passed, the Engineers did not need to prove more
to trigger the presumption that Hutton had abandoned the water right. The
burden then shifted to the water right holder, the Foundation, to demonstrate
a fact or condition excusing such nonuse or a lack of intent to abandon.
To be sure, our holding adds a step in the analysis. But the second step
necessarily resolves an important question of burden-shifting and public
policy. Once the Engineers establish nonuse of the decreed diversion point,
the burden shifts to the water right holder to show use to rebut the
presumption of abandonment. At that point, tie water right holder stands in
the better position to provide evidence of use and intent. The onus should be
on a water right holder who is using an undecreed point of diversion to rebut a
presumption of abandonment. Thus, we conclude that the water court erred
in holding that the Engineers did not establish the statutory presumption of
abandonment for the Tip Jack water right."
Wolfe v. Jim Hutton Educ. Found., 344 P.3d. 855, 860 (Colo. 2015).
"We hold that when the Engineers prove that the water right holder has
not used the decreed point of diversion for ten years or more, the Engineers
trigger the rebuttable presumption of abandonment under section 37-92402(11). Once triggered, the burden shifts to the water right holder to
demonstrate a lack of intent to abandon. Because the water court erroneously
believed that proof of nonuse at the decreed point of diversion was insufficient
to raise the presumption, it failed to require evidence excusing such noiuse in
order to rebut the presumption."
Id. at 862.
Farmers Water Development Co. v. Colorado Water Conservation Board
"We begin with the fact that the legislature vested the CWCB with exclusive authority to appropriate instrean flows 'on behalf of the people of the
state of Colorado.' S 37-92-102(3). We have consistently recognized that the
CWCB acts to protect the environment on behalf of the public... CWCB is
'the mechanism to address state appropriation of water for the good of the
public'... CWCB 'acts on behalf of the people of the state of Colorado and
is thereby burdened with a fiduciary duty arising out of its unique statutory responsibilities' ... recognizing that in giving the CWCB exclusive authority to
appropriate minimum instreani flows on behalf of the public, the legislature
prohibited the judiciary from decreeing instrean flow rights to a private par-
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ty.... Thus, to the extent that any rights are at issue in the CWCB proceeding, it is the public's interest in the preservation of the environment.
Moreover, the purpose of the CWCB's ISF proceedings is to establish
whether a water appropriation by the CWCB would preserve, 'to a reasonable
degree,' the existing natural environment without injury to existing water
rights. § 37-92-10 2 (3)(c). This is a policy detennination within the discretion
of the CWCB. For example, in rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of
the legislative delegation of power to the CWCB, we described the nature of
the CWCB process. Specifically, we stated that 'Itihe legislative objective is to
preserve reasonable portions of the natural environment in Colorado,' and
that the legislature empowered the CWCB, an agency 'having specific expertise regarding the preservation of flora, fauna and other aspects of the natural
environment,' to pursue that policy objective through appropriation of instream flows ... the 'policy of protecting the natural and man-made environment' is addressed through the 'statutory mechanism' of the CWCB's appropriation of instream flows.., the CWCB is 'a unique entity charged with
preserving the natural environment to a reasonable degree for the people of
the State of Colorado'. Thus, the appropriation of instream flows in order to
protect the natural environment is a policy determination delegated to the
CWCB. Indeed, the purpose of the CWCB's notice, comment, and hearing
process is to gather input from the public regarding this policy determination.
Furthermore, the CWCB's determination that a particular ISF will preserve the environment to a reasonable degree is a prospective policy detemination... section 37-92-102(3) bestows a unique fiduciary obligation upon
the CWCB on behalf of the people of Colorado to preserve the environment
on an ongoing basis. Thus, 'it applies generally applicable policy going forward,' which we have recognized as a hallmark of prospective policy determinations."
Farmers Water Dev. Co. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 346 P.3d.'52,
58-59 (2015).
"In short, because instream flows are junior water rights which cannot
place a call on senior rights, we find Farmers' argument regarding injury to
other water rights unconvincing. At bottom, the focus of the CWCB's instream flow appropriation is not on the rights of identifiable individuals or entities, but instead on the furtherance of a policy of preserving the natural environment for the people of Colorado. We conclude it is quasi-legislative in
nature, and therefore alfirm the water court's decision."
Id. at 61.
McKenna v. Witte
"We must determine whether the water court's judgment of abandonment
was proper. The Applicants contend that the judgment was improper because
the Division Engineer missed the statutory deadline to prepare the abandonmient list by several days, which they claim divested the water court of jurisdiction. We hold that the deadline to prepare the abandonment list under section 37-92-401(1)(a), C.R.S. (2014), is directional and is not a jurisdictional
mandate. Thus, the Division Engineer's failure to prepare the abandonment
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list by the statutory deadline did not divest the water court of jurisdiction over
the case. Further, we decline to overturn the water court's detennination of
abandonment because the record supports the conclusion that the Applicants
intended to permanently discontinue their use of the Sanchez Ditch water
rights."
McKenna v. Witte, 346 P.3d 35, 37 (2015).
"The court found the 'prevaricated receipt and the choreographed photos' of the 2003 diversion insullicient to overcome the presumlption. Instead,
the court found that the pictures were staged to avoid abandonment. The
court found no evidence of actual repairs to the ditch, no attempt to legally
change the point of diversion, and no in-priority calls for water until 2013.
Moreover, although McKenna participated in some local water-court matters,
he never did so to protect his Sanchez Ditch water rights. Accordingly, the
water court determined, from the totality of the circumstances, that McKenna
(lid not prove any actual, beneficial use of his Sanchez Ditch water rights, nor
(lid he present any acceptable justification for the extended period of nonuse.
In so doing, the court concluded that McKenna's decision to spend his resources developing wells showed that.he did not find the Sanchez l)itch worth
the required repairs. Thus, the water court ordered that McKenna's Sanchez
Ditch water rights be decreed abandoned."
Id. at 39.
"It is the province of the water court to weigh the evidence and measure
the credibility of wimtnesses, and we will not disturb its resolution of factual issues on appeal. In this case, the record supports the trial court's finding that
McKenna abandoned his Sanchez Ditch water rights. He never made a legitimate effort to apply the water to beneficial use and could not prove that he
ever intended to do so. Consequently, we must sustain the water court's finding of abandonment."
Id. at 44.
East Cherry Creek Valley Water and Sanitation District v. Wolfe
"A chanige of water right application is considered to be a complaint under C.R.C.P. 15, and a statement of opposition is considered to be a responsive pleading. Colo. Unif. Water Ct. R. 4(a). Correspondingly, the "claim" in
a change of water right application is the aggregate of operative facts that give
rise to the right to a change decree.
A water right owner may apply to change the type of use, location of use,
time of use, and/or point of diversion of a water right. The change of water
right must be adjudicated into a change decree, and its issuance is subject to a
two-step factual inquiry into: (1) the scope, measure, and limit of the water
right proposed to be changed and (2) the conditions necessary to protect
against injury to other decreed water rights.
First, the right to a decree changing the usufructuary right is limited in
quantity and time by the appropriator's actual historical beneficial use. Quantification of the amount of water beneficially consumed guards against rewarding wasteful practices or recognizing water claims that the nature and extent of
the appropriator's need do not justify. Indeed, actual application of the water
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to the appropriator's beneficial use becomes the basis, measure, and limit of
the right. An applicant must be able to show the legal extent of its water right
interest before it can be changed to ensure that no injury occurs in the process.
The second part of the water court's inquiry concerns the decree conditions necessary to ensure that the change will not injuriously affect other decreed water rights. Thus, a change decree contains conditions that differ from
those contained in the prior decree. This two-step examination facilitates
transfers of water rights, allows continued application of the appropriated water to specified beneficial uses at identified locations, mad ensures that a valid
appropriation will continue in effect under provisions in the change decreewhile maintaining return flow patterns, alleviating material injury to other water rights, and preventing enlargement of the water right."
E. Cherry Creek Valley Water and Sanitation Dist. v. Wolfe, 348
P.31 434, 440-41 (2015).
"In conclusion, factual issues remain to be resolved by the water court in
this case, including how much water is available for use for purposes of the
change of water right and the terms and conditions necessary to prevent injury
to other decreed water rights, belore the water court may enter a final judgment and decree for purposes of appeal.
Because there is no final judgment on a claim for relief within the purview
of Rule 54(b), we are without jurisdiction to entertain this appeal."
Id.at 443.
Frees v. Tidd
"(W)e determine that the Tidds properly obtained a court declaration and
decree of no material injury before making alterations to a ditch easement located on their property. To apply the water decreed for their hydropower
use, the Tidds must first make several alterations to the ditch. In 1?oaring
Fork Club, L.P. v. S..Jude's Co., we held that the owner of property burdened by a ditch easement has no right to alter an easement without the consent of the benefitted owner unless he or she first obtains a declaration by a
court that such alterations will cause no damage to the benefitted owner. The
Frees own an easement across the Tidds' property for the ditch, and therefore
the Tidds were required to show that their proposed alterations to the ditch
would not injure the Frees' vested property rights. Here, the water court
made a factual finding that the terms mad conditions of the decree are sufficient to mitigate any injury to the Frees' water right and right-of-way property
interests, and the water court retained continuing juisdiction for reconsideration of the question of injury to the Frees' water and ditch rights. The water
court's findings of fact are supported by the record. Accordingly, the Tidds
complied with our directions in S Jude's to obtain a declaration of the court
before altering the rights associated with the ditch easement located on their
property."
Frees v. Tidd, 2015 CO 39, 17, __ P.3d - (2015).
"(T)he Frees .do not own the physical water they divert through the
Garner Creek Ditch No. 1 headgate; instead they own the right to beneficially
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use the water for irrigation. The fact that the sane physical water owned by
tie public and diverted from Garner Creek will be put to an additional use
Under a separate water right before reaching the Frees' place of beneficial use
in no way depnived the water court of authority to issue the conditional water
right decree with a 2010 priority in this case. The Frees overlook the fact that
the General Assembly has provided that tie public's water resource becomes
'available' to an adjudicated water right either because there is unappropriated
water available in a stream that is not over-appropriated or, when the alliected
strean is over-appropriated, tie decree for tie junior water right contains
sufficient conditions to prevent injury to other adjudicated water rights."
Id. 123.
"Small-scale hydropower projects benefit the public because they ofler an
alternative source of energy that has generally minimal enviromnental impacts,
diverts less water, is less susceptible to blackout and damnage as a result of
storms, and does not require the creation of damns or reservoirs because they
rely on existing infrastructure. In granting the Tidds' non-consumptive conditional water right application, the water court followed Colorado law allowing
the public's scarce water resource to be put to multiple beneficial uses while
protecting decreed senior water rights."
Id.130.

BOOK NOTES
Kenna Lang Archer, Unruly Waters: A Social and Environmental History
of the Brazos River, University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque, NM
(2015); 142 pp; ISBN 978-0-8263-5587-4.
Kenna Lang Archer is a history instructor at Angelo State University in
San Angelo, Texas. She has a Masters Degree in Environmental Science
from Baylor University and a PhD in American History from Texas Tech
University. In her book, Unruly Waters:A Social aod Environment;dHistory
of the Brazos Rivei; Dr. Lang utilizes her expertise in environmental science
and history to provide a holistic look at a unique waterway. The Brazos is the
longest river within the state of Texas. It flows from the deserts and canyons
of northwest Texas-populated by ranchers, farmers, and Native Americanssouth through prairies, plantations, and coastal wetlands on its way to tie Gulf
of Mexico. This trajectory steers the Brazos through the intersection of
southern and western geography and culture in the United States. The differing geological realities within the Brazos River basin, and the competing economic and political goals of the people at different points along the river, have
posed significant challenges to its development since the early 1800s. In Unruly Waters, Dr. Lang chronicles the attempts, and many failures, at developing the Brazos River, and the cultural, economic, and technological consequences of those attempts.
Chapter one opens on a group of men during the Civil War tasked with
mapping Texas. The group's analysis of the Brazos River provided the first
glimpse of the ecological, geographic, and cultural diversity along the different
sections of the river. Dr. Lang uses this imagery to foreshadow a discussion of
the differences between the Upper, Middle, and Lower Brazos River. The
distinctions between the three segments of the river are significant to understanding the difficulties each has experienced in development, and how efforts
to develop each region has affected the others.
The Lower Brazos River empties into to the Gulf of Mexico after flowing
through wetlands, wooded areas, oxbow lakes, and areas of rich fertile soils.
The soils around the Lower Brazos are ideal for agricultural production.
However, its flat landscapes and fertile but unstable soils make the region susceptible to flooding. The Middle Brazos River is characterized by a combination of prairie lands and forests. The significant majority of the river's tributaries empty into the Brazos in this section, which also experiences the largest
flows of any segment of the river. While the heavier flow creates an environment with no shortage of water, it also fosters flood risk and creates stretches
of rough waters that make navigation difficult. The Upper Brazos River flows
through canyon lands mad red clay soils. Though located in a more arid climate where drought is common, the rolling topography and steep riverbed
walls make the Upper Brazos River taner, more predictable, and less suscep-
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tible to flooding. Consequently, the Upper Brazos has become a popular region for farmers and ranchers.
In chapter two, Dr. Lang highlights the cultural heritage along the different segments of the river in order to set up a discussion of the different development strategies Texans would eventually employ. Since (he early 1800s,
Texans have immortalized the Brazos in folk tales, songs, photographs, and
paintings. Fnous artists, laborers, Native Americans, and everyday people
have commented through different mediums on the heritage of the region.
The lower half of the river basin is most comparable to the landscapes and
culture of the Deep South. Early Texans saw the opportunity to maximize
economic production by establishing prison farms and utilizing convict labor.
At these camps, prisoners sang songs that told stories of work on cotton mad
sugar plantations. Eventually photographers captured the same stories. Photographs portray the harsh conditions in which they worked, but also show
prisoners bathing in the sun or playing sports during their free time.
There is a distinct geographic and demographic shift from the Lower
Brazos to the Upper Brazos. Contrary to the Lower Brazos, aspects of American western culture emerge along the Upper Brazos River. The transition
manifests itself in artwork mid literature that depict beautiful desert scenes and
discuss the interactions and activities between American emigrants and Native
Americans. Dr. Lang points out that the river is a centerpiece of artistic expression throughout the entire river basin. Through allegory or direct communication, Brazos-centric artwork depicted an admiration for the river, but
also a frustration over the lack of control of its waters.
In chapter three, Dr. Lang provides a survey of what fostered the original
desire to develop the Brazos River, and illustrates why the first undertakings
proved cumbersome. Geological factors make the Brazos difficult to develop
at every point along the river. The fertile soils of the Lower Brazos River basin attracted immigrants from the United States, Europe, and Mexico in the
early 19th century. Boosters and politicians knew that if they could make the
waterway consistently navigable, it would provide farmers and ranchers access
to domestic and foreign markets. However, the region experienced a comnbination of drought periods and flood seasons that hurt agriculture and created
dramnatic fluctuations in water levels, rendering navigation difficult and sometimes impossible.
In response, boosters and politicians devised development plans mnodeled
after Southern port cities. Two of the first projects included a ten-mile canal
from the Brazos to Galveston (one of the largest ports in Texas), and a series
of jetties where the river empties into the Gulf of Mexico. The goal of these
projects was to provide people inland with access to a port, as well as to provide ships an inland entry point. In both cases, loose soils on the river bottom
made finishing and maintaining these projects expensive and time consuming
because the waterways required frequent dredging. A combination of rising
and falling water levels and soil deposits on the river floor often made navigation possible for only small vessels.
In chapter four, Dr. Lang details the continued determination to render
the Brazos navigable. Beginning in 1890 and into the twentieth century,
stakeholders shifted their focus to the Middle Brazos River. Instead of dredging the low-lying Lower Brazos, they attempted to implement a series of locks;
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and dams that could calm the river and provide avenues around difficult
stretches. Again, natural limitations, including erodible soil and changing elevations, prevented the projects from finishing within their budgets. At the end
of the chapter, Dr. Lang emphasizes that failure did not fatigue the stakeholders' resolve, but it did force them to reflect on their efforts to turn the Brazos
into a riparian highway.
Flooding and drought remained the prominent problems in the river basin. The failure of navigation projects spurred a political outcry by 1929 that
shifted the focus of development from navigation to flood control. In chapter
five, Dr. Lang chronicles perhaps the most successful period of development
between 1929 and 1958, during which the focus of development shifted from
the lower two-thirds of the river to the Upper Brazos River. There, developers envisioned a series of dan projects that more closely resembled development on the Colorado and Tennessee Rivers, rather than Southern-style development like that on the Mississippi.
The dam projects along the Upper Brazos and its tributaries were designed to quell flooding throughout the entire river basin, conserve water for
irrigation, reclaim and conserve soil for agriculture, and produce hydroelectric
power. The first few projects accomplished these objectives, but also ended
up costing much more than originally planned. However, it was not economic
considerations that eventually derailed this phase of development, but disagreements over its purposes. Some thought the projects focused too much on
energy development, while others argued that they focused on flood control at
the expense of hydroelectric power. Additionally, interested stakeholders in
the Lower Brazos region were concerned that development on the Upper
Brazos would diminish water supplies downstream. Ultimately, political disagreements and limited resources halted several plans for more dan projects.
In chapter six, Dr. Lang discusses the most ambitious of the Brazos River
development plans. In the second half of the twentieth century, concerns
about water supply became a real threat due to an increasing population in
West Texas and other areas. In response, national and state politicians proposed a series of importation and diversion schemes. The idea was to take
water from areas with surplus to areas of the country that often experienced
shortage. Groups proposed plans that would divert and import water from
other major United States waterways to West Texas and Eastern New Mexico
and store the water in underground aquifers. One plan, the MississippiBrazos diversion project, proposed developing a North Texas Canal that
could transport water from the Mississippi River to West Texas.
None of the diversion plans ever took hold, in part because of the significant costs for the technology and infrastructure necessary to move forward. In
addition to technological and monetary challenges, political barriers proved to
be the greatest obstacles for these projects. People in the West needed more
water, but people in East Texas and people from out of state erected several
roadblocks to prevent moving too much water out of their ecosystems.
The final chapter of the book is aptly named, "A Defiant Brazos and the
Persistence of its People." In this chapter, Dr. Lang reflects on over one hundred years of attempted development on the Brazos, and identifies several interrelated themes underlying each attempt. The combination of floods and
droughts has motivated every development attempt. From the Upper Brazos
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to tie Lower Brazos, problems have spawnved great conviction amongst successive generations to improve upon the work of the generation belore, but
the nature and magnitude of the projects thwarted every attempt. In the end,
Dr. Lang determines that the stories of the many attempts at development
along the Brazos River are not stories of failure. The stories are about a steadfast conviction that they may eventually optimize conditions, and that the lives
of individuals will improve once they employ the right solution.
Unruly
iV14ters:A Socia&and En vfronmenial Histoiy of'the Balos River
transcends a discussion of how people utilized technology in an attempt to
preserve and perfect water resources in a region. In Unrlv Waltiers, Dr. Lang
exanines how the Brazos River's stakeholders have worked together through
history to shape the lives of people who live near, develop, and seek to control
it. Dr. Lang endeavors to show how politics, innovation, individuals, and
community needs have coalesced in a bigger picture. This is not a narrative
about how a political machine, or a technological giant conquered-or failed to
conquer-a stubborn river. Rather, the book presents a sociopolitical analysis
of how all of the parties involved are actually interested in the same end: maximizing the safety and utility of a significant waterway.
Robert Montgoineiy
Juan Estevan Areliano, Enduring Acequias: Wisdom of the Land,
Knowledge of the Water, Univ. of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque, NM
(2014); 232 pp; ISBN 978-0826355072.
Juan Estevan Arellano is a journalist who spent most of his life working
with the irrigation networks in Northern New Mexico and studying the world
history that led to the development of acedluias and irrigation networks in his
homeland. EndulingAcequias: Wisdom of die Land,Knowledge of'the Waler mixes Arellano's own personal experiences working the land with a broader historical perspective analyzing irrigation techniques in the Indus Valley, the
Iberian Peninsula, and the American Southwest. Arellano incorporates his
own research, travel experiences, and practical experience to explore the history of acequias, or water canals. He Further uses this infbmmation to describe
his own querenck,, or love of place.
In Part I, "The Wisdom of the Land," Arellano outlines the book's trajectory while giving an autobiographical account, describing his philosophy on
water distribution and describing the original land grants in New Mexico. He
situates himself on the Emhudo Land Grant and places an emphasis on his
use of the Acequia Junta y Cinaga. Situated in his place, Arellano then explains how his Indo-hispano heritage influenced his view that water is a common resource to be shared and not sold for profit. After divulging his personal predilections, Arellano gives a history of his native landscape, describing the
first Spanish land grant and settlement of the region by Don Juan Narrihonda
Salazar de Ofiate. This history transitions to a description of the land grants
encapsulating his current property.
In the next chapter, "Sacred Water," Arellano catalogues historical water
management techniques ranging from Yemen to South America. Believing
that his New Mexican open-air irrigation culture derives from Moorish influ-
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ence, Arellano begins his analysis in ancient Yemen. He notes that irrigation
in Yemen dates back at least 5,200 years, and points out that, linguistically,
many words describing irrigation techniques come from the Sabaen language
that originated in Yemen. Arellano relates this tradition to his own culture,
pointing out that acequias originated in Yemen and then made their way to
North Africa, the Iberian Peninsula, and eventually the Americas.
Continuing with his historical analysis, Arellano explains how similar irrigation practices developed in Europe, particularly Switzerland. Recounting
how the Swiss treated water as a common right, he explains the function of
consortages, common-property corporations that managed the canals. Furthermore, he emphasizes how landscapes dictate different types of irrigation
by delving into Les Hortillonnages,French marshland gardens. The example
of Les Hortilonnagesshows how open-air canals function in marshland habitats as opposed to Arellano's native desert landscape. Arellano then transitions to the Muslim influence on European agriculture and irrigation by analyzing texts by Muslim authors dating back to 1 A.D., explaining how these
texts impacted agriculture in the Iberian Peninsula. To exemplify the influence, Arellano outlines Ses Feixes of[Ibla, a network of channels off the coast
of Spain created using Muslim irrigation principles.
Finally, Arellano transiti6ns to Incan irrigation themes. He traces the development of rock acequias cut through tie Andes and their importance for
watering terraces. As exanples of these achievements, Arellano goes into
depth describing the city of Choquequirao, the Terraces of Moray, the Tip6n
Aqueducts, and Argentina's acequias. Staying in the Western Hemisphere,
Arellano next describes the Mesoamerican irrigation principles thit preceded
New Mexico's acequias. He notes how Mesoamericans coupled acequias with
chinampas, an artificially created floating garden, in order to irrigate the landscape. All these examples show the diverse influences that collectively shaped
irrigation in Arellano's native New Mexico.
Arellano begins Part II, "The Knowledge of the Water," with Chapter 2,
"The Canino Real de Tierra Adentro: The Water Road." In this chapter,
Arellano offers a thorough discussion of early irrigation principles in Mexico
and New Mexico. He points out that the Spanish and Native Americans had
distinct irrigation systems and that these systems integrated as the two interacted. Arellano analyzes how Spanish law, particularly the Law of the Indies, influenced the development of irrigation and water systems in the New World
by fostering notions of communal responsibility and public use. He places a
great deal of importance on early development of acequias and canals because
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 protected existing acequias and
their easements. Arellano further emphasizes that these original acequias
were handled communally. He then defines the Rio Arriba bioregion, stretching from south of Santa Fe to the San Luis Valley in Colorado, and describes
the development of acequias mad agriculture in the bioregion that he focuses
upon for the rest of the book.
In the third chapter, "The Embudo Land Grant," Arellano describes the
laws regulating irrigation in the New World and then describes the land in the
Embudo Lid Grant. He argues that three main laws influenced Spanish development of irrigation: King Philip II's Ordenanmas,tie Law of the Indies of
1681, and the Plan of Pitic. Focusing on the Law of the Indies, Arellano
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notes how processes concerning land occupation, water sharing, grazing, and
relations with Native Americans functioned. Arellano then describes the
landscape of the Sebastidn Martin Land' Grant, which is within the Embudo
Land Grant, noting how its devefopment comported with the aforementioned
laws. In addition, Arellano uses this chapter to explain economic development within the Embudo Land Grant, demonstrating how the switch from a
traditional agricultural econoiy to the modern industrial economy led to degradation of the landscape and the acequias.
In the fourth chapter, "Li Merced," Arellano highlights many facets of
New Mexican agriculture, primarily the acequia. "Merced' is the Spanish
word for "land grant," and Arellano emphasizes three parts of the land grants:
the commons, the acequias, and the sueras,or the private land irrigated by
the acequias. He explains the system of lnayordomos, or administrators who
handle the acequias. Arellano's knowledge of this role is very personal, as he
currently serves as the mayordomo of his acequia. From this personal
knowledge, Arellano describes how co-owners of acequias work together to
manage them and elucidates the technicalities of acequias' function and construction. In addition, Arellano thoroughly discusses the four different types
of terraces served by acequias: those on slopes, in valleys, on terraces along
bends in the river, and on mini-terraces. Lastly, Arellano reminds the reader
of the history of agriculture and emphasizes how this history came to be,
thanks in large part to the acequias. He illustrates the blending of traditional
crops such as corn, sunflowers, squash, gourds, and chiles with Old World
crops such as soybeans, coffee, and limes to create what is now a uniquely
New Mexican cuisine.
In the final chapter, "Mi Querencia," Arellano gives a final autobiography
and praises the acequias for helping form his connection to the land that his
family has cultivated since 1725. He laments that many acequias are falling
into disrepair, pleading for people to care about the resource and to preserve
traditional modes of agriculture. In addition, Arellano makes many connections between his multicultural heritage and the nmltiethnic forces that combined to create the aceqiia landscape.
EnduringAcequi*s is an intimate collection of local knowledge and expenence. Arellano's deep connection to the land and its water led him on a
path of academic research and linguistic adventure that he used to better understand his own patch of land on the Embudo Land Grant. He effectively
combines old Spanish laws, Muslim agricultural literature, and a knowledge of
open-air irrigation around the planet to further the provincial knowledge of his
own landscape. Arellano's unique blend of storytelling frequently jump from
New Mexico to the Old World and back again, but the transitions consistently
connect the common themes of developing irrigation practices, history, and
the communal nature of acequias. His mlange approach to his own querencia and culture serves as a fascinating window into the irrigation culture of
New Mexico and the milieu of cultural phenomena that formed it.
Joey R :ch
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Desert Water: The Future of Utah's Water Resources, Univ. of Utah
Press (Hal Crimmel ed., 2014); 240 pp; ISBN 978-1607813750.
Hal Crimmel is a Brady Presidential Distinguished Professor of English at
Weber State University and founding co-chair of its Environmental Issues
Committee. He is the editor of and contributor to Desert Water: The Future
of Utah's Water Resources, a collection of essays by professors, social scientists, and policy makers studying current and future water resources in Utah.
Crimmel aims in his book to increase public awareness of the importance of
water and water-related issues in Utah. Through the perspective of each contributor, the book assesses the historical and current state of Utah's water resources, identifies current and future threats, critiques certain consumption
policies and practices, and proposes solutions for managing the unrelenting
demand on the state's waters. While )esert Waterprimarily focuses on water
resources in Utah, decisions made within the state's borders are likely to impact surrounding states. Accordingly, many of the problems and solutions
discussed in the book are relevant to water resources in similarly arid western
states.
In the first chapter, "The Coming Challenge: Population Growth and Water Decline," Eric Ewert, a professor of geography at Weber State University,
explores the inverse relationship between Utah's declining fresh water resources and its rapid population growth. These two trends, Ewert suggests,
are set to combine with each other in what he refers to as the "waterpopulation collision." Drawing on 2012 predictions, Ewert points out that
due to a high birth rate and an influx of immigrants, the population in Utah is
expected to double by 2060. At the sane time, trends in the state show a continuous decline in its water supply and reservoir capacity. This is due, in part,
to less runoff, earlier snow melts, evaporation, sedimentation in the reservoirs,
and Utahans enjoying the second highest per-capita water use rate in the country. While Utah does not presently have a water shortage problem, Ewert
contends, consumption will naturally grow alongside the population. So unless changes are made now, Utah's unsustainable water use rates will lead to a
shortage crisis in the future. In his analysis, Ewert rejects some of the state's
supply-focused policies and practices, such as building more dams and diversions. He instead recommends that Utah adopt more demand-focused policies, such as climate-appropriate landscaping, water education, and rate incentives.
In Chapter 2, Stephen Trimble, an award-winning author and teacher of
writing at the University of Utah Honors College, authors "The Miracle at the
End of the Line." The chapter is a personal story that considers the sources
of water in the rural town of Torrey. In arid southern Utah, Torrey only receives an average rainfall of seven and a half inches per year. The rain and
running water from Thousand Lake Mountain currently delivers fresh clean
water to a population of one hundred and eighty people, a local agriculture
system, and a few surrounding communities. Trimble describes how Mormons first pioneered the town in the 1870s and settled it through the cooperative construction of ditches and canals. As water storage and control continued to drive growth in the area, disputes inevitably arose over water allocation,
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giving rise to discussions of equity and water politics. Trimble uses the rest of
the chapter to illustrate how history and priorities continue to make our relationship With water complex and sometimes contentious. Using specific examples from the town, he ponders how much growth will come to Torrey,
how much growth the town really wants, and how much it can reasonably sustain. In the lauger context, Trimble's story of accessible water in Torrey symbolizes how growth and economic development in small towns across the arid
west depend on infrastructure and access to affordable, clean water.
Craig Denton, author and professor of communication at the University
of Utah, examines the nature and use of the Bear River in Chapter 3, "Bear
River: Learning from a River That Closes Our Circle." Bear River is a lesserknown watercourse that begins and ends in northern Utah. Although it provides nearly sixty percent of the water to the Great Salt Lake, by the time it
reaches residential areas the river is opaque, slow moving, mid uninspiring.
Denton contends that rivers that are revered, like the Colorado and Green
Rivers, receive more protection than less celebrated rivers, such as the Bear
River. Therefore, Denton's goal in this collection is to raise awareness and
protection for the Bear River. He accomplishes this in two ways. First, Denton examines the river's regional importance to avian ecosystems, aquatic life,
water rights holders, and the local population. Second, he discusses some of
the river's most pressing threats, including additional proposed diversions, irrigation runoll, diminished biodiversity, and lower quantities of water due to
climate change. Denton adds to these concerns by critiquing western water
laws. He criticizes western water law's emphasis on prior appropriation. Specifically, Denton argues that the courts should see conservation as a beneficial
use, especially since the Great Salt Lake lacks its own water rights. Denton
ends the chapter by applauding the protection etlors of various governments
and environmental groups. He also proposes several steps that Utahans cal
take to protect the river, including conservation awareness and increasing residential water rates.
In Chapter 4, George Haldley authors "The Restoration of All Things:
The Case of the Provo River Delta." Handley is a professor of interdisciplinary humanities at Brighani Young University. In this piece, Handley ponders why so many Utahans are apathetic towards the health of their local water
ecosystems mad addresses what he sees as personal roadblocks to conservation. In one sense, Handley articulates, modern populations do not appreciate rivers because people are not aware of the journeys rivers take, their histories, or of our relationship to rivers. In another sense, he explains how
different doctrines held by members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Litterday Saints, are used to support attitudes that both encourage and reject environmental conservation. For instance, many Mormons believe that the end is
near. This can either motivate a believer's stewardship or it can encourage her
to dismiss long-term environmental concerns altogether. Handley breaks tie
church's theology into twelve different pro-environmental and antienvironmental attitudes. He then expresses his hope for Mormonism to embrace stronger environmental ethics. In the case of the Provo River Delta,
eighty percent of the population is Mormon. Therefore, Handley points out,
any meaningftil restoration in the area may have to include a shift in doctrinal
beliefs. Handley ends the chapter by arguing that pro-environmental beliefs
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are still consistent, if not more aligned, with the church's theology.
Desert Water takes a turn to Utah's most famous body of water in Chapter 5, "Climate Change and the Future of Great Salt Lake." Geographer Daniel Bedford expands on Denton's discussions in Chapter 3 by examining the
large but mysterious Great Salt Lake. The Great Salt Lake is a terminal lake,
meaning that water flows into but not out of it. Consequently, Bedford explains, the Great Salt Lake is susceptible to human and natural influences of
which readers should be aware. Natural influences on the lake include,
among other things, a warming global clinate system, lake-effect precipitation,
river inflows, and a shallow depth that contributes to greater evaporation and
drastic water level changes. Direct human influences, such as irrigation and
residential consumption, have a much smaller effect on the health and level of
the lake. However, as the population in Utah is estimated to double in the
next forty years, more water will be required to support its residents. Ultimately, Bedford argues, the health of the Great Salt Lake will depend on how
much humans care for it. Aside from its iconic image and economically valuable minerals, many locals do not care for the lake and do not see it as a
unique resource that should be protected. Bedford contends that this apathy
may come at a great cost, not just to humans but to birds, fish, and other wildlife that depend on it for their survival.
Zachary Frankle, founder and executive director of the Utah Rivers
Council, interrupts the book's serious tone in Chapter 6 with "Chicken Little's
New Career: How Utah's Water Development Industry Shows False Fears
and Misinformation." In this chapter, Frankle argues against developments
similar to the Lake Powell Pipeline project, which is expected to carry water
from Lake Powell to southwest Utah. The project will cost Utah's taxpayers
over one billion dollars. Frankle insists that Utah has all the money Mid water
it needs to solve its water problems without the project. Utah's lack of water,
he argues, is nothing more than a myth perpetuated by a large mid elusive water development industry and repeated by an under-informed media. Frankle
exanines the tax and fee structures behind projects like the Lake Powell pipeline and Price River dan proposal, which proposes to dana the headwaters of
the Price River. In doing so, he describes how taxpayers are being asked to
spend millions of dollars on projects when simple modernization efforts, such
as phasing out water waste, could solve the sane problem and impact fewer
ecosystems. In addition, and in unison with other authors in this collection,
Frankle believes raising water rates is one of the more simple and effective solutions available for reducing consumption. Property taxes and federal subsidies currently subsidize the water rates in Utah. As a result, residents pay just
a fraction of the real cost of the water that they use and are, not surprisingly,
more wasteful. Frankle concludes with a reminder that not all conservation
projects are actually good for conservation and that some should be considered with great skepticism.
The Great Salt Lake receives even greater attention in Chapter 7, "Time
to Rethink Policy: Ideas for Improving the Health of Great Salt Lake." In this
chapter, attorney Rob Dubuc examnines characteristics of the lake, identifies
differing perceptions of its value, mid discusses threats to the lake's long-term
condition. With a focus on economic considerations, Dubuc weighs the economic value of the lake against its inherent value and general health. For ex-
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ainple, operations that extract salt and other minerals out of the Great Sale
Lake yield approximately $1.13 billion dollars in economic output annually
and create approximately 5,300 jobs in the area. With an eye toward proposals to expand these operations, Dubuc ponders the consequence of such
widespread projects, especially in combination with other local threats, including industrial discharge, nutrient loading, diking, and a lack of water rights for
the lake. Dubuc concludes by asking the open question of whether state law
should protect a mininum lake level..*
In Chapter 8, "The Colorado: Archetypal River," writer and former river
guide Brooke Williams describes the personal and philosophical appreciation
she has for the Colorado River. Writing from the perspective of the Colorado
River's banks, Williams portrays the Colorado as an archetype river. It supports tie life of thirty million people and ecosystems across seven states, and
to some it represents a collective unconscious that contains universal symbols
of the evolutionary history of our species. Intertwined with facts and anecdotal stories, Williams's chapter attempts to develop for the reader a deeper appreciation of the natural and spiritual importance of the Colorado River. Experiences and connections that some people take for granted, she argues, may
forever be lost due to iisuse of the water. For instance, the Colorado was
listed as America's Most Endangered River in 2013. Ultimately, Williams's
essay aims at inspiring a sense of urgency to protect these western water resources. Many readers will appreciate her philosophical approach.
In Chapter 9, "Going with the Flow: Navigating to Stream Access Consensus," Sara Dant considers the balance of fairness between the rights of private
landowners and the public's- right to access Utah's rivers and streams. With
an emphasis on the Weber River, Dant explores these issues through a historical examination of Utah's water use and policy. Historically, the Weber River was widely used for timber floating, irrigation, and sports fishing. These uses were often guaranteed by the courts, but were challenged in 2010 when the
Utah State Legislature passed House Bill 141, the Public Water Access Act.
This strean access bill essentially prohibits and even criininalizes all public
recreational use of rivers and streams that cross private property, except for
floating and incidental touching. In her chapter, Dant proposes that legislators
respect the rights of private property owners, but at the same time recognize
that people should have the right to access and enjoy public waters, especially
in arid climates where water is scarce. While some areas of the law remain
undecided, such as owner liability, fencing issues, and the extent of riverbeds,
Dant urges courts and policymakers to draw inspiration from Utah's water history and not to forget their roles as trustees for the public.
Lake Powell is the focus of Chapter 10, "The Return of Glen Canyon:
The Beginning of a More Sustainable Future for the Colorado," by senior
journalism lecturer and Southwest Editor for Backpacker Magazine, Annette
McGivney. The Glen Canyon Dam was built in southvyest Utah to provide
hydroelectricity and to create Lake Powell, a reservoir and storage buffer between the Upper and Lower Colorado River Basins. One of six dams built
along the Colorado River, the Glen Canyon Dam ensures that the Lower Basin gets the water to which it is legally entitled under the 1922 Colorado River
Compact. McGivney argues, however, that holding water in six dams across
the arid region may not be the best solution. The reservoir is currently over-
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allocated and rising temperatures in the region lead to greater evaporation and
lower input levels. In 2005, for example, Lake Powell was only at thirty percent capacity. To better manage scarce water reserves in the state, McGivney
suggests decreasing consumption rates and removing the dam, thus lowering
the water in Glen Canyon to its original level. McGivney argues that doing so
will recover lost ecosystems and archeological sites. Although Lake Powell
attracts millions of visitors every year, thereby boosting the local economy,
McGivney argues that the beauty of the canyon will attract new visitors and
support a more sustainable life cycle.
Chapter 11, "Land of 20,000 Wells: Impacts on Water from Oil and Gas
Development in Eastern Utah" by editor Hal Crimmel, explores natural resource drilling in the Uinta Basin and Green River watershed. Current research shows that Utah has four hundred billion barrels of oil shale and its tar
sands deposits contain another twelve to nineteen billion barrels. In the process of extracting these resources, companies use and dispose of vast amounts
of water in an already arid region. Criminel recognizes the relative pennanence of natural resource drilling in today's economy, so he suggests certain
policies and regulations to better manage threats posed to the state's water resources. Equating certain oil and gas rhetoric with that of the tobacco industry, he argues that even with precautions, there are no guarantees of safety
from water supply contamination throughout all phases of the extraction process. While the region examined in this chapter is somewhat remote, natural
resource drilling continues to take place across the West, even in highly populated areas. Especially because water crosses state lines, Crimmel argues that
oil and gas development should not be treated as a local issue.
In Chapter 12, "Moving Water," author Jana Richman takes on a proposal by Pat Mulroy, General Manager for Southern Nevada Water Authority, to pump water out of Snake Valley in western Utah and carry it to Las Vegas through a three-hundred-mile pipeline. Proponents of the pipeline claim
that the water can be pumped and transported with minimal to no impact in
the area. Richman, however, argues that no one can be certain of the extent
of devastation the pipeline may cause. She examines the failure of similar
groundwater pumping projects, predominately out of Owens Valley in California, and examines whether or not this project will have similar results. The
Owens Valley pumping project resulted in consequences such as the drying up
of Owens Lake, disappearance of native flora and fauna, local farm and orchard crop failures, and massive traveling dust storms. Richman argues that
even with the proposed monitoring precautions in place, it could take centuries after the pumps are shut off to slow and stop the damage that has been
done, not to mention the inherent damage of digging 300 miles of pipeline.
Richman does not offer specific alternatives for a Las Vegas water shortage
problem but contends that there are better solutions than the proposed pipeline.
In the final chapter, "A New Water Ethic," Daniel McCool, professor and
director of the Environmental and Sustainability Program at the University of
Utah, challenges the anthropocentric framework with which we currently think
about water use in the West. Water, he posits, is irregular and unpredictable,
but also essential to every organism. Going forward, we need to have a coherent vision and framework in which to develop western water law and policy.
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McCool devotes his essay to discussing why we need change mad what the new
western water ethic should look like. Broadly, he encourages evolution to a
more bio-centric concept of ethics.
For anyone interested in learning more about the condition of water resources in Utah, Desert Walter is anuoverall valuable resource. It oflers a v'ariety of well-cited works by various authorities in the state. The book does not
advocate for a particular method or even ofler a conclusion about the optimal
use and regulation of water in the state. Instead, it offers a fair evaluation of
pressing issues and conservation motivations from a multitude or )erspectives.
Additionally, the short collection of essays allows the reader to delve directly
into the particular topics most interesting to them. For those who choose to
read the book in its entirety, the chapters compliment each other with minimal overlap.

Koli Vebb

CASE NOTE
THE WAR OVER THE DELTA SMELT: BALANCING
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT WITH THE
HUMAN INTEREST

LILLIE PARKER
I. Introduction .....................................................
416

II. Background .....................................................
417

A . The Central Valley Project ....................................
418
B. T he State W ater Project ......................................
418
Im . Statem ent of the Case .............................................
419

A . Standard of Review ..........................................
420
B. The District Court Failed to Give Proper Deference to the PA/S's
Scientific Determ inations .....................................
421
C. The District Court Misinterpreted the Non-Jeopardy Factors ....
424
IV.Analysis: The Highest Priority Policy: Here to Stay ........................
425

V . Conclusion ......................................................
427

I. INTRODUCTION
The Central Valley Project ("CVP") and State Water Projects ("SWP")
(collectively "the Projects") are two of the largest and most important water
projects in the United States.' Combined, the projects supply water to more
than twenty million agricultural and domestic consumers in central and southern California.! The estuary at the confluence of the San Francisco Bay and
Sacramnento-San Joaquin Delta ("Bay Delta"), the source of the water for the
Projects, also serves as the sole habitat of the Delta Smelt, a threatened species
under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA").3
San Luis & Dela-Mendota Water Authority v. Jewell is the latest chapter
in the "continuing war over protection of the Delta Smelt."' In 2005 the Bureau of Reclamation ("Reclanation") requested a Biological Opinion ("Bi1. San Luis & Deta-Mendota Water Authority v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 592 (9th Cir.
2014).

2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
at 591.
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Op") from the United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") to deterine
whether continued operation of the Projects would jeopardize the Delta
Smelt.5 In 2008 the FWS released the final BiOp, a four hundred-page opinion concluding that continued operation of the Projects would threaten the
Delta Smelt and proposing reasonable and prudent alternatives ("RPAs") as
required by the ESA.' The plaintiff-appellees ("Appellees"), a group of water
districts, water contractors, and agricultural interests, brought suit to prevent
the implementation of the BiOp and its RPAs.7 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of California ("district court") found the 2008
BiOp arbitrary and capricious.8
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ("Court") reviewed the district court's findings to determine (i) whether the FWS's findings were arbitrary and capricious under the ESA; (it) whether the FWS violated the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") by not completing an
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS"); and (iii) whether Reclamation
complied with NEPA in implementing the FWS's BiOp. The Court held that
(i) the BiOp was not arbitrary and capricious; (it) NEPA did not require FWS
to prepare an EIS in conjunction with the BiOp; and (iii) Reclamation's provisional adoption and implementation of the BiOp triggered its obligation to
comply with NEPA.
,Lan Lui & Delta-Mendota Water Authority serves as a recent example
of the challenges water users and Federal agencies face in trying to both satisfy
appropriated water rights and protect endangered species. Focusing on the
Court's discussion of the proper standard of review, and its analysis in regard
to whether the BiOp was arbitrary and capricious, this Case Note examnines
the ESA's ability to affect water rights and allocation under the ESA policy,
first articulated in Tennes.see VdlevAuthiorit v. Hill, that endangered species
receive the highest priority in relation to an agency project.

1I. BACKGROUND
The mild"climate, abundant natural resources, and scenic beauty attracted
settlers to California.'" However, early farmers experienced difficulty growing
crops in the arid conditions and quickly realized the need for a reliable water
source, including water storage, delivery, and protection from periodic
floods." Though farmers were in dire need of this water infrastructure, miners
were the first to truly harness California's water resources.'" In order to sluice
gold, miners developed hundreds of miles of flumes and ditches to divert the

5.

Id. at 592.

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173-74 (1978).
10. The Central V-dlev Projecit, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION
http://vw.usbr.gov/mp/cvp/.

11.

(Jan.

3,

2014),

Id.

12. Histoiy of the CaliKiaom State W'ater Project, DEPARTMENTF1 WATER RESOURCES,
hit)://www.water.ca.gov/swvp)/history.cf'i (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
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necessary water." When gold became scarce, the miners turned to farming
and converted the infrastructure to serve irrigation purposes.'4 As California's
population grew and its cities developed, local infrastructure developed to
bring water to booming metropolitan areas.'5
A. THE CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT
Lieutenant Robert B. Marshall of the United State Geological Survey first
proposed the idea of a statewide water development project in 1919.6 The
proposal involved transporting water from the Sacramento River system to the
San Joaquin Valley, and then transporting the water over the Tehachapi
Mountains into southern California.7 In 1931, State Engineer Edward Hyatt
introduced a report, titled "State Water Plan," which identified the necessary
infrastructure and cost. 8 In order to implement and authorize the plan, the
state legislature passed the Central Valley Act of 1933," and voters thereafter
authorized a $170 million bond to carry out the project. But the Great Depression forced construction of the CVP to halt." The federal government
took over the project and provided the necessary funds in 1935, and continues
to oversee CVP operations through Reclamation today.' The CVP now consists of twenty-two reservoirs with a total capacity of eleven million acre-feet,
which provide water to irrigate three million
acres of farmland and to meet the
22
needs of nearly two million customers.
B. THE STATE WATER PROJECT

While the CVP provided water infrastructure for farmers, municipalities,
and flood control, it proved inadequate to meet the needs of a growing population."2 Following World War II, California experienced a population boom,
and water officials soon realized that local water supplies would not be enough
to meet growing needs. Consequently, in 1945 the state legislature authorized an investigation of statewide water resources.15 The Division of Water
Resources, predecessor to the Department of Water Resources, conducted
the investigation and produced three bulletins that laid out the plans for developing a SWP.1
In 1959 the California legislature approved the SWP, and in 1960 voters

13.

Id.

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17.

Id.

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. The Cenal ValIy Project, supra note 10.
22. CaiforniaState Water Project andthe Central Valley Project,DEPARTM F\,r OF WATER
RESOURCES, http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/cvp.cfin" (last visited Oct. 31, 2014).
23. History ofthe CaliforniaState Water Project, supra note 12.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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approved bonds for its construction through the Bums-Porter Act.27 Today,
the SVP consists of twenty-two dams and over seven hundred niles of pipeline, employed to distribute water to twenty-nine urban and agricultural water
suppliers in northern California, the San Francisco Bay area, the San joaquin
Valley, tie Central Coast, and southern California. " In addition to the pipeline, the SWP also boasts "thirty-four storage facilities, reservoirs, and lakes,
twenty pumping plants, four pumping-generating plants, and live hydroelectric
power plants."' Seventy percent of the transported water serves urban users,
with the remaining thirty percent serving agricultural uses." The SWP provides water to approximately two-thirds of California's population-roughly
twenty-live million individuals-and seven hundred and fifty thousand acres of
agricultural land.'

H. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Section 7 of the ESA applies to all "municipal water supplies with a federal nexus."" Section 7 requires federal agencies to consult with the FVS or
National Marine Fisheries Service to ensure that any "actions they authorize,
fund or carry out 'larel not likely to jeopardize the continued existence' of any
threatened or endangered species." ' Pursuant to its obligations under the
ESA and Section 7, the present case began when Reclanation sought a BiOp
From the FWS as part of its long-term operation of the CVP and its coordinated operations of the SWP.3 The E\VS issued a BiOp in 2005, concluding
that operation of the Projects would not have an adverse effect on the Delta
Smelt.' The Natural Resources Defense Council challenged the FWS's conclusion, and the district court found the 2005 BiOp arbitrary and capricious."
In 2007, the district court conducted an extensive evidentiary hearing and subsequently issued an "interim remedial order [concerningl ... the effects on
'
the delta smelt of negative flows in tie Old and Middle River" ("OMR").
The district court ordered the FWS to complete a new BiOp in nine months.
That deadline was later extended to a year. 8
The FWS issued the new BiOp on the deadline, December 15, 2008. In
the words of the Court, "Jiun stark contrast to the 2005 BiOp, the 2008 BiOp
27.

7he Big

'Vater 1rojects il Calik'inia, CALIFORNIA WATER IMPACr NETWORK,
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U. Coiw. L. Riv. 361, 380 (2001).
33. Federico Cheevcr, 7he Road to Recovery: A New WFav of/Thinking About the LchlangeredSpecies Act, 23 EcoLOGY L.Q. 1, 17 (1995) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1985)).
34. San Luis & Deha-Mendota Water Authority v. Jcvcll, 747 F.3d 581, 597 (9t Cir.
2014).
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concluded that the 'coordinated operations of the CVP and SWP... jeopardize the continued existence of the Delta Smelt.'" 9 The FWS made five findings of fact regarding the Delta Smelt: (i) diversions of water from the Delta
have increased since the SWP began joint operations with the CVP; (ii) the
Delta Smelt is currently at its lowest population since monitoring began; (iii)
the proposed SWP/CVP operations are likely to reduce inflows to the Delta
as upstream water demands increase; (iv) other baseline stressors, like contaminants, microcystis, aquatic macrophytes, and invasive species, will continue to
adversely affect the Delta Smelt; and (v) "the Delta Smelt will need a more
abundant adult population, an increase in the quality and quantity of spawning, rearing, and migratory habitat, a reduction in contaminants and pollutants,
a reduction in exposure to disease and toxic algal blooms, and a reduction in
entrainment at water-diversion facilities in the Bay-Delta.'..
The FMS also provided six RPAs: (i) protect the adult Delta Smelt life
stage by controlling OMR flows during the vulnerable December-to-May time
period; (ii) protect larval and juvenile Delta Smelt by limiting OMR flows, following the completion of the first RPA, when the Bay Delta water temperatures reach 12 degrees Celsius or when a spent lemale smelt is detected in
trawls or in the salvage facilities; (iii) improve smelt habitat by increasing Bay
Delta outflow during the fall; (iv) restore habitat in the Bay Delta and Suisun
Marsh by establishing a program to create or restore intertidal and associated
subtidal habitat; (v) monitor and report on the implementation and success of
the RPAs, and determine possible improvements.4
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Claims under the ESA and NEPA are reviewed under the standards of
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")."' Section 706(2) of the APA states
that an agency action must be upheld unless "it is arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law."' To determine if the standard of Section 706(2) is met, a reviewing court "must consider
whether the decision is based on a consideration of the relevant tactors and
whether there has been a clear error of judgment.""
A reviewing court must also recognize that the standard of review is highly
deferential, and an agency's decision is "entitled to a presumption of regularity."' The highly deferential standard requires courts to uphold agency findings even if "the evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation. '

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.

Id. at 598
Id. at 598-99.
Id. at 601.
See5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

44. San Luis & Dcla-Mendota W1aterAuth., 747 F.3d at 601 (quoting Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).

45. Id.
46.

Id. (quoting Bear Lake Watch, Inc. v. FERC, 324 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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B. THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO GIVE PROPER DEFERENCE TO THE
FWS'S SCIENTIFIC DIETERMINATIONS
The district court heard five objections to the 2008 BiOp. The first four
dealt with the scientific methods the FWS employed and their subsequent
conclusions. On appeal, the Court held that the district court, in reviewing
these agency decisions, overstepped its bounds and failed to apply the proper
level of deference.'
First, the 2008 BiOp concluded that reducing OMR flows increased the
entrainmnent risk of delta smelt in the pumping operations. 8 In order to mitigate this effect, the BiOp recommended strict pumping limits based on OMR
flows." However, as the Court noted, the "OMR flow limit ha[di a great practical significance, not merely to the delta smelt but to Californians, as it representled] the ultimate limit on the amount of water available to sustain California's millions of urban and agricultural users."0°
The FWS partially based this determination "on the number of delta
smelt salvaged from the fish screening facilities."" The Appellees argued that
the FWS erroneously relied on raw salvage figures as compared to normalized
salvage figures, adjusted for variations in the annual smelt population. Therefore, according to the Appellees, "[alny apparent relationship between OMR
flows and smelt salvage. . . may actually be a relationship between smelt population size and smelt salvage."" The district court agreed and found the analysis relying on raw salvage figures to be arbitrary and capricious and not the result of the best available science, stating that "the use of normalized salvage
data rather than gross salvage data is the standard accepted scientific methodology among professionals in the fields of fisheries biology/lanagement.""
In reviewing the district court's conclusion, the Court noted that it was uncontroverted that "the FWS could have done more in determining OMR flow
limits." However, the Court afforded the highest deference to the FWS because it had to choose "between various scientific models" to make its determuination. The Court recognized that the FWS was facing measurement uncertainty and a smelt population with a threatened existence. 7 Given these
factors, the Court held that the F/S's choice of which scientific tools to use
was within its discretion, and "that an agency may choose to 'counteract the
uncertainties'.., by 'overestimating known parameters without being unreasonable. '""
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.at 593.
Id. at 606.
Id.
Id. at 607.
Id.

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 760 F. Supp. 2d 855, 889 (E.D.
Cal. 2010).
55. Swm Luiv & Delta-Mendota Water Auth., 747 F.3d at 608.
56. Id.at 610.
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Second, the district court found that the BiOp's reliance on two different
models, CALSIM II and DAYFLOW, to predict the location of X2 (the
point in the Bay Delta where the salinity is less than two parts per thousand)
introduced bias requiring a corrective calibration or an explanation. ' The
Court recognized that a comparison between these two models cane with limitations, but that the use of the two models together, even without further calibration, was not arbitrary and capricious." Contrary to the district court, the
Court held that the highest deference must be given to the FlWS's decision to
use these models, because it was a "scientific determination" requiring a higher level of technical expertise," While the CLASIM II and DAYFLOW
comparison may have contained flaws, the Court had little choice but to defer
to the agency in deciding which flawed model to rely upon." Therefore, the
Court disagreed with the district court and held that the F1WS did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in relying on the CLASIM II and DAYFLOW models
to predict the location of X2.
Third, the district court found the BiOp did not explain why different data sets were used to calculate the incidental take statement ("ITS") for juvenile
and adult smelt or why these limits were calculated using an average of the
previous years' smelt salvage. The Court disagreed, stating that the ITS adequately explained the use of the chosen data.' The BiOp explained that the
selected years from the historical record "best approximate expected salvage,"
and that the data set was large "because juvenile smelt 'are less demographically significant than adults.'6 6 The Court held that the FWS's decision to use a
more conservative data set is "exactly the sort that we afford agencies discretion to make." 7 The Court also addressed FVVS's use of an average cumulafive salvage index to create the Concern Level.' According to the Court, the
use of an average counteracts the uncertainties in overestimating known parameters and that the use of such data deserves substantial deference. In applying this deference, the Court held that the ITS was not arbitrary and capricious because it included an adequate explanation and support for its
determination.7
Finally, the district court found that the BiOp did not adequately support
its conclusion that the Projects' operations will affect the Delta Smelt by limiting food supply, increasing pollution and contaminants, and increasing the
detrimental impact of other stressors." The BiOp had determined that the
Projects would present a threat to the Delta Smelt's already-limited food sup-

59. Id. at 618.
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Id.
Id. at 626.
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ply." However, the FWS omitted the statistical analysis that supported this
conclusion. While the district court took issue with this omission, the Court
held that such action was responsible science and not an attempt to hide evidence." The Court noted that an independent peer review panel agreed with
the FWMS's "conceptual model and with the justification of its elements," but
recommended removing the statistical analysis because "the figures meant to
support this analysis Iwerel not convincing."" The Court would not find error
in the FWS following tie recomnmendations of the peer review.7' Further, the
Court noted that nothing in the ESA required tie FNVS to conduct the "particular study tie peer review panel thought inadequately supported by the data." 7 Thus, the Court concluded that no evidence indicated the FXVS was attempting to hide evidence.'8
The BiOp also explored the Projects' impact ol water contanination, and
concluded that water contamination from the Projects would adversely affect
the Delta Smrielt population. '7 The district court took issue with this conclusion because it was "not clear how the BiOp or any other document in the
record linkledi the impacts of contaminants to Project Operations."'
The
Court disagreed."' The Court recognized, and the BiOp admitted, that science is not advanced enough to understand the complicated ecosystem interactions in the Bay Delta. " However, the Court held that "the fact that science
must advance further belore the complicated ecosystem interactions in the
IBay Deltal are fully understood does not necessarily mean that the PANTS
failed to rely on the best available science. " '
The Court then considered the BiOp's conclusions regarding other
stressors affecting the Delta Smelt. The district court found that FWS (i)
failed to consider whether striped bass predation was significant; (ii) did not
discuss "connecting 'seasonal flushing flows ...the natural frequency of upstream and downstream movement of the Ilower salinity zone] and lengthenled] upstream shifts of the lower salinity zone]' to the presence of any
aquatic macrophyte"; and (iii) made no connection between continued Projects operation and microcystis."" The Court stated that it would not review
"with a fine-toothed comb" the studies the FWS relied on, that the lAVS drew
rational conclusions from the best available science, and that the Court would
not deter agencies from recognizing tie limitations of science or their

72. Id. 628.
73. Id.
74. d.at 629.
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76.
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Cal. 2010).
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knowledge.' The Court found that the BiOp's analysis of the connection between the Projects and other stressors was sufficiently clear and thorough,
based on the best available science, and not arbitrary or capricious.'
C. THE DISTRICT COURT MISINTERPRETED THE NON-JEOPARDY FACTORS
The FWS's regulations define RPAs as alternative actions identified during formal consultation 1] that can be implemented in a manner consistent
with the intended purpose of the action, 121 that can be implemented consistent with the scope of the Federal agency's legal authority mid jurisdiction,
131 that is economically and technologically feasible, mid 141 that the Director
believes would avoid the likelihood of jeopardizing the continued existence of
listed species or resulting in the destruction or adverse modification of critical
habitat."
Elements one through three are commonly referred to as the "nonjeopardy" factors." The FVS Consultation Handbook states that "Iilf certain
alternatives are available that would avoid jeopardy aid adverse modification,
but such alternatives fail to meet one of the other three elements in the definifion of 'reasonable and prudent alternative,' the Services should document the
alternative in the biological opinion to show it was considered during the formeal consultation process."' The district court interpreted this to mean that
FWS regulations "required the FWS to engage in a record exposition of the
non-jeopardy factors. ' The district court also stated that the "AiPA requires,
mad the public is enfided under the law to receive, some exposition in the record of why the agency concluded.., that all four regulatory requirements for
a valid RPA were satisfied."' Accordingly, the district court determined that
the FWS failed to sIfliciently consider the non-jeopardy factors when it drafted the RPAs, in violation of both its own regulations and the APA. "
The Court disagreed. First, the Court held that this conclusion misread
the ESA and its implementing regulations.' While the Court acknowledged
that the FWS regulation requires documentation when an RPA fails to meet a
non-jeopardy factor, the Court "failledi to see anywhere that the FWS has required itself to provide an explanation of the non-jeopardy factors when it lays
9
out an RPA."
Sinilarly, the Court held that while the FWS "must insure that
the RPA does not jeopardize the species or its habitat," the ESA does not re-

85. San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth., 747 F.3d at 632.
86. Id.at 630.
87. Id. at 634 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 402.02).
88. Id.
89. U.S. FISH & WV1LI)LIFE SERV. & NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERv., ENDANGERED SPECIES
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90. 1. at 635.
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Cal. 2010).
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quire "that the FWS address the remaining three non-jeopardy factors."'
The Court also found that the district court misinterpreted the third nonjeopardy factor." The district court "faulted the FWS for not accounting for
tie cost of 'interdictling] the water supply for domestic human consumption
and agricultural use for over twenty million people who depend on the Projects for their water supply.""' The Court held, however, that under the ESA,
the FlWS must only consider if the proposed alternative is financially and
technologically possible." The purpose of this consideration is to determine
"whether the RPA 'can be taken by tie Federal agency ... in implementing
the agency action,' not to whether restricting CVP activities will affect its con,,100
surners.
The Court determined that the record showed the RPAs were consistent
with thie purpose of the underlying action: the continued operation of the Projects "to divert, store, redivert, and convey CVP and SWP ...water" without
jeopardizing the Delta Smelt.' The Court stressed that the "economic and
technological feasibility" of an alternative does not include the econonic impacts of Reclamation being unable to continue its CVP operations.'0 Specifically, the FWS is not "responsible for balancing the life of the delta smelt
against the impact of restrictions on CVP/SWP operations."'"3 Rather, "the
FWS's duty is to opine on the viability of the smelt and 'to halt and reverse
the trend toward species extinction, whalever the cost ......
IV. ANALYSIS: THE HIGHEST PRIORITY POLICY: HERE TO STAY
The Court's holding in Sani Luis & Dela-Mendota Water Authority realfirmed the highest priority policy of the ESA first established in Tennessee
Vallev Authoriitv v. Hill (" TVA"). 3° In 71VA), the United States Supreme
Court held that, in passing tie ESA, Congress had afforded tie highest of priorities to endangered species, and that "the plain intent of Congress in enacting Ithe ESAI was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction,
whatever the cost.....
As a result, the Supreme Court held that the ESA prevents courts from balancing the loss of a benefit to humans over the "incalculable" value of endangered species.' °7
In this case, the district court accused the F WS of "'show[ing] no inclination to fully and honestly address water supply needs beyond the species,'
even as it 'interdicts] the water supply for domestic human consumption and
agricultural use for over twenty million people who depend on the Projects for
96.
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their water supply.' ' .. The Court recognized these enormous ramifications,
but concluded that the outcome was unavoidable and "the consequences were
prescribed when Congress determined that 'these species of fish, wildlile, and
plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people.""' The Court held that it could not
"balance the smelt's interests against the interests of the citizens of California."" Consequently, it could reach no other conclusion concerning the survival of the Delta Smelt and the allocation of California's water resources."
The CVP's continued operation is considered "Itihe nation's hottest endangered species conflict today .... California is suffering from drought conditions for the third year in a row,"3 and the state estimates that implementing
the RPAs contained in the 2008 BiOP resulted in the loss of seven hundred
thousand acre-feet of water supply in the winter of 2012-2013 alone."'
The San Joaquin Valley agricultural interests ("the Orchards") characterized the Court's holding as "another exaniple of the anti-human bias of TVA
v. Hill and its staggering assertion that species protection takes absolute precedence over all other considerations," and urged the United States Supreme
Court to use the opportunity to overturn TVA's highest priority policy." The
Orchards argued that the Court's decision undenrines Congress's subsequent
efforts to avoid the impacts currently facing the San Joaquin agricultural community."' According to the Orchards, Congress created the RPA framework
in an effort "to temper [T/A's] radicalism and insensitivity to human and
economic costs," and authorizing the FWS "to ignore those same .costs when
formulating
so-called [RPAsI effectively nullifies Congress's legislative judg'
lnent ....

The Orchards also argued that an RPA cannot be reasonable and prudent
if "no thought has been given to the potentially disastrous economic consequences of its implementation .... Yet, they argue, the Court's holding does
not require the F'WS to consider "the economic consequences of its modifications to a proposed project" even though the consultation process creates

108. San LuiA & Delta-Mendota Water Authorily, 747 F.3d at. 592 (quoting San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 760 F. Supp. 2d 855, 956-57 (E.D. Cal. 2010)).
109. Id. at593 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3)).
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2014), http://www.ocregister.coin/articles/california-644826-water-house.ltnl.
114. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Stewart & Jasper Orchards v. Jewell, No. 14-377,
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"enormous leverage and influence over species-alecting projects ..... Accordingly, the petition concludes, the Court's decision violates prior Supreme
Court precedent prohibiting the F\VS from, "'zealously but unintelligently
pursuling Iitsl environmental objectives' through 'uneconomic... jeopardy
determinations'' ' .0
V. CONCLUSION

The ESA has significant ability to affect not only endangered species, but
also the water supply on which western states rely. Much of the tension between the ESA and human water needs is found in the large operational differences of the ESA and western water law.'"' The prior appropriation system,
designed to put water to a benelicial use, does not always mesh with the ESA's
water right limitations "for the purpose of maintaining adequate flows for
listed species ..... As evidenced by Sam Luid )ela-Mendoa lValerAulhoil.v,
this "regulatory overlay" of the ESA creates great uncertainty for western water
users, especially those who receive water firom a federal project."
Recently, there has been a greater emphasis on avoiding litigation and using a collaborative process to negotiate solutions for water supply issues involving the ESA.'"' If the ongoing litigation over the Delta Smelt has taught us anything, it's that water users, water managers, and federal agencies need to work
together to implement collaborative measures and find innovative methods to
meet the water needs of both humans and the environment.
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COLORADO WATER CONGRESS 2015 ANNUAL CONVENTION:
RETHINKING COLORADO'S WATER
Denver, Colorado

January 29-30, 2015

OPENING GENERAL SESSION: COLORADO'S WATER STATE OF THE STATE

How will Colorado provide water to the 2-3 million people moving to the
state in tie next two decades? Innovation and conservation, said Colorado
Governor John Hickenlooper and state planners during the opening session
of the Colorado Water Congress's 2015 Annual Convention. The discussion,
moderated by Colorado Water Congress President John McClow, included
three speakers of different expertise: Governor Hickenlooper; James Eklund,
Director of the Colorado Water Conservation Board; and Henry Sobanet,
Director of the Office of State Planning and Budgeting. The panelists discussed tie challenges Colorado faces in 2015, how the economic forecast
might affect the Governor's priorities, and the next steps to finalize Colorado's
Water Plan ("Water Plan").
Governor Hickenlooper opened the session with a survey of the Water
Plan and how it will help Colorado handle its water challenges in the coming
years. The Water Plan is the first statewide plan for Colorado's water. Hickenlooper described the development of the Water Plan as "nothing short of
remarkable," noting the long history of discord among stakeholders over
competing interests for water. The Colorado Water Conservation Board developed the first draft of the Water Plan using input from water leaders in
each basin across the state. In response to increasing demands for a finite water supply, the Water Plan offers suggestions for conservation and reuse, alternative water transfer methods (as opposed to "buy-and-dry"), and potential
agricultural, municipal, and infrastructural projects. Hickenlooper noted that
developing the Water Plan was a collaborative effort demonstrating the interdependence of Colorado's urban and rural areas, from the Western Slope to
the Eastern Plains. "When I look at the Colorado Water Plan, I have every
reason to be optimistic," Hickenlooper said.
Hickenlooper emphasized the importance of innovation, as encouraged
by the Water Plan. Home to one of the top five metropolitan areas in the
country for tech startups, Colorado is equipped to prepare for the water challenges ahead, Hickenlooper said. He highlighted one recent innovation in water: IRO, the smart sprinkler by Rachio. Rachio won the Colorado Innovation Network's "Glorious Failure: In Search of Success Innovation Challenge"
with IRO, a sprinkler control system that adjusts for weather and geography
and can be controlled by a smart phone or tablet.
Next to innovation, Hickenlooper emphasized conservation.
When
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asked how Colorado's declining hydrograph will support its population
growth, he said, "We find a way to use a lot less water per person or we don't
have more people coming here. There is no magic." He acknowledged the
rollout of the Water Plan as only the beginning: it is time to access the ideas
that have been put on the table and make them better, he continued. Hickenlooper presented the first dra t of the Water Plan to the public in December 2014, and it remains open for public comment until May 2015.
James Eklund echoed Hickenlooper's comments on the Water Plan.
Eklund emphasized the importance of public feedback on die Water Plan,
likening the initial draft to an "open source code" in product development:
freely available and open for improvement by anyone. Eklund also acknowledged the current and looming challenges Colorado faces-drought, agricultural "buy-and-diy," flooding, and climate change-but countered with the
promise of the robust Water Plan combined with the collaborative and innovative spirit of Coloradans. Eklund highlighted collaborative ellorts already
under way, such as the Water, Infrastructure, and Supply Efliciency project
("WISE") and the Colorado River Cooperative Agreement ("CRCA"). WISE
is a partnership between Denver Water and South Metro Water Supply Authority ("South Metro"), allowing Denver Water to sell its excess unused water
to entities that are part of South Metro. CRCA is an agreement between Denver Water and lorty-two entities on the Western Slope concerning Denver
Water's transmountain diversions and intended to benefit water supply, water
quality, and recreation.
Henry Sobanet augnented the discussion on Colorado's water challenges
by explaining Colorado's current fiscal issues. Sobanet said the current fiscal
plan is not working for the taxpayers. Formulas in the plan create negative resuits for Colorado citizens, particularly in the context of the Taxpayer's Bill of
Rights ("TABOR"). Sobanet explained that two sources of revenue create a
TABOR refund: Colorado's general Fund and cash funds. Colorado's general
fund includes revenue from income and sales taxes, while the cash fund includes revenue from fees. When those sources of revenue combined exceed
the TABOR limit in a given fiscal year, Coloradans receive a TABOR refund.
However, the refund is always drawn from the general fund, regardless of
which source of revenue caused the combined total revenue to exceed the
TABOR limit. With potential refunds on the horizon, Sobanet emphasized
the importance that Coloradans understand how the system works. If a
TABOR refund is generated, the refund will come out of the general fundthe fund responsible for Health and Human Services, Public Safety, Courts,
K- 12 Education, Highway Users Tax Fund, Capital Construction, and Higher
Education. Sobanet suggested the fiscal plan would better maximize the taxpayers' money itf
it were rewritten to eliminate the fonmula problem.
As Colorado's population grows, so does the importance of its water and
fiscal planning. The Water Plan is the beginning of a long-range effort to
meet water supply challenges, but as Governor Hickenlooper said, "water is
always in short supply." Overcoming .Colorado's water challenges requires
conservation, cooperation and innovation from water users statewide.
Molly Kokesh
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CAPITAL, IDEAS: PUBLIC. PRIVATE. PARTNERSHIPS.

As part of its two-day Annual Convention, the Colorado Water Congress
hosted a five-member panel discussing how Colorado businesses and regulatory authorities must recognize and address water scarcity issues as business and
economic issues.
The first speaker, Will Sarni, a director at Deloitte Consulting, took a
commercial view of water scarcity. Deloitte Consulting is a large, international
economic consulting finn aiding in financial advice, human capital, mergers
and acquisitions, and many other areas. Sarni conveyed that water scarcity is
current, real, and a serious business risk worth the attention of companies.
Energy, water, and food are all interconnected and, as such, companies within
these various sectors need to pay close attention to water supply and demand
issues. Sarni stressed the need for public and private sector collaboration on
the issue, and suggested that more companies should incorporate water risk
mad water stewardship into their business models.
The second speaker, Mike Brod of the Colorado Water Resources and
Power Development Authority ("CWRPDA"), spoke of private and public
partnerships as well as future capitalization. The CWRPDA provides low-cost
financing to governmental agencies in Colorado for water and wastewater infrastructure development. Brod opined that there is a current need to think
about changes in tax laws in order to employ more productive private and
public partnerships. Going forward, he remarked that there is also a need for
future and continued public capitalization of projects. The current loan capacity is sustained by grants from Congress, and in order to rejuvenate and replenish loan programs, Broad stressed the need for future capitalization.
The third speaker, Reeves Brown from the Colorado Department of Local Affairs ("DOLA"), spoke on DOLA's work regarding water planning and
infrastructure. DOLA's mission is to strengthen communities and enhance
livability through sustainable community development. Access to water is a
foundational component of DOtA's mission, and DOLA provides technical
and financial assistance for the design and construction of public water infrastructure. DOLA is currently incorporating water infrastructure planning into
flood and fire recovery efforts. DOLA and the Colorado Water Conservation
Board ("CWCB") have made grant funds available to establish stakeholder
coalitions in ten watersheds devastated by floods and fire. They are also developing watershed master plans that will assess the post-disaster damage and
prioritize recovery and restoration.
The fourth speaker, Tin Feehan of the CWCB, spoke of the large capital
investment needed to construct a sustainable water structure. Feehan made
clear that the CWCB is just one piece of a large puzzle within a complex finance fixture, and that a large financial investment will be necessary in order
for Colorado to meet its water needs. Remedially, CWCB will set up a statewide funding committee dedicated to looking at various interest groups.
These interest groups will discuss how to deal with the long-term funding within the state. Feehan mentioned that such solutions might come in the form of
private and public partnerships, constructive legislation, public funding, mad
the maximization of existing grant programs. In closing, Feehan stated that
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the CWCB is facing problems utilizing existing programs and finding additional funding. There is a need to assist entities that already have funding programs and mix them together to become more efficient.
The last speaker, Doug Robothan of the Nature Conservancy, spoke of
how companies and public organizations can use impact investments to generate more tinding for water infrastructure. Robotham explained that impact
investments are adapted into the work of companies, organizations, and Funds
with the intention of generating measureable social and environmental impact
alongside a financial return. Individuals, foundations, private companies, nongovernmental, and governmental organizations can all make impact invest-

ments. Potential impact investors will want to know whether an investment in
water will be viable. Robothamn mentioned four factors that potential impact
investors will look for: (i) the water resource must have a definable and measurable value; (ii) the organization must have a demonstrated transactional
track record; (iii) a low cost of operations, transactions, and scalability; and (iv)
the presence of strong growth drivers and measurable impacts.
Overall, the panel provided a detailed synopsis of how Colorado businesses and regulatory authorities need to continue addressing the business and
economic issues of Colorado's water future.
De von Bell

COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 761 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(holding that (i) the plain language of a Bureau of Reclamation contract required the Bureau only to make available the contractual amounts of water,
not to deliver it; (ii) the trial court improperly focused its damages determination on the amounts of water the appellant actually requested under the contract, as opposed to the amounts it would have requested but for the Bureau
of Reclamation's initial repudiations; and (iii) the United States waived its right
to dispute the trial court's award of cost of cover damages by failing to properly cross-appeal the issue).
In 1983 Central San Joaquin Water Conservation District ("Central") and
Stockton East Water District ("Stockton") (collectively "the Districts") contracted with the United States Bureau of Reclamation ("Reclamation") for appropriations of water from the New Melones Reservoir ("Reservoir") in California's San joaquin Valley. Central's contract called for Reclamation to
make available, after a ten-year buildup period, between fifty-six thousand and
eighty thousand acre-feet of water annually.
To determine the type and location of the conveyance systems needed to
distribute the anticipated water, Central retained an engineering finn, CH2M
Hill, to help determine projected demand. After meeting with the area's agricultural community, surveying their lands, and obtaining letters of intent,
CH2M Hill concluded that Central would need at least seventy thousand acrefeet of water annually from the Reservoir. The conveyance system was completed in 1993 at a cost of $7.4 million.
The year before, in 1992, Congress enacted the Central Valley Project
Improvement Act ("CVPIA"), requiring Reclamation to dedicate eight hundred thousand acre-feet of water to fish, wildlife, and habitat development. As
a result, Reclamation inforned the Districts that it would likely only be able to
provide them with water in the wettest of years. Central brought suit against
Reclamation for breach of contract and a takings claim, seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief and damages. In 2006 the United States Court of Federal
Claims ("trial court") held a trial on liability. The trial court found for Reclaination on the breach of contract claims and dismissed a related takings claim.
The Districts appealed, challenging the trial court's judgment of non-liability
for the years 1994, 1995, and 1999-2004. The United States Court of Ap-
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peals for the Federal Circuit ("Court") afin-ned the trial court's judgment for
the years 1994 and 1995, but reversed its finding of non-liability for the years
1999-2004 and remanded with instructions to determine damnages. On remand, the trial court awarded Central $149,950 in cover damages but denied
Central any expectancy damages.
On appeal a second time, Central argued that the trial court misinterpreted the nature of the breach and therefore failed to consider all evidence relevant to damages. The trial court had found that Reclamation was obligated
only to make available the specified quantities of water, and that "Central did
not set forth persuasive evidence demonstrating how much New Melones water its faners plausibly might have requested in the 1999-2004 non-breach
world, one in which Reclamation made full allocations under the 1983 contract." Central argued, on the other hand, that beginning in the eleventh year,
"Reclanation was obligated to provide, and Central was obligated to pay for,
at least 56,000 acre-feet of water per year regardless of whether Central actually requested that quantity or not." Therefore, Central argued, the trial court
should have considered evidence such as the initial CH2M Hill demand estimates to properly determine expectancy damages.
The Court disagreed with Central's assertion that the trial court erroneously interpreted the nature of Reclamation's breach, but agreed that the trial
court erred in failing to award expectancy damages and in how it analyzed
those danages based on the facts of the case. Specifically, the trial court improperly "focused its damages analysis on Central's failure to request at least
the minimum amount of water specified in the contract in the years following
Reclamation's non-performance announcements." Because the trial court
failed to consider these years in the context of Reclanation's repeated announcements from 1993-1999 that it would be unable to provide the minimum contractual amounts of water, the trial court assumed that Central's requests for less than the minimum amount of water was due to a lack of
demand by Central's customers. This interpretation implied that Central did
not have actual economic loss attributable to Reclamation's contractual breach
during those years.
Instead, to properly analyze expectancy damages, the Court held that the
trial court needed to focus on what would have happened but for Reclanation's initial repudiation in 1993. In other words, the trial court should have
taken into account testimony and other data from 1993 onward that could
have revealed the amount of water the farmers might have requested from
Central if Reclamation had complied with the contract. The Court stated that,
by 1994, Central was on notice that "Reclamation was not going to supply the
contractual quantities of water," and that "talt some point most people stop
asking for what they have been told they are not going to get, and they make
other plans to meet their needs."
In Reclanation's brief to the Court, it raised for the first time the argument that the cost of cover damages the trial court awarded to Central was incorrect. Reclanation claimed that the trial court erred by including the excess
costs that Central paid South San joaquin Irrigation District for water during
certain breach years, because Central failed to take all the water'made available by Reclamation during those years. Central argued that Reclamation
right to challenge the awarded amnount by not properly filing a crosswaived its
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appeal on the issue. The Court agreed with that position. Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court's judgment not to award expectancy damages and remanded with orders to make a damages determination consistent with the Court's opinion.
W. James Tlton

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAIS FOR THE
NINTH CIRCUIT
San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Locke, 776 F.3d 971 (9th Cir.
2014) (holding that (i) the district court abused its discretion by improperly
admitting extra-record declarations and substituting its own analysis for the
National Marine Fisheries Service's ("NMFS") opinion; (ii) NMFS acted within its discretion by using a non-scaled data model to set river flows where it
adequately explained its decision and used additional studies to validate its decision; (iii) NMFS did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when determining the
State Water Project's and the Central Valley Project's continued operations
were likely to jeopardize the viability and essential habitat of species because it
demonstrated sufficient research to support its conclusions; and (iv) NMFS's
various reasonable and prudent alternative recommendations and requirements were not arbitrary or capricious).
Over twenty-five million agricultural and domestic users in California's arid Central Valley rely on the government's extraction of water from its rivers.
However, this extraction dramatically alters the rivers' natural states and
threatens the viability of the species that depend on the water. To resolve this
conflict, the US Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation ("Reclamation") called upon the NMFS to evaluate under the Endangered Species
Act ("ESA") how the State Water Project's and Central Valley Project's ("the
Projects") continuing water withdrawal would impact certain endangered
Salmonid species in the rivers.
In a 2009 Biological Opinion ("BiOp"), NMFS found that continuing extraction threatens species, and proposed a solution. In response to the proposed remedies, San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority and Westlands
Water District ("the Water Districts") filed suit against the Department of
Commerce, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and
NMFS (collectively, "the Federal Defendants"), arguing that the 2009 BiOp
was arbitrary and capricious. On summary judgment, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California ("district court") found that
NMFS violated the Administrative Procedure Act's ("APA") arbitrary or capricious standard when developing the BiOp and granted relief in part.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
("court"), the Federal Defendants asked the court to overturn the components
of the BiOp that the district court struck down, and the Water Districts asked
the court to overturn the district court's holdings that were favorable to the
BiOp. Before reviewing the 2009 BiOp, the court resolved the initial question of whether the district court erred in its own record review by supplementing the administrative record with extra-record declarations. The court
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noted that in making its determinations, a district court may only admit extrarecord evidence to further understand whether an agency complied with the
APA's arbitrary or capricious standard. However, the district court heavily relied upon extra-record scientific opinion to evaluate mmd question the 2009
BiOp. The court found tie district court violated the general rule limiting a
court's review of agency action to the administrative record. Specifically, the
court reasoned that the district court erroneously substituted the extra-record
declarations for NMFS's own analysis.
The court next determined whether NMFS complied with the procedural
requirements of the APA. Because the ESA does not have its own standard
of judicial review, the court evaluated the BiOp under the APA's deferential
arbitrary and capricious standard wherein a court will sustain an agency's actions if there is a rational connection between the facts and conclusions. In
determining the best method to prevent endangered fish species from being
caught in a negative flow resulting from 1umping, NMFS used raw salvage data from fish salvage facilities to provide a reasonable and prudent alternative
("RPA") in its BiOp. The Water Districts challenged the use of raw salvage
data instead of data scaled to fish populations and the district court held that
using raw salvage data went against the grain of traditional science. Referencing its decision in SLm Luis & Menclota Water Authojitv v. Jewell ("Delta
Smelt"), where the consulting agency also used raw salvage data, the court held
that NMFS's choice to use raw salvage data was within its substantial discretion. In )elta Smelt, the court determined an agency has substantial discretion to choose whichever available scientific model it wants to use. The court
noted that NMFS adequately explained why the loss data usefully assisted it in
identifying whether and how fish loss relates to negative flow velocity. Also,
NMFS (lid not base maximum negative flow prescriptions on raw data alone,
using other studies to help decide the specific flow requirements imposed.
Finally, similar to the Delta Smell BiOp, the incidental take statement ("ITS")
in this case used )opulation data to scale incidental take, and the RPA used
that infoniation to create its flow restrictions. For these reasons, the court
held that NMFS acted within its discretion in using non-scaled data models to
restrict flows.
Next, the court considered whether NMFS arbitrarily or capriciously determined that the Projects' continuing activity would jeopardize the viability
and essential habitat of the species. First, the district court determined that
NMFS's designation of the winter-run Chinook ats a species at a "high risk" of
extinction was unsupported by the record. The court held that NMFS's explanation of how a 2007 study of the winter-run Chinook influenced its opinion was sufficient to satisfy the requirement that an agency consider all relevant f lctors and offer an explanation for its conclusions. Second, the district
court held that NMFS did not consider all of the relevant factors when it determined the Projects jeopardized orca viability because it failed to address a
2009 Orca BiOp's contrary finding. The court found that NMFS did in fact
discuss the 2009 Orca BiOp mid distinguished the two different outcomes as
dealing with dilTerent time frames and yielding different results. This was sufficient to show that NMFS considered the 2009 Orca BiOp when developing
the 2009 Salmonid BiOp. Third, the district court found that NMFS's conclusions that the Projects' deviations from Central Valley ("CV") steelhead
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preferred spawning water levels significantly reduced spawnable habitat were
arbitrary and capricious. The district court stated that NMFS's use of "maximum habitat" as a benchmark for spawnable area was not a goal of the ESA.
However, the record showed that NMFS looked to several studies to determine the point at which tie Projects' restriction of flows on the river would
appreciably reduce habitat. The court found that NMFS explained why tie
studies provided an adequate baseline for developing minimum flows in the
river and thus satisfied its obligations under the ESA. Additionally, the record
adequately cited studies supporting NMFS's conclusion that the Projects' operations negatively impacted spawning gravel quality and quantity. Accordingly, tie court held that these findings were not arbitrary or capricious.
Next, the district court found that NMFS failed to articulate the connection between the Projects' operations, invasive species, and harm to the endangered species. However, the 2009 BiOp found that (i) the Projects' operations were degrading the environment in the interior delta, making it ill-suited
to many native species; (ii) continued Projects operations would cause fish
oulniigration through the main channels of the delta to divert into intersecting
channels that split off from the main rivers; and (iii) fish that are drawn
through intersecting channels and into the inner Delta have a lower survival
rate than fish that remain in the main delta. Noting that NMFS's analysis was
not perfect, the court held that evidence to support NMFS's conclusions
could be reasonably discerned and that its analysis was therefore not arbitrary
or capricious.
Finally, the court examined whether the challenged RPA actions were arbitrary or capricious. The district court previously reversed and remanded
several of the BiOp's RPA actions because NMFS did not explain how each
RPA action was essential to avoiding jeopardy or how each action complied
with the ESA's non-jeopardy factors. Specifically, the district court found that
NMFS failed to explain how each RPA action could be implemented in a
manner consistent with the intended purpose of the action, consistent with the
scope of the Agency's authority and jurisdiction, and in an economically and
technologically feasible way. The court held that tie district court's analysis
was erroneous. In so concluding, tie court relied on the holding in Della
Snmt, which explained that the ESA only requires that an agency impose
RPAs that are "not likely to jeopardize" the species or its habitat, rather than
those that are "essential to avoiding jeopardy." Applying that standard here,
the court found that NMFS was not required to meet all of the non-jeopardy
factors but only to conclude that the proposed RPA would not further jeopardize the listed species.
The district court invalidated several RPA actions on the grounds that
they were not supported by scientific evidence, were not economically or
technologically feasible, or were made arbitrarily or capriciously. Finding that
the record showed sufficient evidence or reasonable support for all of the actions, the court reversed all of the district court's holdings. In so doing, the
court reasoned that Action IV.2.1, requiring Reclamation and the California
Departnent of Water Resources to implement specific flows on the San
Joaquin River to a higher rate to increase survival and abundance, was traceable to the record even if also maximally protective of fish. The court found
that Actions IV.2.3 and IV.3, reducing exports from two pumping plants from
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January through June and November through December, respectively, to mitigate the adverse eflects of the negative flows on the Salmonid fish species migrating during those time f'rames, were also supported by data cited in the record. It upheld Action IV.4.2, requiring the California Departmrent of Water
Resources to implement specific measures to reduce pre-salvage fish loss and
improve salvage elliciency, because contrary to the district court's analysis, the
ESA did not require NMFS to cite record evidence showing economic and
technological feasibility.
The court further upheld Action 111.1.2, requiring Reclamation to make
cold water releases from the New Melones Reservoir to provide more suitable
temperatures for the CV steelhead to spawn, as supported by the record.
Here, the court noted that Action 111. 1.2's exception for when the projected
temperatures could not be achieved was suLiciendy limited in application because Reclaiation must satisfy several procedural requirements before NMFS
would grant an exception. The court found that NMFS's decision to recommend Action 111. 1.3, requiring Reclamation to operate releases f'rom the East
Side Division reservoir to achieve a minimum flow schedule to help sustain
the CV steelhead habitat, was properly documented. It reasoned here that the
district court erred by failing to defer to the Agency's interpretation of a scientilic study. Finally, the court upheld Action 111.2.2, requiring Reclanation to
collaboratively develop an operational strategy to achieve floodplain inundation flows that would help restore floodplains and CV steelbead habitat in the
Stanislaus River, as within NMFS's discretion. The court emphasized again
that the Agency was not required to explain the Action's feasibility.
Finally, the court aflined the portions of the district court's holdings that
upheld the 2009 BiOp. In so doing, the court echoed its holding in lelta
Smelt that an agency need not distinguish between discretionary and nondiscretionary actions. In holding that the BiOp's indirect effects on fish mortality were actually direct effects requiring no further elaboration, the court
noted that the eflects occurred concurrently with the Projects and were therefore direct effects. Finally, the court held that Reclamation was not independently liable under the ESA because the BiOp was legally sound.
The court reversed the district court's holdings that invalidated the BiOp
and affirmed the district court with regard to the issues on cross-appeal. Accordingly, the court remanded for entry of summary judgnient in favor of the
Federal Defendants.

Victoia THunbley

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 758 F.3d 892 (7th Cir. 2014)
(holding (i) federal agencies are subject to public nuisance claims for their
choice of policy implementation options; (ii) appellee agencies were not authorized by statute to operate waterways in the interest of navigation to the ex-
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clusion of potential environmental harms; and (iii) appellants had not alleged
sufficient facts to show appellees' operation of the waterway constituted a public nuisance).
In the early twentieth century, a series of canals were constructed to connect Lake Michigan to the Mississippi River-two of tie country's most crucial
navigable waterways. Near the same time, the Chicago Area Waterway System ("CAWS") was constructed and the flow of the Chicago River was 'reversed to carry Chicago's wastewater away from Lake Michigan. In the 1970s,
further down the Mississippi River, aquatic farmers introduced bighead and
silver Asian carp into their facilities to mitigate unwanted plant growth. Flooding in the area eventually allowed the Asian carp to navigate into open freshwater systems and ultimately within six miles of Lake Michigan and the Great
Lakes.
As a species, Asian carp present potential harm both to the ecosystems
they occupy and to individuals in their vicinity. Asian carp are insatiable eaters that consume food in such amounts that they crowd out other species of
fish by eliminating their food supply. In addition, Asian carp present dangers
to individuals in their vicinity by leaping out of the water when agitated, causing danage to watercraft and injury to individuals on board.
To address the growing concern of Asian carp advancement, the Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps") and the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago ("District") have attempted preventative measures for
more than a decade. In 2002, the Corps introduced the Dispersal Barrier
System to kill or shock fish that passed by. By 2011, a total of three barriers
had been constructed in the CAWS. After a spotting of Asian carp near one
of the barriers in 2009, the Corps twice introduced fish poison-rotenonenear the ban-ier. By 2010, the Asian Carp Regional Coordinating Committee-a group including federal, state, and Canadian authorities lead by the
White House Council on Environmental Quality-began monitoring Asian
carp in the CAWS. Through April 2014, none of the Committee's tests indicated the presence of Asian carp beyond the barriers.
Nevertheless believing that the Asian carp presented an imminent and serious threat, live states (Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Ohio, mad Pennsylvania), joined by the Grande Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indian
tribe, (collectively, "States") brought suit against the Corps and District. The
States claimed that the Asian carp would either soon or already had invaded
the Great Lakes, which would result in billions of dollars of damage. Specifically, the States claimed that the Corps and District had failed to act according
to their responsibility of preventing the potential Asian carp danage. The
States sought a permanent injunction under the federal common law of public
nuisance that would require the Corps and District to expeditiously develop
and implement measures to create a complete hydrological separation between Lake Michigan and the Mississippi River Basin. The States also demanded an expedited completion of a congressionally-mandated report on
the options available to prevent aquatic nuisance species between the Great
Lakes and the Mississippi River ("the Report").
At trial, the States sought a preliminary injunction requiring the Corps and
District to take aggressive interim steps to stop the advancement of the Asian
carp. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
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("district court") denied the preliminary injunction, stating that the States had
failed to prove that ineparable injury would occur before resolution of the
underlying litigation. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit ("court") allirmed the denial of preliminary injunctive relief.
The district court ultimately dismissed the States' suit for failure to state a
claim. In so holding, it reasoned that the operation of the CAWS and Lake
Michigan-Mississippi River connection did not constitute a public nuisance
because such operation was both lawful and required under the law.
Between the district court's dismissal and the States' second appeal, the
Corps completed the Report, which proposed eight alternative plans to prevent aquatic nuisance in the area. However, the Corps declined to make a
recommendation in the Report due to the need for further technical and policy evaluations. The proposed options ranged in cost between $7.8 billion to
upwards of'$18.3 billion for lakefront hydrological separation. In addition to
being among the most expensive options, the Corps stated that a hydrological
separation would also have significant negative eflfects in the waterways in
terms of navigability, water quality, and ecology.
On al)peal, the court first indicated an appreciation for the potential dangers at stake regarding the advancement of Asian carp for the States, noting
that the risk of danger had increased since the start of litigation. First, the
court held that agencies of the federal government are subject to federal public
nuisance actions. The court explained that, when federal agencies act according to their enabling statutes, their activity represents a balancing of interests
undertaken by Congress, which therefore reflects the public interest and precludes public nuisance claims. However, an agency's choice among options to
implement a policy is not subject to such rigorous interest balancing and may
not categorically represent the underlying public interest. Accordingly, these
actions may be subject to public nuisance claims.
The court emphasized that the agencies were authorized by statute to operate the CAWS in a manner conducive to facilitating navigation but, contrary
to the district court's conclusion, were not authorized to execute these duties
while disregarding the potential environmental impacts of doing so, including
the advancement of potentially hazardous fish species. However, the court
also held that die Corps and District had been dutiful in their elorts to accomplish both of their responsibilities: to operate the CAWS waterways in
such a way that would prevent the advancement of Asian carp into Lake Michigan while facilitating navigation. The court indicated that, even in a light most
favorable to the States, there were insutllicient facts to suggest the Asian carp
would advance beyond the Corps' and District's current prevention attempts,
nor that the Corps and District would fail to adjust their efforts should the current attempts fail. Accordingly, the States had not alleged sufficient facts for
the court to hold that the Corps' or District's current actions constituted a
public nuisance.
The court also held that it would be inappropriate for the federal .judiciary
to grant the States' request for an injunction requiring construction of a hydrological separation under tie Rivers and Harbors Act. That Act precludes the
court from ordering an injunction requiring the Corps to construct a separation of the waterways, in light of concerns regarding impediments to navigation
of crucial interstate or international waterways. Instead, the court indicated
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that other remedies should be considered in this case, including judicial review of the recommendation chosen by the Corps and District to solve the
Asian carp problem and a claim for review of agency action, should the Corps
or District halt their preventative measures unlawfully. Finally, the court held
that the States were not precluded from bringing suit in the future; should the
advancement of Asian carp be imminent and occur as a result of the Corps' or
District's negligence in operating the waterways.
Accordingly, the court affirmied the judgment of the district court's dismissal ofthe State's suit against the Corps and District for failure to state a claim.

Cody Cassady

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT
American Whitewater v. Tidwell, 770 F.3d 1108 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding
that (i) the US Forest Service's revised wild and scenic river management and
oversight plan allowing restricted floating on the northernmost section of the
Chattooga River was supported by the record and not arbitrary and capricious;
(ii) floating is not an outstandingly remarkable value of the Chattooga requiring protection under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act; and (iii) claims that the
revised management plan may lead to additional trespassing and environmental impact were not reasonably foreseeable and did not require analysis under
the National Environmental Protection Act).
In 1974, Congress designated fifty-seven miles of the Chattooga River
("Chattooga") for preservation under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
("WSRA"). The US Forest Service is responsible for managing the Chattooga
under the WSRA. The WSRA requires the Forest Service to "protect and
enhance" the "outstandingly remarkable values I"ORVs"I ...that led Congress to designate the river" and to limit other uses that "substantially interfere
with the public's use of these ORVs." Prior to 2012, Forest Service policy
permitted non-motorized rafting on the lower portions of tie Chattooga but
prohibited the practice on the twenty-one-mile northernmost section of the
Chattooga ("Headwaters"). In 2005, after American Whitewater and several
other non-motorized watercraft associations (collectively, "American Whitewater") challenged the floating ban, the Forest Service began studying whether
floating could be expanded beyond the lower portions of the Chattooga.
Over the course of seven years, the Forest Service "measureIdi tie expected impact of allowing Headwaters floating on the Chattooga's ORVs."
The Forest Service concluded that expanded floating made sense so long as it
imposed certain linitations to ensure the upper Chattooga still offered opportunities for remoteness and solitude to all users, and to limit potential conflicts
with other recreational users. These limitations included restricting floating
on the Headwaters to the winter months when water flows were highest and
prohibiting floating in areas that offered prime fishing but marginal floating
potential. In 2012 the Forest Service revised its management plan for the

Issuie 2

COURT REi'ORT5

Chattooga to allow floating on most of the Headwaters between December I
and April 30 or when flows exceeded 350 cubic feet per second. The Forest
Service determined that the revised plan would have no significant effect on
the environment and did not require preparation of all Environmental Impact
Statement under the National Environmental Protection Act ("NEPA").
American Whitewater filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina ("district court") challenging the Forest Service's revised plan. American Whitewater argued that the revised plan did not go Ia
enough, and that the remaining limits on floating were both inconsistent with
WSRA and arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the APA.
Two parties, Georgia ForestWatch ("ForestWatch"), a not-tbr-profit environmental groutp, and the Rust family, who own approximately 1.7 miles of
the Headwaters' shoreline, moved to intervene. ForestWatch asserted that
the Forest Service's decision to allow any floating on the Headwaters violated
the Forest Service's mandate under the ,VSRA. The district court, however,
limited the scope of ForestWatch's intervention to dlefending the remaining
limits on Headwater floating. The Rust funily sought a declaratory judgment
from the district court that the Headwaters running through their property
were non-navigable and outside Forest Service control. The Rust's also filed a
cross-climr asseiting that the Forest Service's analysis violated NEPA. All parties moved for judgment on the administrative record. The district court upheld the Forest Service's decision, rejected all of American Whitewater's
claims and the Rust's NEPA claim, and dismissed the Rust's request for a declaratory judgment as premature. The parties appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ("Court").
According to the Court, "the crux of American Whitewater's claim Iwasl
that the Forest Service struck the wrong balance when it opened the Headwaters to floating partially but not entirely [by] maintaining some restrictions on
floating in order to avoid conflicts with other recreational users." American
Whitewater argued that the Forest Service's concern about potential conflicts
was unsupported by the record and therefire arbitrary and capricious, and
that the remaining restrictions violated the WSRA.
The Court first addressed American Whitewater's argument that that no
basis existed in the record for the Forest Service's concern about potential
conflicts among recreational users. The Forest Service relied on a history of
user conflicts on the Headwaters prior to the original floating ban as well as
evidence from the lower Chattooga and other rivers where floating has always
been permitted. In the Court's words, the Forest Service "assembled significant data pointing to the potential for future conflicts, counting cars to estimate
usage, developing expected encounter estimates, and analyzing a wealth of
public comments including many f'rom current users who expressed a preference for solitude mad an isolated experience." American Whitewater argued
that the Forest Service was required to allow floating on the Headwaters as a
part of the study to identify actual conflicts between recreational users. The
Court disagreed, holding that "[wihere the agency's conclusion otherwise rests
on a fiin factual basis, nothing in the APA requires it to experiment wid a
practice before continuing preexisting policies."
The Court next addressed American Whitewater's argument that the remaining restrictions on the Chattooga violated section 1281 of the WSRA,
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"which requires the Forest Service to 'protect and enhance the values which
caused' the Chattooga to be designated for preservation 'without... limiting
other uses that do not substantially interfere with public use and enjoyment of
these values."' American Whitewater argued that floating on the Chattooga
was one of the values that led Congress to designate the Chattooga for protection under the WSRA; therefore, the Forest Service had to "protect and enhance" that value by lifting all floating restrictions on the Chattooga. In the
alternative, American Whitewater argued that the Forest Service could not
limit floating on the Chattooga because the Forest Service did not show that
floating substantially interfered with any protected recreational use of the
Headwaters. The Court rejected each of these claims in turn.
First, the Court noted that neither the 1971 Forest Service report that led
to the Chattooga's protective designation nor the Senate and House Reports
accompanying the designation specifically mentioned floating in contrast with
all other forms of recreational activities on the Chattooga. Rather, because
these reports all made mention of a wide variety of recreational activities on
the Chattooga, the Court declined to find Congress had intended to give special status to floating, let alone any one recreational use, when it designated the
Chattooga under the WSRA. Accordingly, the Court rejected American
Whitewater's argument that the Forest Service had no choice' but to lift all restrictions on floating on the Chattooga.
Second, not only did the Court agree with the district court's assessment
that the record supported a finding of substantial interference with other protected recreational uses of the Chattooga, the Court took the analysis one step
further and found American Whitewater's argument to be "flawed in its premise." Under section 1281(a) there are only two categories of "uses" of designated rivers: (i) public uses of ORVs; and (ii) other uses "to be limited when
they interfere substantially with public use and enjoyment of an ORV." The
Court stated that floating is more akin to hiking and other recreational activities and thus more accurately characterized as "a 'public use' of the recreational value, not an 'other use' subject to the substantial interference standard."
The Court next addressed the Rust family's claims against the Forest Service. The Rust family had sought a declaratory judgment designating as nonnavigable the 1.7-mile stretch of the Headwaters running through their land.
The effect of such a designation would make this stretch of water private
property, which in turn would prohibit the Forest Service from taking any action that would provide public access to this stretch of water. However, because the Forest Service's 2012 decision neither authorized floating on the
Rusts' property nor covered any portion of the Headwaters that concerned the

Rust family's property, the Court found that the Forest Service had not taken
any action to exercise regulatory authority over the Rust's property. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the Rust family's request for declaratory judgment
because it failed to present a justiciable controversy in the absence of such action.

The Court then addressed the Rust family's claim that "the Forest Service
violated NEPA by failing to analyze the risk that opening portions of the
Headwaters to floating could lead to trespass on the Rust's property." The
Rust fanily argued that floaters will illegally cross the Rust's property on their
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way to the Chattooga. However, the Court noted that the Forest Service's
2012 decision only authorized floating on portions of the river that are downstream from the Rust family's property. Accordingly, the Court characterized
this concern, and any associated environmental impact, as too speculative to
require NEPA analysis.
Last, the Court quickly addressed" whether the district court had erred in
limiting the scope of ForestWatch's intervention. On appeal, ForestWatch
attempted to depart from its assigied role of defending the Forest Service's
remaining restrictions and instead challenge the Forest Service's decision to
permit any floating at all under NEPA and the WSRA. The Court declined
to address these new arguments on appeal, and found that the only issue
ForestWatch could properly raise on appeal was the district court's decision to
limit its scope of intervention. The parties disputed the proper standard of
review, but the Court deternined, and ForestWatch's counsel admitted at oral
argument, that a review of the district court's decision to limit Forest'Vatch's
intervention ultimately hinged on whether the decision was fundamentally unFair. Because the district court preserved ForestWatch's opportunity to raise
its NEPA and WSRA claims in a pending lawsuit related to the matter, and
carefully limited its decision to insulate ForestWatch's claims against the Forest Service, the Court found no evidence of fundamental unfairness.
Accordingly, the Court dismissed all challenges brought against the Forest
Service by American Whitewater, the Rust family, and ForestWatch, and held
that the Forest Service's WSR management and oversight plan for the Chattooga' River was not arbitrary and capricious under the APA, that the Forest
Service's WSR management and oversight plan complied with the WSRA,
and that the Forest Service's analysis satisfied NEPA.
R. Co/well

STATE COURTS
IDAHO
Brown v. Greenheart, 335 P.3d 1 (Idaho 2014) (holding (i) the statute of
limitations for a quiet title action does not begin to run until a party claims a
right in property that is adverse to another; (ii) the statute of limitations for
mutual mistake does. not begin to run until the fdcts constituting the mistake
are discovered, not when the mistake is discoverable; (iii) the plaintiffs adequately pleaded the issue of mutual mistake; and (iv) the property conveyance
was anbiguous and, therelore, the trial court did not err in considering extrinsic evidence to resolve the anbiguity).
Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown owned a 320-acre parcel of land
in Elmore County, Idaho ("Brown Property"). In 2000, the Snake River Basin Ad judication Court decreed water rights associated with the parcel to the
Browns. The rights authorized the Browns to irrigate a total of 287 acres. In
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2003, the Browns agreed to idle 160 acres of their property from irrigation
and lease the associated water rights to the Idaho Water Resource Board.
Three years later, the Browns listed sixty unirrigated acres of their property for
sale, communicating to their real estate agent that they did not wish to transfer
any water rights with the listed sixty acres.
Augusta Greenheart purchased the sixty acres of land from the Browns.
The real estate agent verbally informed Greenheart that the land was "dry,"
and that there were no water rights associated with the property. The purchase and sale agreement included two provisions about the associated water
rights. The first provision stated: "Seller represents that the property does
have the following utilities, improvements, & other rights available." The provision was marked "not applicable." The second provision, paragraph 16, stated: "WATER RIGHTS: Description of water rights, water systems, wells
springs, water, ditches, ditch rights, etc. if any, that are appurtenant thereto
that are on or used in connection with the premises and shall be included in
the sale unless otherwise provided herein." This provision was left blank.
Additionally, in the Seller's Disclosure Form accompanying the purchase and
sale agreement, the parties marked the disclosure "Irrigation water provided
by" as not applicable.
In 2007, First American Title prepared a warranty deed conveying the sixty-acre piece of land to Greenheart, granting the premises "with their appurtenances." Soon after, Greenheart noticed that, contrary to the conversations
she had with the real estate agent and the Browns, her new property was classified as irrigated agriculture for tax purposes. Greenheart submitted a challenge with the Elmore County Board of Equalization to have the property
classilied as dry-grazing. The Elmore County Board of Equalization adjusted
the classification, which decreased her taxes by six hundred dollars annually.
In 2012, the City of Mountain Home entered into discussions with the
Browns to purchase their water rights for two thousand dollars per acre. During the negotiations, the Browns' attorney notified the city that the Browns
might have conveyed some of their water rights to Greenheart during the 2006
sale because of the "appurtenances" language contained in the 2007 warranty
deed. After the Browns notified Greenheart of the possible mistake, Greenheart filed a notice of change of water right ownership with the Idaho Department of Water Resources ("IDWR"). IDWR approved Greenheart's request, granting her ownership of a portion of the Browns' water rights.
The Browns filed a quiet title action "and sought declaratory judgment
that they owned the water rights because the claim that the water rights passed
under the appurtenances clause of the warranty deed was rebuffed by facts
demonstrating that the parties did not intend to convey water rights." The district court found that inclusion of the appurtenance language in the warranty
deed was based on a mutual mistake between the parties, that the Browns
were entitled to equitable relief on the grounds of quasi-estoppel and waiver,
mid entered a judgment reforning the warranty deed to reserve the water
rights to the Browns.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho ("Court") first addressed Greenheart's contention that the Browns' quiet title action and mutual mistake claim
were both time-barred. The Court agreed with the district court and held that
the statute of limitations provided in Idaho Code section 5-224 did not pro-
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hibit the Browns' quiet title action. The court noted that a cause of action for
quiet title does not begin until a party "claims an interest in property 'adverse
to' another." The Court determined that the statute of limitations period did
not begin to rin until Greenheart asserted a claim to the water rights by filing
the notice to change ownership with the ID\WR.
The Court also rejected Greenheart's assertion that the three-year statute
of limnitations provided in Idaho Code section 5-218(4) prohibited the
Browns' mutual mistake claim. Greenheart argued that the Court should
adopt "a bright line rule that a party is expected to realize the alleged fraud or
mistake at the time of execution of a deed." In lefusing to adopt such a rule,
the Court noted that the statute expressly states a cause of action does not accrue "until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the
fraud or mistake." The Court held that this did not occur until the Browns'
attorney discovered the mistake in 2012. Prior to that, both parties had operated under the assumption that the sale (lid not transfer water rights. Greencontrary.
heart failed to produce evidence to the
Next, the court addressed the Brown's mutual mistake claim. The district
court ruled that the Browns were entitled to reformation of the deed based on
mutual mistake. The district court found that "both parties shared a vital misconception about the water rights ... and that the misconception was so substantial and fundamental as to deleat the object of the parties, which was die
sale of dry-grazing land." Greenheart did not challenge the factual basis of the
district court's ruling, but argued that the district court erred because die
Browns did not plead mutual mistake, or in the alternative, that they did not
plead mutfial mistake with sufficient particularity. The Court disagreed and
found that the Browns suLfficiently pleaded the mutual mistake claim and that
Greenheart had adequate notice that the issue would be litigated.
Greenheart also asserted a negligence claim against de Broms, arguing
that they were negligent in protecting their interests in the water rights by not
seeking legal advice during the sale. The district court concluded that the
Browns acted reasonably because they sought the assistance of a licensed rcal
estate agent. Because the district court's discussion of negligence was only in
the context of the statute of limitations argument, Greenheart's independent
negligence claim was being raised for the first time on appeal and the Court
declined to address it.
Last, Greenheart appealed the district court's decision that the purchase
and sale agreement was ambiguous. The Court noted that, "tal contract tern
is ambiguous when there are two different, reasonable interpretations of the
language." The Court held that the district court did not err in finding paragraph 16-providing for a "[djescription of water rights ... if any, that are appurtenant thereto that are now on or used in connection with the premises
and shall be included in the sale unless otherwise provided herein"ambiguous because the tenn "herein" is inherently ambiguous. The Court
also held that the agreement was ambiguous as to whether water rights were
transferred, because the Browns checked the box indicating that a water rights
transfer fee was not applicable. The Court stated that, "Jijf water rights were
intended to be transferred, then the payment of the transfer fee would very
much be applicable." As a result, the Court held that the district court (lid not
err in considering extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity.
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Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's findings in all respects,
and held that the Brown's were entitled to reformation of the original deed to
specifically reserve all water rights to the Brown's.
Blaine Bengston

MONTANA
Eldorado Co-op Canal Co. v. Lower Teton Joint Objectors, 337 P.3d 74
(Mont. 2014) (holding that (i) water commissioners' use of a ditch to divert water to a property was a management tool, not a right personal to the user; and
(ii) the Water Court acted properly in listing the water rights that could be diverted through the ditch).
The Ninth Judicial District Court of Montana ("district court") appointed
Water Commissioners to administer certain water rights diverted from the Teton River pursuant to a 1908 water rights decree in Perny v. Beattie. That case
determined the priority date and flow rate of dozens of Upper Teton water
right claims, all located upstream of the Plaintiffs' property. The Plaintiffs
held priority dates senior to or contemporary with the upstream users.
Around 1950, the Water Commissioner appointed to administer the Periy decrees began diverting most of the Teton's flow into the Bateman Ditch.
The ditch runs parallel to the Teton River's natural channel, bypassing a several-mile-long section of gravel riverbed. The gravel riverbed soaks up a significant amount of water. The Water Commissioner did not establish this
practice in accordance with an express order or written agreement among appropriators. Choteau Cattle had the most senior right in the Perty decree,
with a priority date of 1876. In exercising its water right, Choteau Cattle diverted water through the Bateman Ditch, returning it to the natural' channel
during times of low flow. If the Bateman Ditch were not utilized in this manner, upstream junior right holders (including Saylor and Eldorado) would
have had to substantially restrict their water use. The Lower Teton Joint Objectors ("Lower Users") challenged this practice.
In 2011 the Lower Users commenced an action claiming that the Water
Commissioners' diversion of water out of the Teton River and into the Bateman Ditch harmed their appropriation rights by depriving the Teton River
aquifer of recharge water. The Water Court found that Saylor had a protectable right to divert Teton River water through the Bateman Ditch downstream. The Lower Users mid Saylor appealed.
The Supreme Court of Montana (Court") addressed two predominant issues on appeal. It first considered whether the Water Court erred in establishing the Bateman Ditch diversion as a right belonging to Saylor. Subsequently, the Court considered whether the Water Court erred by including
Choteau Cattle on the tabulation of water rights holders authorized to divert
water from the Teton River into the Bateman Ditch.
In addressing the first issue, the Court reiterated portions of the Water
Court's opinion, emphasizing two main points. First, water law recognizes
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"historic patterns of water use." Therefore, the fact that this particular use of
the Bateman Ditch was no longer part of any claim in the water adjudication
process did not preclude recognition of the practice. Additionally, the Court
noted that while the Bateman Ditch diversion was not an exchange plan, it was
"typical of historic arrangements" made throughout the area in order to obtain
maximum benefit from a limited resource. The Bateman Ditch was a typical
tool used by administrafors as a conservation measure. The Court disagreed,
however, with the Water Court's conclusion that the Bateman Ditch diversion
was a private right held by Saylor. In so concluding, the Court explained that
Saylor did not possess a right or duty to administer the water rights of others.
Rather, the administration of these rights was a management tool available only to the District Court and its Water Commissioner.
Subsequently, the Court concluded that the Water Court acted properly
in listing the water rights that could be diverted through the Bateman Ditch.
The Lower Users objected, arguing that Choteau Cattle's right was improperly
listed because Choteau Cattle had specifically removed the Bateman Ditch as
a point of diversion for its right. Additionally, the Lower Users argued that
during the water adjudication process Saylor filed to claim the right to use
Batemnan Ditch to supply Choteau Cattle's right. The Court explained that
because the use of Bateman Ditch to deliver water to Choteau Cattle was a
management tool and not a right personal to Saylor, it was unnecessary for
Saylor to have claimed the right in the adjudication process. It therefore concluded that the Water Court properly listed Choteau Cattle's right as one diverted from the Bateman Ditch.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Water Court's decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the Water Court for further proceedings.

Neilie Fields
Marks v. 71 Ranch, LP, 334 P.3d 373 (Mont. 2014) (holding that (i) water
colmnissioner records of low water supply levels had little probative value regarding whether claimant applied water right to beneficial use; (ii) testimony
that different portions of a creek constituted separate water sources was insufficient to overcome a prior court decree describing the creek as a single, unified system; and (iii) standing alone, water commissioner records of insufficient delivery did not prove abandonment).
In 1940, Wellington Rankin acquired a decree ("Rmki'n Decree") to four
water rights (the. "creek rights") located on Confederate Creek. Rankin's
rights had a priority date of 1866 and a combined flow rate of 385 miner's
inches. The Rankin Decree described Confederate Creek as a single, unified
water system. It also identified a point of diversion and place of use located
on the lower part of the creek ("downstream location"). In 1950, Rankin sold
the property surrounding the downstream location. However, Rankin properly severed and maintained ownership of the creek rights. In 1982, Louise R.
Galt, Rankin's successor in interest and 71 Ranch's predecessor in interest,
filed Statements of Claim for the creek rights. The Statements of Claim described a new point of diversion and place of use roughly three miles upstream from the original diversion point ("upstream location"). Objector ind
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appellant Donald C. Marks owned property and water rights between the
claimed upstream and old downstream locations. Marks's rights were junior
to the creek rights.
Marks liled an objection to the creek rights' new place of use and point of
diversion. The Water Master dismissed Marks's objection in 2002 and the
Water Court aflirmed the dismissal. Both determined that Marks had failed
to rebut the prima facie evidence that Galt's claims properly defined the point
of diversion and place of use for the creek rights at the upstream location.
Marks's appeal thus came to the Supreme Court of Montana ("Court") to
consider whether the Water Court erred in its determination. In Montana,
prior to July 1, 1973, an appropriator could change the point of diversion and
place of use of its water right as long as the appropriator beneficially used the
right at the new place of use mad did not injure any other appropriators. Under Montana law, a claim of right is prima facie proof of its content mad places
the burden of proof on the claim's objector to prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the original claim misrepresented the actual beneficial use
of the water right prior to July 1, 1973.
Thus, Marks had to prove that the information in Galt's Statement of
Claim was inaccurate. Marks offered three theories: (i) the creek rights were
not beneficially used at the upstream location prior to July 1, 1973; (ii) the upper and lower portion of Confederate Creek were separate water sources; and
(iii) Rankin and Galt had abandoned the water rights.
To support his first argument, Marks provided records indicating that on
certain days water flow was less than the Rankin Decree dictated. Marks used
this infornation to argue that, if Rankin mad Galt had beneficially used their
creek rights, more water would have flowed to the upstream location of the
creek rights. The Water Master observed that the records did not indicate the
total water flow, made no mention of diversions during high flows, did not describe stream flow conditions, and did not disclose whether anyone ever requested more water. The Water Master also noted that water commissioners
were generally only appointed in times of water shortage. The Court concluded that, given these facts, it was reasonable to assume that Marks's records
only reflected measurements of low flow years. Given the lack of any data for
several multi-year periods, the Court found that the Water Master did not err
in determining these records provided minimal probative value regarding the
question of beneficial use during the disputed decades.
The Court then addressed Marks's second argument. Marks argued there
were separate water sources for the upper and lower portions of the creek. In
support of his claim, Marks testified as to the division of the two portions, and
introduced the testimony of the 2002 water commissioner. However, the
commissioner's testimony conflicted somewhat with Marks' own testimony.
Specifically, Marks claimed one particular area would dry up in the summer
months, while the water commissioner conceded that water did flow past the
area during the spring flood season. The Court considered the conflicting testimonies and noted that Marks failed to present any evidence from anyone
famniliar with the conditions of the Creek prior to 1973. The Court further
noted that the Ramkin Decree described the creek as a single, unified water
system. Emphasizing that a "decree of a court stands as an absolute finality"
and that Marks had failed to provide reliable evidence to rebut the decree, the

Issue 2

COURTREPOR7S

Court affirmied the Water Master's lindings that the two portions of the creek
did not constitute separate sources.
Finally, the Court addressed Marks's abandonment argument. To support this contention, Marks relied on the sane evidence he had provided for
his first assertion. Specificaly, he used the water commissioner's reports of
insufficient water flow to claim that Rankin and Galt failed to beneficially use
their rights. From this argument, Marks drew the conclusion that Rankin and
Galt had eflectively abandoned their rights by allowing them to lie dormant for
over twenty years. Relying on the previous decision that, standing alone, the
water commissioner records failed to prove non-use, the Court determined
that Marks's argument for abandonment failed.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Water Court's dismissal of Marks's
objection.
Kaly Riankin

NEBRASKA
Weber v. N. Loup River Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 854 N.W.2d 263
(Neb. 2014) (holding that the district court properly granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment because (i) the plaintifl's' failure to pay irrigation charges was a condition precedent to the defendant's contractual duty to
deliver water to the plaintiffs' land; (ii) the defendant did not waive the condition precedent when it waived tie irrigation fees for one newly-contracted tract
of land; (iii) the defendant did not anticipatorily breach the contracts because
the plaintiffs had already materially breached the contract through nonpayment; and (iv) the defendant was not negligent in its delivery of tie water to
the plaintiffs because the plaintiffs' prior breach of the contracts relieved the
defendant of any preexisting duty).
North Loup River Public Power and Irrigation District ("North Loup")
manages an irrigation system with many diversion dams and canals, including
the Taylor-Ord Canal ("Canal"), which originates at the Taylor Diversion
Dam ("Dam"). William and Dixie Weber ("the Webers") held eight contracts with North Loup to irrigate their farmland from the Canal. The contracts stated that North Loup would provide water during the irrigation season
to the Webers' land for $2.50 per acre. The Webers were to pay for their water by the first of December the year preceding the irrigation season. The
contracts also stated that North Loup would withhold delivery of the water if
the Webers failed to pay within four months of that date.
In June 2010 the North Loup River experienced an uncommon anount
of rainfall and flooding. On June 11, 2010, the flood completely destroyed
the Dam and severely damaged the Canal. North Loup determined that the
Dam was "beyond repair" and decided to rebuild a permanent dam. The
landowners with contracts for irrigation water received no water that year due
to the damnage.
The Webers' bill for the 2010 irrigation season was due December 1,
2009. At the time of the flood in June 2010, the Webers still had not paid
their bill. The Webers finally paid their bill on April 13, 2011, but they did so
"under protest." In December 2011 the Webers filed a complaint against
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North Loup alleging that North Loup had breached its contracts with them
and negligently failed to provide water during the 2010 irrigation season.
North Loup denied the allegations and asserted that the Webers had failed to
fulfill a condition precedent of the contracts when they failed to pay the 2010
irrigation charges until April 13, 2011. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court for Loup County ("district court") granted North Loup's motion
for summary judgment, concluding that the Webers breached a condition
precedent, thereby relieving North Loup of its duty to deliver water. The
Webers appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Nebraska ("Court").
On appeal, the Webers claimed that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment to North Loup because issues of material fact existed regarding the Webers' obligation to make an advanced payment for the 2010
irrigation season. Accordingly, the Webers claimed, North Loup anticipatorily breached its contract. The Court clarified that the "meaning of an unambiguous contract is a question of law."
The Court applied general contract principles to the Webers' contract. In
doing so, the Court first considered whether the Webers' payment of irrigation charges was a condition precedent to North Loup's contractual duty to
deliver water. Holding that it was, the Court found a condition in the terms of
the contract that stated, "INorth Loupi shall withhold and stop the delivery of
water to the landowner in the event a default of payments herein required occurs and such default continues for a period of four months following the due
date." The Webers did not deny that they failed to pay their bill when due on
December 1, 2009. Further, the Webers admitted that their bill continued to
be in default for much longer than four months after the due date. Therefore,
the Court reasoned that North Loup's duty to provide water "never came to
fruition," negating the possibility of breach.
The Court further held that North Loup did not waive the condition
precedent. The Webers argued that North Loup never decided whether it
would waive the landowners' 2010 irrigation charges due to the flood. Noting
that waiver of a condition precedent requires a clear, unequivocal, and decisive action, the Court held that North Loup did not waive the condition precedent to the Webers' contract. Although North Loup waived a different
landowner's irrigation charges in the 2010 year, the Court found that North
Loup did so because the contract was only formed two months prior to the
flood. The Court concluded that North Loup's isolated wavier of the other
landowner's irrigation fees did not waive the condition precedent in its contract with the Webers.
The Court next considered whether North Loup anticipatorily breached
the contracts. The Webers argued that North Loup anticipatorily breached
the contracts when it decided to build a new dan rather than a temporary one,
without an assessment of damages two months before the irrigation season.
The Court disagreed and held that North Loup did not anticipatorily breach
the contracts. The Court reasoned that the Webers breached the contracts
before North Loup's alleged breach. Because payment of the 2010 irrigation
fees was both the Webers' duty to perform and a condition precedent to
North Loup's duty to provide water, North Loup could not anticipatorily
breach the contracts when the Webers had already materially breached them.
The Court emphasized that the term was material because the Webers' pay-
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ment was one of their only obligations under the contracts.
Finally, the Court held that North Loup (lid not act negligently by Failing
to deliver water to the Webers, even though non-delivery of the water might
have been a statutory violation. Nebraska Revised Statutes section 46-263
makes it a misdemeanor for a person in charge "of a ditch or canal used for
Irrigation puirposes... to prevent or interfere with the proper delivery of water
to the person or persons having the right thereto." North Loup argued that
the statute was inapplicable because it applied to "persons" and not to "public
"entities." The Court did not address whether the statute applied to "public
entities," instead linding that the statute did not require North Loup to deliver
water to "those having no right to the water." The Court held that the Webers' nonpayment of the irrigation fees relieved North Loup of itsdtity to deliver water. Because North Loup had no duty to deliver the water at all, the
Court found that North Loup's failure to deliver the water was not negligent.
Accordingly, the Court alfinned die district court's grant of North Loup's
motion for summary judgment.
Kylie lVvse

WYOMING
Plait v. Platt, 337 P.3d 431 (Wyo. 2014) (holding the district court's order
to partition in kind a ranch property, including the water rights appurtenant to
the individual parcels, through construction of a separate ditch to carry water
from one parcel to the other, was incomplete and clearly erroneous because
the record lacked competent evidence to establish that the ditch requirement
would not manifestly injure the value of the property).
Ralph E. Platt, Wayne W. Platt, and appellant Alice A. Platt ("Alice"), inherited their family ranch near Encampment, Wyoming. The Platt brothers
eventually placed their half of the ranch in the Platt Ranch Trust (die "Trust"),
one of the appellees in this case. Disagreenents concerning the operation of
the ranch led the parties to seek partition in kind from the District Court of
Carbon County, Wyoming ("district court"). Finding the parties were entitled
to partition, the district court appointed three commissioners to detennine an
equitable division of the land and water rights. The commissioners proposed
a division of the land that the parties accepted, and additionally recommended
allocation of the water rights to the parcels of land to which they were appurtenant.
In Wyoming, "[wlater rights can be partitioned along with the real property to which they pertain, provided that each parcel receives an equitable share
of the right and has enough water to permit continued use of the land as it has
historically been used." Historically, the Platt's irrigated the ranch by drawing
water from the King Tumbull Ditch No. 2 located on the neighboring Kraft
ranch, and then sending it through the North-South Ditch to flood-irrigate the
Trust's parcel. They recaptured the remaining water to irrigate Alice's parcel.
Because this system depended on a single water right, the commissioners determined that a ditch, headgate, and measuring device were necessary to meter
and distinguish Alice's water from the Trust's. Accordingly, the commissioners reconnended establishing a "Dedicated Ditch" to separately carry Alice's
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allocated water to her property from the Trust's property.
In the first proceeding before the district court, the commissioners recommended the parties decide the location for the Dedicated Ditch because
snow cover prevented the commissioners from locating it. When the parties
were unable to agree on a location, the district court held a second hearing to
decide the issue. The district court heard recommendations from the commissioners, Alice, and the Trust. Ultimately, the district court ordered the
parties to construct the Trust's proposed "Westerly Ditch" because, although
it was "arguably the most expensive option, lit offered the best future outcome for both parties, being that there would be mininal to no interaction between them for maintenance and inspection." The Westerly Ditch required
an easement from Kraft Ranches, a non-party. The district court ordered the
parties share the cost of construction, including the cost of installing a workable irrigation system.
Alice appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court ("Court"), arguing that
the district court's order for construction of the Westerly Ditch was legally and
factually erroneous because it required her to obtain an easement from a nonparty and to change her means of water conveyance without evidence that she
could do either without causing manifest injury to the value of her property.
On appeal, the Court first addressed whether the district court's first order
for partition in kind of the parties' property was clearly erroneous. Under
Wyoming law, partition in kind is inappropriate if "the real property cannot
be divided in kind without causing manifest injury to its value." In the first
proceeding, the district court determined the property could be partitioned in
kind "without manifest injury to the whole" despite the fact that the commissioners did not detemline the exact location of the Dedicated Ditch. The
Court found this conclusion erroneous. Given that Alice planned to use the
partitioned property for agriculture and ranching, knowing whether and how
water could be delivered to her parcel was essential to determining the land's
value. The Court noted "Ithere can be little doubt that a property with good
water rights and a means to convey the water to the land is worth considerably
more in arid Wyoming than land without one or the other." The Court held
that the location of the Dedicated Ditch would also affect the value of the
Trust's parcel because two of the ditch locations the district court considered
would have used seven acres of the Trust's valuable hay meadows. Because
the location of the Dedicated Ditch would impact the partitioned property's
value, the Court held the district court's finding that partition in kind would
not manifestly injure the value of the property, without affirmatively locating
the ditch, was clearly erroneous.
Next, the Court addressed whether the district court erred in the second
proceeding when it ordered the parties to build the Westerly Ditch because it
required an easement from a non-party, Kraft Ranches. Alice argued the district court could not require the parties to obtain an additional easement
across Kraft Ranches's property without evidence of pemlission. The Platt
brothers argued that the district court could require the easement because evidence in tie record demonstrated Kraft Ranches would grant it. The Court
began by noting that it was a matter of first hinpression whether a court has the
power to order a party to obtain an easement from a non-party in a partition
proceeding. The Court held that one approach to the issue may lie in the
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common law doctrine of "owelty," where one coparcener compensates the
other when land is not capable of being partitioned into exactly equal shares.
Accordingly, had the record supported a conclusion that it was possible to obtain an easement from Kraft Ranches and build a ditch connecting the Westerly Ditch to King Turnbull Ditch No. 2, the district court could have ordered
the Trust to pay the difference in value or divide the cost of construction between the parties to effectuate an equitable partition.
The Court held, however, that the "vague promise of future performance"
from Kraft Ranches in the commissioners' report was not specific enough to
constitute consent to an easement under the Statute of Frauds. Because the
district court did not detennine if the easement (i) could be obtained, (ii)
would allow appropriate construction and necessary maintenance of the ditch,
or (iii) would run with the land, the Court held it had no basis to determine
that the partition was eqluitable, nor that the order would not manifestly injure
the value of the partitioned property.
Next, the Court considered whether the district court's order for construction of the Westerly Ditch required Alice to change her means of conveyance
for the water she received in the partition. Alice argued she could not be
compelled to change her means of conveyance because Wyoming law requires her to petition the State Board of Control for the change, but does not
guarantee perinIssion. The Trust argued that a person can change their
means of conveyance without petitioning the Board of Control. The Court
held that the Wyoming Legislature did intend to "require a person changing
the means of conveyance of water supplied through a water right to obtain approval by the Board of Control," but that the district court did not order Alice
to change her means of conveyance. If the district court required construction
of the Westerly I)itch on remand, Alice could choose to change her means of
conveyance to bring water to her land, or choose not to change her means of
conveyance and forego her water rights. The Court noted that this result "may
be a Hobson's choice, but it may also be unavoidable." However, the Court
also noted the lack of evidence demonstrating that Alice could obtain approval
to change her means of conveyance. On remand, evidence that Alice could
not obtain permission to change the means of conveyance would negatively
affect the value of her partitioned parcel and weigh against the Westerly Ditch
as an equitable means of dividing the property.
Finally, the Court considered whether the district court abused its discretion in choosing the Westerly Ditch over the alternatives that Alice and te
commissioners suggested. Alice contended that building the Westerly Ditch
was a high cost risk because the ditch was unproven. The Trust argued that
evidence presented at trial showed the Westerly Ditch could be successfully
built and operated. The Court concluded the district court did not review evidence of construction costs for the Westerly Ditch until after selecting it, and
remanded the issue of whether the cost of building the Westerly Ditch would
manifestly injure the value of the property.
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Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's order to construct the
Westerly Ditch and remanded with instructions for the district court to determine whether the property could be partitioned in kind without manifestly
injuring its value, and if so, whether the Westerly Ditch is an equitable means
of dividing tie property.

Molly Kokesh

STUDENT SYMPOSIUM
A COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: MONO
LiKEAND GROUNDWATER IN CALIFORNIA, CITIZEN INITIATIVE AND
LEGAL ADAPTATION IN COLORADO
Editor'sNote: The lbllowing ]burnotes comprise a series of collabottaive
scholiu:shixi
nd discussion between the University of Denver Water Law Review and /ie Stanford Environmental LawJournal that studies the public rust
doctrine, the stark contrast of its historv and development in Colorado and
COai/rnia,and the imiplicationsofits applica1tion to groundwatir;
ie series opens i4th Colom1do, beginning with a suminajy of the basic
historicaldebates and resistance to estabhlihnient of a public trust doctilne in
the state and concluding with an exiamination of how the Colorado Doctline
has adapted incrementadly to protect some of the same envionnlental aind
recreationii interests, to a luger or smaller extent, in the absence of a public
trustdoctrine.
7he series then shiis to Califbrni, beginning with a sunniuy of the roots
of the public trust doctrine and the seminal "Mono Lake Case," National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County; continuing with a discussion o the doctine's extension to groundwater in Environmental Law
Foundation v. State Water Resources Control Board; and concluding wiith a
discussion of that case and the public trust doctuine 's potential impact on
groundwaterregulation,particularlyin light of die recendy-enactedSustainable
GroundwaterManagementAct.
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE IN COLORADO: ARGUMENTS MADE
FOR AND AGAINST ITS APPLICATION
Bruce C. Walters

I. INTRODUCTION
A relic of antiquity, the public trust doctrine provides that "the state holds
certain natural resources in trust for the benefit of its citizens."' The state may
provide for the private use of these resources, and allow private entities to obtain property rights in those resources, but the state must always ensure that
the purposes of the trust are fulfilled.'
As a common law restraint, the doctrine prevents the diminishment of
sovereign authority or the elimination of public access to navigable waters and
submerged lands.3 Under its classic formulation in Illinois Central, the doctrine provides that the state is to hold tide to the lands beneath navigable waters for the people, so that they may enjoy these waters free from the "interference of private parties."' In Illinois Central, the United States Supreme
Court explained that a state's public trust duties can never be fully relinquished, likening obligations under the trust to a state's immutable police
powers.
Although a state may not restrict the public trust doctrine, the doctrine
may be expanded to meet the needs of an evolving community and the changing use of natural resources
By the close of the twentieth century, many
states had expanded the doctrine beyond its traditional focus on navigable waters to include lakes, tributaries, wetlands, and even groundwater.' In the
1970s, as the environmental movement rose to prominence, the doctrine took
on additional significance in the world of legal academia.' Joseph Sax, a
preeminent public trust scholar, was at the forefront of the move towards what
has since been dubbed an "ecological" public trust doctrine.9 Sax envisioned
the doctrine as a tool by which judges could compel legislative consideration
1. Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, 7he Public TrustDoctrine,and the Administrative
State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1099, 1107 (2012).
2. Id.
3. Stephen H. Lconhardt & Jessica J. Spuhler, 7he Public Trust Docrine: What it As,
Where it Came From, and Why Colorado Does Not (And Should Not) Have One, 16 U.
DENY. WATER L. REV. 47, 50 (2012).

4. 11. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
5. Id. at 453-55.
6. Julia K. Brarnley, Supreme ForesightJudicial Takings, Regulatory Takings, and the
Public Trust Doctrine,38 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 445, 456 (2011).

7. Id at 456; see also Order After Hearing on Cross Motions for Judgment on tie Pleadings, Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., No. 34-2010-80000583 (Cal.
Super. Ct.Jul. 15, 2014).
8. Russell M. McGlothlin & Scott S. Slater, No fictions Required: Assessing the Public
Trust Doctrinein Pursuitof Balanced Water Management, 17 U. DENy. WATER L. REV. 53,
60 (2013).
9. Id. at 61.
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concerning actions harmfil to trust resources." By emphasizing judicial action, Sax believed that citizens could bypass legislatures and adninistrative
agencies, which, according to Sax, had been corrupted by private agendas."
In recent decades, there has been a continued debate over the applicability of the doctrine to the managenent of scarce western water. In Colorado,
the public trust doctrine holds no legal authority.'2 Those arguing for the
adoption of the doctrine, at least in reference to surface water and tributary
groundwater, contend that the public trust doctrine should be applied more
aggressively in the world of western water, and that the private property approach to water resources is inimical to solving issues of scarcity. By contrast,
opponents caution against the enactnent of a public trust doctrine, fearing the
consequences such a wholesale adoption could have on water law in Colorado-a system that has been in place for Imore than a century. This article examines the history of the public trust doctrine in Colorado water law, discusses
recent attempts to enact a public trust doctrine in the state, and briefly explains arguments for and against adoption of the doctrine within Colorado.
1I. WESTERN WATER LAW
Water law in the American West is governed by the doctrine of prior appropriation, a legal system designed to facilitate the maximum use of a finite
and scarce resource. The doctrine of prior appropriation is characterized by
the principle of "first in time, first in right";" the first person to put a particular
quantity of water to beneficial use acquires a paramount right to the continued
use of that water.' Today, all western states adhere to some variant of the appropriative regimne.'6
In Colorado, the doctrine of appropriation inherited its purest form.'7 In
response to the harsh realities faced by water users, the Colorado Constitution
of 1876 declared that water fron natural streams in the state will be "the
property of the public," and that the right to appropriate such water "for beneficial use in order of priority shall never be denied."" Central to the Colorado
Doctrine is the principle that "priorities of right to the use of water are property rights."'" When a prospective appropriator diverts unappropriated water
10. Id. (citing loseph L. Sax, 7he Pablic 7Tust lDocirthie in Natueda Resoi'ee Law: E/Fective
.Judicil nitervention. 68 MICH. L. RI-V. 471. 555-58 (1970)).
11. Joseph L. Sax, The Public 7lhust Joctincin Valuril Resowrce Law: Ellieticicl
Inter'ention,68 MICH. L. RFv. 471, 560 (1970)
12. See generlv People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979) (establishing thai Colorado waters are bound under tie rule of private ownership, thereby rendering the public trust
doctrine irrelevant, if not inoperable).
13. Gregory .1.Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An Historical OverI ikw, I U. DENY.

WATER L. REV. 1, 2 (1998).
14. German Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. Platte Valley Irrigation Co., 178 P. 896, 896 (Colo.
1919).
15. A. Dan Tarlock, PriorAppwopriation: Rule, Princlek, or Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L. REV.
881, 882 (2000).
16. Danielle Spiegel, Can the Public 7iTst I)octiine Save lesterl Groundwatcr?, 18
N.Y.U. ENVTL. Lj. 412, 419 (2010).
17. See COIo. CONST. art. XVI, § 5; Leonhardt & Spuhler, supra note 3, at 50.
18. Hobbs, supi-a note 13, at 6 (quoting COLO. CONST. arl. XVI, §§ 5-7).
19. Nichols v. Mclntosh, 34 P. 278, 280 (Colo. 1893).

WA TER 1A W REVIEW

Volumec 18

from a natural stream (or from tributary groundwater') and puts it to a beneficial use, the private property right that results is a usufructuary right providing
the appropriator with the right to use water that is owned by the state without
corrupting its quality." The resulting property right "is not an ownership right
to molecules of water, but a right to divert a specified quantity of water for a
specified 'beneficial use with a specific priority relative to other users from the
same source.' ' . This right to use is a fully vested and alienable property right,
which can be bought and sold without regard to the real property over which
the water flows. A priority right to the use of water, equivalent to a property
right, is protected under the Colorado Constitution, meaning that no person
can be deprived that right without due process of law. 4
1II. COLORADO AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
Article XVI, Section 5 of the Colorado Constitution states that "ItIhe water of every natural stream ... within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared
to be the property of the public ... subject to appropriation."' Yet despite
this provision, Colorado has not adopted the public trust doctrine, and the
public interest is not considered during water adjudication proceedings. ' The
Colorado Supreme Court has opined that an objection to a decree based on
public interest is invalid is directly in conflict with the doctrine of prior appropriation.7 Questions regarding the public interest, the court explained, are the
province of the General Assembly and the electorate, mad are not an appropriate matter for courts to consider.2 The Colorado Constitution requires only "protection for appropriation, not protection firom use or for preservation.",
Furthermore, while other states have adopted less stringent definitions of
navigability, the Colorado Supreme Court has not declared any stream in the
state as navigable. "ITIhe Colorado Supreme Court long ago stated 'It]he natural streams of the state are nonnavigable within its limits."'20 While the court
has not had an opportunity to directly confront the issue, it seems unlikely that
the court would declare any stream within the state as navigable."

20. See Safranek v. Town of Limon, 228 P.2d 975 (Colo. 1951) (stating Colorado's presumption of groundwater tributariness).
21. Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2(1 374, 1377 (Colo. 1982).
22. Stephen N. Bretsen, RainwaterHarvesting Uinder Colordo'sPrior Appropiation Doetrinc: PropertyRghts ;nd Takings, 22 FORDHAM ENVrL. L. REV. 159, 182 (2011) (quoting
GEORGE VRANESH, VRANESH'S COLORADO WATER LAW 8 (James N. Corbridge

& Teresa A.

Rice eds., rev. ed. 1999)).
23. Navajo Dem: Co., 655 P.2d at 1378.
24. Nichols, 34 P. at 280.

25. COLO. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 5.
26. Hobbs, supranote 13, at 22.
27. B(. of Cnty. Comni'rs v. United States, 891 P.2d 952, 972-73 (Colo. 1995).

28. Id.
29. Leonhardt & Spuhler, supra note 3, at 64.
30. John R. Hill, Jr., The "ight" to Float Through Private Propelty in

Coloado: l)ispeling the Myth, 4 U. DEN.'. WATER L. REV. 331, 342 (2001) (quoting In re German Ditch &

Reservoir Co., 139 P. 2, 9 (Colo. 1913)).
31. Bd. of Cnt;y Comm'rs, 891 P.2d at 972 ("Conceptually, a public interest theory is in
conflict vith the doctrine of prior appropriation because a water court cannot, in the absence of
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While the Colorado Supreme Court has systematically rejected any attempt to enact a statewlide public trust regime, voters in Colorado can anend
the state constitution through ballot initiative.13 Over the last twenty years,
there has been a concerted effort to force courts to recognize a public trust in
surface water and tributary groundwater through that process, and these argumenLs are evocative of a much larger movement in the West.' Of paramount
importance to those arguing for a robust public trust doctrine is the principle
that certain public interests in natural resources are immune from private alienation, and should be protected as a communal resource*. Proponents argue that many of the virtues of the public trust doctrine-its ability to spur on
legislative action and influence the reallocation of natural resources through
judicial intervention-make it an ideal tool for addressing environmental concerns."; Moreover, because the doctrine affects a wide variety of natural resources, its potential for environmental preservation is tremendous." Supporters argue that "the heightened protection of water resources that attends
broader application of the public trust doctrine could help slow the overappropriation of vital waters, reacquire instream flows of such waters, and increase water conservation efforts."' Proponents further contend that the doctrine can help reverse trends of environmental degradation and ongoing water
scarcity, while a continued reliance on an appropriative regime will only accelerate these issues, by catering to special interests."
In 2012, Richard Hamilton and Philip Doe proposed Ballot Initiatives 3
and 45, seeking to amend the Colorado Constitution in an effort to enact Colorado's own variant of the public trust doctrine.' Hamilton has been the architect behind a series of ballot initiatives seeking to amnend Colorado's constimution to impose the public trust doctrine on the state's water resources."
Whereas Initiative 45 sought to expand the scope of public control over all of
the state's waters, Initiative 3 was designed specifically to enact a Colorado
public trust doctrine by adding language to article XVI, section 5 of Colorado's constitution.2 The third section of Initiative 3 provided that "the public's
estate in water in Colorado has a legal authority superior to rules and terns of
contracts or property law."'" A later provision of Initiative 3 relating to state-

statutory aulhority, deny a legitinsate appropriation based on public policy").
32. Leonhardi & SJ)uhlcr, supla note 3,at 49.

33. CoLO.CONS'r. art. XIX, § 2.
34. See, e.g., Carol Necole Brown, ln.hl hg liom a Deep Well: 7he ltihlic Trust l)ocatne
and Western Water Law, 34 FiA. ST. U. L.Ri.'v. 1 (2006).
35. Spiegel, supia note 16, at 429.
36. McGlotllin & Slater, supra note 8, at 61-62 (citing Sax, stpqa note 10, at 555-58).
37. Hm-rison C. Dunning, 7he Public 7)-ust: A FunmdinentalDoctrine of Amnerklan
opertvILa, 19 ENV'L.L. 515,517 (1989).
38. Brown, supIr7 note 34, at 9.
39. Id. at 3 (explaining that the prior appropriation doctrine "was and still
is a doctrine that
caters to specikd interests such as development, mining, and apiculture").
40. Leonhard & Spuhlier, supra note 3, at 84; Kemper v. Hamilton (I)re Title, Ballot Tide, m(d Submission Clause lor #3), 274 P.3d 562 (Colo. 2012); Kemper v.Hamilton (In re Tide, Bdlot Tile, maid Submission Clause for #45) 274 P.3d 576 (Colo. 2012).
41. Id. at81.
42. In re 7tie fr #,15, 274 P.3d at 578; In re 7tile for #3, 274 P.3d at 564.
43.
i re 7tie ?k)r
#3, 274 P.3(1 t 568.
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owned water rights stated that "lwlater rights, held by the state of Colorado for
government operations, shall be held in trust for the public by the State of
Colorado with the State acting as the stewardofthe public's water estate."'
Although the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the ballot fide and submission clause for both of the 2012 proposed initiatives, neither measure obtained the requisite number of signatures to qualify for the statewide ballot.'
In the case for Initiative 45, Justice Gregory Hobbs warned in his dissenting
opinion against enacting a public trust doctrine. According to Justice Hobbs,
if a public trust in water were enacted, "it would prevent fanners, cities, fmnilies and businesses from making beneficial use of water rights that have vested
in them over the past 150 years under Colorado's statutes and Constitution."'
The public's dominant water estate would also supersede the Colorado Water
Conservation Board's appropriations for instremn flows and lake level water
rights, which are designed to protect the environment and recreational uses."
Moreover, it would inhibit Colorado's ability to use the full extent of its allocations under various interstate compacts, resulting in a windtfall to neighboring
states. " Justice Hobbs concluded that adopting a public trust in water would
"drop what amounts to a nuclear bomb on Colorado water rights.'""
Notably, Doe, together with Barbara Mills-Bria, is proposing a new public
trust initiative in 2015-2016; the Colorado Supreme Court aflinned the Ballot
Title Board's approval of the ballot title and submission clause for "Initiative
#4" on March 12, 2015, allowing the initiative to move forward and seek the
requisite number of signatures to make it onto the 2016 state ballot.'
In response to those extolling the public trust doctrine for its ability to
confront environmental concerns, others caution that environmentalism was
not a function of the traditional public trust doctrine, and that "[eixtension of
the public trust doctrine ... is judicial sleight of hand; its rationale (far afield
from its roots) is that environmental concerns deserve the same nature and
level of protection as public access to water bodies historically used for navigation." ' Opponents of the public trust doctrine acknowledged that while many
environmental concerns are well-founded, "they are public policy goals best
resolved by legislation after public debate, considering the most appropriate
solution for each resource, with due regard for property rights.""
In Colorado, most of the apprehension surrounding the public trust doctrine has centered on the consequences such a profound change would have
on the Colorado Doctrine. Colorado has relied upon its current approach to

44. Id. at 569 (emphasis added).
45. Lconhardt & Spuhler, supra note 3, at 84.
46. In r 7tite Ibr #45 274 P.3d at 586 (Hobbs, J., dissenting).
47. Id. (Hobbs, J., dissenting).
48. Id. (Hobbs, J., dissenting).
49. Id. (Hobbs,J., dissenting).
50. See Order of Court, Kemper v. Doe (In re Title, Ballot Title, and Submission Clause
for Proposed Initiatives 2015-2016 #4), No. 15SA15 (Colo. Mar. 12, 2015), available al
https://%w'.coui-ts.state.co.us/userliles/tile/Court Prlbafion/Supreme-Couri/initiaives/20 1516/15SAI 5/3-12-15%20court%20order.pdf.
51. Lconhardt & Spuhler, supra note 3, at 90.

52. Id.
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water rights for over 150 years53 An initiative such as the one Hamilton and
Doe advanced in 2012 would inevitably result in a draniatic increase in litigation over current water rights in the state.'
Opponents of the doctrine argue that imposing the public trust doctrine
would place current water owners and users in Colorado in a precarious position, as their rights would be subject to potential alteration or revocation under
a trust regime5 In addition, because water rights in Colorado are legally recognized property rights, any forced transfer of these rights resulting from a
public trust regime could subject the state to takings liability.' Furthermore, a
broad adoption of the public trust doctrine in Colorado could create enormous uncertainty in the water market by making it imlpossible for a user to
plan or finance a significant water project and interfering with tie ability of users to transfer water rights .
Finally, implementing a public trust doctrine
would result in significant costs to the state. A study surrounding a 1996 initiative "estimated the very uncertain net fiscal impacts of the initiative to local
governments in Colorado could range from $2.28 to $3.36 billion. '8
IV. CONCLUSION
It seems unlikely that the public trust doctrine will ever be judicially enacted in Colorado, and it is uncertain whether it will ever be enacted through
voter referendum. Nevertheless, the debate surrounding the public trust doctrine surges on, and Colorado continues to feel the pressure of those arguing
for its adoption. Elsewhere in the American West, many have turned to the
doctrine as the neans by which to solve water scarcity and attendant environmental issues. However, Colorado remains steadfast in its reliance on its strict
appropriative regime, and ballot initiatives attempting to introduce tie public
trust doctrine to Colorado remain the subjects of fierce objection.

53. Id.
54, Id., at 88.
55. Id. at 90.

56. Id.at 94
57. Id. at 89.
58. Id.at 90.

HOW COLORADO'S PRIOR APPROPRIATION
SYSTEM ADDRESSES ENVIRONMENTAL AND
RECREATIONAL CONCERNS WITHOUT A PUBLIC
TRUST DOCITRINE
Lauren R.

Bushong

I. INTRODUCTION
The public trust doctrine ("lTD"), moldable to each state's individual
needs, follows ie central premise that ie state, as trustee, holds natural resources such as water in trust for the benefit of its citizens.' The United States
Supreme Court has opined that the doctrine's definition and parameters are a
matter of state law and that each state can choose to create a public trust or
not.' Unlike California and various other states, Colorado has never adopted
the doctrine, instead relying on its system of prior appropriation to protect
public interests. The Colorado Constitution declares surface water (and tribu-

tary groundwater) "to be the property of the public" that is "dedicated to the
use of the people of the state."' The right to divert water for beneficial use
"shall never be denied," the state constitution continues' Colorado courts
have consistently held that the state's constitution fails to provide a fbundation

for the implementation of a public trust for water.' Despite the lack of a PTD
in Colorado, the state has made efforts to work within the prior appropriation
system to preserve the natural environment, fish, and wildlife,' and to protect
recreational uses.8
II. HOW COLORADO ADDRESSES PUBLIC INTEREST AND

ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
Unlike California, where courts have expanded the PrTD to encompass
1. Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, 7he Public Thist Docjnc, and the Adninisuanve

State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1099, 1107 (2012).
2. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892); see also Danielle Spiegel, Can
p,
the Public Trust )octrine Save Western GrounditeN; 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. 412, 428-29
(2010).
3. See Safanek t. Toini of lirnon,228 P.2d 975 (Colo. 1951).
4. COLO. CONST. art. XVI § 5; see also Stephen H. Leonhardt &JessicaJ. Spuhler, 77e
Public Thrst Doctrine: 14T'at It Is, Where It Came From, And Why. Colorado J)oes Not (And
ShouMiNot) Have One, 16 U. DENv. WATER L. REV. 47, 48-49 (2012).
5. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
6. Lconhardt & Spnhler, supra note 4, at 60.
7. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr. & Bennett W. Raley, Water Rights Protection ,i Water Quality
Law, 60 U. CoLo. L. REV. 841, 879, 881-82 (1989).
8. Id; see also Joshua Mack, 7he Evohlution of Colorado's Recreational In-ChannelDivelsions, 10 U. DENv. WATER L. REV. 73, 76 (2006).
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environmental protection in the realm of surface water and, recently, some
tributary groundwater use,9 Colorado, in the absence of a state PTD, has created specific statutory prograns and beneficial uses for water to address public
interests such as recreation and the environment." Specifically, Colorado law
pennits the state to appropriate or acquire instrearn flow rights that operate
within the prior appropriation system to protect minimum streamflows for fish
and other purposes. Colorado has also addressed recreational concerns by
expanding the definitions of beneficial use and diversion to permit "recreational in-channel diversion" decrees, which have the byproduct of also sinultaneously protecting flows necessary to protect the natural environmenL."
Both of these expanded definitions of beneficial use include a caveat that constrains who can appropriate water for such uses.'" A brief look into the legislative and legal history of these adaptations to beneficial use highlights how Colorado's prior appropriation law endeavors to protect public interests as well as
the environment in the absence of a robust IrD.

III. INSTREAM FLOWS
Statewide concern about aquatic habitat spurred legislators to expand the
definition of beneficial use in Colorado in 1973. 1' The expanded definition
enabled the appropriation of environmentally-protective minimum flows in
Colorado lakes and streams." Under Colorado law, beneficial use is
the use of that amount of water that is reasonable and appropriate under
reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the purpose for
which the appropriation is lawfully made and, without limiting the generality of
the foregoing, includes ... (c) For the benefit and enjoyment of present and
future generations, the appropriation by the state of Colorado in the manner
prescribed by law of such minimum flows between two specific points or levels for and on natural streans and lakes as required to preserve the natural
environment to a reasonable degree.'"
To limit this expansion of the definition of beneficial use, the Colorado
General Assembly granted exclusive authority to appropriate instream flows to
the Colorado Water Conservation Board ("CWCB")." For the CWCB to initiate a water appropriation, it must make a determination that preservation of
the natural environment will occur to a reasonable degree by the current

9. Owen, supranote 1, at 1109-10 (discussing Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal.
1971)); see also Order After Hearing on Cross Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings at 9,
Envil. Law Found. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., No. 34-2010-80000583 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Jul. 15, 2014).
10. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (2013).
11. Mack, supra note 8, at 76, 79, 94.
12. Id. at 76.
13. Cynthia F. Covell, A Sutvcv of Sate Inslream Flow Programsin the Western United
States, 1 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 177, 184 (1998).
14. Mack, supra note 8, at 75-76.
15. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (2014).
16. Thomas Hicks, An Interpretationof the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations Supporting the 7bLr Deductibilitv of the Voluntary CharitablcContribution in Perpetuity
of A PartialInterest in an ApproprTative or RIhpaian Watei, 17 HASTINGS W.-NW. .1.ENVTL.

L. & POL'Y 93, 148-49 (2011) (discussing COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3)-(4)).
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amount of water available for appropriation." If a reasonable degree of natural environment preservation can occur by CWCB's instream flow appropriation, the right is created but it must not cause material injury to senior surface
water or tributary groundwater rights.'8
The water rights the CWCB appropriates are junior rights, but they do
not require a diversion.' 9 In 1979 the Supreme Court in Colorado River
Water Conservation Distlict v. Colorado Water Conservation Board confirmed that the CWCB did not need a diversion to appropriate water.' ° The
Court outlined that the state constitution only uses the word "divert" once and
that it does not mandate that diversion be an essential element of appropriation in Colorado."
This confirmation of the CWCB's ability to appropriate water without a
diversion allowed the CWCB to work to preserve lakes and streams; in its duty to appropriate to protect the natural environment, the CWCB has preserved cold and warm water fisheries, waterfowl habitat, glacial ponds, unique
hydrologic and geologic features like Hanging Lake, and critical habitat for
threatened or endangered native fish.2 These types of environmental protections are also at the core of the PfD's ability to protect the natural environment for the public interest." Colorado's instream flow program therefore
provides for these environmental protections in the absence of a public trust
doctrine.
The CWCB has instrean flow rights "on more than 1,500 stream segments covering more than 8,500 miles of stream and 477 natural lakes."' In
2002 the Colorado General Assembly authorized the CWCB to acquire existing senior water rights by lease, purchase, or donation in order to enable
CWCB to further protect the natural environment.'
Instead of only appropriating junior rights for minimum stream flows, now the CWCB can obtain
decreed, senior rights and put those rights to instream flow use to preserve
and improve the natural environment. 2 This expansion of the instream flow
program creates more potential for environmental protection in the state:
since the 2002 change, the CWCB has completed more than twenty voluntary
water acquisition transactions. These legislative enactments exemplify an alterative approach to the PTD and allow for a state without a PTD to protect
aquatic life and habitat, and to maintain minimum flows throughout the state,
by other means.

17. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3); see Covell, supra note 13, at 185.
18. Id.
19. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 594 P.2d 570, 573 (Colo. 1979); see Hicks, supra note 16, at 148-49.

20. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 594 P.2d at 574.
21. Id. at 573.
22. Instream Flow Program, Colorado Water Conservation

Board

("CWCB"),

http://cwcb.state.co.us/ENVIRONMENT/INSTREAM-FLOW-PROGRAM/Pages/main.aspx

(last visited March 7, 2015) [hereinafter Colorado Water Conservation Board].
23.

Owen, supra note 1, at 1109.

24.
25.
26.
27.

Colorado Water Conservation Board, supra note 22.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2014); see Hicks, supra note 16, at 148.
Id.
Colorado Water Conservation Board, supra note 22.
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IV. RECREATIONAL IN-CHANNEL DIVERSIONS
In 1998 the City of Golden saw an opportunity to develop a recreational
niche and filed an application for a decree for one thousand cubic feet per
second ("cfs") of water for the months of May, June, and July for its whitewater sports park.28 This very large application spurred the water court to address the definition of diversion and beneficial use. The water court stated
that structures that control, concentrate, and direct the flow of water constitute
a diversion.' The water court also confirmed that using water for recreational
boating is a beneficial use." On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court atfirmed the decree." This decision confirmed that recreational in-channel diversions ("RICDs") could be very large and opened up the possibility that
RICDs could have negative impacts on upstream transfers, storage, and transmountain diversion plans." Following the court's decision, in 2001 the Colorado General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 216 ("SB 216") to address similarly large RICD applications."
SB 216 implemented restrictions on RICDs similar to those imposed upon instream flow rights. The bill changed the definition of beneficial use and
diversion to specify that only "a county, municipality, city and county, water
district, water and sanitation district, water conservation district or water conservancy district" could divert water for the beneficial use of recreational inchannel purposes." The ability to control water for RICDs, therefore, is only
for those specified entities.' This new bill also defined RICD as "the mininum strearn flow as it is diverted, captured, controlled, and placed to beneficial use between specific points defined by physical control structures pursuant
to an application filed by a Ilocal government entity] for a reasonable recreation experience in and on the water. ' The law mimics the instrean flow regulations, requiring a municipality seeking a RICD to first submit an application to the CWCB for review and recommendation, and to then bring the
application to the water court for final review." Public policy concerns and the
technical expertise needed to analyze RICDs resulted in the selection of the
CWCB as the recommending body for RICDs.5
The role of the CWCB in the RICD application process caused quite a
controversy and led to a Colorado Supreme Court confirming the CWCB's
28. In re Application for Water Rights of Golden, No. 98CW448, 1 (Colo. Water Ct. Div.
No. 1 2001), available at lttP://cdss.staie.CO.us/onlineTools/Pages/WaitcrRights.aspx (last visited
Mar. 24, 2015).
29. Id. at 4-5; see also Mack, supra note 8, at 77.
30. In re Application lbr Water Rights of Golden. at 5; see also Mack, supra n te 8, at 77.
31. State Eng'r v. City of Golden, 69 P.3d 1027, 1028 (Colo. 2003).
32. Mack, supra note 8, at 78-79.
33. S.B. 01-216, 63rd Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2001).; see also Mack, supra note
8, at 79.
34. S.B. 01-216, 63rd Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2001) (current version at COLO.
REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4)(b) (2014); see also Rebecca Abeln, Instren Flows, Recreation as
Beneficial Use, and the Public Interest in Colorado Water Law, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REV.

517, 523-24 (2005).
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Coio. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(10.3).
Abeln, supra note 34, at 527.
Mack, supa note 8, at 81.
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authority to recommend RICD applications.9 In 2002 the Upper Gunnison
River Water Conservancy District filed a RICD application with the CWCB. 4
The CWCB significantly reduced the amount of water in the application to an
amount it considered reasonable and then made a favorable recommendation
to the water court." When tie application moved to the water court for review, the CWCB had made no factual findings, as statutorily required." The
water court made its own findings, based on the statutory factors outlined in
SB 216, and granted the decree for the full application amount. 3 The CWCB
appealed the decree to the Supreme Court, which held that the CWCB is a
"narrowly constrained fact-finding and advising body" when reviewing RICD
applications and must act as such." The court agreed with the CWCB's concern about water waste and held that decreed RICD water rights are only for
the minimum amount needed for a reasonable recreational experience. ' 5
While the role of the CWCB in approving RICDs and determining the
minimum flow needed for recreation has proved tenuous at times, RICDs
have provided for the protection of flows that benefit recreational interests,
but also the natural environment.' 6 RICDs are appropriated for recreational
beneficial use, but by leaving the water in the streams for recreational use they
provide for minimum instream flows that benefit the natural environment.
More than ten cities, counties, and water districts hold decreed RICDs in
Colorado.' These municipalities may find RICD tourism and economic benefits as the greatest assets, but RICDs also allow for environmental conservation.' Demonstrating that recreational interests span from boating to fishing,
fish and recTrout Unlimited has indicated the potential for RICDs to benefit
9
reational fishing by protecting flows sufficient to support habitat.
Colorado courts have consistently held that there is no public trust doctrine, but RICDs do consider the public interest to some extent." Similar to
legislatively-enacted minimum instreani flow rights, RICDs are a legislative
means to address the public interest without impinging on Colorado's system
of prior appropriation." RICDs, while legislatively constrained, address the
public interest in providing minimum flows for recreation. This collaterally
provides for the preservation of the natural environment.i The intention of
39. Colo.Water Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 109
P.3d 585, 593 (Colo. 2005); see Mack, supra note 8, at 84-85.
40. Upper Gunnison River Water ConservancyDist., 109 P.3d at 589.
41.

Mack, supra note 8, at 84.

42. Upper Gunnison River Water ConservancyDit., 109 P.3d at 590.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 593; see Mack, supra note 8, at 85.
45. Upper Gunnison River Water ConservancyDist., 109 P.3d at 593.
46. Reed D. Benson, "AdequateProgress,"or Rivers Left Behind? DevelopmenLs in Coloiado and Wyoming Instream Flow Laws Since 2000, 36 ENVrL. L. 1283, 1301 (2006).
Decreed
RICDs, Colorado Water Conservation Board,
47. Pending and
http://cwcb.state.co.us/environrnent/recreafional-in-chanel-diversions/
Pages/PendingandDecreedRICDs.aspx (last visited March 7, 2015).
48. Abeln, supra note 34, at 533.

49. Id.at 543.
50. Id.
at 533.
51. Leonhardt & Spuhler, suprm note 4, at 65-66.
52. Abeln, supra note 34, at 537.
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Colorado legislators may not have been to provide for the aquatic environ3
ment directly, but RICDs certainly have that additional benefit.
V. CONCLUSION
Colorado courts have consistently held that the public trust doctrine does
not apply to appropriative water rights in this state." This steadfiastness to a
"pure" system of prior appropriation has led instead to highly specific legislative enactments that modify the prior appropriation doctrine to accommodate
additional interests. These enactments address developing concerns about the
preservation of fisheries, wildlife, and aquatic habitat, as well as the promotion
of recreational water use in the state. As public interest needs and values have
developed in Colorado, adaptations to the prior appropriation system have
effectively addressed these additional public interest concerns." Unlike California, where the courts are responsible for implementing the public trust doctrine, the Colorado judiciary only applies prior appropriation as directed by
6
In the ongoing
the state constitution and the Colorado General Assembly
legislative attempt to accommodate environmental and recreational interests
under the Colorado Doctrine, collaborative discussions and engagement with
multiple parties to creatively address water concerns have liourished.7 As Justice Hobbs stated, "there are no aspects of the public interest that cannot be
protected" within Colorado's prior appropriation framework. Given the adaptive qualities of Colorado's prior appropriation system, this will continue to be
true .

53. IL at 533.
54.

Leonhardt & Spuhler, supra note 4, at 49-50.

55.

Id. at 94.

56.
57.
58.

Abeln, supra note 34, at 541.
Leonhardt & Spuhlier, supra note 4, 95.
Hobbs & Raley, supianote 7, at 874.

THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND ITS
GROUNDWATER APPLICATION IN CALIFORNIA
ADAM BOWLING* AND ELIZABETH VISSERS*

*

I. INTRODUCTION
This piece is the beginning of a two-part series discussing the recent application of the public trust doctrine to groundwater withdrawals in the July 2014
case, Environrental Law Foundation v. State Water Resources Control
Board ("ELF).' The California public trust doctrine provides that the state,
in its capacity as a sovereign, "owns all of its navigable waterways and the lands
lying beneath them as a trustee of the public trust for the benefit of the people."2 As a trustee, the state has a fiduciary duty to consider possible environmental impacts and, when feasible, preserve these natural resources for public
use. The ELF case held for the first time that California's public trust doctrine includes environmental impacts on navigable waters from pumping
groundwater. The first part of this series describes the public trust doctrine as
applied in California and the ELFcase. Then, because ELFcould potentially
limit some groundwater withdrawals, the second part of this series discusses
ways this case interacts with California's recent groundwater legislation, the
Sustainable Groundwater Management Act.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN
CALIFORNIA
Origins of the public trust doctrine trace to the Roman Code of Justinian'
and English common law, though the US Supreme Court first highlighted the
doctrine in Illinois CentralRailroadCo. v. Illinois.' As a matter of state common law, each state applies the public trust doctrine differently. Hawaii, for
J.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School, expected 2016.
* J.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School, expected 2017; M.S. Candidate, Emmett Interdisci-

plinary Program in Environment and Resources, Stanford School of Earth Sciences, expected
2017.
1. Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., No. 34-2010-80000583 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 15, 2014).
2. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 434 (Cal. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
3. See, e.g., J. Inst. 2.1.1 ("By the law of nature these things are common to all mankindthe air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea. No one, therefore, is
forbidden to approach the seashore, provided that he respects habitationes, monuments, and
buildings, which are not, like the sea, subject only to the law of nations.... All rivers and ports
are public; hence the right of fishing in a port, or in rivers, is common to all men.... The public use of the seashore, too, is part of the law of nations, as is that of the sea itself.").
4. 11. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Ill., 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
5. See PPL Mont. v. Mont., 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 (2012) (clarifying that "the public trust
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example, has perhaps the most expansive public trust doctrine with regard to
groundwater; all water in the state is protected by the public trust doctrine and
this protection is reflected in the state's constitution! California recognizes
two distinct public trust doctrines: a public trust duty derived from statute and
the common law doctrine discussed in this series.
Historically, the public trust doctrine only protected public rights to use
waterways for navigation, commerce, and fishing.' The uses protected by the
public trust doctrine in California, however, have expanded. During the
emergence of modern environmental law, Joseph Sax's influential 1970 article, 7he Public 7&ust Docwtne in NaturalResource Law: lEIOctiveJudicialiIntervention, argued for an extended public trust doctrine that would encompass
environmental protection." Shortly thereafter, the California Supreme Court
in Marks v. Whitney, recognized "that one of the most important public trust
uses ... is the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they
may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which
favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area."
The seminal California case on the public trust doctrine's application to
environmental protection is National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,
which held that the public trust doctrine bestows on the state the affirmative
duty to consider the impacts of government action on public trust resources.
This affirmative duty includes "protectling] the people's common heritage of
streamns, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering the right of protection
only in the rare cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent With
the purposes of the trust."'" In practice, this duty requires the trustee to "consider the effects of [its action] upon interests protected by the public trust, and
attempt, so far as feasible, to avoid or minimize any harm to those interests.""
This continuous duty led the California Supreme Court in NationalAudubon
to require reconsideration of forty years of water diversions from Mono Lake
because no responsible trustee had considered environmental impacts. At its
core, the public trust duty requires the trustee to "exercise a continuous supervision... over the navigable waters of the state and the lands underlying
those waters."'"
Im.APPLYING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO
GROUNDWATER: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOUNDATION v.
STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD
In Environmentl Law Foundation v. State Water Resources Control
doctrine remains a matter of state law" and (hat "the States retain residual power to determine
the scope of the public trust over waters within their borders").
6. See HAW. CONST. art. 11, §§ 1, 7; In re Water Use Permit Applications (Wai' Hole
Ditch), 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000).

7. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Docfine inNatual Resourcc Law: Elictivc Judicial
Interiention, 68 MicH. L. Rrv. 471, 539 (1970).

8. See ic.
9.
10.

Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259 (Cal. 1971).
NatPAudubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 440 (Cal.1983).

11.

ld.at425.

12.

hi.
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Board, the Superior Court of California applied 'NationalAudubon to hold
that the public trust doctrine encompasses groundwater extraction that directly
affects navigable waters. The court issued this holding in an order on the parties' cross motions for judgment on the pleadings, meaning that this ruling
came before the case proceeded to trial. In NationalAudubon, the California
Supreme Court held that the public trust doctrine applied to diversions of water from non-navigable tributaries of Mono Lake-which itself is navigablebecause those diversions affected Mono Lake's water levels and harmed its
public trust uses.'" Thus, the court concluded that the scope of the public trust
doctrine includes activities in non-navigable waters that harm downstream,
navigable waters."
The court in ELF v. SWRCB relied on this principle to apply the public
trust doctrine to "groundwater so connected to a navigable river that its extraction harms trust uses of the river."'" The ELF case deals with groundwater
impacts on the Scott River, a navigable waterway in Siskiyou County, California, used for boating and fishing mad thus protected by the public trust doctrine. " The petitioners claimed that pumping of nearby groundwater deIn fact, they alleged the groundwater is so
creased flows in the river.'
hydrologically connected to the Scott River that pumping groundwater at times
decreases the river's flow by the amount pumped.'8
According to the facts alleged, decreased flows resulting from groundwater
extraction harm the public trust uses of the Scott River. The river is an important coho salmon run, but groundwater pumping contributes to dewatering
of the river in summer and fall, reducing it to a series of pools. This harms
the river's fish populations and also impacts its navigability and other recreational uses. Groundwater pumping in this case allegedly has the same result as
diversion of Mono Lake's tributaries did in National Audubon-decreased
flows in a navigable waterway that harm its public trust uses. Thus, the court
reasoned that under these facts the public trust doctrine applies to the extraction of groundwater near the Scott River.'9
After the ELF court issued this order, the litigants asked the California
Supreme Court to accept an expedited review of the order's primary legal
holding-that the public trust doctrine applies to groundwater impacts on navigable waters. The California Supreme Court, however, declined to expedite
review. The ELFcourt issued its order in the context of cross motions from
both parties for judgment on the pleadings-in other words, the court made its
legal decision assuming the truth of the facts alleged by the Environmental
Law Foundation. Presumably, the case will now go to trial in Sacraniento
County Superior Court, where the Environmental Law Foundation will have
to prove as a factual matter that the groundwater pumping permitted by Siski13. Envt. Law Found., No. 34-2010-80000583, at 7-8 (Cal. Super. CtJuly 15, 2014).
14. Id.
15. Il at 7.
16. Id.at 3.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.at 9. But see Santa Teresa Citizens Action Grp. v. City of San Jose, 114 Cal. App.
4th 689, 709 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the public trust doctrine does not apply to
groundwater itself, only groundwater impacts on navigable waters).
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you County does in fact harm environmental uses, navigation, or re&eation on
the Scott River.

IV. CONCLUSION
California has one of the most expansive public trust doctrines in the
United States. If de Superior Court's holding in ELF stands, then Californa's public trust doctrine also applies to groundwater )um)ing that impacts
navigable waters. Historically, California has had no comprehensive state-level
limitations on groundwater use. The ELF holding would provide more opportunities for environmental litigants to contest unchecked groundwater
pumnping.
When the EnVironmental Law Foundation filed suit in ELF i, SWRCB
in 2011, California had no comprehensive state restrictions on groundwater
pumrping. In 2014, however, California enacted the Sustainable Groundwater
Management Act. This legislation institutes comprehensive state regulation of
groundwater for the first time in California's history. The practicd eflects of
ELFshould therefore be considered in tandem with the provisions of this new
legislation. The second part of this series dissects possible interactions between the public trust doctrine and the new groundwater law.

TWO INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CALIFORNIA'S
SUSTAINABLE GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT
ACT AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
Philip Womble *andRichard Griffin

I. INTRODUCTION
When the Environmental Law Foundation filed suit in Environmental
La w Foundation v. State Water Resources Control Board in 2011, Calilornia
had no comprehensive state restrictions on groundwater pumping. While
some isolated local groundwater management districts or agencies held authority to regulate groundwater extraction and courts had adjudicated groundwater rights in some regions, most groundwater users faced little or no limitation on pumping. This regulatory void no longer exists. In 2014 the California
Legislature passed, and GovernorJerry Brown signed into law, the Sustainable
Groundwater Management Act. This legislation institutes comprehensive state
regulation of groundwater for the first time in California's history.
The implications of ELFdifler when considered alongside the Sustainable
Groundwater Management Act. In this post, we contemplate two issues that
the new groundwater legislation poses for applying the public trust doctrine to
groundwater as in ELF First, we discuss how the public trust doctrine's limitations on groundwater differ from those that will be implemented in groundwater sustainability plans under the new groundwater law. And second, we discuss how the public trust doctrine as applied in ELFcould shield the State of
California in lawsuits claiming that the Sustainable Groundwater Management
Act results in Fifth Amendment takings of private property. Before considering these two issues, however, we first present some background on existing
groundwater rights in California and the new groundwater restrictions in the
Sustainable Groundwater Management Act.
II. BACKGROUND ON CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS
In practice, California's judicially-established groundwater rights system
has resulted in few practical limitations on groundwater pumping in much of
the State. When groundwater aquifers experience overdraft-a condition that
occurs when more water is pumped than is replenished over many yearsCalifornia's groundwater rights system exclusively relies on lawsuits to adjudicate water rights and limit pumping. Outside of groundwater basins that have
undergone court adjudications, groundwater pumping is largely unregulated.
- J.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School, expected 2016; Ph.D Student, Emmett Interdisciplinary Program in Environment and Resources, Stanford School of Earth
Sciences.
J.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School, expected 2017.
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The Sustainable Groundwater Management Act is the first comprehensive
state regulatory programr for groundwater. This Act will be applied on top of
three existing types of groundwater rights.
Cali0frnia's correlative groundwater rights system results in three types of
rights: overlying rights, appropriative rights, and prescriptive rights.
e Overlying rights allow landowners over an aquifer to extract groundwater and use it on their overlying land. These water rights are only limited to a quantity that is reasonable when compared to the demands
of other overlying rights.
e Water users who use water on land that does not overlie the aquifer
are appropriators; appropriators may use "surplus" water, or water in
excess of current use that will not result in aquifer overdraft. As with
other appropriative water rights, groundwater appropriators in Calilornia operate under the first-in-tine, first-in-right system. However,
appropriators may only legally use water above and beyond that required by overlying landowners-even if overlying landowners stall
pumping after the appropriator. If a basin is experiencing overdraft,
no new appropriators may initiate pumping. Moreover, if overlying
landowners begin using more water, lower priority appropriators must
stop pumping.
e Prescriptive groundwater rights have also been established in the past
in California. These rights are created by the open and adverse continuous use of groundwater in an overdrafted basin for the prescripfive period (live years in California). Other users in the basin must
have notice of the overdraft conditions. Jnder these circumstances,
an appropriator may gain a prescriptive right that is exercisable against
any other groundwater right in the basin, including overlying rights.
H. BACKGROUND ON THE SUSTAINABLE GROUNDWATER
MANAGEMENT ACT
California's new groundwater law requires all groundwater basins that the
Department of Water Resources designates as high- and medium-priority to
achieve sustainable groundwater management. The law relies on local
groundwater sustainability agencies to design plans that achieve this sustainability goal. These plans must achieve sustainable groundwater management by
avoiding the "undesirable results" listed in Table I over a 50-year time period.
ByJanualry 31, 2020, local agencies in groundwater basins that experience critical overdraft conditions must adopt their plans. The remaining high- and medium-priority basins must adopt their plans by January 31, 2022. And by
2040, all high- and medium-priority basins must attain sustainable groundwater management. Moreover, the Act
provides the State Water Resources Control Board backstop authority to
develop and implement plans if a local agency fails to satisfy its sustainability
objectives.
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TABLE 1: "Undesirable results" that must be avoided to achieve sustainability
under California's new groundwater law
(1) Chronic lowering of groundwater levels indicating a significant and unreasonable depletion of supply if continued over the planning and implementation horizon. Overdraft during a period of drought is not sufficient to establish a chronic
lowering of groundwater levels if extractions and recharge are managed as hecessary to ensure that reductions in groundwater levels or storage during a period of
drought are offset by increases in groundwater levels or storage during other periods.
(2) Significant and unreasonable reduction of groundwater storage.
(3) Significant and unreasonable seawater intrusion.
(4) Significant and unreasonable degraded water quality, including the migration
of contaminant plumes that impair water supplies.
(5) Significant and unreasonable land subsidence that substantially interferes with
surface land uses.
(6) Surface water depletions that have significant and unreasonable adverse impacts on beneficial uses of the surface water.

IV. POSSIBLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GROUNDWATER LIMITS
IMPOSED BY THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE
SUSTAINABLE GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT ACT
The specific nature of limits on groundwater extraction under the public
trust doctrine and California's new groundwater law remains unclear. No governmental agency in California has ever considered, much less satisfied, a public trust duty related to groundwater impacts on surface waters. Similarly, local
agencies are only beginning to grapple with developing groundwater sustainability plans that comply with the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act.
Nonetheless, the groundwater linitations that would be imposed by the public
trust doctrine in ELF differ from those that the groundwater legislation requires.
First, California's public trust doctrine does not specify particular levels of
protection for the environment, navigation, or any other interest protected by
the doctrine. Instead, it inposes a common law duty on governmental agencies to balance their impacts on the environment and navigation with other socially or economically beneficial purposes. As the California Suprene Court
instructed in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, before harming
interests protected by the public trust doctrine, agencies must simply "consider
the effect of such diversions upon interests protected by the public trust, and
attempt, so far as feasible, to avoid or minimize any harm to those interests."
Meanwhile, the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act sets more
specific and enforceable requirements for groundwater management. This legislation does afford local agencies substantial flexibility in how they attain sustainable groundwater management. Nonetheless, these agencies or the State
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Water Resources Control Board must adopt groundwater plans that avoid the
six statutorily specified "undesirable results." Local agencies or the State
Board might consider groundwater management options, such as importing
water, that allow stressed basins to remain economically productive while also
meeting the law's sustainability goals. And courts and agencies might interpret
the requirements to avoid only "significant and unreasonable" adverse impacts
f'om groundwater extraction and use to allow agencies to balance interests.
But-unlike the public trust doctrine-the Act does not leave agencies the option to recognize undesirable results from groundwater extraction mad take no
action to stop them.
The scope of waters protected by the public trust doctrine also differs
f'rom those protected by the recent groundwater legislation. First, the recent
groundwater legislation applies to a broader set of water resources. The Sustainable Groundwater Management Act regulates impacts on groundwater aquifers, navigable and non-navigable surface waters, and lands that suffer from
land subsidence. California's public trust doctrine, although it may restrict
groundwater pumping, is currently tethered to impacts on navigable waters.
The ELF court's decision rested on groundwater pumping dewatering a connected navigable water body-the Scott River-and harming navigation and
fish. Another California case, Santa Teresa Ci&ten Action Gioup v. City of
San .Jose, held that the public trust doctrine "has no direct application to
groundwater sources." Nevertheless, the public trust doctrine might still have a
broader geographic reach than the Sustainable Groundwater Management
Act. While the public trust doctrine applies statewide, the groundwater law only requires sustainability in specilied high- or nediumn-piiority basins.
Practically speaking, the ELFdecision may result in few changes beyond
those that would occur under the groundwater law. Before the Legislature
passed the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, the ELFcase seemed
like it could lend local agencies the regulatory authority they lacked in statute
to limit groundwater pLumping. But the groundwater law gives local agencies
these regulatory tools, and it already requires high- and medium-priority basins to avoid significant and adverse surface water depletions. It seems unlikely
that the public trust doctrine, given its balancing of competing interests and its
required link to navigable surface waters, would result in restrictions that the
groundwater law would not already require. Professor Dave Owen's 2012
study of the public trust doctrine's impacts on surface water rights in California
supports this conclusion. Professor Owen found that while the doctrine resulted in limitations on new surface water rights, it rarely limited existing rights.
He also found that, because courts often view compliance with environmental
statutes as fulfilling public trust duties, the doctrine rarely results in restrictions
that would not have happened under those statutes. Consequently, the most
substantial practical impact of the ELFdecision may be the defense that it may
provide against Fifth Amendment takings lawsuits for governmental agencies
implementing the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act.

V. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AS A DEFENSE AGAINST
TAKINGS CLAIMS
Once the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act goes into effect and
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local agencies begin imposing restrictions on groundwater withdrawals, tinhappy water users may file takings claims under the theory that these restrictions constitute an unlawful confiscation of a vested property right. The
Texas case Edwmds Aquifkr Authority v. Day provides a salient example.
There, the Texas Supreme Court held that, despite the fact that the Legislature has empowered local agencies to limit groundwater withdrawals, agencies
acting under this authority can still be subject to takings claims. California
landowners may decide to initiate similar takings lawsuits once the new regulations are implemented.
If such claims are filed, California agencies may be able to use the public
trust doctrine as a defense. As the U.S. Supreme Court articulated in Lucas v.
South CarohiaCoastal Council,state law may bar a Fifth Amendment takings
claim where background principles of state law already limit-or prohibit the
property interest at issue. Applied here, the agencies' argument would be that
the state merely allowed use of groundwater before the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act went into effect, but that California's public trust doctrine limits legal protection of that groundwater use.
Pursuant to NationalAudubon, the public trust doctrine in California bars
any party from "claiming a vested right to divert waters once it becomes clear
that such diversions harm the interests protected by the public trust." Even
when agencies balance Other interests with the public trust and authorize activities harmful to trust interests, under National Audubon, these rights to conduct harmful activities remain non-vested. Accordingly, under Lucas, they may
not be property interests protected against takings. When coupled with the
ELF principle-that groundwater pumping that alfects navigable waterways is
subject to the public trust doctrine-NationalAudubongives agencies enforcing the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act a defense to takings claims.
However, this defense will not apply to all groundwater. As decided in
Saint Teresa Citizen Action Group, the public trust doctrine does not apply
directly to groundwater sources. Therefore, agencies will not be able to use
the public trust doctrine as a defense to takings claims unless they can show
that the groundwater being regulated has an impact on navigable waterways.
A recent case in Federal Claims Court in California, Casitas Municipal
Water District v. United States, suggested that the lederal government cannot
use the public trust doctrine as a defense to a water rights takings claim. The
case was resolved on appeal on other grounds without reaching the public
trust doctrine defense. The trial court, however, held that because the public
trust doctrine is a state doctrine, federal agencies could not claim it as a defense. The trial court also wrote that, even if the public trust doctrine applied
in Casitas, diversionary interests outweighed the fishery preservation interests
protected by the trust. Since state, and not federal, agencies will implement the
Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, Casitasdoes not bar a public trust
doctrine defense for the state agencies implementing it. The balancing of interests in Casitasalso contradicts NationalAudubon's instruction that no entity retains a vested right to perform activities that harm public trust interests.
Accordingly, a court evaluating a takings claim under the Sustainable
Groundwater Management Act might hold that the public trust doctrine places a preexisting limitation on groundwater rights, and that this doctrine protects the state from takings claims.

Issue 2

PUBLIC TRUSTDOCTJRINE

477

VI. REFERENCES
Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. CI. 443 (2011), a/I'd,708
F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 100 (2007), a/I'd in
part ;aid rev'd in pirt, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008), reh g en banc denied,
556 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009), dismised on renwd, 102 Fed. CI. 443
(2011), a/i'd, 708 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, The Public 7&ust Doctrine, aid the Adinni:stnitiveState, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1099 (2012).
Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012).
Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., No. 34-2010-80000583
(Cal. Super. CtJuly 15, 2014).
GARY W.

SAWYERS, A PRIMER ON CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS,

available

at http://aic.ucdavis.edu/events/oudookO5/Sawyer-primer.pdt.
John D. Echevarria, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background Pinciples
Deknse in T7kings Li'ation,45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931 (2012).
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
Nat'! Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419 (Cal. 1983).
Santa Teresa Citizens Action Grp. v. City of San Jose, 114 Cal. App. 4th 689
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (Assemb. Bill No. 1739, Sen. Bill
Nos. 1168, 1319 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.).

UNIVERSITY OF DENVER WATER LAW REVIEW
EIGHTH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM:
"THELAW WITHOUT SCHOLARSHIP WOULD BUILD A BOAT
TO FLOAT A WATERLESS SEA": A SYMPOSIUM IN HONOR AND
CELEBRATION OFJUSTICE GREGORY HOBBS,JR.'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO
COLORADO WATER LAW
Denver, Colorado

April 10, 2015

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
The 2015 University of Denver Water Law Review Annual Symposium
was a celebration and conmemoration of Justice Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr.'s contributions to Colorado water law, in light of his upcoming retirement. The
event began with a welcome by the Sturm College of Law's Dean, Marty Katz,
followed by an opening presentation from Justice Allison Eid and Chief Jusice Nancy Rice of the Colorado Supreme Court.
Justice Eid began by sharing how the idea for the symposium stemmed
from her sadness that one of her closest friends, her "bench mate," would be
leaving the Court. The symposium was a way to memorialize Justice Hobbs's
contributions to the Colorado Supreme Court and the whole state of Colorado in a permanent, thoughtful way.
Justice Eid then recited Charles Wilkinson's charge: "We need to develop
an ethic of place. It is premised on a sense of place, the recognition that our
species thrives on the subtle, intangible, but soul-deep mix of landscape,
smells, sounds, history, neighbors and friends that constitute a place, a homeland." To Justice Eid, this quote aptly capturedjustice Hobbs's life's work. It
was Wilkinson's "ethic of place" that drew Justice Hobbs to water law in the
first place. And as the "Great Water Justice," his love of Colorado's landscapes, history, mad communities manifested throughout his numerous water
court opinions.
Following this introduction, justice Eid shared some stories exemplifying
Justice Hobbs's commitment to land and water. She described his famous
tours of the Colorado Supreme Court, which always begin with a detailed
presentation of his prized map collection-a collection he has now generously
donated to the Court. She described attending a water conference in Eugene,
Oregon where Justice Hobbs seemed to risk life and limb just to climb out on
the precipice of a damn they were touring.
justice Eid also shared how justice Hobbs's ethic of place includes not only a passion for both the land and water in Colorado, but also for the state's
rich history. She spoke of Justice Hobbs's passion for history, and his knack
for writing opinions that give the reader a true sense of the history and value of
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the location in question. To Justice Hobbs, context was always of critical importance. In all of Justice Hobbs's work, the deep history of the land mad
people in question, the profound sense of that place, was the necessary foundation for understanding the questions at hand.
Finally, she described Justice Hobbs's love of neighbors, friends, and fainily, and his comminent to a diverse and inclusive conmuinity in Colorado.
She revealed that the Court's recognition of law firms committed to pro bono
work was Justice Hobbs's brainchild. She also talked about how justice
Hobbs recently took his grandson on a college tour, and is currently taking a
creative writing class with his granddaughter. To Justice Hobbs, the ethic of
place is rooted in the land, and integr'ates a profound appreciation of fainily
and friends.
justice Eid closed by observing that Justice Hobbs is an accomlplished author, traveler, historian, and poet. Although he will be retiring from his position on the bench, he will doubtlessly continue in his other "jobs," tirelessly
committed to history, community, and his ethic of place.
Following Justice Eid, ChieflJustice Nancy Rice shared her thoughts and
rellection. on nearly two decades of working with Justice Hobbs. As Suprele
Court Justices, the seven members of the Court spend a great deal of time together, often sitting, talking, mad waiting for things to happen. To Chief Justice
Rice, Justice Hobbs represents one-seventh of her life, her conversation, and
her work; accordingly, she will greatly miss his camaraderie and friendship.
Of special inportance to Chief.lustice Rice is the learning center at the
Ralph Carr Judicial Center. She described how a committee, which included
Justice Hobbs, inet regularly for two years in order to create the center, and
she believes that the learning center represents one of Justice Hobbs's greatest
legacies.
The ChiefiJustice's linal story involved Justice Hobbs convincing the other
justices to pertormn a play in commenoration of the founding father John Adans and his wife Abigail. Justice Hobbs played John Adams, and Chief Justice Rice played Abigail Adamns. To the delight of the crowd, Chief.lustice
Rice brought pieces from her costume to share, and reenacted a particular
scene where she threw her bonnet in frustration at John Adams's failure to
give women the right to vote in the US Constitution. The play is one of her
favorite memories of her time with Justice Hobbs, a representation of the fun,
humor, and intellectual curiosity that he brought to the Court.
Chief justice Rice finished by thanking Justice Hobbs for his friendship,
his many contributions to the Court, and his many contributions to the state of
Colorado.
Kaly Rankin
ACCESS TO JUSTICE & TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS

Professor Lucy Marsh, a professor at the University of Denver Sturi College of Law dedicated to pro bono work for elderly and low-income tribal clients, was the moderator for the opening panel at the University of Denver
Wa1erLiwevieWs eighth Annual Symposium. Professor Marsh introduced
three esteemed speakers: Retired New Mexico Supreme CourtJustice Patricio
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Serna, Chairman of the US Indian Law and Order Commission Troy Eid,
and Professor Sarah Krakoff of the University of Colorado School of Law.
All three panelists spoke on a topic that is dear to Professor Marsh's and Justice Gregory Hobbs's hearts-the rights of Native Americans and other underserved groups and Justice Hobbs's enduring contributions to the protection
and advancement of those rights.
Retired Justice Serna served fifteen years on the New Mexico Supreme
Court. He was a District Court Judge for eleven years before that. Justice
Sema is still active as a member of the Emeritus Board of Directors for the
National Consortium on Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts. Justice
Serna began the panel speaking about how important the past is to Navajo
people and how a group of Navajo awarded him with his own bolo tie. The
bolo tie is a trademark of Justice Hobbs, who is rarely seen without one. According to justice Serna, the bolo tie represents for Navajo people their philosophy that people are to be "in harmony with nature."
Justice Sema spoke of the New Mexico tribal state judicial consortium.
He explained that the consortium is composed of individuals who are appointed by the New Mexico Supreme Court to represent the twenty-three recognized tribes and pueblos in New Mexico. Justice Sema noted that the consortium was established to facilitate communications between the courts and
the tribes. The consortium succeeded by creating tribal courts with their own
tribal judges. Further, he explained that the tribal judges are given authority
by the state to make rulings, and that these courts are unique in that each tribal judge sits in tandem with a state judge. Justice Serna then spoke of his personal experiences with the tribal courts, his appreciation for the tribal court
judges, and the effective work he has done to improve the livelihood of tribal
members.
Next, Justice Serna shared an Indian water law case that has been ongoing
since 1966, New Mexico ex wie. Sitve Engineer v. Aamod. The case was filed
in 1966 in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico and
is the longest running water law dispute in New Mexico. The case is adjudicating the water rights in the Rio Pojoaque System of both pueblo and nonpueblo peoples of New Mexico. The pueblo peoples include the Nambe, Pojoaque, Tesuque, and San Ildefonso. Further proceedings in the case were
stayed in August 2000. The parties still have not reached a settlement agreement and the case remains open today. Justice Serna concluded his presentation by reading an poem by Justice Hobbs, "An Oath as Good as Fry Bread."
Troy Eid presented next. Eid is a principle shareholder in the Denver olice of the law firm of Greenberg Traurig LLP. He also teaches is an adjunct
professor at both the University of Denver Sturn College of Law and the
University of Colorado School of Law. He has worked as a US Attorney for
the District of Colorado and is recognized for his passion for improving the
lives of Native Americans. Eid gave a glimpse into Justice Hobbs's life before
being a Colorado Supreme Court Justice. Justice Hobbs was once a boy
scout. He excelled at that, as he has many things in his life, and earned an Eagle Scout Badge to show for it. Justice Hobbs also served in the Peace Corps
with his wife, Bobbie.
Eid also shared that Justice Hobbs revolutionized water law here in the
\Vest through his work in the judiciary. The role of reclamation, as a prilci-
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pie of water management, has changed over the years. During this change,
Justice Hobbs has helped people understand water law, steering the discussion
by issuing educational decisions on water law throughout his career as a jus[ice. Justice Hobbs's reputation only grew when he becane the focal point in
a 2009 primary election. In that primary, Congressman Scott McGinnis was
accused of plagiarizing an article written by justice Hobbs. This incident was,
according to Eid,justice Hobbs' love for "water, personified in the state."
Eid, like Justice Serna, also had stories to share of times when justice
Hobbs served the Native American community. Justice Hobbs, together with
Mike Welsh, obtained a two million dollar grant to set up a workshop for
Navajo teachers on tribal sovereignity. The goal of the prograun wias to equip
the Navajo teachers with the skills needed to develop a curriculum and to
share their own history with others. Eid concluded his speech by commending Justice Hobbs for his involvement in educating the public of the importance behind Governor Hickenlooper's fornnal apology to the Cheyenne
and Arapahoe tribes for the Sand Creek Massacre. The massacre occurred
on November 29, 1864, when Colorado Territorial militia slaughtered between two hundred and four hundred tribal people. Those murdered were
mostly women, children, and elders. It was not until December 3, 2014, that
Governor Hickenlooper apologized to the descendants of these tribes, the
lirst lormal apology of the massacre from a representative of the State. justice
Hobbs played a large role in making the apology happen. justice Hobbs gave
a speech at the State Capitol that day, and Eid quoted one of the Native
American leaders who was present for the ceremony. That leader said ofJustice Hobbs, "That judge sure told the truth."
The panel concluded with a presentation by Professor Sarah Krakoll, who
is well-renowned in the areas of American Indian law and natural resources
law. Krakoff started the American Indian Liw Clinic at University of Colora-do School of Law, and before that she lived on the Navajo Nation for three
years while working for DNA People's Legal Services. Today, Krakoff regularly takes students to work with traditional farmers in the San Luis Valley.
Krakoff and her law students work pro bono for low-income farners engaged
in traditional irrigation techniques that use "acequias." Connecting this work
to Justice Hobbs' ultimate respect for indigenous traditions, even when they
are contrary to the western doctrine of water law, she presented her work on
"The Acequia Project" as "a Hobbsian Trifecta."
The Acequia Project is a trifecta of three values that are dear to justice
Hobbs: access to justice, scholarship and scholarly writing, and western water
law. Krakofi commended Justice Hobbs for all the work mad contributions he
has made, as an attorney and as a jidge, in the realm of water law. Krakoff
explained how the Acequia Project benefits the land and farmers of Costilla
County, Colorado. Many of the farmers in Costilla County are descendants of
original Spaniard settlers.
Next, Krakoff provided some light on why her work is termed the
Acequia Project. She explained that acequias are used in irrigation. The water is diverted in a canad from the river, with smaller ditches running off of the
canal to provide water to the fields that it flows by. When water is scarce, the
acectuia families and community determine how to prioritize the water from
the acequia for irrigation. This method of irrigating, and the equitable division
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of water, is counter to Colorado's water law doctrine, which recognizes first in
time, first in right. Colorado has chosen to recognize acequias as a form of
irrigation and assisted these f'armers by passing Colorado Revised Statutes section 7-42-101.5. This legislation gives the farmers in the valley the ability to
establish bylaws similar to conventional ditches that, amnong other things, may
give acequia members the right of first refusal when a member seeks to sell
their water rights.
After providing all this background, Krakoff spoke of the other parts of
the trifecta. A couple of the students on the Acequia Project have done extensive research and drafted an acequia handbook. There is also a scholarship in
place for those participating in the progran. The majority of the work (lone
has been by the students of the project, along with collaborators.
Krakoff ended her presentation of the Hobbsian Trifecta with a fourth
commitment of justice Hobbs, one that all of the speakers recognized-his
poetry. Krakoff delivered a brief five-line poem, known as a cinquain, she
wrote herself in honor of Justice Hobbs. The poem ended by honoring justice Hobbs as "one of Colorado's sages."
The final part of the presentation was a question and answer session. Professor Marsh asked Justice Hobbs to explain the case of Archuleta v. Gomez,
a case the Colorado Supreme Court considered twice, most recently in 2012.
Having written both opinions, Justice Hobbs explained how the Court determined that a person may adversely possess a water right after diversion
through a headgate if the adverse possessor beneficially uses the water right.
As Justice Hobbs related, he had considered this legal concept before and discussed the possibility of water right adverse possession with the late Joseph
Sax while at the University of California-Berkeley School of Law, but before
Archuleta the issue was unresolved in Colorado.
Jamles K1ton
WATER LAW AND THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPING THE WEST
As part of its one-day annual Symposiumn, the University ofDen ver Water
Law Review hosted a three-member panel discussing the importance of water
law history and its relationship to Justice Hobbs's tenure on the Colorado Supreme Court bench.
The first speaker and the host of the panel, Professor Tom Romero of
the University of Denver, relayed the importance of history, its effect on the
law, and its utility in arriving to consistent legal conclusions. Historical and legal traditions are often linked, as most judges are trained similarly to historians. Judges describe all sides of the issues with which they are presented, even
if those sides are socially unpopular. History also plays an important role in
legal jurisprudence around issues including free speech and claims of reverse
discrimination. Professor Romero also stated that history is necessary for legal
context, something that Justice Hobbs incorporated extremely well into his legal analysis and conclusions as a justice. Lastly, Professor Romero mentioned
that history plays a vital role in water law, using the example of how deteninations of historical consumptive use require close inspections of historical patterns.
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The second speaker, Professor Susan Schulten, chair of the history department at the University of Denver, explained how she and Justice Hobbs
share a passion in history, maps, and poetry. Professor Schulten displayed
several maps, including Stephen Long's map showing the legacy of Colorado.
The map labels ie region now occupied by Colorado as the "Great Amcrican
Desert" and warns of the Native Americans' migrations in search for game.
The map further displays the reputation of tie interior of Colorado's Eastern
Plains that would last for decades. On the western edge of the Plains, it shows
land that was only lit lor natives. The map helped America think about its
growth capacity, saddled with an assumption that nothing could be done with
the West, which could not mirror the prosperity of eastern settlenients. This
conception persisted into the 1840s, but as more and more Americans settled
into the western edge of the Plains, the reputation began to change.
Professor Schulten emphasized the ways in which maps give us clues into
how earlier Anericans conceived of the American landscape. Specifically, she
told of how naps like Stephen Long's used propaganda to discourage or encourage settlement, depending on the political viability of the times. Maps
displaying the amount of rainfall and areas of vitality began to emerge, allowing many Americans to think about other uses for that land, including settlement and agriculture. The understanding of the western edge was further reshaped by the discovery of gold in 1858. An estimated one hundred thousand
men cane to the area that had not previously hosted an Anglo settlement.
There was no easy passage over the Rocky Mountains, exacerbating misunderstandings surrounding the area.
However, William Gilpin passionately promoted the idea of the Interior
as the future source of prosperity for the country. Gilpin's maps used language that exaggerated the sense of the natural contours of the country, displaying an unnatural favor toward the Interior. After the Colorado Gold
Rush, territories within tie Interior were only loosely organized. Gilpin subsequently became the first governor of the area; during his tenure, he hired
the best-known surveyor of the times, Frederick Ebert, to create a topographic
view of the territory that might also attract new settlement. What Ebert created would be the best representation of the high country that had been crafted
yet. Nevertheless, Professor Schulten characterized the map as "aspirational,"
including such anomalies as nonexistent lakes and other features. Describing
the conflict between reality and historical maps, Professor Schulten illustrated
the paradigm shifts present in Colorado's records and celebrated Justice
Hobbs' commitment to understanding the place where we all live.
The final speaker, Professor Patty Limerick, director of the Center for the
American West at the University of Colorado and president of the Organization of American Historians, became close friends with Justice Hobbs as she
conducted research for her book, A Ditch Hi 7hme. Professor Limerick discussed what Justice Hobbs brings to the discussion of history through spirit
and perspective. First,Justice Hobbs's writing on history allowed him to apply
his understanding of history to his legal opinions. Professor Limerick described Justice Hobbs' belief that one should think seriously about our distant
past in order to have the right relations with posterity. This is an unpopular
conviction, Professor Limerick believes, because it forces one to think about
mortality as well as to deepen awareness of the present moment. Second,
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Professor Limerick described how we know and live with our inheritance
from history and that, if we are not careful, knowing our history can give way
to feeling trapped by it. Justice Hobbs is an inspiration in that regard because
he knows history well, but refuses to feel trapped by it. This is exemplified by
one of Justice Hobbs' essays on the early drought, wherein he mentioned that
one should be aware of the past but also lists some productive acts of creation.
Professor Limerick celebrated Justice Hobbs's ability to take the past and
beneficially apply it to the future. Finally, Professor Limerick mentioned that
a person of good and congenial nature has a unique advantage in maintaining
a historical memory of sorrowfhl events and delivering those lessons to the
American public. This is something that justice Hobbs emulates greatly, as he
reminds Colorado's public about its history, both positive and negative, such
that we may craft a better future. Professor Limerick noted Justice Hobbs's
ability to do all of this with a sense of unwavering hope.
Overall, this panel provided beneficiil insight into how.justice Hobbs utilized historical lessons and applied them to legal precedent throughout his
tenure on the Colorado Supreme Court. Even further, it demonstrated the
impact Justice Hobbs has made on his fellow admirers of history and the deep
appreciation mad respect they have for him because of it.
J)evon Bell
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION & STATE WATER LAW

At the Eighth Annual University ofl)enver Water Law Jeview Symposium, Professor Federico Cheever moderated a panel of three professionals in
the field of water and environmental law focused on the nexus between environmental protection and state water law. The panel discussed the evolution
of water law in Colorado, focusing heavily on instream flow rights, and considered the use of the Endangered Species Act as a compliment to existing water
conservation efforts.
David Robbins, president and co-founder of Hill & Robbins, P.C., spoke
first. Mr. Robbins was namned the 2012 Colorado Water Leader of the Year
by the Colorado Water Congress, and currently serves as a board member of
the Colorado Water Trust. Mr. Robbins lirst discussed his time at the EPA,
where he first met and worked with Justice Hobbs. Robbins then laid out
what he believed to be the fundamental issue of water today: how to place new
social interests into a system based upon vested property rights.
Mr. Robbins discussed three ways the state of Colorado has modified prior appropriation law, and the legal difficulties it has faced, in order to balance
social interests with existing water rights. First was the instream flow law,
which cane about in the 1970s after an unfavorable water court ruling; the legislature declared that the Colorado Water Conservation Board ("CWCB")
could obtain instream flow rights to protect the natural environment to the
mininmum amnount necessary. This presented the legislature with an issue:
how to codify instream flow rights without inherently adopting parts of the riparian doctrine. Mr. Robbins commended the legislature for adopting the solution of vesting the sole power to obtain instream flow rights with an independent state agency.
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Next, Mr. Robbins explained the evolution of the recreational in-channel
diversion ("RICD") law. In another creative solution, the Colorado Supreme
Court held that an appropriator could satisfy the diversion and beneficial use
requirements by constructing an "in-channel" structure able to control and
manage flow. Mr. Robbins pointed out, however, that lie believes the inherent tension between the RICD law and prior appropriation will eventually
force the court to address the legality of a large recreational right that would
preclude any future development on a particular reach or system.
Finally, Mr. Robbins discussed the link between water quality and the environment. Both Colorado and the federal government have statutes suggesting that water quality laws should not prevent the exercise of existing water
rights. Mr. Robbins pointed out that, while this is sound policy, everyone
must remember that water rights are not absolute; the government has to play
a role in water regulation for environmental protection.
Next to speak was Amy Beatie, Executive Director of the Colorado Water
Trust. Ms. Beatie is a former law clerk for justice Hobbs and helped found
the Univiersity of Denver 14aIerLaw Jeview. Ms. Beatie first spoke about her
connection with the University of Denver and the challenges she and her
classmates faced in founding the Watier Law Jeview. She then thanked Justice Hobbs for his efforts and contributions to the DU Water Law Review as it
evolved over the years.
Ms. Beatie then shifted her focus to the development of the instream flow
programn as a means to preserve the natural environment. She spoke about
the CWCB's ability to protect against future development, and the program's
1,500 water rights covering some twenty-five percent of the perennial streams
in Colorado. However, the majority of the CWCB's instream flow rights are
junior and often ineffective. The Colorado Water Trust became involved to
hell) aniplify the CWCB's acquisition progran by focusing on the leasing and
acquisition of vested senior rights-the backbone of the state's instream flow
programn. The Colorado Water Trust's activities also include habitat and
structural restoration, including a recent dam removal in the Cache la Poudre
River. Lastly, Ms. Beatie urged the audience to not confuse progress with
success in the arena of preservation. Specifically, she pointed out the need to
increase funding among conservation groups and water trusts for improving
flow outcomes. She applauded the state's efforts as well as the efforts of other
stakeholders in encouraging water aid enviromiental preservation, while
pointing out that there remained much work to be done.
The final speaker was Professor Sandra B. Zellmer, coming from the
University of Nebraska College of Law where she teaches and writes about
natural resources, water, and environmental law. Prior to her career in academia, Ms. Zellmer was an attorney in the Environment and Natural Resources Division of the US Department of Justice, where she litigated public
lands and wildlife issues. Additionally, she practiced at Faegre & Benson and
clerked for the Honorable William W. Justice in the US District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas. Ms. Zellner began her presentation by thanking
the WaerLawleviewtfor organizing the event and giving her the opportunity
to thank Justice Hobbs for his contributions to the field.
Ms. Zeller's presentation focused on whether the Endangered Species
Act ("ESA") could coexist with state water law and existing vested water rights.
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She began by discussing Section 7's no-jeopardy requirement, and the Supreme Court's holding in TVA v. Hill that the language of the Endangered
Species Act is very clear: federal actions must avoid jeopardy of endangered
species at all cost. As an example of how Section 7 can affect state water law,
Professor Zellmer explained the case of the Rio Grande silvery minnow. In
response to a severe drought, the US Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") proposed to allow the Bureau of Reclmnation to continue delivering water to irrigators, causing a stretch of the Rio Grande to go dry and possibly jeopardize
the endangered silvery minnow population. The FWS's biological opinion
found jeopardy, but neglected to offer reasonable and prudent alternatives.
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit vacated the biological opinion, refused to allow
the irrigation deliveries, and required the flow of water to continue in the Rio
Grande. Professor Zellmer pointed to the silvery minnow case and Ninth
Circuit case law to illustrate that, when vested water rights are dependent on a
federal nexus, the Bureau of Reclanation may, and may even be required to,,
shift water from established uses to protect species.
Ms. Zellner then discussed Section 9 of the ESA, which prohibits the
"take" of endangered or threatened species. Courts have interpreted irrigation
to constitute a take where it was reasonably foreseeable that irrigation would
harm endangered species and their habitats. Therefore, under the "no take"
provision, parties with vested rights can be precluded from exercising those
rights in order to protect a species. However, this might result in another kind
of "taking"-under the Fifth Amendment-requiring the government to compensate the private party for the "loss" of its water right. Additionally, Section
9 of the Act offers some relief in the form of incidental take permits, whereby
actors who may otherwise cause jeopardy will be free from liability if that
jeopardy is incidental to an otherwise lawful action.
Professor Cheever thanked the panel and opened the floor to questions.
First, Zellmer fielded a question about applying the ESA to the Ogallala Aquifer. Ms. Zellmer opined that, since there are several endangered species within the area of the aquifer, there is the possibility that the ESA may be invoked.
However, both Ms. Zellmer and Mr. Robbins suggested that the connection
between groundwater depletion, surface flows, and any harm to endangered
species would be so attenuated that courts would not likely find the proximate
cause necessary to support a violation of Section 9. The final question concerned whether water law can change quickly enough to accommodate the
evolving issues that climate change presents. Ms. Beatie suggested that the
current framework of law is flexible enough to handle emerging issues. If anything, Ms. Beatie suggested, laws would only need to be tweaked (and funds
raised) in order to respond to unforeseen issues. Mr. Robbins added to this
response by pointing out that climate change, while serious, may not have a
direct effect on annual stream flows in Colorado, but could create serious issues for water managers by altering the traditional timing of those flows.
7Tm Bemnier
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THE HOBBS OPINION

There is a formula to writing legal opinions, and a tuly gifted legal writer
like Justice Hobbs can .take the formula and make it his own. That was the
final panel's theme at the 2015 University of Denver Water Law Review Symposium honoring Justice Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr. of the Colorado Supreme
Court ("Court"). The panel comprised several of Justice Hobbs's former colleagues: retired Chief Justice Michael Bender, retired Justice Jean Dubofsky,
and retired Justice Alex Martinez.
The panel moderator was retired Justice Dubosky, who was appointed to
the Court in 1979. Justice Dubofsky provided symposium attendees with a
history of the judicial opinion and how it has evolved in Colorado over the
decades. At the tine she wits appointed, justices were expected to write on
the issues and areas in which they specialized. Former justice Jim Groves, for
examnple, was the water expert on the Court at the time, and anytime the Court
decided a water issue ie would write the opinion. Justice Dubofsky had a
passion for constitutional cases and would write those opinions.
Justice Dubofsky shared that, at that time, each justice on the Court was
expected to write at least one hundred opinions per year. Currently, the justices write an average of thirty two opinions per year. Because the justices
wrote so prolifically at the beginning of former Justice Dubofsky's tenure, the
opinions were often short and simple. As the number of appellate divisions
and avenues lor direct review grew, the Court was required to take lewer cases
on certiorari, meaning the method of opinion writing changed. The justices
were able to spend more time writing their own opinions and editing the work
of their colleagues, and the Court moved away from justices specializing in
particular topics. Over time, the process and fornula of opinion writing
evolved into its present state-focused both on substance and creativity. Justice Dubofsky closed out her portion of the panel by stating: "If you like solving problems, it is one of the worlds most rewarding jobs. Greg Hobbs has
done it very well."
Retired ChiefJustice Michael Bender was die next speaker; he and Justice
Hobbs sat on the bench together for seventeen years. He began by remarking
thatjustice Hobbs's enormous energy, love for people and history, and desire
to be a spiritual leader for the law helped him shape Colorado water law and
the foundational principles of a variety of other legal fields.
In one of ChiefJustice Bender's favorite cases, Justice Hobbs authored an
ofpinion about whether a tent should be considered "habitation" for purposes
of the Fourth Amendment. In People iv Schadki; Justice Hobbs's knack for
history is apparent and applied in an eloquent version of the legal writing formula. Justice Hobbs cited, among other historical sources, the expeditions of
Lewis and Clark to build his argument that a tent is in fact a constitutionally
protected forin of habitation. Chief Justice Bender next spoke about a case
where the Court decided whether a bible constituted an improper outside intluence during jury deliberations. Justice Bender remarked that the writing in
this opinion is so clear, and the reasoning so convincing, that the opinion has
been cited in other jurisdictions to overturn death sentences where the jury
improperly consulted the bible during jury deliberations.
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Chief Justice Bender ended his portion of the panel by explaining that he
chose to talk about these cases because they highlighted notable times where
Justice Hobbs's writing has been influential outside of water law. While water
law is incredibly lucky to have him, Justice Hobbs is an advocate for all in the
state of Colorado, and he has had an influential career in many areas of the
law.

From the basic premise of a person grounded in morality, you see this
great man with concerns for history and humanity, a man with enthusiasm that
uses innovative thinking to solve problems, a man that shows respect for all
those he meets. Those were the opening remarks from Justice Martinez, the
linal panel speaker. He commented on Justice Hobbs's vast knowledge and
extensive experiences, his hard work, his enthusiasm for people, and his approachableness. Justice Martinez stated that because of all of these attributes,
Justice Hobbs has been a role model for many, and these attributes shine
through in the opinions he has authored.
Justice Martinez thinks that, while opinions do need to follow a certain
foriula, strictly following that fornula can be dull. Justice Hobbs's love of
history and the state of Colorado is apparent in his writing and makes his
opinions in every area of law interesting to read. Justice Martinez said that if
he was ever assigned an opinion on a topic he was not very familiar with, he
would read a few of Justice Hobbs's opinions in order to educate himself on
the issue. Justice Martinez remarked that one of Justice Hobbs's great gifts is
that he not only knows the law, but he communicates it in a way that makes it
easy for people to understand and learn from.
Justice Martinez spoke about a unique case the Court decided, Airchuleta
v. Goiez, which dealt with the adverse possession of water rights. In the
opinion, Justice Hobbs was careful to communicate that adverse possession
has a limited role in water law, and that you cannot adversely possess water in
the stream; it only applies to water that has passed the headgate and has been
diverted from the stream. More importantly though, justice Martinez wanted
to focus on the poetic nature of a line in the opinion: "The Colorado doctrine
of water use is propelled by need and bounded by scarcity." Justice Martinez
remarked that this one sentence poetically embodied so much of Colorado,
and justice Hobbs fit it artistically into the formula.
Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr. gave the final remarks and began by taking a moment to acknowledge his law clerks and interns over the years. In his opinion,
the more minds that are wrestling with the written product, the better the result. He concluded by expressing gratitude for a career that has been filled
with scholarship, and that was shaped by negotiation and different ideas.
Lauren Collins

